Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002886

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57068/2024
LP /11662/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

AM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Mazumder, Wildan Legal Services
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrel, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He entered the United Kingdom in September 2021 to study, with permission to remain until 27 August 2022. He did not complete his studies, and he did not leave the United Kingdom when his permission to stay expired.
2. On 30 December 2022 the appellant claimed asylum saying he feared persecution by the ruling Awami League if he returned to Bangladesh because he is a supporter of a rival political party Chhatra Shabbir. In August 2024 the Awami League government in Bangladesh fell and an interim government replaced it.
3. In December 2024 the respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim. The appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal. One month before that appeal was due to be heard, in January 2025, the appellant raised a new matter saying that he had contributed to building a Hindu temple in Bangladesh and as a result a group of Muslims in Bangladesh who opposed the building of the temple, attacked his family home. He claimed therefore to fear both former Awami League members who remain in power in Bangladesh and also the Muslims who attacked his family. The respondent consented to the new mater being considered in the appeal.
4. The appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Row (the Judge) on 10 February 2025. In support of his appeal the appellant submitted a number of documents including medical records, newspaper reports, a letter from Nirapod Bangladeshi Chaai (NBC) concerning the his political involvement and a record of a money transfer. The Judge considered documentary evidence submitted by the appellant and by the respondent as well as the appellant’s oral evidence at the hearing. The Judge also heard submissions from both parties to the appeal.
5. On 13 February 2023 the Judge issued his decision. The Judge found that the appellant did not have any political interest while in Bangladesh, and that he had not been attacked by the Awami League prior to coming to the United Kingdom. The Judge found the appellant’s evidence to that effect to be “a fabrication”. Similarly, the Judge found that the appellant had not sent money to finance the construction of a Hindu temple and that his family had not been attacked as a result. The Judge found the appellant’s evidence to that effect to be a “fabrication”. The Judge found that the appellant is not at risk from anyone in Bangladesh and can safely return to that country. Having determined that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for being granted permission to stay in the United Kingdom on the basis of his private life, the Judge dismissed the appeal.
6. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to this tribunal on four grounds. The first ground asserts that the Judge failed to apply the correct principles when assessing the appellant’s credibility, the second ground asserts that the Judge failed to properly consider corroborative evidence adduced by the appellant, the third ground argued that the Judge erred when assessing the risk to the appellant on return to Bangladesh and the fourth ground asserted that there was a procedural unfairness in the appeal hearing.
7. The respondent opposed the appellant’s appeal in a rule 24 notice. A consolidated bundle was prepared for the hearing in this tribunal. The appellant also filed a skeleton argument.
8. At the beginning of the hearing Mr Terrel identified some anomalies in the material submitted by the applicant in support of this appeal. In the grounds of appeal at [16] the applicant places reliance on a case of MK (documents – relocation) Somalia [2004] UKIAT 00124 when no such reported case exists. Mr Mazumder acknowledged the case did not exist, explained that the grounds had been drafted by someone at his firm, apologised and said he does not seek to rely on that fictitious case. In the skeleton argument at [15] reference is made to facts from a different case and a finding that was not made by the Judge. Mr Mazumder said that although it had been prepared by a colleague at his firm, he had never seen the skeleton argument. Having been given time to take further instructions, he indicated that he had not been assured of the accuracy of the skeleton argument and therefore did not rely on it.
9. I heard submissions from Mr Mazumder and Mr Terrel. In Mr Mazumder’s submissions he sought to raise new complaints about the Judge’s decision that had not featured in the grounds of appeal on which permission had been granted and which had not been raised in any of the previous correspondence. As this tribunal warned in Rai and DAM (Grounds of appeal – limited grant of permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC) at [15] “Grounds of Appeal will not ordinarily be permitted to evolve during the course of the appeal. The Upper Tribunal is likely to take robust decisions and not permit grounds to be advanced if they have not been properly identified and pleased or where permission has not been granted to raise them” Mr Mazumder did not provide any explanation for the attempt to introduce new grounds of appeal during the hearing or for the procedural failings identified in the previous paragraph. He did not seek an adjournment or permission to amend his grounds of appeal. In the circumstances I determined that allowing new grounds of appeal to be argued at this late stage and in these circumstances where permission for those new grounds had not been granted, would be contrary to the tribunal’s overriding objective of a fair and just hearing.
10. Having heard from Mr Mazumder and Mr Terrel I reserved my decision in relation to the four grounds of appeal on which permission was granted. I have now considered those grounds with care, and I am satisfied that they do not identify an error of law in the Judge’s decision. My reasons for this conclusion follow.
Ground one
11. The first ground argues that the Judge failed to apply the correct legal principles when assessing the appellant’s credibility. It is argued that the Judge “placed undue weight on perceived inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence”, “improperly dismissed the Appellant’s explanation” and failed to acknowledge that the letter from the NBC which the Judge found to be unreliable originated in the United Kingdom and not Bangladesh. These complaints are in reality disagreements with the Judge’s assessment of the evidence and do not identify any error of law.
12. At [51] of his decision the Judge identified that the appellant had said in his asylum interview that he had been in hiding from 2017 until he left Bangladesh in 2021 and that he did not go publicly anywhere during that time. The Judge then identified (as the respondent had done when refusing the appellant’s claim) that this answer was inconsistent with photographs he adduced purporting to show him at public meetings during that time. The Judge was unarguably entitled to factor this inconsistency into his assessment of the appellant’s credibility. What the Judge made of the appellant’s explanation for that inconsistency and how much weight he gave to that inconsistency when deciding whether he could believe the appellant were matters for the Judge’s assessment.
13. At [39] the Judge found that a letter from the NBC which spoke of the appellant helping to organise campaigns, demonstrations and seminars had referred in fact to someone else within the body of the letter. The appellant says that this error was identified and corrected. That may be the case, but the Judge was entitled to consider the circumstances in which that evidence came to be presented before him when considering the reliability of the evidence. The Judge was also entitled to identify that despite the fact the provenance of that letter and its reliability was questioned; no evidence had been adduced to explain how or why the mistake came to be made. The fact that the letter originated from the United Kingdom and not from Bangladesh only serves to strengthen the Judge’s point – it would have been straightforward and reasonable to expect evidence to explain such a fundamental error, but no such evidence was forthcoming.
14. Overall, therefore, this ground does not identify an error of law in the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility. Such an assessment is the paradigm of a decision with which an appellate court should be slow to interfere. Here, there is no reason to do so. The appellant simply disagrees with the Judge’s assessment.
Ground two
15. Likewise, the submission in ground two that the Judge failed to “give adequate weight” to corroborative evidence is no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s assessment of the documents that the appellant adduced. In addition to the very general assertion that is made in the heading to this ground, the ground contains two specific assertions that bear closer analysis to see if they identify legal error. It was these assertions that led to permission being granted.
Blanket Scepticism
16. Considering documents that had been submitted by the appellant in support of his case, at [35] – [38] of his decision, the Judge says the following:
35. The respondent’s position is that it is not accepted that any of the documents which the appellant has produced is what it purports to be. The appellant is put to proof of this.
36. The respondent’s reasons for this are set out in the refusal letter. Background information concerning documents emanating from Bangladesh shows that Bangladesh is one of the most corrupt countries on earth. Forged documents, or genuine documents containing false information, are widely available and frequently used by Bangladesh nationals for fraudulent purposes. Such documents include medical reports, official documents, and attestations said to confirm the genuineness of those documents.
37. This is unfortunate for honest Bangladesh nationals. There will be some. The appellant may be one of them. It does however mean that circumspection must be used in dealing with any documents emanating from that country.
38. In addition to the general doubt as to Bangladeshi documents there are specific matters which cause the respondent to have doubts about the documents which the appellant has produced.
17. The appellant argues that these paragraphs indicate that the Judge had a blanket scepticism towards documents originating from Bangladesh and that the Judge failed to assess the documents on their individual merits. Although I found the Judge’s comments at [37] to be poorly expressed, when read as a whole and together with the paragraphs that follow, it is apparent that the Judge has assessed the documents on their individual merits and by reference to the evidence. The Judge begins his assessment at [36] by acknowledging the evidence about the prevalence in Bangladesh of unreliable documentation of the type adduced by the appellant. The Judge then recognises at [37] that the appellant may or may not be adducing this evidence honestly (I repeat that this could have been expressed better) and therefore at [38] he introduces an individual assessment of the documents. That assessment incudes the unexplained error in the NBC letter, inconsistency with the envelope that was said to have carried the documents to the United Kingdom and the appellant, and an issue with the ID document that had been adduced.
18. Contrary to the argument in the grounds therefore, the Judge demonstrably did give the documents individual consideration and was not “blanketly” sceptical of all the documents adduced. The Judge was entitled to have regard to the prevalence of unreliable documentation, but he discernibly made his assessment of the weight to be attached to the individual documents having consciously considered more than the general evidence in the background evidence.
Requiring corroboration
19. Whilst still considering the documentation that the appellant had adduced, the Judge went on to say the following at [44] –[48] of his decision:
44. The issues with the documents could have been resolved. In a situation where the authenticity of a document is not accepted the obvious course of action would have been for the appellant’s solicitors to have written to ask for confirmation that they were genuine.
45. They could have asked for a copy of the newspaper. They could have asked the money transfer company to confirm that the transaction took place. They could have written to the people who had made statements to ask them to confirm that they were genuine. They could have asked the various hospitals concerned to confirm that the records presented were correct.
46. Presumably those concerned would either have confirmed that they were genuine or that they were not. Either way it would have resolved the matter.
47. The appellant’s solicitors would only have done so if the appellant instructed them to do so. Presumably he would only have instructed them to do so if he thought that the answers would suit his case. For whatever reason this has not been done.
48. It might not have been possible to get this information. It would have been straightforward and reasonable to have attempted to.
20. The appellant argues that these paragraphs indicate that the Judge was impermissibly requiring corroborative evidence from the appellant and applying an evidential standard that was too exacting. For the respondent Mr Terrel submitted that the Judge’s approach to the evidence was entirely consistent with the law and that the Judge specifically and correctly reminded himself of that law at [56].
21. The Court of Appeal identified at [86] of MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 that, while there is no requirement for corroborative evidence in a protection appeal, the absence of such evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value. If for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is not good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight. That is the approach the Judge took in the paragraphs of his decision repeated above. The Judge had regard to the fact that the appellant was aware that the reliability of the documentation was in issue. The Judge noted that there could have been enquiries reasonably made that would have addressed the issues about the documentation adduced and noted that there was nothing to suggest those enquiries had been undertaken. It was in those circumstances that the Judge concluded he could attach little weight to the documents. That was an orthodox approach to the evidence which did not involve any error of law.
Ground three
22. The third ground advanced by the appellant was misguided and fails to acknowledge the findings of fact that were made by the Judge. The Judge’s assessment was that there is no risk to the appellant in Bangladesh. That assessment of risk was based on the Judge’s comprehensive rejection of his account as being a “fabrication”. Evidence from the country expert about positions of influence held by former Awami League members was, in the light of the Judge’s factual findings, irrelevant. Likewise the principles set out in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 which are relied upon in these grounds, were of no relevance given the Judge found that the appellant had fabricated his account of a political interest.
Ground four
23. The assertion in the fourth ground was of procedural unfairness. Although it was not immediately clear, the basis for this assertion was that it was unfair for the Judge to consider the background evidence about documents in Bangladesh referenced by the Judge at [36] and that the Judge did not give the appellant a fair opportunity to address his concerns about the documentary evidence. I agree however with Mr Terrel’s submission that the reliability of the documents was raised as an issue in the respondent’s decision letter and the appellant was clearly on notice that it was an issue that the Judge would need to determine to resolve the appeal. In those circumstances it was a matter for the appellant what evidence he adduced to meet the challenge, and the Judge was entitled to sit back and see how the evidence unfolded in respect of this disputed issue (see Abdi v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 at [29] and [30].
Conclusion
24. The grounds of appeal do not identify an error of law in the Judge’s decision. The Judge assessed the reliability and credibility of the appellants claim and gave reasons which were clearly adequate to explain his conclusion that the appellant fabricated his claim and would not be at risk in Bangladesh. Whilst some parts of the Judge’s decision could have been better expressed and while the appellant may disagree with the Judge’s assessment the decision did not contain an error of law and there is no lawful basis for this tribunal interfering with the Judge’s decision.
Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
The decision of Judge Row did not contain and error of law and shall stand.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 February 2026