Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002891
UI-2025-002892
UI-2025-002893
UI-2025-002894

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59781/2024
PA/59776/2024
PA/59775/2024
PA/59768/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JOLLIFFE

Between

KF
AF
MK
NK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Dar of Counsel, instructed by Abbott Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants, a mother and three children from Pakistan, appeal with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (the FtT) dated 11 May 2025 dismissing their appeal against the respondent's refusal of their protection and human rights claim. For convenience, we shall refer to the lead appellant, the mother, below as ‘the appellant’.
2. The grounds, in brief, allege the following errors: misapplication of the law on sufficiency of protection; misapplication of the test for internal relocation; erroneous dismissal of the claimed risk from the appellant’s family; and failure to recognise the appellant as a member of a particular social group. Permission was granted on the first three grounds only. No renewed application was made for permission to argue the fourth ground.
3. Mr Dar made oral submissions in support of the three permitted grounds. We took them into account in their entirety.
4. In short, he argued that evidence considered in KA and Others (Domestic Violence - Risk on Return) Pakistan CG [2010] UKUT 216 (IAC) suggested that protection was not generally adequate in Pakis tan for victims of gender-based violence. In any event, the FtT had failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the materials relied upon by the appellant and finding instead that she would have sufficient protection in her particular circumstances.
5. The FtT had given inadequate reasons for finding the appellant’s claim that her brother-in-law was a powerful former army office to be a ‘recent fabrication’, rejecting her claim that she could be located through Pakistan’s centralised ID and biometric system, and rejecting her claim that her husband had left Pakistan. In any event, it had not been reasonably open to the FtT to find that the appellant’s husband, who had not protected her from his brother’s abuse, would be able to support and protect her on return.
6. The FtT had failed properly to consider the risk to the appellant from her family or explain why she found there was none.
7. Mr Nappey submitted that the FtT had properly followed all applicable country guidance and had given adequate reasons for permissible conclusions. Even if the FtT’s conclusions on sufficiency of protection had been reached in error, the error was rendered immaterial by the FtT’s conclusions on internal relocation. Similarly, any error in the FtT’s conclusions on internal relocation were immaterial, if her conclusions on sufficiency of protection were safe. Any error in the FtT’s approach to assessing risk from the appellant’s family was also immaterial for the same reasons.
Ground One – Sufficiency of Protection
8. The FtT’s findings on sufficiency of protection can be found at [19]:
‘19. I note the appellant did not report her brother-in-law to the authorities before she left the country. In evidence the appellant claimed it would be pointless to seek help from the police because they do not protect women, and stated it is likely they would in fact accuse her of being the aggressor. According to the Country Policy and Information Note: Pakistan - Actors of Protection July 2024 the state is both willing and able to offer sufficient protection. I find the appellant has failed to show that this would not apply in her case.’
9. It is not suggested that the FtT has inaccurately or inadequately recorded what the appellant said in oral evidence. The relevant passages of her witness statement are:
‘6- Due to my brother-in-law’s influence within the military and his connections to the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), he is an influential figure in Pakistan.
7- I knew that if I reported the abuse, the police would not protect me or my children. Corruption is rampant within the Pakistani police force, and my brother-in-law had the power and finances available to bribe the police to ensure that no action was taken. I felt powerless and feared for my life and the lives of my children. My brother-in-law has full control of the finances for the entire family and all the property is in his name.
…
21- State protection in Pakistan is unavailable to me and my children due to widespread corruption and inefficacy within the country's law enforcement agencies. The police are frequently accused of bias and are often complicit in concealing crimes, especially when influential individuals like my brother-in-law are involved. The pervasive corruption and lack of accountability significantly compromise the effectiveness of any protective measures that should be available, leaving us with no viable means of securing safety through state intervention.’
10. The appeal skeleton argument (ASA) raised the following arguments about sufficiency of protection (although confusingly conflating them with submissions on internal relocation):
‘32. Given the respondent’s own guidance it is more likely than not that the appellant would not be able to internally relocate in Pakistan.
Protection
2.5.5 The police are sometimes unwilling to register or investigate domestic violence cases, viewing them as family problems or not serious crimes, and instead encourage reconciliation. Some police demand bribes before registering cases and investigations are often superficial (see Access to justice and Treatment by, and attitudes of, the police and judiciary).
2.5.6 Informal justice systems lack formal legal protections but continue to be used in rural areas and pass harsh punishments to women, including ‘honour’ killings or giving girls in marriage as a form of compensation (swara) (see Informal justice systems).
2.5.7 Referring to pre-existing caselaw, in the country guidance case KA and Others the UT held that:
‘The guidance given in SN and HM (Divorced women – risk on return) Pakistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00283 and FS (Domestic violence – SN and HM – OGN) Pakistan CG [2006] UKIAT 00023 remains valid. The network of women’s shelters (comprising government-run shelters (Darul Amans) and private and Islamic women’s crisis centres) in general affords effective protection for women victims of domestic violence, although there are significant shortcomings in the level of services and treatment of inmates in some such centres. Women with boys over 5 face separation from their sons’ (headnote paragraph vi).
33. It is respectfully submitted that the respondent’s own CPIN corroborates the appellant’s account in her witness statement that she would not be able to avail state protection given her circumstances (Para 21 WS – AB/6). In any event, the appellant fears a state actor as her brother in law was in the army and continues to have influence over the authorities and the government.
34. Moreover, given the appellant’s circumstances and vulnerability she is likely to be a victim of further abuse if she approaches the authorities without a male figure to support her. There is widespread corruption within the authorities in Pakistan and given her vulnerabilities and past encounters she could be seen as an easy target for abuse by the corrupt individuals.’
11. Although not made entirely clear, the extracts quoted in paragraph 32 of the ASA are from the respondent’s CPIN, ‘Pakistan: Women fearing gender- based violence’, published in November 2022. However, even the CPIN extract quoted in the ASA suggests by reference to extant country guidance that effective protection is generally available for victims of victims of domestic violence.
12. That is consistent with what the same CPIN says at paragraph 2.5.2 (regrettably not quoted in the ASA):
‘2.5.2 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from non-state actors, including ‘rogue’ state actors, the state is, in general, willing and able to provide effective protection. A person’s reluctance to seek protection does not mean that effective protection is not available. Any past persecution and past lack of effective protection may indicate that effective protection would not be available in the future. Each case must be considered on its own merits, with the onus on the person to demonstrate that protection is not available.’
13. That is also consistent with what is said at paragraph 2.1.1 of the respondent’s CPIN, ‘Pakistan: Actors of protection’, published in July 2024, to which the FtT referred in [19]. Moreover, paragraph 2.5.7 of the November 2022 CPIN accurately quotes headnote (vi) of the extant relevant country guidance case of KA & others. Mr Dar properly no longer argues that the FtT decision was inconsistent with country guidance.
14. He argues instead that the FtT has failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s case on sufficiency of protection. However, given the background evidence relied on by appellant, we are satisfied that the FtT needed to say nothing more than was said at [19] regarding sufficiency of protection in general.
15. As for sufficiency of protection for the appellant in her particular circumstances, the ASA argues at paragraph 33 that the appellant would not have sufficiency of protection because her brother-in-law is a ‘state actor’ as a former army officer with continued influence over the authorities and government, and also at paragraph 34 that she might be the target of abuse from corrupt individuals if she approached the authorities without a male figure to support her.
16. The FtT deals with these points in [20] and [25] respectively (which are considered further below). Whilst these are paragraphs dealing principally with the issue of internal relocation, the judgment must be read as a whole. All in all, we are satisfied that the FtT has given sufficient reasons for the parties to understand why the issue of sufficiency of protection was resolved against the appellant.
Ground 2 – Internal Relocation
17. The FtT’s findings on internal relocation can be found in [20]-[25]:
‘20. In relation to internal relocation, during her interview the appellant claimed that her brother-in-law did not work but owned and operated properties and cars. However, the appellant now claims that her brother-in-law is a former army officer, is powerful and is involved with a political party. I find this is a recent fabrication I do not accept this claim. I find the appellant is simply attempting to suggest her brother-in-law's capacity to locate and reach her elsewhere in the country is such that it would not be safe for her to return anywhere. Suggesting as she did an interview that he was the most powerful among all the family members, I find is not the same as suggesting he has power and influence on a state level.
21. I find the appellant has failed to show that her brother-in-law would know she and the children were either back in the country or would have the ability to locate them elsewhere in the country. I do not find the first appellant has established that her brother-in-law has such power, influence or reach that she and the children could not safely return to any part of the country.
22. I consider also that the appellant would not be returning to a different part of the country alone, given I find her husband still remains in Pakistan. It would appear that the appellant's husband was either unconcerned or powerless for many years during the abuse suffered by the appellant. The appellant now claims that her sister informed her recently that her husband has left the country because he was under too much pressure from the family because he failed to ensure the appellant’s return. I note the appellant left in 2022, it therefore does not follow that her husband would wait until 2025 to give in to this apparent pressure, such that he felt compelled to leave the country.
23. Although the appellant claims it was her sister that had informed her that her husband had left Pakistan for Bahrain, the appellant could not explain why the letter sent by her sister and relied on by the appellant regarding her father and brother, makes no mention at all of her husband leaving the country. I do not accept the appellant’s husband has left Pakistan.
24. The appellant relies on a document relating to the couple’s property in Pakistan signed by her husband in January 2025, however she could not explain why if, as she claims, he no longer wants any contact with her he would be willing to provide this document only a few months ago to assist her.
25. I find the appellants can relocate within Pakistan and live in a different part of the country safely, away from her brother-in-law. Given I find she is still married and her husband is in Pakistan and given he was willing to join the family in the UK, I find he can join the family in whatever new part of the country they choose to live in. Accordingly, the first appellant would not be returning as a lone woman with young children, she would have the support and protection of her husband on return.’
18. Mr Dar argues that the FtT has failed to give adequate reasons for finding the appellant’s evidence of her brother-in-law’s state-wide power and influence to have been a ‘recent fabrication’. He accepts that she did not state in her asylum interview that he was an ex-army officer with influence over the authorities and government; however, he argues that she was not asked follow-up questions. It is illustrative to consider the following relevant parts of the interview:
‘58. Question Have you ever approached the authorities for help in Pakistan?
58. Response no I didnt, it was a futile exercise as I wouldn't get any support or help I would be belittling myself and in the eyes of my children and daughter and I didn’t want that
59. Question Wouldn't it have been worth a try to go to the authorities?
59. Response I didn’t think it was worth a try because I knew nothing would happen. In the society I live in no one takes a stand for women. He would have ended up accusing me about all sorts of things, I would have ended up committing suicide myself
60. Question Why do you believe nothing wouldn't happen, have you seen this happen to other women?
60. Response I had grown up hearing and being aware of the fact things like that did happen and no one stood up for the girl and she would either get killed or commit suicide
61. Question Could you have relocated to another part of Pakistan?
61. Response if I moved he would have found me, he has money and money can get you anything.
62. Question What did your brother in law do as a job?
62. Response he didn’t work he was at home all day. The money he had he obtained from properties he had a share in with my husband. He had cars and had a showroom and one of those cars he gave to my husband to drive’
19. Not only did the appellant not say that her brother-in-law was a former army officer or that he had any influence over the authorities or the government, she also gave completely different explanations for not going to the authorities, and for why she would be unable to relocate within Pakistan. The FtT can hardly be criticised for expecting the appellant to give at her asylum interview the explanations she relied on in her appeal. Moreover, [20] sets out perfectly adequate reasons for describing that explanation as a ‘recent fabrication’.
20. Mr Dar accepted that there was no background evidence that the appellant could be traced wherever she went in Pakistan by use of the national ID and biometric system. The FtT was entitled to expect such a proposition to be supported by more than the appellant’s bare assertion, let alone that a mere member of the public would be able to use the system that way (having concluded that the appellant’s brother-in-law had no connections or influence with the authorities).
21. As for the FtT’s rejection of the appellant's claim that her husband had left Pakistan, that conclusion is more than adequately reasoned in [22]-[23]. Mr Dar argues nevertheless that it was perverse for the FtT to accept on the one hand that the appellant’s husband knew about his brother's abuse of her but was powerless to intervene to protect her, but to find on the other that he would protect her on return. However, that submission overlooks the FtT’s finding that the appellant and her husband would be able to relocate away from the brother-in-law’s influence. The FtT’s conclusions on the husband’s willingness to relocate with the appellant and his ability to act as a protective factor in those circumstances was one reasonably open to her in the circumstances.
22. Regrettably, much of Mr Dar’s complaints on the FtT’s analysis boiled down to the appellant having given evidence to the contrary. However, it was rationally open to the FtT to reject the appellant’s claims regarding such matters as her brother-in-law and her husband’s present whereabouts, for the reasons given in the decision. In short, Mr Dar’s submissions on the appellant’s evidence constituted mere disagreement and identified no error of law.

Ground 3 – Risk from the Appellant’s Family
23. The one issue on which we were minded to agree that the FtT had fallen into error was her rejection of the appellant’s claim that her family had threatened to kill her. The relevant passage in the decision is [17]:
‘17. I accept it is likely the appellant’s brother-in-law has poisoned the minds of the appellant’s father and brother against her especially given one can imagine the nature of the allegations, such that they no longer want to speak to her, however I do not accept the appellant has shown they now want to kill her and the children.’
24. Whilst we accept that it would have been open to the FtT to reject the appellant’s claims that her father and brother would kill her if she returned to Pakistan (see in particular paragraph 16 of her witness statement), in particular having found her to have fabricated her brother-in-law’s state-wide influence, the FtT was obliged to explain why she did, especially given an apparent partial acceptance of the appellant’s case on this issue. Even reading the decision as a whole, the reasoning on the point is sufficiently deficient as to constitute an error of law.
25. That said, given the FtT’s conclusions on internal relocation, which we have found not to have involved any error of law, the FtT’s failure to give adequate reasons for her conclusion in [17] is immaterial.
26. For these reasons, the decision of FtT stands.
Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
2. The appeal is dismissed.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 November 2025