Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002903

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62372/2023
LP/11185/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JOLLIFFE

Between

RE
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hodson, solicitor
For the Respondent: Mr Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of the Philippines. She appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (the FtT) dated 4 May 2025 dismissing her appeal against the respondent's refusal of her claims for asylum, humanitarian protection and on human rights grounds. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge Saffer on 2 July 2025.
2. The Order of Judge Saffer granting permission to appeal did so in general terms without restricting the grant of permission to particular issues or grounds of appeal.
The SSHD’s decision
3. The underlying decision of the Secretary of State is the refusal letter dated 15 November 2023. It noted that the appellant feared persecution from non-state actors for reasons unconnected to her race, religion, nationality or political opinion. Between 1993 and 2000 she had experienced domestic violence from her husband. It was accepted that she was a victim of gender-based violence and of trafficking and exploitation. She had support from her sons and brothers who could help her. Her husband was not able to pursue her, and there was a sufficiency of protection in place. She could relocate internally to one of the large cities in the Philippines. Removing her would not be contrary to her Article 8 family and private life rights.
The appeal to the FtT
4. The appellant’s skeleton argument for the appeal at paragraph 11 identified the issues in her case as being her credibility, and whether her case should be recognised as forming part of a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention; whether she qualified for Humanitarian Protection; internal relocation; and any other compelling and compassionate circumstances.
5. The Judge found that the appellant’s husband was not influential in the Philippines. She had not heard from him for several years, but if still alive he would be about 74 or 75 years old. There was credible protection for women against domestic violence, and the authorities were able to provide protection from non-state actors. The appellant had not shown a good reason why she could avail herself of state protection. The Judge concluded that her asylum claim was bound to fail. She had been the victim of human trafficking, but her former employer had left the United Kingdom in 2013, and had no influence in the Philippines, so she would not be at risk there on that front.
6. The Judge found that the appellant was evasive and not credible. Her account of her children was inconsistent. The Judge found that they were working adults who could support her on her return to the Philippines. He found that her credibility was damaged within the meaning of Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 because of the late timing of her asylum claim.
7. The Judge also considered her claim based on Article 8 family and private life rights, and rejected it.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal
8. The appellant’s grounds of appeal alleged various errors, including delay, inaccurate recording of the evidence in the case, making inaccurate findings of fact, failing to make relevant findings of fact, and failing to consider the appellant’s skeleton argument.
9. The appellant’s first ground noted the length of time between the FtT hearing on 31 January 2025 and the appeal being promulgated on 4 May 2025, and submitted that the Upper Tribunal should examine the factual findings with particular care where there was delay. It was noted that the Judge gave the wrong name for the appellant’s husband’s name in paragraph 5, and later in the same paragraph had inaccurately summarised the evidence of the appellant’s sons to the effect that “if something happened to her “he would feel guilty for the rest of his life”, whereas he had not said that. However, the appellant’s daughters had provided evidence, which was not referred to, and it was said that the appellant had contacted the authorities on 2 occasions, whereas in fact her mother had done so.
10. The second ground was that the Judge had failed to record the SSHD’s concession that the appellant had been the subject of domestic violence in the past. The third ground developed one of the points in the first ground, that the Judge had failed to engage with the documentary evidence of the appellant’s mother’s complaint to the authorities about the conduct of the appellant’s husband, when he had drunkenly threatened to kill the appellant.
11. The fourth ground was that the Judge had made irrelevant findings about the appellant’s children and the frequency of their contact with the appellant. The fifth ground was that the Judge had failed to have regard to the appeal skeleton argument, and that to determine an appeal without properly considering the submissions amounted to a material error of law.
12. Mr Hodson articulated these points helpfully in his submissions to the Tribunal, noting that the Judge did not have to accept the appellant’s case on any given point but he did have to engage with it and balance it against the SSHD’s position.
13. The effect of these mistakes was that the judgment was so flawed that there was nothing salvageable and so the appeal should be remitted to the FtT. It was not possible to separate out parts of the judgment which were not infected by the imprecise approach. It was not inevitable that the outcome would have been the same but for the errors complained of, and the appellant was entitled to a proper evaluation of her claim.
14. The Presenting Officer responded by acknowledging that the Judge’s judgment was imperfect but submitting that it was not that bad. He accepted that the Judge referred to the appellant’s husband by the wrong name in paragraph 5, although noting that he did refer to his first name correctly in paragraph 7. He also accepted that the Judge had made unfounded assumptions when finding either that the appellant’s husband was no longer alive or that she would have no fear of him because of his age.
15. He also accepted that the Judge was wrong in having found that the appellant had made complaints in 2015 and 2020, whereas in fact it was her mother who had done so. He further accepted that the Judge should have considered the specific allegations concerning the appellant’s husband in detail, and that he had not done so.
16. He made the further acknowledgment that the Judge had not sufficiently grappled with the PSG issues which had been raised in the appellant’s skeleton argument, and that he had not produced an adequate reasoning for the important finding in paragraph 26 that the victims of domestic violence are not a PSG in the Philippines.
17. He did not accept that these admitted errors meant that the judgment as a whole was flawed. His core submission to that effect was that the Judge had at paragraph 4-5 and 14-16 adequately set out the basis of the claim. If the judgment was read as a whole, it was apparent that the Judge understood that this was a trafficking claim and that the appellant had been subjected to domestic violence. The Judge had not sought to go behind that core aspect of the case. He submitted that the judge’s credibility findings were safe.
18. On the issue of how to dispose of the appeal if the Tribunal found an error of law, the Presenting Officer admitted to being in two minds, and said that the appeal could be kept in the Upper Tribunal or remitted. He noted that the Article 8 findings had not been challenged.
Analysis
19. It is apparent from the admissions made by the Presenting Officer that the Home Office did not seek to defend a significant part of the Judge’s reasoning and instead accepted that he had made some concerning errors.
20. The Tribunal has considered whether nonetheless the Presenting Officer was right that the Judge had sufficiently set out the core of the claim and given sufficient reasons for rejecting it, and also whether the outcome would have been the same in any case for example because of the credibility findings and the findings about there being sufficiency of protection and available internal relocation.
21. There is a difficulty with the Presenting Officer’s submission that the Judge got the basis of the claim right in paragraphs 4-5 and 14-16. It was in paragraph 5 that the Judge incorrectly stated the appellant’s husband’s name, and inaccurately sought to summarise the content of the appellant's son’s evidence.
22. The Tribunal is troubled by the undisputed failure to grapple with the issues in the appellant’s skeleton argument. It is fundamental that a judge should engage with and determine the principal matters in issue between the parties, and that the judgment should give sufficient reasons for the losing party to understand why he/she lost, and show that the judge has come to sustainable findings on those issues.
23. Having reviewed the Judge’s findings, it is clear that there were several inaccuracies as set out above. Although they were not relevant to every matter in issue in the appeal, they were clearly significant. The Tribunal finds that in his handling of the evidence, the Judge made errors of law.
24. The Tribunal has gone on to consider whether notwithstanding the above analysis, the outcome reached by the Judge was nonetheless correct because the errors of law were not material.
25. The Tribunal cannot be satisfied that this is the case. The errors permeate the judgment, and neither advocate was able to articulate an account identifying which parts of the judgment could be preserved.
26. Having reviewed the judgment, we consider that is not possible to separate those parts of the judgement which are affected by the errors of law and those which are not and could be regarded as severable.
27. The Tribunal therefore concludes that the proper way to dispose of this appeal is to remit it to a different judge of the First-tier Tribunal.
28. That is not to say that the appeal will necessarily succeed. The SSHD raised issues about the appellant’s credibility, about internal relocation and sufficiency of protection which have some merit, and perhaps decisive merit. Those will be issues for the FtT judge to determine.
Notice of Decision

1. The FtT decision involved the making of errors of law, and is set aside.
2. The appeal will be remitted to be determined by a different FtT.

John Jolliffe

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber