Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025‑002909
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53894/2024
LP/11856/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 22nd of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ATHWAL

Between

KB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Imamovic of Counsel, instructed by AB Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 5 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the re-making, under s.12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 5 April 2025 to dismiss the appellant’s protection appeal, made under s.82(1)(a) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“2002 Act”).
2. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the appellant. I consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (‘UK’) under the Refugee Convention is such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.

Background
3. The appellant is an Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity, who lived in the Sulaymaniyah governate. His claim arises from an incident in August 2022 concerning repair work undertaken to a vehicle said to be connected with “SB”, whom he describes as a local leader within the Kurdish Democratic Party (“KDP”).
4. The appellant departed Iraq on 29 August 2022 and claimed asylum in the United Kingdom on 18 October 2022.
5. The appellant’s claim relies on the following matters:
a. risk as a victim of an honour-based act;
b. risk arising from his imputed political opinion;
c. his sur place activities including demonstrations and Facebook posts;
d. his lack of documentation namely his CSID and/or INID.
Error of Law and Preserved Findings
6. In a decision promulgated by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Walsh on 14 April 2026, the following material errors of law were identified in the determination of the First-tier Tribunal;
a. When addressing the identity of SB, the First-tier Tribunal failed to engage, whether adequately or at all, with the appellant’s written and oral evidence, including the Facebook extracts (see [15]–[28]).
b. The First-tier Tribunal failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claim for protection under the Refugee Convention (see [31]–[34]).
7. In consequence, the Judge directed that the decision in the appeal be set aside and remade in the Upper Tribunal, the remaking being confined to the issue of risk of persecution or serious harm arising from the events in Iraq (see [39]).
8. The Judge further recorded that there was no challenge to the findings of the First-tier Tribunal in respect of the appellant’s sur place activities and the asserted risk arising on return without a CSID or INID. Accordingly, the findings at [22]–[27] were preserved (see [40]). Likewise, there was no challenge to the findings made under Article 8, and the findings at [28] and [30] were preserved.
Issues
9. At the start of the hearing the parties agreed the following matters;
a. The ASA submits that the appellant is at risk of persecution because of his imputed political opinion as he will be considered to be opposed to SB and sought to cause him and his family harm for political reasons. The respondent’s review accepts that this claim engages the Refugee Convention.
b. The appellant is from the Sulaymaniyah Governorate.
c. The appellant refers to SB in his asylum interview as SA, Ms Asif, having considered the evidence contained in the supplementary bundle, now accepts that is the same person.
d. Ms Asif accepts that an internet search using SB’s correct name was not conducted. Having considered the additional evidence provided by the appellant, in particular the country expert report of Dr George, together with those aspects of his account accepted as credible, Ms Asif further accepts that, at the time the appellant left Iraq, SB was the leader of the KDP in his local area.
e. As recorded in the decision letter, the respondent accepts the following elements of the appellant’s account;
i. His apprentice fitted tyres to a vehicle belonging to the son of SB.
ii. After the vehicle left the premises, a malfunction occurred involving the tyres which led to an incident, as a result of which SB’s wife and daughter were taken to hospital.
iii. the appellant was held accountable for that incident on the basis that it occurred following work carried out at his shop.
iv. SB sought to locate the appellant at both his workplace and his home address and made threats to kill him arising from the incident.
f. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (“PUK”) controls the appellant’s home area and the appellant could not relocate to Erbil or Dohuk because it is controlled by the KDP, who would not protect the appellant from SB.
10. The parties agreed that the only issue that I must decide is whether there is sufficient protection for the appellant in his home area.
Evidence
11. Ms Arif and Ms Imamovic confirmed that it was not necessary for the appellant to give oral evidence, as credibility was not in issue. The sole matter for determination was whether there was a sufficiency of protection, to be assessed by reference to the country information. I agreed and therefore the appellant did not give evidence.
12.  In reaching my decision, I have taken into account the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, together with the documents contained in the consolidated bundle and the appellant’s supplementary bundle.
Legal Framework
13. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s.32 of the Nationality Asylum and Borders Act 2022, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100.
14. A claim for humanitarian protection in the UK may be granted under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules where the person is not a refugee but has shown substantial grounds for believing that if they were returned to their country of origin they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm, and is unable, or owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, unable to internally relocate, and were not excluded from humanitarian protection.
15. When considering internal relocation, I have considered the general circumstances prevailing in that part of the country the respondent asserts the appellant can return to; the personal circumstances of the appellant; and disregarded any technical obstacles relating to travel to that part of the country.
16. For the appellant to succeed on Article 3 ECHR grounds, the appellant has the burden to prove a real risk of torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment (“the treatment”). Article 3 is a non-derogable right.
Risk on Return to Iraq
17. I have considered the guidance to be found in the decision in AH, AK & AJ (Identity documentation; returns to the KRI) Iraq CG [2026] UKUT 00150 (IAC) which replaces all existing country guidance on Iraq.
Discussions and Analysis
18. Ms Imamovic relied on the country expert report prepared by Dr George dated, 20 May 2026. In particular, she drew attention to [18] of the report which states;
“Both the KRG and Baghdad authorities have well established records of being unable to protect persons targeted by determined attackers, notably in situations involving revenge and honour, blood feuds and domestic violence and actual or perceived sexual orientation. In this context, I do not consider it of any real significance that the person [KB] fears is a KDP official based in an area controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). “
19. She further relied on the Country Policy and Information Note, Iraq: Blood Feuds, Honour Crimes and Tribal Violence (Version 1.0, July 2024). She referred in particular to paragraph [10.2.5], which records that tribal disputes may be triggered by a range of issues, including car accidents, and to paragraph [4.1.1], which indicates that, in general, the Iraqi Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government are neither willing nor able to provide effective protection against blood feuds, tribal disputes, or related violence.
20. In addition, she relied on the Country Policy and Information Note, Iraq: Actors of Protection (Version 2.0, September 2025), and in particular paragraph [2.1.1], which states that in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region a person’s ability to access protection is contingent upon a range of factors, including gender, socio-economic status, family support, religious or ethnic identity, political affiliation, the profile and influence of the actor from whom protection is sought, and the nature of the harm feared. She submitted that SB, as a local leader of the KDP, possessed a higher profile and greater influence than the appellant, who operated a car repair shop, and that, in consequence, the appellant would be unable to obtain effective protection.
21. Ms Arif submitted that she relied on the references to country information set out at paragraph [10] of the respondent’s refusal decision.
22.  I turn first to the material relied upon by Ms Arif. The refusal decision refers to the Country Policy and Information Note, Iraq: Actors of Protection (December 2020), paragraph [2.3.2]. That passage describes the position within Federal Iraq, noting inter alia that the Federal Police are comparatively well equipped and trained, whereas the Local Police are under-resourced, underpaid, and in some instances affected by corruption, with the consequence that their effectiveness in responding to crime varies significantly by location.
23.  In my judgment, that extract is of limited relevance to the present appeal. It concerns the position in areas under the control of Federal Iraq, rather than the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Moreover, that version of the CPIN has since been superseded by the September 2025 version. As set out above, Ms Imamovic relies on the latter document in support of her submission that the authorities in the KRI are unable to provide effective protection. Ms Arif has not referred me to material that rebuts the information referred to by Ms Imamovic.
24. The refusal decision further refers to the Country Policy and Information Note, Iraq: Opposition to the Government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (July 2023), [11.1.1]. That passage records that, although the Kurdistan Regional Government exercises formal jurisdiction, in practice the region is divided between areas under the control of the KDP, comprising Erbil and Dohuk, and those under the control of the PUK, comprising Sulaymaniyah, each with its own politically affiliated internal security (Asayish) and military (Peshmerga) forces. That information is not in dispute. It underpins Ms Arif’s acceptance that internal relocation would not be available to the appellant, as it would require him to relocate to an area under KDP control. In my judgment, this extract does not materially address the question of whether the local authorities would be able to afford the appellant effective protection against SB.
25. I have carefully considered the information provided. Dr George’s evidence that the authorities are neither willing nor able to provide effective protection from tribal disputes is consistent with the information contained in the 2024 CPIN. Furthermore, the 2025 CPIN clearly sets out the factors that dictate whether the state will act and I accept Ms Imamovic’s submissions that SB’s social standing and influence is such, that the state protection is unlikely to protect the appellant from him. The material referred to the by the respondent is out of date and does not address the key issues before me. I am therefore satisfied that the appellant has established that he would not be able to avail himself to state protection because the state is unable to protect persons targeted by determined attackers in tribal disputes involving revenge and honour.
26. I have given careful consideration to the country evidence before me. Dr George’s evidence that the authorities are neither willing nor able to provide effective protection from tribal disputes is consistent with the information contained in the 2024 CPIN. Furthermore, the 2025 CPIN identifies the factors relevant to the availability of protection, and I accept the submission advanced by Ms Imamovic that SB’s social standing and influence would materially diminish the appellant’s ability to access such protection. The material relied upon by the respondent is both outdated and does not address the central issue in this appeal.
27.  Drawing these matters together, I am satisfied that the appellant has established that he would be unable to avail himself of state protection, as the evidence demonstrates that the authorities are unable effectively to protect individuals targeted by determined attackers, particularly in situations involving revenge and honour.
Conclusion
28. The respondent accepts that the Refugee Convention is engaged and that the appellant’s account is credible. In particular, it is accepted that the appellant was held responsible for a car accident in which SB’s wife and daughter were injured, that SB subsequently sought to locate the appellant at his workplace and home, and that threats to kill him were made. The respondent, through Ms Arif, has considered the report of Dr George and accepts that SB is the leader of the local branch of the KDP. It is further accepted that the appellant would be unable to relocate to Erbil or Dohuk, those areas being under KDP control.
29.  The sole issue for determination is whether the appellant would be able to obtain protection from the local authorities, who are under the control of the PUK. I am satisfied that the country evidence corroborates the appellant’s account that the car accident gave rise to a tribal dispute. I am further satisfied that the country information establishes that the appellant would be unable to avail himself of effective protection from the local authorities, particularly in circumstances where the individual seeking retribution possesses greater social standing and influence.
30. In those circumstances, I allow the appellant’s appeal on asylum and human rights grounds. In light of that conclusion, the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
31. Pursuant to Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Walsh’s decision, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
32. I remake the decision by allowing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 1 February 2024 on asylum and human rights grounds.

H.Athwal

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 June 2026