Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002898
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50130/2024
LP/12712/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

AH
(Anonymity Ordered)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Rutherford, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Abdul-Karim, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 17 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iraq. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. This matter came before me to remake the underlying appeal decision following the decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Kirk to find a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds in a decision dated 17 March 2025. The appellant’s factual case was that he had treated, in the course of his work as a nurse, a member of a Kurdish tribe for Covid-19 during the pandemic. The course of treatment was unsuccessful and the patient died because of her condition. Senior figures from the tribe blamed the appellant for her death and attempted to locate the appellant in his home area. The FtT found the appellant to be a credible witness about his core narrative as to what had transpired in Iraq to cause him to flee. It was further found that he could not turn to the authorities for sufficient protection. However, his protection and human rights grounds of appeal were dismissed because it was decided that he could obtain the necessary civil identification documents to reasonably internally relocate and avoid Article 3 conditions on return. At [16] of the error of law decision, DUTJ Kirk noted the following position on behalf of the respondent:
The Respondent conceded Ground 1 and accepted that the Judge made a material error of law. The Judge found the Appellant’s account of events in Iraq to be credible, which included that his original ID documents were taken by armed men. The Judge did not adequately engage with the process for obtaining an INID by proxy in the UK, which on the facts found supports a finding that the Appellant would not be able to redocument in the UK.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
3. At the remaking hearing, I asked Ms Abdul-Karim how it was suggested that I could go behind the combination of the undisturbed findings of the FtT and the position set out at [16] of the error of law decision to sensibly conclude that the appellant could obtain the required documents to reasonably internally relocate in the Iraqi Kurdish Region (‘IKR’). It was properly recognised that the respondent may be in difficulty in sensibly resisting the appeal. I stood the matter down to allow Ms Abdul-Karim to take instructions and reflect on the respondent’s position. When I returned to court, Ms Abdul-Karim realistically and pragmatically accepted that the combination of the undisturbed findings of fact in the FtT decision and the position adopted by the respondent in the error of law proceedings meant that she would not be inviting me to dismiss the appeal. I indicated that it was unnecessary to hear from the appellant in the circumstances and that I would be allowing the appeal on Refugee Convention grounds. Below are my reasons.
Discussion
4. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is upon the appellant. As per Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449, the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution.
5. I have considered SMO, KSP & IM (Article 15(c); identity documents) Iraq CG [2019] UKUT 00400 (IAC) and SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) [‘SMO2’].
6. The single decisive issue in this appeal is whether the appellant could reasonably relocate in another part of the IKR. There was no dispute between the parties that he could only do so if he had available to him the required identity documents required to function in Iraqi civil society. Ms Abdul-Karim properly recognised that this was no longer a reasonably likely proposition given the previous judicial decision which reflected the reality that all of these documents had been seized by members of the tribe the appellant. The result is that he cannot reasonably internally relocate without suffering unduly harsh conditions. It follows that I allow his appeal on Refugee Convention grounds. It is unnecessary to resolve the human rights grounds of appeal because there is no longer any prospect of his being returned to Iraq such that his human rights might be breached.

Notice of Decision
I allow the appeal on Refugee Convention grounds.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 March 2026