Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002928
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50097/2024
LP/11543/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16 April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

GOQ
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Muhammad Malik, counsel instructed by Hanson Law
For the Respondent: Mr Mcveety, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at the Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 30 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I am remaking the decision in respect of the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 4 May 2025 to dismiss the Appellant’s asylum appeal, made under s82(1)(a) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“2002 Act”).
Background
2. The Appellant is a national of Iran and is of Kurdish ethnicity. His claim was that he was at risk on return to Iran because he had given some 5 million rials a year to the Komala Party (referred to with differing names through the documents). The Appellant had referred to his friend, ‘K’ having asked him to distribute leaflets about the party when in Iran. The Appellant had stated to the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) that he had remained in touch with his family in Iran, including with his father. The Appellant had claimed that there was a warrant for his arrest. The Appellant had claimed that his father had been arrested and detained on 8 or 9 occasions.
3. The Appellant had also claimed that since being in the UK he had attended some 14 demonstrations. The FTT Judge noted that the Appellant had provided a ‘vast amount of Facebook material’.
4. The Appellant’s appeal had been dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal. The Appellant had sought permission to appeal against that decision on 6 grounds. Permission to appeal was granted on only one ground. The Appellant had not renewed his grounds of appeal. The FTT Judge had made numerous adverse credibility against the Appellant. I refer to some of those adverse findings below.
The FTT Judge’s findings
5. The FTT Judge had made extensive findings. These included the following:
“22. In consider[ing] the totality of the evidence I had in mind the guidance of Budhatkoki [2014] UKUT 00041 (IAC) (below). A failure to refer to every piece of evidence should not be construed as meaning it was not considered. It is generally unnecessary and unhelpful for First-tier Tribunal judgments to rehearse every detail or issue raised in a case. This leads to judgments becoming overly long and confused and is not a proportionate approach to deciding cases. It is, however, necessary for judges to identify and resolve key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms their reasons, so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost.
23. Having considered all of the evidence, in the round, with the highest standard of fairness in mind and with the most anxious scrutiny I did not find the claims advanced by the appellant to be credible. I arrived at this adverse conclusion for various reasons. These reasons are set out below in no particular order. However, when having reviewed all the factors I arrived at the inescapable conclusion that this was a fabricated claim for asylum.
24. At the hearing, for the first time, the appellant mentioned several important aspects of his claim. He claimed that whilst in Iran he gave 5 million rial a year to the political party he supported (this has various names but I have referenced it as the Komala party for simplicity and consistency). When questioned about the source of these funds he stated that whilst working on the family’s apple orchard during the course of the year his father gave him limited funds for his expenses. Depending on how successful the crop was, when the profits were shared at the end of the year he would be given 2 – 5 million Rial. This therefore meant that for 2 consecutive years, as was his claim at the hearing, the appellant gave the entire value of a good harvest (or at least his proportion of the profits) to the Party. This is a claim that he had never advanced before. When queried as to why this had never been mentioned the appellant stated he had never been asked any questions and had “no chance to give more explanation”. In his interview (question 108-SB 775) the appellant stated all he did for the party was distributing leaflets not that he gave his entire yearly profits from the business to fund their activities. Whilst I accept the appellant’s representative submissions that the detail to a claim may expand over time and there may be nothing inherently suspicious about this. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in 2021. He has been legally represented. I find the late divulgence of this piece of evidence to highlight that the claim is fabricated and the appellant is seeking to embellish a claim. I am reinforced in this view when the other embellishments are considered.
25. Two of the main individuals who have played an important role in the appellant’s claim are a family friend ‘K’ (SB 775 - question 112) and his father. The appellant’s friend is the individual who asked him to distribute leaflets in the village. He is also the person who informed the appellant of his friend’s arrest. He is also the person who vouched for the appellant which enabled the appellant to get the letter from the Komala Party. At the hearing the appellant stated he has been in contact with this friend. When asked why no letter or supporting documents had been provided from him he then stated he had lost contact with him a couple of months ago. The appellant’s witness statement was signed in September 2024. No good reason has been advanced as to why this friend did not provide any supporting evidence. Whilst an appellant does not need to provide corroboration for a claim for asylum. When evidence could reasonably be obtained the failure to produce this evidence can be considered. Given how central this evidence would have been to the appeal I find that its omission is telling regarding credibility.
26. Further there is the appellant’s father. The appellant at the hearing confirmed that he is still in contact with his family. The appellant stated he is 100% sure there is an arrest warrant outstanding for him. The appellant also stated that his father has been detained and then released on approximately 8 or 9 occasions. There is no evidence from the appellant’s father. Again there is no reasonable explanation as to why this is not been provided. Again I note that corroboration is not required but where evidence could reasonably be obtained a failure to do so can be factored into the overall assessment.
27. A further embellishment is the arrest warrant. The appellant claimed at the hearing that he was 100% sure that one had been issued. No reference to an arrest warrant having been issued was previously mentioned. In his witness statement (paragraph 6) he states he fears he has been identified. Whether he had been identified by the Iranian authorities is clearly something that was in the mind of the person assisting him in the preparation of his witness statement. If the appellant was sure that an arrest warrant was outstanding there would be no reason for him to state that he fears he has been identified.
28. At the hearing the appellant also indicated that the Iranian authorities had been to his family home indicating that they were aware of his activities in the United Kingdom. I find this to be a startling omission from his documentary evidence. If true this would clearly show an adverse interest. The appellant claims that he has never been asked or given an opportunity to provide this detail. If this evidence were in fact true the appellant would have told those instructing him. It appears that the representative at the hearing was not aware of this information as it came out in cross examination. Had the representative been told this prior to the hearing itself I would have expected questions to be put in evidence in chief to elicit these answers. I find that the appellant was simply trying to present a picture that he has a well-founded fear of persecution upon return. I find he has invented and then embellished an invented claim.
29. I find that the appellant’s claim is inherently lacking in plausibility. The appellant claims that he and three friends were responsible for secretly handing out leaflets in their village. Sometime after they had undertaken this activity one of his friends was working as a Kolbar. Whilst working he got arrested, again this detail is all missing form his statement. Information of his arrest was passed back first to his own family via two of the Kolbars who had escaped arrest and return to the village. This information then made its way to the appellant’s friend ‘K’. There is no reason why he would/ should have been told. The appellant’s friend then warned the appellant who went to go and stay at a cousin’s residence approximately 2 hours away from his own house. In the early hours of the morning, at approximately 5 AM, the appellant’s family house was then raided. When asked at the hearing the appellant stated that he left his house the day before the raid. This would suggest that he left his house on the same day that his friend was arrested. From the arrest of the appellant’s friend to his house being raided is therefore a matter of hours. From the arrest to the appellant leaving the house is an even shorter period of time. The appellant stated there was no information at his house that would link him to any illegal activity. Despite this the authorities have reportedly arrested and detained his father on numerous occasions in an effort to pressure the appellant to return. When viewed in the round I found this claim to be inherently implausible.
30. Finally, there is the letter from the Komala Party. The appellant gave evidence that this letter was obtained with the assistance of his friend. There is no indication on the letter that any form of checks were made as to the appellant’s role. In considering the document in line with the overall credibility of the claim I find that the appellant has simply provided some information and a fabricated letter produced. I do not accept that this letter contains genuine information regarding the appellant. The appellant is an Iranian Kurd who would be returned on some form of emergency travel document. Whilst this may bring him to the attention of the authorities for the reasons set out in HB Kurds I do not find that he would be placed at risk of persecutory ill-treatment as there are no additional risk factors.
32. The appellant claims to be in fairly regular contact with his family. There is no evidence that he has been called up for his military service.
33. The Iranian CPIN on military service states: 5.2.2 The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) COI Compilation on Iran, dated July 2015, cited the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, BZ) December 2013 ‘General Official Report on Iran’, which stated that ‘… all men, upon reaching the age of 18, are called up as part of their military service duties. They must report to the military authorities within one month after the start of the Iranian calendar year in which they turn 18. Announcements are made via the media (including newspapers, radio and television) calling upon men born in a given year to report to the local conscription bureau…’25
34. The appellant left the country when he was aged 21. From the evidence he may have therefore been called up and completed his military service. In the alternative the CPIN lists various ways in which someone can be exempted. The appellant simply states in paragraph 9 of his witness statement (SB 36) that he is not completed military service and will be forcibly recruited to do so upon his return which he does not wish to do. He does not set out how he managed to avoid military service for 3 years following his 18th birthday. He does not give any justification as to why does not wish to undertake his military service. Given the credibility concerns above I do not accept that the appellant has not either completed his military service or has been exempted from the same.
35. The submission advanced regarding the Iranian intelligence services is that they are very sophisticated and ever developing. If this is true then I would anticipate that they would be able to ascertain the difference between a genuine political opponent, or threat to the state, and someone who has simply stood outside the embassy holding various placards to fabricate a claim for asylum. At interview the appellant provided a very limited detail concerning his political motivations (SB 772 questions 92 to 98). 36. The appellant claims to have attended approximately 14 demonstrations in the United Kingdom. He has certainly produced a vast amount of Facebook material. The front page of 1 of the bundles produced lists the appellant’s friends. When asked the names of some of these individuals the appellant had no idea who they were. I do not find that his Facebook friends are real “friends”. I find that the appellant has sought to develop an online profile in an attempt to place himself at risk. All of the photos in which the appellant appears he is facing away from the demonstration towards the camera holding a poster. He states that these posters and images are provided by those that organise the meetings. In some of the photographs that are sequential one can see the appellant holding one photograph and then in the next photo the person standing next to him is holding the same one. It is quite clear that these photographs are just passed between the individuals for a photo opportunity (page 34, 39, 56 of 445 by way of example). The appellant states he has never been approached by the Iranian authorities. His Facebook account has never been closed down. There is no indication he has been in any way monitored. There is no indication that he has been at these demonstrations for any period of time.
37. The appellant stated there were no other instances in Iran and he had never been brought to the authority’s attention. For the reasons given above I do not find his claim is credible that his friend was arrested whilst working as a Kolbar, the appellant’s family home was then raided, that an arrest warrant has been issued and his father has been repeatedly detained and released in order to try and secure the appellant’s attendance in Iran. Equally I do not find his claims to be at risk due to a purported failure to complete military service to be credible. Finally, whilst I acknowledge the amount of Facebook and other online activity that the appellant has undertaken whilst he has been in the United Kingdom and the demonstrations that he has attended I do not find that the motivation behind these is a genuine political motivation. I have considered the point in BA Iran that even a person acting in bad faith who has deliberately put themselves in harm’s way may still be in harm’s way but I dismiss this argument. I dismiss the argument on the basis that the Iranian authorities would be able to differentiate between a genuine political protest and someone who has simply attended demonstrations to fabricate a false claim for asylum in an attempt to generate a well-founded fear.”
The Hearings at the Upper Tribunal
6. Following the grant of permission against the FTT Judge’s decision, the matter had come before Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Seelhoff for an Error of Law Hearing on 29 October 2025. In a decision sealed on 24 November 2025. The Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge had allowed the appeal on the single ground before him. The Deputy Judge was minded to proceed to remake the decision, but he noted that Mr Muhammad Malik, counsel (who also appeared before me in this case) raised a difficulty:
“I considered that the case was suitable for remaking immediately as it was a narrow issue with their having been no challenge to the extensive adverse credibility findings. Mr Malik however sought time to take instructions which I allowed whilst I dealt with the other matter in the list.
When we resumed Mr Malik informed me that he was suffering with chronic leg pain and needed to go to hospital, that he did not consider he had adequate time to consider the approximately 1400 pages of documents before me and that he did not have an interpreter available to take instructions from the Appellant.
I indicated that I considered that this case would have always been suitable for an immediate remaking given the very narrow issues but agreed that given counsel’s health concerns I would adjourn.”
7. The Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge decided that,
“As I have already noted there is no challenge to the extensive adverse credibility findings and the assessment of risk on return is a narrow one to be conducted on the basis of the evidence already submitted. The case of ‘S’ cited above does suggest that on the factual findings in this case, the exercise may be straightforward. In all the circumstances of the case it is suitable to be remade in the Upper Tribunal.”
8. The Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge said,
“10. The issue with this decision is how the judge has approached risk on return in the context of the caselaw.
11. The Judge accepts that the Appellant has engaged in extensive sur place political activity including attending a number of demonstrations and posting extensively on Facebook.
12. At paragraph 31 of the decision the judge notes when referring to HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC) ; “The appellant is an Iranian Kurd who would be returned on some form of emergency travel document. Whilst this may bring him to the attention of the authorities for the reasons set out in HB Kurds I do not find that he would be placed at risk of persecutory ill-treatment as there are no additional risk factors.”
13. The first problem with this is that it is clear that even if carried out in bad faith, sur place activity and activity on Facebook can be a risk factor as is made clear in XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) (CG) [2022] UKUT 00023 which the Judge did not cite despite it being raised in the grounds and the Judge also did not address risk on return in line with FA (Iran) [2024] EWCA Civ 149.
14. The structure of the decision is such that the conclusion in respect of there being no additional risk factors precedes the consideration of the risk that might arise from sur place activity.
15. HB Kurds references the “hair trigger” approach the Iranian authorities have to political dissent. The judge seems to proceed on the basis that the authorities would be aware of the Appellant’s political activities [35] but would be able to; “ascertain the difference between a genuine political opponent, or threat to the state, and someone who has simply stood outside the embassy holding various placards to fabricate a claim for asylum.”
16. A similar form of words is repeated at [37]. What the judge does not do is consider whether or not the Iranian authorities would treat even the Appellant’s “bad faith” political activity as an offence against the Iranian authorities given the “hair trigger” approach to Kurds and those who have left illegally as is discussed in HB (Kurds). It may well be that had the judge taken the proper approach he would still have concluded that the Appellant was not at risk in line with S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 but the fact remains that the analysis was not completed.”
9. In the section setting out his notice of decision, the Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge stated:
“The decision contains a material error of law in respect of the global assessment of risk on return and is set aside to that extent save that all credibility findings are preserved including those that the political activities carried out by the Appellant were done so in “bad faith”.
10. Following the making of a transfer order, this appeal was listed before me for re-making on the issue of the Appellant’s sur place activities and the risk he may face in Iran.
11. I have set out much of the FTT Judge’s decision above, but I summarise some of the adverse findings for ease:
(a) “I find the late divulgence of this piece of evidence to highlight that the claim is fabricated and the appellant is seeking to embellish a claim. I am reinforced in this view when the other embellishments are considered.”
(b) “I find that the appellant’s claim is inherently lacking in plausibility”.
(c) “Given the credibility concerns above I do not accept that the appellant has not either completed his military service or has been exempted from the same.”
(d) “The appellant stated there was no information at his house that would link him to any illegal activity. Despite this the authorities have reportedly arrested and detained his father on numerous occasions in an effort to pressure the appellant to return. When viewed in the round I found this claim to be inherently implausible.”
(e) “In considering the document in line with the overall credibility of the claim I find that the appellant has simply provided some information and a fabricated letter produced. I do not accept that this letter contains genuine information regarding the appellant. The appellant is an Iranian Kurd who would be returned on some form of emergency travel document.”
(f) “The front page of 1 of the bundles produced lists the appellant’s friends. When asked the names of some of these individuals the appellant had no idea who they were. I do not find that his Facebook friends are real “friends”. I find that the appellant has sought to develop an online profile in an attempt to place himself at risk. All of the photos in which the appellant appears he is facing away from the demonstration towards the camera holding a poster. He states that these posters and images are provided by those that organise the meetings. In some of the photographs that are sequential one can see the appellant holding one photograph and then in the next photo the person standing next to him is holding the same one. It is quite clear that these photographs are just passed between the individuals for a photo opportunity (page 34, 39, 56 of 445 by way of example). The appellant states he has never been approached by the Iranian authorities. His Facebook account has never been closed down. There is no indication he has been in any way monitored. There is no indication that he has been at these demonstrations for any period of time.”
12. The real issue before me is whether the Appellant’s sur place activities, contrived to bolster his protection claim, may come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. Be that for the purposes of the obtaining of an Emergency Travel Document or otherwise. Be that, even if the Appellant undertook such sur place activities in ‘bad faith’.
13. For the hearing before me, I had been provided with a 408 paged bundle. That had within it a witness statement of the Appellant dated 17 September 2024. That statement was therefore dated before the hearings at the Upper Tribunal and so it was a statement provided for the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal.
14. Additionally, there was an undated skeleton argument at pages 6 to 18 of the Appellant’s bundle. That referred to older matters and Mr Malik confirmed that it was the skeleton argument for the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal.
15. Similarly, there were older documents such as a letter of support from the Komola party dated 13 (and 17) January 2025, but the FTT Judge had dealt with those matters extensively and had found that the Appellant had not told the truth.
16. At pages 51 to 332 the Appellant provided newer documents in respect of his Facebook profile, activating documents and activity logs from 20 January 2026 onwards. He has attended more demonstrations in the UK since the last hearing. In some images, the Appellant can be seen holding flags and A4 placards and is amongst crowds depicting himself in photographs. The Appellant’s bundle also contains many items of background material and news headlines and the like. None of those specific documents were highlighted to me at the hearing, but I have considered the background material and Facebook documents in the round.
17. Nor did the Appellant provide any oral evidence before me. No other witnesses were called either.
18. I had also been provided with 4 pages of background material from the Appellant’s solicitors shortly before the hearing. That evidence being “Silent protestors gather in Cheltenham in Solidarity with Iran”, “I saw people getting shot: Eyewitnesses tells of Iran protest crackdown”, “How Iran is enforcing an unprecedented digital blackout to crush protests”, “Have the protests in Iran failed”, “Irfan protester Erfan Soltani to be executed tomorrow amid brutal crackdown by regime in Tehran”, “I’m an Iranian protestor in the UK-I’m terrified I will disappear” and “Is history repeating itself in Iran”.
19. In his submissions before me Mr Malik said that just in the past few weeks 5000 people had been killed in Iran. It had been admitted by the Iranian leadership that thousands of protesters had been killed. He said it was inhumane and “it was almost manslaughter”.
20. Mr Malik said he relied on the skeleton argument in the Appellant’s bundle, but I pointed out that that was an old skeleton argument for the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal because it relied on matters which the FTT Judge had found against the Appellant and which were not the subject of an appeal before me as no permission had been granted to raise those matters.
21. Mr Malik said that the significant issue was the Appellant’s sur place activity. Mr Malik referred to the letter from the Komola Party in the bundle dated 17 January 2025. I asked Mr Malik how this was helpful noting that the FTT Judge had dealt with this issue and because the FTT Judge had made an adverse credibility finding on this issue. Mr Malik agreed that in fact the letter did not help after all.
22. Mr Malik then referred to the Appellant’s claim that he had not undertaken military service, but again this issue was not before me because the FTT Judge had made findings on this issue too which were adverse to the Appellant.
23. Mr Malik submitted that the case law did not deal with sharing of information and how it can be deleted. Mr Malik said that there were hundreds of messages and comments too. Mr Malik said that because the Appellant was a Kurd then that was a risk factor too.
24. Mr Mcveety relied on the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in OM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1585 (05 December 2025). He said that there had been preserved findings of the FTT Judge whereby the Appellant’s activities had been contrived. Mr Mcveety asked rhetorically whether the Appellant would really come to the attention of the authorities. He said that the Appellant could delete his Facebook account at the earliest opportunity. Mr Mcveety said that the Appellant is ‘not on the radar’. Mr Mcveety said that he was alive to what was happening in Iran and that it was not clear if there was going to be durable change with the uprising in Iran. No one could predict what would happen in the future.
25. I was also referred by the parties to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482. I note that at paragraph 30 it was made clear that,
“56. In contrast, as was pointed out in XX at [99] the Iranian authorities do not persecute individuals because of their political neutrality. Moreover, in the present case, and in the light of both the retained findings and those made by Judge Kebede as to the unlikelihood of the appellant having already come to the attention of the authorities and his lack of genuine political belief in the PJAK, the appellant was not in a position where he would have to prove his political loyalty, rather it would be one in which, as Judge Kebede found, the appellant would not be required to volunteer information about his activities in the UK.”
26. Mr Mcveety also referred to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in WAS (Pakistan) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 894. I note with care that it was said at paragraph 84.
“84. I paraphrase a question which Phillips LJ asked Mr Holborn in argument, 'What evidence did the UT expect?' It is very improbable that there would be any direct evidence of covert activity by the Pakistani authorities, whether it consisted of monitoring demonstrations, meetings and other activities, monitoring social media, or the use of spies or informers. I do not consider that Sedley LJ was suggesting, in paragraph 18 of YB (Eritrea), that a tribunal must infer successful covert activity by a foreign state in the circumstances which he described. He was, nevertheless, making a common-sense point, which is that a tribunal cannot be criticised if it is prepared to infer successful covert activity on the basis of limited direct evidence. Those observations have even more force in the light of the great changes since 2008 in the sophistication of such methods, in the availability of electronic evidence of all sorts, and in the ease of their transmission. To give one obvious example, which requires no insight into the covert methods which might be available to states, it is very easy for an apparently casual observer of any scene to collect a mass of photographs and/or recordings on his phone, without drawing any adverse attention to himself, and then to send them anywhere in the world.”
Legal Framework
27. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. The lower standard of proof applies. In an Article 3 ECHR claim the Appellant must show there are substantial grounds for believing that he will face a real risk of suffering serious harm in his country of origin.
28. I have taken into consideration the country guidance cases of HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC), SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308 (IAC), BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC), XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC), and S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482.
Analysis and conclusions
29. I have carefully considered the evidence in the round but even to the lower evidential standard which applies to the Appellant’s claim, the Appellant’s political activities are contrived. I come to this conclusion because firstly there are the retained findings of the FTT Judge which say that. I have considered the further documentation provided by the Appellant, including updating Facebook evidence and pictures of the Appellant at demonstrations since the original hearing at the First-tier Tribunal. The Appellant has failed to provide any oral evidence or to be tested in respect of his motivators or the like for the purposes of cross examination. That is a matter for the Appellant who has remained legally represented by competent solicitors and counsel throughout. It is not for me to second guess why the Appellant did not provide oral evidence, but the fact is that he did not.
30. The retained findings are that the Appellant did not do the things he alleged in Iran in terms of his anti-regime activities. Whilst I accept that as a Kurd it would not be easy to undertake political activity in Iran, I cannot ignore that the Appellant has not been accepted to have told the truth about his past activities or claims. Not even in respect of his letter from the Komola Party.
31. I am not satisfied even to the lower standard that even the Appellant’s latest attendance at demonstrations reflects his genuine political beliefs. The Appellant provided photographs of himself with occasional A4 sized placards, with unfolded red Komola Party flags and is amongst others at demonstrations. At best there is attendance at demonstrations. Whilst I am well aware that corroboration or supporting evidence is not required (I deal with this further below), it is surprising that despite there being much time to obtain it, there is nothing to support the Appellant’s claims of being a genuine political supporter or the like. This is despite the Appellant having been legally represented for years.
32. The Appellant’s political activity is limited to attending protests and posting on Facebook. He has not provided any cogent evidence and nor do I accept that he has engaged in any other political activities in the UK. This lacuna in the Appellant’s evidence is yet a further reason why I have no alternative but to conclude that the Appellant’s sur place activities are contrived. I have been very careful to ensure that I do not seek corroboration or supporting evidence which breaches the principles revisited in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216; [2023] Imm. A.R. 713 Singh LJ with whom Warby and King LJJ agreed. It was made clear that corroboration is not required. His Lordship said,
“86. It was common ground before this Court that there is no requirement that the applicant must adduce corroborative evidence: see Kasolo v Secretary of State for the Home Department (13190, a decision of the then Immigration Appeal Tribunal, 1 April 1996). On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight. This is what was meant by Green LJ in SB (Sri Lanka) at para. 46(iv).
33. In this Appellant’s case, the absence of such easily obtainable evidence of various strands, including videos, witnesses, a witness statement for example, from leaders of parties and other matters were clearly and obviously necessary in this case. The Appellant’s failure to produce such evidence, even now, at a remaking hearing when there has been plenty of time for it to be obtained means it is a factor I cannot ignore. It affects the weight I can attach to the other evidence from the Appellant. There will be varieties of cases in which Appellants are without legal representation, but in this case the Appellant is represented by experienced solicitors and counsel.
34. I have also taken into account that the previous Judge with the retained findings, found that the Appellant fabricated an account of persecution in Iran in order to bolster his asylum claim.
35. Having attached little weight to the Appellant’s account, his Facebook posts, and photographs, I turn to consider what other evidence he has provided in support of his claim. The Appellant has chosen not to provide evidence from any of the organisers or the friends that attended the demonstrations. I have not been referred to any videos that show him actively participating in any demonstration. Nor, therefore, can I ‘see’ the demonstrations beyond the stills photographs/images and we are not able to see for myself how the Appellant ‘fits in’ at the demonstrations. Indeed, I remind myself that this was an issue at the heart of the appeal and well known to both the Appellant and his legal advisers.
36. Having considered the evidence as a whole and for the reasons set out above, I find that the Appellant has contrived his sur place activities in an attempt to bolster his claim even with his updating evidence since the FTT hearing.
37. I assess whether the Appellant is at a real risk as a result of his Facebook posts. In accordance with XX the issue before me is whether the Appellant has been, or before the Appellant deletes his account, is likely to be, the subject of more focussed, ad hoc searches because he is an individual of significant adverse interest. In reaching a decision I must consider the Appellant’s existing profile, where he fits on the social graph, and the extent to which he or his social network may have their Facebook material accessed.
38. I note carefully the reference to numerous ‘friends’ on the social graph the Appellant’s profile fits and the extent to which his Facebook material or that of his social network may be accessed. I am not satisfied that the Appellant is of significant adverse interest for the following reasons because the Appellant was not politically active in Iran and he was not of interest to the authorities when he left.
39. At paragraph 83 of XX, guidance was issued that in assessing the publicity the Appellant’s account has generated one must examine the number of meaningful interactions the appellant has with people on Facebook and their interaction in the real world. For the reasons previously found and which I conclude too, the Appellant is not a member of or genuine supporter of Kurdish separatist/dissident organisation in the UK. His “real world” activities at their highest, are that he attended demonstrations. He posts and re-posts messages that have been posted by his friends. He appears never to have seen the real media at demonstrations. His “real world” activities do not present him as an individual who would be of significant interest to the authorities so as to prompt targeted Facebook surveillance.
40. I consider that the appellant may have garnered many friends but the issue is whether the interaction with them has attracted publicity, attention or raised his online profile. The Appellant claims to have many friends but I was not referred to any real evidence to establish this, I only really have the Appellant’s account. Even if that is correct, the highest number of likes attracted by a post was low in the hundreds and that relates to limited popularity. I therefore have no hesitation in concluding that the Appellant has not established that he has a Facebook account that attracts publicity/online traffic and would therefore come to the attention of the authorities. Nor has the Appellant provided evidence that he is friends with people who are of significant political interest to the Iranian authorities. The Appellant provided no evidence that he received any threats or harassment from people purporting to be part of the Iranian government or leadership, nor had he received such adverse comments to his posts. This indicates that he has not come to the attention of the authorities to date. The printouts provided are therefore of limited evidential value. I do not therefore accept that the printouts establish the dates of the posts or the privacy settings of the posts.
41. I am satisfied that the Appellant has not come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities and that he would not raise the Iranian authorities’ suspicions or concerns upon return by not having or deleting his account. The timely closure of his Facebook account would neutralise the risk consequential on having had a “critical” Facebook account.
42. In further assessing whether the Appellant is at a real risk because of his attendance at demonstrations in the UK (both before the FTT hearing and the more recent attendances) I have applied the principles established in BA and I am not satisfied that it is likely that the Appellant came to the attention of the Iranian authorities or that tracing him would be a priority for them. It is obviously very easy for anyone to stand amongst crowds matching one’s own ethnicity and to take and images, including unfurling flags and to hold placards. Therefore, even when there have been genuine demonstrations which can be proved with dates, I do not accept that the Appellant’s actual and truthful involvement was more than staged photoshoots. The Appellant had the opportunity to provide video evidence of the real scenarios.
43. The Appellant has attended demonstrations. I attach some weight to the Appellant’s claim but I must temper that with the findings that he has fabricated evidence to bolster his claim. I was not referred to any evidence that establishes that the demonstration attracted media attention in the UK or Iran. This is therefore a significant factor. It tends to lend support for the Appellant’s activities being opportunistic, relatively brief, contrived, staged. I accept that there were a number of times that he did this (at least 14 previously and more now), but that of itself is not sufficient for me to conclude that he will have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities or that his profile will be linked to others which causes him to also be identified.
44. In accordance with BA, I have taken into consideration that the Iranian authorities attempt to identify people demonstrating outside the Iranian Embassy in London by filming and photographing them. I also note that Iranian security apparatus attempts to match names to faces of demonstrators from photographs. However, I am not satisfied that the Iranian authorities have the Appellant’s name- he was not of interest to them in Iran. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that his Facebook activities have come to the attention of the authorities. It has not been explained to me how, in the manner set out how photographs of the Appellant at a demonstration could be used to identify him.
45. I note the guidance in BA that as a result of the large number of people who demonstrate in the UK, the Iranian government is unable to monitor all returnees who have been involved in these demonstrations, and the lack of evidence that the authorities have facial recognition technology at Iman Khomeini International Airport that would detect people of interest.
46. Since BA, in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 and of WAS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 894, the issue of monitoring has been reconsidered.
47. I accept that Iran is now likely to have access to facial recognition technology. That however is not the issue, the real question is whether facial recognition technology has the capacity to register the faces in demonstrations, when thousands of participants attend, and then at a later date, notify the user that the person is in the vicinity. The consistent thread through BA and XX is that such technology is available but it does not have the capacity to conduct mass surveillance which is why the authorities target specific individuals. I accept of course that the Iranian authorities use surveillance technology, HB (Kurds), BA and XX all establish that the state does. As the Appellant and his legal advisers are well aware, what was required was that the face recognition technology and AI has the capacity to monitor and subsequently identify people like the Appellant who are not known to the authorities, have not attracted targeted surveillance, and who are no more than passive (which I conclude that the Appellant in reality was, despite his staged events) members of a crowd.
48. I therefore find that the Appellant has not established that his attendance at demonstrations in the UK has come to the attention of the Iranian authorities or is likely to do so. In accordance with paragraph 66 of BA I am satisfied that the Appellant is not at real risk of identification and therefore not at real risk of ill-treatment on return because he would not be identified as a frequent demonstrator, he played no particular role in demonstrations, and his participation was not highlighted in the media. The Court of Appeal’s important decision in MH does not assist the Appellant in this important regard.
49. I am well aware of the recent events in Iran. I note the additional 4 pages of background material and which I have referred to above. Whilst the Iranian authorities will almost certainly be at a heightened level of suspicion of returnees, particularly from the UK and the West, this Appellant’s profile is so low and of such irrelevance that no additional difficulties will arise for him. In particular, this Appellant has lied about his past accounts of persecution. Despite him continuing to attend demonstrations and to update his Facebook account, there is nothing which will mean that he will be at any real risk, despite the hair trigger approach now being heightened.
50. I assess whether it would be unreasonable to expect the Appellant to cease his sur place activities. In regard to his Facebook activities, the guidance provided in XX is clear; “In deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution, as there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform.”
51. The same reasoning I have provided can be repeated in respect of the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations. I am not satisfied that he has attended the demonstrations to express his genuinely held political beliefs. I find that the Appellant attended his past and recent demonstrations to bolster his protection claim. In these circumstances it is not unreasonable to expect the Appellant to stop attending demonstrations.
52. I assess further whether it is likely that the Appellant’s sur place activities would come to the attention when applying for an Emergency Travel Document or if returned to Iran. I repeat matters above in respect of the very recent updating problems and killings of protestors In Iran. I have also reminded myself of the guidance provided in HB that Kurdish ethnicity is a risk factor because Kurds are regarded with greater suspicion by the Iranian authorities and are likely to be subjected to heightened scrutiny on return to Iran. This when combined with other factors, may also create a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. The mere fact of being a returnee of Kurdish ethnicity with or without a valid passport and even if combined with illegal exit does not in itself create a risk of Article 3 ill-treatment. Being Kurdish is a risk factor, which when combined with other risk factors, such as involvement in low-level political activity, if discovered, involves the risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. Moreover, that the Iranian authorities demonstrate a “hair-trigger” approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activity or support for Kurdish rights, such that the threshold is low and the reaction by the authorities is likely to be extreme.
53. I have also reminded myself that in accordance with BA when considering the risk on return to Iran it is the authorities’ perception of the individual’s political activities which is important, the appellant’s motivation is irrelevant. If discovered, the appellant faces a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment in Iran due to his political activities in the UK.
54. I was provided with much background material in the bundle, but I was not directed to anything specific, other than the 4 recent pages. The thrust being that the Iranian authorities will be even more vigilant about outsiders than they were previously. I have considered the updating background material set out within the Appellant’s bundle which I have taken into account.
55. I conclude to the required test that the Appellant’s sur place activities have not come to the attention of the authorities and a timely closure of his Facebook account would neutralise the risk it presents. I note that as a Kurd who is returning without a passport, and who exited illegally, the Appellant is likely to be questioned on entry into Iran. I also accept the recent events have resulted in an increased scrutiny of Kurds. Against that background is the question of whether the Appellant could reasonably be expected to disclose his sur place activities when questioned by the authorities.
56. At paragraphs 98 to 100 of XX it is established that the law does not prevent a decision maker from asking if a person will volunteer to the Iranian authorities the fact of a previous lie to the UK authorities, such as a protection claim made on fabricated grounds, or a deleted Facebook account. This was distinguished from RT (Zimbabwe) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38; [2013] 1 AC 152 on the basis that the Iranian authorities do not persecute people because of their actual or perceived political neutrality; a returnee to Iran will return to a highly organised state, and the decision maker is not applying a test of what a claimant ought to do. In my judgment the Appellant remains in this risk-free category despite the recent events in Iran because of the serious adverse credibility findings against this Appellant and because of his non-genuinely held sur place activities online and at demonstrations. His activities have been in ‘bad faith’. He can say so if he is asked.
57. At paragraph 102 XX states that the Tribunal is permitted to ask what a returnee to Iran would do in relation to a contrived Facebook account or fabricated protection claim provided the inquiry is not too speculative. On the facts of this case, it is not too speculative. The Appellant has practiced deception and/or dishonesty in relation to dealings with state officials in the making of his protection claim; the Iranian government has a well-established method of questioning and are therefore predictable; and the risks around discovery of social media material, prior to account deletion are minimal because the persons social graph and/or social media activities are limited as are the risks of him being identified at a demonstration. For the reasons I have referred to above, this is so even with the most recent events in Iran.
Conclusion
58. The Court of Appeal in S v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 confirmed that the guidance provided in XX was correct. I have the Court of Appeal’s decision in mind including when it was made clear at paragraphs 46 and 47 that,
“46. Undoubtedly, it was necessary for the judge to have regard to the whole history of the appellant's attendance outside the Embassy since his arrival in the UK, and to consider its significance in relation to the risk to the appellant, in accordance with the relevant country guidance in the cases to which both she and we have referred.
47. Likewise in relation to the evidence concerning the appellant's use of social media, it was necessary for the judge to take into account the whole history of his usage of social media since his arrival in the UK, and to consider its significance in relation to the risk to the appellant in accordance with the relevant country guidance.”
59. The Court of Appeal went further and applied the same legal rationale to the attendance of appellants at demonstrations who are not expressing genuine political views.
60. Additionally, as I have stated above the recent decision in OM v SSHD makes this even clearer.
61. I have considered the recent background material in respect of Iran and the killing of demonstrators in Iran, but in my judgment this Appellant’s claim comes nowhere near placing him at such a risk because he is not and will not be perceived to be against the regime in Iran.
62. I therefore find that although the Appellant is likely to be questioned because of his ethnicity, lack of passport, and illegal exit, he would not be required to volunteer information about his activities in the UK. The Appellant is not at risk on return because of his Kurdish ethnicity and illegal exit alone as noted in SSH and HR and accordingly he does not face a real risk of persecution. The Appellant’s other aspect of his protection claim including humanitarian protection and Article 3 ECHR fail for the same reasons.
63. In respect of any other human rights grounds, including Article 8 ECHR, there were no specific separate arguments put before me and nor am I able to discern any for myself. On the facts of this case therefore, the Appellant’s claim based on human rights also fails.
Notice of Decision
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law.
I remake the decision.
The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

26 February 2026