Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002936
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65617/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
28th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KIRK

Between

K.U.
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P. Richardson, Counsel, instructed by Lawmatics Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh. He appeals against the decision of the Respondent dated 4 December 2023 to refuse his claim for refugee status and alternatively for humanitarian protection.
2. In a decision which was promulgated on 30 April 2025, following a hearing in the First-tier Tribunal on 21 March 2025, Judge Hena (‘the Judge’) dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal (‘the Decision’).
3. The Appellant was anonymised by the First-tier Tribunal. There is no reason for this Tribunal to interfere with that order.
4. On 31 July 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick granted the Appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on one of the three grounds raised.
Background
5. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom (UK) on 27 March 2008 with entry clearance on a visit visa. He claimed asylum on 15 May 2019 on the basis of his membership of Jamaat-e-Islami, and him coming to the attention of the Awami League. He submitted a claim to be recognised as a refugee on the ground of political opinion, and alternatively was taken to have made a claim for humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules. He also claimed he engages Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR.
6. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s application in a decision letter dated 4 December 2023.
7. The Appellant is married to his partner who was granted refugee status in the UK on 8 December 2023. They are parents to two children who were born in the UK in May 2023 and March 2025 respectively.
First-tier Tribunal decision
8. The Judge noted her concerns in relation to the Appellant’s evidence which impacted his credibility and found that the Appellant was not targeted in Bangladesh and there are no false charges against him (at [43] and [47]). Her Honour concluded that the Appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution and was not eligible for humanitarian protection (at [53]). Further, the Appellant’s Article 2 and 3 claims had not been made out (at [54]).
9. With respect to the Article 8 claim, the Judge was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate the Appellant and his partner are in a genuine and subsisting relationship (at [57]). The Judge accepted that they ‘clearly have a family life’ and noted that both children were born in the UK (at [58]). However, Her Honour found the evidence was ‘lacking’ on why the Appellant cannot make an application for entry clearance to join his partner in the UK. She accepted that the Appellant’s partner has family in the UK, including an aunt who had ‘previously provided her with accommodation and care’, which demonstrated that his partner had a ‘strong support network in the UK’ (at 58)]. She noted that the Appellant’s partner and children would be entitled to support in the UK should they require it until he is able to join them (at [59]. Her considered the best interest of the children and found that ‘given their young age their best interest is to remain in the UK with their mother’, and it did not appear from the evidence that ‘the impact of separation from the appellant would be so great at this stage of their lives’ (at [59]).
10. The Judge took into account that the Appellant had been in the UK since 2008 and did not claim asylum until 2019, which was a factor that ‘add[ed] to the public interest in maintaining immigration controls’ (at [60]). Her Honour concluded at [61]-[63] with reference to section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002:
The separation would be temporary, and I do not have the evidence before me to say the temporary separation would impact them to such a degree to balance the scales in favour of leave outside of the rules.
I must consider the s.117 factors and make the following findings:
(i) The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest. This public interest factor is engaged.
(ii) It is in the public interest that the person seeking to remain in this country can speak English. The appellant can speak some English. This public interest factor is neutral.
(iii) The public interest also requires persons who seeks to remain to be financially independent. This public interest factor is engaged.
(iv) The public interest requires that little weight be attached to any relationship or private life established during the period that the appellant has been here unlawfully. Little weight should also be attached to any private life established during the period where the appellant’s leave has been precarious. These public interest factors are engaged.
Given my findings above, and the public interest factors, I find that the factors weigh in favour of the public interest in removal of the appellant.
Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The Appellant submitted that the Judge erred in:
1) Failing to consider relevant evidence or give sufficient weight to evidence;
2) Over-relying on credibility issues;
3) Taking an incorrect approach to assessing private and family life in the UK under Article 8.
12. Permission was granted by the Upper Tribunal on the Article 8 ground only:
Ground Three raises four separate complaints about the FTT’s article 8 assessment. It is arguable that the FTT erred in conducting the article 8 assessment on the basis that that the appellant’s separation from his wife and children would be “temporary” because even though she had been granted refugee status and could not safely return to Bangladesh, he could return there and apply for entry clearance. The appellant asserts that the FTT failed to take into account that he did not meet the financial requirements for a grant of entry clearance, such that there was no factual basis for finding that any separation would be temporary. This is arguable. Any error in this regard will inevitably have affected the FTT’s assessment of the best interests of the children as well.
Upper Tribunal hearing and submissions
13. The oral and written submissions at the hearing are a matter of record and need not be set out in full here. The Tribunal had access to all the documents before the First-tier Tribunal and the composite bundle filed by the Appellant. I heard submissions from Mr Richardson for the Appellant and Mr Naffey for the Respondent, which I have fully taken into account.
14. Mr Richardson on behalf of the Appellant contended that the Judge did not consider that if the Appellant were forced to return to Bangladesh, he would be unable to join his partner in the UK as he would not be able to meet the financial requirements. The Judge treated the Appellant’s ability to seek entry clearance as a ‘silver bullet’ fatal to the assessment. Further, the Judge’s finding at [59] that it is in the best interest of the children for them to remain in the UK with their mother is ‘perverse’ if the separation of the Appellant from his children is permanent not temporary, as the Judge found. The Judge did not undertake a careful consideration of the best interests of the Appellant’s children. As the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in making the proportionality assessment under Article 8, the Judge’s error made with respect to this issue is material.
15. Mr Nappey on behalf of the Appellant argued that the Judge gave due regard to the length of time the Appellant had been in the UK at [60] and the strong support network the Appellant’s partner had available to her in the UK at [58]-[59]. The Appellant did not provide evidence that he would not be able to seek entry clearance due to the financial requirements. The Judge noted at [58] that the Appellant’s evidence was ‘lacking’ on why he could not make an application to join his partner in the UK. There was no evidence that the Appellant’s partner would be unable to care for their children if he were removed from the UK, or that the support that the Appellant’s partner’s aunt had previously provided her would not continue. The Judge noted at [58] that the Appellant’s partner ‘has a strong support network in the UK’, and at [59] that she and the children would be entitled to support if they needed it as she has been recognised as a refugee. The Judge considered the best interest of the children is for them to remain in the UK with their mother having regard to their young age, and from the evidence it did ‘not appear the impact of separation from the appellant would be so great at this stage of their lives’ at [59].
Findings on error of law
16. There are limited circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the Judge, who saw and heard the Appellant give his evidence. In Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48 (‘Volpi’) Lewison LJ, with whom Males and Snowden LJJ agreed, explained interference with findings of fact and credibility is appropriate only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ at [2]-[5]:
“The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
(ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
(v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
(vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
17. The Judge noted that the evidence was ‘lacking on why the appellant cannot make an appropriate [entry clearance] application to join his spouse’ if he were returned to Bangladesh. This is a finding the Judge was entitled to make based on the evidence before her, including the written statements of the Appellant and his partner, which did not state that the financial requirements would be a barrier to the Appellant obtaining entry clearance. Her Honour therefore reasonably concluded that the ‘separation would be temporary’ (at [61]). The Judge considered the s 117B factors and found that the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration control was engaged, referring to the evidence that the Appellant had been in the UK since 2008 and did not claim asylum until 2019 (at [60]). Her Honour noted the other factors that she considered weighed in favour of the public interest (at [62]), and she concluded that these factors weighed in favour of the public interest in removal of the Appellant (at [63]).
18. Having made the finding that the Appellant’s separation from his family would be temporary, the Judge found that this would not impact his children ‘to such a degree to balance the scales in favour of leave outside the rules’ (at [61]). The Judge considered the evidence before her that the Appellant’s partner has ‘a strong support network in the UK’, an aunt who had ‘previously provided her with accommodation and care’, and the Appellant’s partner’s access to government support as a refugee. There was no evidence before the Judge that the Appellant’s partner would not receive ongoing support from her family, including her aunt, or from her support network in the UK (at [58]), or that as a refugee she and her children would not have access to government support (at [59]). Her Honour was entitled to reach her conclusion based on the evidence before the Tribunal that ‘the best interest of the children … is for them to remain in the UK with their mother’, having regard to their young age, and it not appearing from the evidence that the impact on the children of their separation from the Appellant ‘would be so great at this stage of their lives’ (at [59]).
19. Having regard to the guidance in Volpi, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Judge’s findings of fact were grounded in the evidence, adequately reasoned and rational, and the Judge applied the law correctly. The Judge’s conclusions were not ‘rationally insupportable’ or ‘plainly wrong’, and it follows that the Decision contains no error of law. The ground of appeal amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Decision.
Notice of Decision
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

Linda J. Kirk
Dr Linda J Kirk
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
25 November 2025