Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER) Case No: UI-2025-002908
(First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58384/2024
LP/05837/2024)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FROOM

Between

MT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms D Revill, Counsel, instructed by Malik & Malik Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard on 19 February 2026 at Field House

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the re-making decision in respect of the Appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Respondent, dated 12 March 2024, refusing her protection claim. The First-tier Tribunal previously dismissed her appeal but that decision was set aside in a decision of the Upper Tribunal, dated 8 January 2026. The decision to set aside the First-tier Tribunal limited the scope of the re-making decision as follows:
“The matters under section 32(2) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 are settled. That is to say the Respondent accepts the claim falls within a Refugee Convention reason and the judge’s finding as regards the Appellant’s subjective fear is preserved, as his attribution of little weight to the section 8 allegation (section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004).
The issues to be determined at the re-making will be the existence of a risk on return from AT and his gang, and if found, sufficiency of protection and internal flight.
The judge’s findings on the alternative general risk of harm have not been challenged and are preserved.”
2. The Upper Tribunal also noted as follows:
“When assessing the risk from AT, it will be noted that he obviously knows the Appellant’s family because they had arranged a marriage and the Appellant claimed AT sent people to her house. Although the Appellant has upset her father, at the time of her interview she was occasionally in touch with her mother.”
3. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order because this is a protection appeal. I have continued that order because the risk of harm outweighs the usual requirement for open justice. As such I am satisfied, having had regard to the guidance in the Presidential Guidance Note No 1 of 2013: Anonymity Orders, that it would be appropriate to make an order in accordance with Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 in the following terms:
“Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, or the Appellant’s protection claim is finally determined, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her, any of her witnesses or any member of her family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.”
4. To re-cap, the Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom by small boat on 9 September 2022 and claimed asylum. She is a citizen of Albania. The Appellant gave an account of fearing a man called AT, whom her family had arranged that she marry. She had refused to marry him because she preferred to pursue her university education and she was subsequently able to gain a degree in plant protection. She worked as a salesperson and as a waitress to support herself, sharing a flat with a friend, and living independently in Tirana for five years. Her problems started in January 2022 when she was kidnapped by three men she believed worked for AT and she was forced to work as a prostitute until August of that year, when she escaped with the help of a man called B, who was one of the men who had kidnapped her but who had grown sympathetic to the Appellant. The Appellant travelled with B as far as France and then, evading him, took a small boat to the United Kingdom.
5. The Respondent accepted the Appellant’s claim fell within a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. She also accepted the Appellant had been the victim of human trafficking and modern slavery. However, she did not accept the Appellant’s fear of returning to Albania was well-founded because it had not been established that she was at risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Albania. This was based on her individual circumstances: TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC).
6. The Respondent noted the Appellant had lived independently for some years in Tirana, without family support. She had qualifications and work experience which would enable her to find employment in Albania. There were shelters in Albania where she could be provided with short to medium term support. It was noted the Appellant claimed AT had influence over the police because there were policemen who frequented the brothel where AT made her work. However, the Respondent did not accept this showed AT had power or influence over state authorities. She noted the Appellant had not had any contact from her traffickers since her arrival in the United Kingdom and inferred that the Appellant had not shown there was a sustained interest in her.
7. The Respondent also found there would be a sufficiency of protection for the Appellant in Albania. There is a functioning police force and the authorities are making efforts to eradicate corruption. The case of TD and AD had decided that there was a sufficiency of protection for most women, although in some cases it is not effective. Looking at the Appellant’s individual circumstances, the level of protection available reached the threshold set out in Horvath v SSHD [2001] 1 AC 489, [2000] 3 WLR 379. Alternatively, the Appellant could safely relocate to Kukës or Sarandë.
8. I heard oral evidence from the Appellant in Albanian through an interpreter she confirmed she could understand. She adopted her witness statement, prepared for the pervious hearing in the First-tier Tribunal, which the Appellant signed on 28 October 2024. She was cross-examined by Ms McKenzie and I asked one clarificatory question. I heard closing submissions from Ms McKenzie and Ms Revill and I reserved my decision.
9. The Appellant has not added to the evidence she filed for the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal in January 2025. I have used the same composite bundle of 399 pages PDF, filed for the error of law hearing.
10. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant and the lower standard of proof applies: section 32(4) and (5) of the 2022 Act.
11. Given the agreed facts that the Appellant was kidnapped and forced to work in a brothel, I have treated her as a vulnerable witness notwithstanding the absence of medical evidence.
12. The Appellant adopted her witness statement with two corrections. The dates in the first sentence of paragraph 67 should both read ‘2022’.
13. In cross-examination the Appellant said she did not know where the father of her child was. She continues to believe her life and that of her son would be in danger in Albania. AT has been to ask about her at her family’s address. He did not go in person but sent other people to ask. She assumed they were AT’s people. Her family had not reported the matter to the police. The Appellant said she still speaks to her mother, and the last time was at New Year. She confirmed she had lived and worked in Tirana for a number of years without family support. Asked about the possibility of going to a shelter for trafficked women, the Appellant said she would still be afraid that AT would find her. Albania is a small country. She would need to go out of the shelter to take her child to the nursery or the doctor. AT might find her anywhere in Albania. She did not believe the police would protect her because AT has contacts in the police.
14. The Appellant told me that the last occasion AT’s people had asked about her was two or three months before she last spoke to her mother, which would be towards the end of 2025.
15. Ms McKenzie relied on the reasons for refusal and asked me to dismiss the appeal. She made no challenge to the Appellant’s evidence. She relied on sections of the Country Policy and Information Note Albania: Human Trafficking, Version 16.0, dated July 2024 (‘the CPIN’), which she had uploaded shortly before the hearing. Ms Revill had no objection to this. Ms McKenzie also relied on TD and AD. She argued the Appellant would receive protection from the police to a Horvath standard and she could reside in a shelter. She also argued the Appellant could relocate internally.
16. Ms Revill relied on her appeal skeleton argument, dated 28 October 2024, which she had prepared for the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal. She first addressed me on the risk on return and relied on paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules. She pointed out the Appellant had not been tricked into modern slavery, but had been targeted by AT because she had ‘dishonoured’ him. Escaping with B would have made AT even more intent on punishing her. AT had managed to track her down once. The Appellant’s evidence that people came to her home looking for her had not been challenged.
17. On protection Ms Revill accepted the Appellant was eligible to go to a shelter as a victim of trafficking for between six months and two years, but TD and AD made clear that the position when she leaves the shelter must be looked at. AT had connections in the police of various ranks and there is objective evidence of links between organised criminal gangs and the police in Albania.
18. On internal flight Ms Revill relied on the findings in BF (Tirana – gay men) Albania [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC) that it was plausible a person’s presence in Tirana might become known by word of mouth and that a person might be traced through family or other connections. The Appellant cannot go back to her family. Ms Revill’s primary position was therefore that there was no safe area the Appellant could go to. However, if there were, it would be unduly harsh to expect her to relocate given the intense stigma attached to single mothers: TD and AD. She would be shunned. Further, having a child meant the Appellant would not be able to support herself as before.
Risk on return
19. I have noted the country guidance decision in TD and AD, in which the focus was on internal flight. The guidance is summarised in paragraph 119 of the decision as follows:
“The decision in AM & BM is now over six years old. The matter in issue in these appeals was to what extent recent measures taken by the Albanian government and others might have improved the situation for female VOTs seeking internal flight. Our remit was therefore narrower than that of the Tribunal in AM & BM and we find that much of the guidance in that decision should remain undisturbed. Where we have amended or supplemented that guidance in respect of internal flight, our findings are highlighted in bold below. We add that the only other part of the country guidance in AM & BM which we have found necessary to amend was sub-paragraph (c) of the headnote. The country guidance is as follows:
a) It is not possible to set out a typical profile of trafficked women from Albania: trafficked women come from all areas of the country and from varied social backgrounds.
b) Much of Albanian society is governed by a strict code of honour which not only means that trafficked women would have very considerable difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas on return but also will affect their ability to relocate internally. Those who have children outside marriage are particularly vulnerable. In extreme cases the close relatives of the trafficked woman may refuse to have the trafficked woman's child return with her and could force her to abandon the child.
c) Some women are lured to leave Albania with false promises of relationships or work. Others may seek out traffickers in order to facilitate their departure from Albania and their establishment in prostitution abroad. Although such women cannot be said to have left Albania against their will, where they have fallen under the control of traffickers for the purpose of exploitation there is likely to be considerable violence within the relationships and a lack of freedom: such women are victims of trafficking.
d) In the past few years the Albanian government has made significant efforts to improve its response to trafficking. This includes widening the scope of legislation, publishing the Standard Operating Procedures, implementing an effective National Referral Mechanism, appointing a new Anti-trafficking Co-ordinator, and providing training to law enforcement officials. There is in general a Horvath-standard sufficiency of protection, but it will not be effective in every case. When considering whether or not there is a sufficiency of protection for a victim of trafficking her particular circumstances must be considered.
e) There is now in place a reception and reintegration programme for victims of trafficking. Returning victims of trafficking are able to stay in a shelter on arrival, and in 'heavy cases' may be able to stay there for up to 2 years. During this initial period after return victims of trafficking are supported and protected. Unless the individual has particular vulnerabilities such as physical or mental health issues, this option cannot generally be said to be unreasonable; whether it is must be determined on a case by case basis.
f) Once asked to leave the shelter a victim of trafficking can live on her own. In doing so she will face significant challenges including, but not limited to, stigma, isolation, financial hardship and uncertainty, a sense of physical insecurity and the subjective fear of being found either by their families or former traffickers. Some women will have the capacity to negotiate these challenges without undue hardship. There will however be victims of trafficking with characteristics, such as mental illness or psychological scarring, for whom living alone in these circumstances would not be reasonable. Whether a particular appellant falls into that category will call for a careful assessment of all the circumstances.
g) Re-trafficking is a reality. Whether that risk exists for an individual claimant will turn in part on the factors that led to the initial trafficking, and on her personal circumstances, including her background, age, and her willingness and ability to seek help from the authorities. For a proportion of victims of trafficking, their situations may mean that they are especially vulnerable to re-trafficking, or being forced into other exploitative situations.
h) Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking's state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available.”
20. The country guidance remains current and has to be followed absent evidence of a durable change justifying a departure despite its age.
21. I remind myself that the core of the Appellant’s factual account has been accepted by the Respondent through the NRM decision. Ms McKenzie’s cross-examination was relatively brief and she did not challenge anything the Appellant said as being untrue. This appeal therefore turns on close examination of the background evidence on Albania and, where the Appellant’s claims are necessarily speculative, the inferences which can legitimately be drawn from the established facts. The standard of proof is low.
22. The facts which are agreed or unchallenged as between the parties are the following:
i) The Appellant is from the north of Albania;
ii) She upset her family, and only retains occasional contact with her mother;
iii) Her father is a farmer;
iv) AT is the friend of a friend of the Appellant’s father;
v) The Appellant went against the wishes of her family by refusing to marry AT, a much older man;
vi) Following her refusal to marry AT, the Appellant lived independently in Tirana for around five years, during which time she completed a degree course and supported herself in unskilled jobs;
vii) In January 2022, the Appellant was kidnapped while walking home, taken in a car to a building on the outskirts of Tirana, raped by AT, and forced to work as a prostitute;
viii) During that time, some of the men who abused her were police officers;
ix) In August 2022, the Appellant escaped with the assistance of one of the men who worked for AT and who had kidnapped her, B;
x) Having arrived in the United Kingdom, the Appellant fell pregnant and gave birth to a child;
xi) She does not know the father of her child;
xii) She remains in contact with her mother, who tells her that people claiming to be her friends continue to visit their house asking about her, but she has not told her family what happened to her in 2022.
23. The matters about which the Appellant has no actual knowledge, but which she believes to be true are as follows:
i) AT is a powerful person and a leading member of an organised criminal group (‘OCG’) in Albania;
ii) AT’s influence and connections reach into the police force and political institutions in Albania;
iii) Prior to her abduction, AT’s people kept her under surveillance by visiting the café where she was working in Tirana;
iv) The people who come to ask about the Appellant at her family home are working for AT;
v) AT continues to want to take revenge on the Appellant for dishonouring him by refusing to marry him, particularly as she escaped from him with B.
24. The CPIN: Actors of protection, Albania, Version 3.0, February 2025, shows that OCGs are operating in Albania and have infiltrated law enforcement. In 20203 local news outlets reported that OCGs had installed surveillance cameras in several cities to avoid the authorities and to facilitate loansharking operations. Freedom House reported in 2024 that law enforcement agencies were under the influence of politicians and organised crime networks.
25. In light of the accepted facts, in assessing the risk to this Appellant on return, I must consider the effect of paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, which sets out the principle that, where the circumstances are the same, then past persecution or serious harm is to be regarded as predictive of future persecution or serious harm. It is a “serious indication”. The Respondent accepts that in 2022 the Appellant was forcibly kidnapped, assaulted, raped, detained against her will, degraded and forced into prostitution. Indisputably this amounts to past persecution. The question is whether that risk remains after the passage of around four years and whether AT has the means to find the Appellant or whether the circumstances are now the same as they were in 2022.
26. This is not a case in which it is now argued the Appellant is likely to fall victim to re-trafficking as a result of her vulnerability or characteristics. That claim has fallen away and I would not, in any event, accept that the Appellant would be likely to be deceived into a situation of being re-trafficked. She is an intelligent, independent and resourceful person.
27. Rather, her claim is that AT will seek to harm her again because he feels dishonoured by her refusal to marry him and his feelings would have been exacerbated by the Appellant’s escape. He is the sole actor of persecution in this case. I accept that, if the Appellant can establish that it is reasonably likely that AT has the desire and means to locate and harm her again, there is little, if anything, the Appellant could do to defend herself.
28. However, AT’s power and influence remain a matter of significant speculation. The agreed facts show he had a number of people working for him, sufficient to run a brothel near Tirana, in 2022. No evidence has been provided to verify independently that AT is a known leader or high-ranking member of an OCG. However, he cannot be a well-known or notorious figure because this would have meant the Appellant’s family would not have arranged the marriage. They believed AT was an ordinary businessman.
29. I am asked to infer from the fact AT traced the Appellant to Tirana in 2022 that he has the means to trace her again, assuming he still has an animus against her. It is said, based on the Appellant’s experiences and what B told her, that AT has connections with the authorities. However, the mere fact some men wearing uniforms or suits frequented the brothel in 2022 does not establish this even to the low standard of proof.
30. Moreover, the fact AT traced the Appellant in 2022 is extremely likely to be linked to the fact AT was on friendly terms with the Appellant’s family. The Appellant had not cut off all communication with her family and her presence in Tirana would have been known, whether or not they were supporting her financially. In her witness statement the Appellant said she told her father she would find a job and accommodation in Tirana and she saw her family “every so often”. In 2022 the Appellant had no need to hide her whereabouts from her family just because she was on bad terms with them. She did not know about AT’s true nature. The reason she did not want to marry him was that she wanted to go to university and he was older than her; not that he was a gangster.
31. In contrast, there is every reason now for the Appellant not to disclose her precise whereabouts to her family, such that AT is extremely unlikely to find this out from them. Since the Appellant came to the United Kingdom, her mother did not inform anyone of her whereabouts, even though the Appellant told her mother she was in the United Kingdom (see asylum interview, questions 62 and 63). AT has not therefore been able to trace her.
32. I accept that the nature of Albanian society means that it is not inconceivable that, even without links to the authorities or other influence, AT might learn that the Appellant had returned to Albania: TD and AD and BF. However, that does not reach the lower standard of a reasonable likelihood.
33. I do not find that, to the lower standard, there is a current risk of persecution by AT in this case. However, in case I am wrong, I shall also consider protection.
Protection
34. I made the representative aware that I was familiar with the case of AD and Others v Sweden (22283/21) of 7 August 2024. The ECtHR found that there was in general a sufficiency of protection, including protection from criminal gangs:
“68. … the Court … sees no reason to depart from the [Swedish] Migration Court’s finding… that it follows from available country information that Albania has a largely functioning judicial system.
69. The Court, however, recognises the challenges faced by the Albanian judicial system, which are described in the country information quoted above, and which were also noted by the Migration Agency and the Migration Court, as well as by the Government. In particular, the Court notes the reports of continuing problems relating to corruption and influence from criminal organisations. Essentially, from all the reports quoted above dating from 2021-2023…, it appears that corruption continues to be a widespread problem in Albania and that further efforts are needed to address this. The report from the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless persons also specifically states that Albanian crime groups remain among the most powerful in all of Europe and that criminals from that ecosystem have ties to the police, judicial officials and other people in high positions…. The report from the Swedish Migration Agency further states that the police have a history of corrupt elements facilitating or even participating in criminal activities…
70. Nevertheless, the Court also recognises that Albania, a member of the Council of Europe and a Contracting State to the Convention, has made concerted efforts to address these issues. The reports quoted above describe several reforms which have been introduced and measures taken to improve the capability and integrity of the law enforcement authorities. The reports also note that, although some problems remain, progress has been made. For example, specialised bodies working against corruption and organised crime have been set up and are operational, vetting processes for judges and prosecutors are ongoing, regular police operations against criminal organisations are carried out and there are examples of investigations, arrests and convictions in cases relating to corruption and to organised crime…
71. In the light of these recent reports, which postdate the decisions in the domestic proceedings, the Court considers that the Albanian authorities’ capacity to protect their people cannot be regarded as insufficient for the general public in Albania. Nor can it be regarded as generally insufficient for all persons who are targeted by criminal organisations…”
35. That was a decision on its facts, but it suggests the situation has improved since TD and AD was heard.
36. Applying the law on the issue of state protection, I rely on the majority opinions in the leading case of Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37, although the test is now formulated in Regulation 4(2) of the Qualification Regulations and Article 7(2) of the Qualification Directive. Lord Clyde approved the guidance of Stuart-Smith LJ below that,
“there must be in force in the country in question a criminal law which makes violent attacks by the persecutors punishable by sentences commensurate with the gravity of the crimes. The victims as a class must not be exempt from the protection of the law. There must be a reasonable willingness by the law enforcement agencies, that is to say the police and the courts, to detect, prosecute and punish offenders.”
37. Lord Clyde went on to say that
“in relation to the matter of unwillingness [Stuart-Smith LJ] pointed out that inefficiency and incompetence is not the same as unwillingness, that there may be various sound reasons why criminals may not be brought to justice, and that the corruption, sympathy or weakness of some individuals in the system of justice does not mean that the state is unwilling to afford protection. “It will take cogent evidence that the state which is able to afford protection is unwilling to do so, especially in the case of a democracy.” The formulation does not claim to be exhaustive or comprehensive, but it seems to me to give helpful guidance.”
38. In other words, the standard of protection is not one which would eliminate all risk, but is a “practical standard.” In AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 31(IAC), the Upper Tribunal held:
“1. At paragraph 55 of Auld LJ’s summary in Bagdanavicius [2005] EWCA Civ.1605 it is made clear that the test set out in Horvath [2001] 1 AC 489 was intended to deal with the ability of a state to afford protection to the generality of its citizens.
2. Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection, a claimant may still have a well-founded fear of persecution if authorities know or ought to know of circumstances particular to his/her case giving rise to the fear, but are unlikely to provide the additional protection the particular circumstances reasonably require (per Auld LJ at paragraph 55(vi)).
3. In considering whether an appellant’s particular circumstances give rise to a need for additional protection, particular account must be taken of past persecution (if any) so as to ensure the question posed is whether there are good reasons to consider that such persecution (and past lack of sufficient protection) will not be repeated.”
39. The shortcomings of the police in Albania are set out in the background evidence. However, Ms McKenzie took me to the CPIN and the passages which give support to the notion that the situation is improving. Albania is a designated safe state under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The United Kingdom and Albania announced a Joint Communiqué on enhancing bilateral cooperation in areas of common interest on 13 December 2022. The communiqué committed to providing sufficient protections within Albania for victims of human trafficking and modern slavery.
40. The United States Department of State acknowledged that Albania continues to make significant efforts to address trafficking. The European Commission noted that the NRM is functioning and assistance has been provided in every case. Shelters offer a full package of services to help a victim of trafficking to recover and reintegrate. Police continue to investigate cases of trafficking.
41. It is clear that the Albanian government wishes to address the problem of trafficking and organised crime, although it lacks some of the resources to do so fully. I remind myself that, as explained in AW at paragraph 24, the test must take account of the Appellant’s individual circumstances and not just the general availability of protection. However, this Appellant has proven herself to be sufficiently resourceful to be able to live without family support (or even approval) in Tirana from the age of 18. She found a flat to share with a friend and supported herself financially such that she was able to complete a degree. She could not find a job in her field prior to her kidnapping. However, her level of education must place her in a reasonably good position in the job market. The Appellant is in good health. Whilst she continues to lack family support, she was able to overcome this obstacle before. The only difference now is that she now has a young son. I also accept she will remain extremely fearful. I accept there is stigma for victims of trafficking and single mothers in Albania. However, I do not accept this Appellant would not receive the full level of protection available from the Albanian authorities, which reach the Horvath standard.

Internal flight
42. In the light of my findings on risk on return and protection, I do not also need to make findings on internal flight. The Appellant’s protection claim cannot succeed and her appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The Appellant’s appeal is allowed to the extent that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal is set aside.
However, the decision is remade dismissing the appeal on protection grounds.

Signed

N Froom
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Date 26 February 2026