Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002924

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54717/2024
LP/10442/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER

Between

Chi
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Aslam, Counsel, instructed by Victoria Solicitors Limited
For the Respondent: Ms S Walker, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 23 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The Appellant is a female Chinese national born on 1 August 1981. The Appellant entered the UK on a visit visa on 14 December 2018 and made an application for asylum on 27 February 2023. This application was refused on 1 February 2024.
2. The Appellant appealed against the refusal decisions. In summary her asylum claim is based upon her fear of persecution upon return to China based upon being trafficked upon arrival within the United Kingdom as a sex worker.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. First Tier Tribunal Judge Juss (‘the judge’) heard the Appellant’s appeal on 13 May 2025 and dismissed it by decision and reasons sent on 14 May 2025. The judge decided that the Appellant was not a victim of human trafficking (§20) that IFA was available to her (§26) and that there would not be unjustifiably harsh consequences to the Appellant if she returned to China (§31).
Anonymity Order
4. The judge made an anonymity order. There was no request for the anonymity order to be set aside. I conclude that the Appellants’ rights to international protection outweigh the Article 10 rights of the public to know their identity as a party to these proceedings.
The Grounds of Appeal
5. The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal and permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Robinson on 2 July 2025. Permission to appeal was granted limited to the following two grounds:
Ground 1 - That the judge failed to give reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s account that she was trafficked into the UK and made adverse credibility findings on a matter not disputed by the Respondent.
Ground 2 – That the judge erred in making adverse credibility findings about the Appellant not reporting her trafficking experience to the Chinese police, when this was not a matter that the Respondent raised and was a mistaken analysis of the factual context given that the Appellant contended that she was trafficked only after her arrival to the UK.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. I had before me the composite hearing bundle of 241 pages, the Appellant’s written skeleton argument and the Respondent’s rule 24 August 2025, authored by Mr Benjamin Hulme, opposing the appeal. Mr Aslam was given time to review the rule 24 response that he had not previously seen.

Appellant’s submissions
7. For Ground 1, Mr Aslam referred me to the Respondent’s refusal letter dated 1 February 2024 where the SSHD states:
Material facts I accept
7. You came to the UK to work doing house massages.
8. Potential victim of sex-trafficking.
8. Mr Aslam emphasised that the Appellant was accepted as being a ‘potential victim of trafficking.’ Whilst the refusal letter did not go onto discuss further whether this was accepted or not, the SSHD had accepted that the Appellant came to the UK to work doing house massage and Mr Aslam submitted that the Respondent did not dispute that the Appellant was not trafficked as part of its reasons for refusal.
9. Notwithstanding this , the judge found at §20
First, I do not find the Appellant to have been a victim of human trafficking. I am aware that the Appellant’s WS refers to the agent by name as Quing Ge – at §7 and I am aware that she refers to the couple who rescued her as Ms Mei Li and Mr. A Qui – at §8. It was open to her to report the problems she had to the Chinese police even after her arrival in the UK. She did not do so. Her reason that there was a language barrier or that she did not know where the agents house was (AIR 32-34) is not plausible. Even more importantly, once in the UK the Appellant declined to be contacted by the police regarding her modern slavery experience (AIR 85) and I do not accept her reasons for doing so.
10. Mr Aslam submitted that §20 only refers to the Appellant not being credible because she did not report her problems to the police. It was submitted that the judge failed to provide reasons as to why they did not believe the Appellant’s evidence of being brought to the UK, her escape from the traffickers and the help she sought from the couple that rescued her. This failure is exacerbated when considered in the light of the fact that the judge departed from the credibility findings in the Respondent’s review, which inferred that the Respondent was not challenging that she was trafficked into the UK for the purposes of sexual exploitation.
11. It was submitted the judge failed to reference, analyse and explain why the Appellant’s evidence and detailed contextual answers provided in the screening interview regarding trafficking was not accepted. The Appellant maintained that the agent Quing Ge was part of the Snakeheads gang of criminal traffickers in China and the UK and the judge’s finding that she was not trafficked meant that a key factor was not taken into account when making subsequent findings on the credibility of the Appellant §21- 26.
12. In respect of Ground 2, it was submitted that the reference at §20 to the Appellant not reporting her trafficking experience to the Chinese police, and the negative impact this had on the credibility assessment was wrong. It was submitted that the Respondent did not take issue with the Appellant not reporting the matter to the Chinese Police, as the Appellant only discovered that she had been trafficked, after her arrival in the UK and at most it would have been appropriate to report her trafficking to the UK police, not to the Chinese police. Therefore by deciding that the Appellant not reporting to the Chinese police the judge has made a material and erroneous adverse credibility finding.
Respondent’s submissions
13. Mr Walker relied on the Rule 24 submissions authored by Mr Benjamin Hulme. In summary:
13.1 The judge considered the credibility and plausibility of the appellant’s account in the round and gave reasoned findings at §19- 25. At §20, the judge provided sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account of being a victim of trafficking.
13.2 The refusal decision, at its highest, accepted that the appellant was a “potential” victim of trafficking (paragraph 8), and accepted that she came to the UK to work doing house massages (paragraph 7). However, it cannot be inferred that the respondent accepted that the appellant was a victim of trafficking.
13.3 At paragraph 10 of the refusal decision, the respondent raised the appellant’s failure to report her problems to the Chinese or UK police, and her declining to engage with the police regarding her modern slavery experiences.
13.4 The judge recorded that aspects of the appellant’s account as to her journey to the UK were challenged in cross-examination §10, and findings at §25 formed part of the overall assessment of credibility.
14. As to ground two, it was submitted that the judge’s adverse credibility finding did not arise solely from the Appellant’s failure to report her trafficking experience to the Chinese police. The judge placed greater weight on her declining to be contacted by the UK police, which was raised by the respondent at paragraph 10 of the refusal decision.
15. Mr Walker developed the arguments by submitting that the reference to ‘potential victim of trafficking’ was not an unequivocal acceptance that the Appellant was trafficked and as such the judge was entitled to make a finding that the Appellant was not a victim of trafficking having considered all the evidence including the absence of risk from the agent and the sufficiency of protection.
16. Mr Walker continued that any factual error, for example reporting reference to the Chinese police was not material given the judge’s findings on risk and internal relocation which were sufficient to dispose of the appeal.
The Legal Framework
17. The Upper Tribunal is confined to considering whether there are errors of law in First Tier Tribunal decision. In R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 Brooke LJ summarises what amounts to an error of law at paragraphs 9 and 10
9. When the court gave this guidance in Subesh, it was aware that it would not be of any relevance to an appellate regime in which appeals were restricted to points of law. It may be convenient to give a brief summary of the points of law that will most frequently be encountered in practice:
i) Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome ("material matters");
ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters;
iii) Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters;
iv) Giving weight to immaterial matters;
v) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter;
vi) Committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings;
vii) Making a mistake as to a material fact which could be established by objective and uncontentious evidence, where the appellant and/or his advisers were not responsible for the mistake, and where unfairness resulted from the fact that a mistake was made.

10. Each of these grounds for detecting an error of law contain the word "material" (or "immaterial"). Errors of law of which it can be said that they would have made no difference to the outcome do not matter. This need to identify an error of law which would have made a material difference to the outcome…
18. It is also important to note and apply guidance given in the case of MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 at [45]) when considering these appeals.
45 But the court should not be astute to characterise as an error of law what, in truth, is no more than a disagreement with the AIT's assessment of the facts. Moreover, where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account.
19. When considering assessing credibility, in SB (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 160, at paragraph. 44, Green LJ said that appellate courts will accord due deference to the fact-finder who has assessed an applicant's credibility. But the appellate court needs to be able to satisfy itself that the fact finder has at least identified the most relevant pieces of evidence and given sufficient reasons (which might be quite concise) for accepting or rejecting it.
Conclusions
20. I am satisfied that there are material errors of law in the judge’s decision.
21. The central issue is whether the judge failed to give adequate reasons for not accepting that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking, in circumstances where the refusal decision described her as a “potential” victim and did not positively dispute her account. I accept that the Respondent is is correct to submit that it’s position was that the Appellant was a “potential” victim of trafficking, and that this was not an unequivocal acceptance of her status. However, the refusal decision did not positively dispute the core elements of Appellant’s detailed account, specifically, discovering that she has been trafficked when she arrived in the UK by being required to work in doing house massages and that the agent who trafficked her was part of the Snakeheads that operate in China and the UK. In these circumstances it was incumbent upon the judge to give adequate reasons for rejecting the Appellant's case and for departing from the implied acceptance of her status as a potential victim of trafficking. The authorities emphasise the need for anxious scrutiny and clear reasoning relating to credibility, particularly where the standard is that of a reasonable degree of likelihood. The judge’s failure to give sufficient reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s account amounted to a material error in the decision.
22. Further, in respect of this ground 1 the failure to reference the Respondent’s acceptance that the Appellant came to the UK to do house massages and that she was a potential victim of sex trafficking amounts to an apparent failure to take into account material facts before arriving at the decision.
23. The judges findings on the Appellant’s credibility are undermined by these error. Further I conclude these errors extend to the judge’s assessment on the Appellant’s risk on return, IFA sufficiency of protection. Specifically, if the Snakeheads are found to be involved in potential trafficking then an assessment of how these impact on the findings on risk on return, IFA sufficiency of protection is necessary.
24. In respect ground 2, the judge was incorrect in referencing the failure to the report to the Chinese police which was not a relevant factor given the Appellant’s case that she discovered that she was trafficked when she arrived in the UK. I conclude that the reference to the ‘Chinese’ police is a typographical error when considered in the context of the finding at §20.
It was open to her to report the problems she had to the Chinese police even after her arrival in the UK. She did not do so. Her reason that there was a language barrier or that she did not know where the agents house was (AIR 32-34) is not plausible.
25. It would have been nonsensiscal for the Appellant to report to the Chinese police ‘even after arrival in the UK’ and there would not have been any ‘language barrier’ in reporting to the Chinese police. Therefore, I do not find that the reference to the Chinese police, in itself, amounts to a material error. It is reasonable to conclude that the the judge was referring to the UK police in this context.
26. Having said that, my conclusions at paragraph 22 and 23 above applies equally to this ground. The judge has not taken into account the Respondent’s acceptance that the Appellant came to the UK to do house massages and that she was a potential victim of sex trafficking when undertaking the overall credibility assessement and this does amounts to a material error of law.
27. I conclude that the errors identified were substantive and material and in these circumstances the Appellant appeal succeeds, and the First-tier Tribunal decision is set aside.
Remaking
28. I consider that it is appropriate to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo, see, AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). Specifically, the effect of the material error means that there will need to be a fresh credibility assessment and none of the findings of fact can be preserved. I conclude that the proper course is to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.
I set aside that decision and remit the appeal to the First Tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by a judge other than Judge Juss.

Benjimin Burgher

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 November 2025