UI-2025-002949
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- Status of case: Unreported
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The decision
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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002949
First-tier Tribunal No: LP/00043/2025
PA/67352/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th February 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAFFER
Between
CWS
(anonymity order made)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Dingley of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Wain a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 2 February 2026
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant was born on 12 October 1997. He is a citizen of China. He appealed against the decision of the Respondent dated 11 December 2023, refusing his application for asylum and humanitarian protection. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Turner (“the Judge”), promulgated on 28 January 2025, dismissing the appeal.
2. The Appellant’s Discretionary Leave to Remain was extended on 24 November 2025. Having heard submissions, I agreed that as the grant did not impact on the sole issue before me, namely whether the Appellant was entitled to protection under the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status or Refugees due to the risk of trafficking, the appeal was not abandoned.
Permission to appeal
3. Permission was granted by Judge Turner on 3 July 2025 who, having refused to grant permission to appeal on other grounds raised, stated:
“3. The grounds argue that the IJ failed to resolve the issue of general retrafficking. The determination at paragraphs 29-37 consider the risk of retrafficking from the Appellant’s original traffickers and also whether the Appellant could internally relocate. Whilst the Appellant’s circumstances and any vulnerabilities were considered, the determination did not specifically make a finding as to whether the Appellant was at risk of re-trafficking by others. It could be inferred from the findings on the reasonableness of relocation that he is not .... As such, this is an arguable error of law.
4. The failure to apply the presumption under 339K is consolidated with the above.
5. In relation to any argument under 276ADE in relation to private life, again the point omitted relates to risk of general re-trafficking which is also consolidated with the above.”
4. Upon renewal to the Upper Tribunal, in relation to the matters on which permission to appeal had not been granted, on 19 August 2025 Judge Kabede refused to extend the grant except on the issue of trafficking as follows:
“6…. permission is limited to the trafficking issue, in particular the arguable absence of findings on the risk of re-trafficking. The grant of permission did not specifically address the second part of Ground 3 (risk from the previous traffickers) but I do not exclude the matter from the grant of permission. Permission is therefore granted on all issues relating to trafficking.”
5. Given the limited grant of permission to appeal, I will only hereafter refer to the trafficking issue.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
6. Judge Turner made the following findings relevant to this hearing:
“29. … The Respondent accepted that the Appellant had been trafficked, following the conclusive grounds determination…
…
31. However, it is the Respondent’s assertion that there is sufficient protection and/or the ability to internally relocate on return...
32. … I … conclude that protection would not be available to the Appellant in general terms. … If … the Appellant returned to his home area, there is always the potential for someone to identify the Appellant, even though such a prospect after so many years is minimal.
33. I am however required to consider whether the Appellant could internally relocate to avoid any potential risk. HC and RC considered this issue and is cited at paragraph 5 of the CPIN. The guidance concludes that:
‘China is a vast country and it may be, for example, that in a particular part of China the efforts to eliminate trafficking are determined and the level of complicity between state officials and traffickers is low. If an appellant comes from such an area, or if she can relocate to such an area, there may be no real risk to her (paragraph 82 [2])’ ‘The Chinese state has an obligation to house the homeless and will not allow their citizens to starve. Therefore, a returned trafficked woman without family support will not be allowed by the authorities to fall into a state of destitution.’ (paragraph 82 [3])
34. The guidance also considers the impact of the hukou system. Whilst the guidance considers some of the obstacles faced by people trying to register within the system, there is limited reference to how this may impact upon a person seeking to avoid detection when seeking to internally relocate. Section 12.1.4 of the CPIN notes that there is no information about the ability of victims of modern slavery to be able to relocate.
35. The country expert report does not consider the issue of internal relocation specifically but rather the lack of support available to victims of human trafficking. The report notes a lack of support available to those such as the Appellant. Mr Dingley submits that the evidence indicates a lack of acknowledgment of trafficking offences against men, thus there is no support available to the Appellant as a male victim. I acknowledge that support and protection is likely to be limited. However, the Appellant is a young man of working age. There is no evidence that the Appellant as any health issues that is likely to cause the Appellant issues on his return.
36. I therefore considered the position of a single male such as the Appellant having to return to China without the support of any family or friends. I reviewed the decision reached in ZC & Others (Risk – illegal exit – loan sharks) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00028. The case noted at paragraph 46 that there was a lack of evidence advanced in that case to indicate that internal relocation would be unduly harsh. Whilst that case considered the issue of risk from loan sharks, I find that case comparable to the present appeal. The Appellant claims that he owes money to those who facilitated his exit from China. There is limited evidence of the people involved in his trafficking, the extent of their power or influence and whether they continue to have any interest in the Appellant, noting the lack of contact since 2017. I also find the Appellant comparable to the Appellant in ZC in the sense that there is a lack of evidence that the Appellant has any risk factors in terms of vulnerabilities, as stated above. The only factor which distinguishes the Appellant in ZC from the Appellant in this appeal is that ZC was said to have a wealthy friend who may offer financial support to ZC on return. Paragraph 46 did however go on to say that even if this was not the case, there was no reason why the Appellant could not relocate elsewhere in China. The determination again goes on to consider the implication of the hukou system but concludes that there was no evidence presented to indicate that information from the registration system would be passed on to the loan sharks. I find the same applies in this case in relation to the Appellant’s traffickers.
37. Overall, I find that the Appellant could internally relocate if he felt that he was at risk from the traffickers in his home area.”
The Appellant’s grounds to seeking permission to appeal
7. The grounds dated 5 February 2025 asserted that:
“9. … the Appellant is an accepted victim of trafficking...
10. The Tribunal is asked to consider that the Appellant's has been trafficked in the past, and is someone who is likely to be subjected to further exploitation as a result of various vulnerabilities. The following risk factors were highlighted in support of this argument:
i. Limited education/literacy (screening 2.6 – p1114)
ii No contact with family (screening – p1125 (AIR q5/6 p1056)
iii Limited Mandarin - speaks Vietnamese
iv. Has been present for 8 years
v. Blacklisted by Chinese govt. preventing access to jobs, homes, education etc. as a result of Falun Gong association
vi. Male - so falls through the gap of any victim protection - see expert report p29 (p67)”.
…
12. Further and alternatively, the First-tier Tribunal has failed to apply the presumption at paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules. It being accepted that the Appellant has been trafficked in the past, there is a presumption that this risk is repeatable unless there are “good reasons” to the contrary.
13. … there are no good reasons identified for why the presumption the appellant would be trafficked again does not apply.
…
16. … in the assessments of potential risk of harm from those who previously trafficked him, the Tribunal has failed to engage with the evidence raised by the Appellant on the effect of the Ho Khau system. At [34] the Tribunal considers the Respondent’s CPIN on this, and at [36] considers the conclusions in the case of ‘ZC’ that there was no evidence presented in that appeal to say information from the Ho Khau system would be passed onto loan sharks. The Tribunal was expressly addressed on this question, with extracts from the expert report relied upon, including:
i. The Judge’s attention was specifically drawn to paragraphs 6.3-6.5 (p73 onward) of the expert report, demonstrating that access to location information is facilitated through an app.
ii. The Judge was expressly addressed on levels of corruption, and the ease of bribing for access to local Hokou information, addressed at paragraph 6.5 of the expert report (p74)
iii. there was additionally evidence suggesting that the Appellant would be unable to register for a Hu Khau if he did try to relocate at paragraph 7.21-7.24 (p82)…
17. This evidence addresses the concerns raised by the Judge at paragraph 36 but is not accounted for in the assessment of whether internal relocation is a viable option.
18. Additionally, at [35] the Judge finds that the Appellant would be a young man of working age without health issues, but does not consider the various vulnerability factors addressed at paragraph 10 above.
19. … those same factors highlighted at paragraph 10 above were relied upon in support of the 276ADE argument, and are not accounted for in the Tribunal’s assessments of this question at paragraph 39.”
8. The renewed grounds dated 10 July 2025 will not be repeated as they relate to the Falun Gong issue upon which permission to appeal has not been granted.
The Respondent’s position
9. There was no Rule 24 notice.
Oral submissions
10. Mr Wain submitted in relation to Ground 1 that the Judge dealt with the issue of risk from alternative traffickers implicitly by finding at [37] “that the Appellant could internally relocate if he felt that he was at risk from the traffickers in his home area”. The Judge found that he was a young man with no health issues and of working age at [35]. The challenge in Ground 1 depends on whether the was a failure to consider the report of Dr Tran.
11. He submitted in relation to Ground 2 that the Judge was not obliged to consider [339K] of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules as it was not raised at the hearing, or in the skeleton argument that had been filed on behalf of the Appellant before the Judge. Even if the Judge was obliged to consider [339K], she was required to consider the risk in the context of the availability of state protection and an internal flight alternative. The Judge did not find that there would be state protection, but dismissed the appeal as there was an internal flight alternative. The challenge in Ground 2 depends on whether the was a failure to consider the report of Dr Tran.
12. He submitted in relation to Ground 3 that at [36] of the decision the Judge relied on the conclusions of ZC. The Judge was not referred to clear and cogent evidence to depart from that country guidance. The report of Dr Tran was based on there being no reasonable internal flight alternative as explained in the skeleton argument at [19-25] before the Judge. The Judge dealt with appeal in the way it was presented. She concluded at [32] “that protection would not be available to the Appellant in general terms.” As explained in Lata v SSHD [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), there was no obligation on the Judge to consider points raised that were not “Robinson obvious”. The report from Dr Tran at [6.5] related to the bribery of officials. This was considered in relation to whether the Appellant would be identified in his home area. It was reflected in [35] of the decision that “Mr Dingley submits that that the evidence indicates a lack of acknowledgment of trafficking offences against men, thus there is no support available to the Appellant as a male victim.” It is not clear that the arguments raised in the grounds were argued in the context of internal flight alternative or that the points raised in Dr Tran’s report were argued then. Dr Tran’s views on internal relocation as set out in [7.23] of her report were not considered in the context of corruption or bribery.
13. Mr Dingley submitted in relation to Ground 1 and 2 that it is now not disputed that the issue was whether there was a risk of trafficking. The Judge was asked to consider that on 2 scenarios. The Judge was asked to consider the issue of trafficking and was bound to consider [339K] as it was Robinson obvious. It was not dealt with as an internal flight alternative issue. The findings do not take into account that material consideration. The risk of exploitation exists independently of the relocation issue regarding the original traffickers.
14. He submitted in relation to Ground 3, that the Judge considered the Hokou system at [34]. The factors in [16] of the grounds were raised at the hearing, namely corruption and the App enabling access. The Judge needed to address the points made. At [32] of the decision, the Judge acknowledged the risk in his home area. Dr Tran at [7.12] said “…to settle his life in China, the Appellant must visit his place of origin in China to apply for the new national ID card, as he does not have a national ID card.” This was not considered by the Judge. The skeleton argument was just that, a skeleton argument. The points raised in [10 and 16] set out in the Grounds were raised orally and are directly relevant to the Judge’s findings.
15. Mr Wain made no further submissions in response.
Discussion
16. In assessing the Grounds, I acknowledge the need for appropriate restraint by interfering with the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge bearing in mind its task as a primary fact finder on the evidence before it and the allocation of weight to relevant factors and the overall evaluation of the appeal. Decisions are to be read sensibly and holistically; perfection might be an aspiration but not a necessity and there is no requirement of reasons for reasons. I am concerned with whether the Appellant can identify errors of law which could have had a material effect on the outcome and have been properly raised in these proceedings.
17. At the heart of the grant of permission to appeal made by Judge Turner against her own decision she stated at [3]:
“…the determination did not specifically make a finding as to whether the Appellant was at risk of re-trafficking by others. It could be inferred from the findings on the reasonableness of relocation that he is not...”
18. I am not satisfied that the answer “could be inferred from the findings on the reasonableness of relocation” as that puts the cart before the horse as if there is a risk of being re-trafficked by others, internal relocation is not reasonable. It is not tangential and was an issue before the Tribunal. At [37] she found “that the Appellant could internally relocate if he felt that he was at risk from traffickers in his home area.” She did not specifically consider the risk from others. Nor did she appear to have considered the impact of Dr Tran’s evidence at [7.12] said “…to settle his life in China, the Appellant must visit his place of origin in China to apply for the new national ID card, as he does not have a national ID card” on the risk from the original traffickers - that being the permission extension granted by Judge Kebede.
19. In relation to other traffickers Dr Tran stated:
“7.23 In my view and with the external information explained above, the Appellant is able to freely live in the new area without Hukou registration, but if he is not able to register the Hukou in the area he relocates to, he will not be able to access basic public services such as state-run health care. He will be regarded as a “black person/left behind” with no rights or official existence in society.”
20. The Judge should have considered whether that may have left the Appellant vulnerable to other potential traffickers, and if so, how that impacted on the reasonableness of internal relocation.
21. I am satisfied that the Judge materially erred in not considering, or not considering adequately, these points. Consequently, the findings on trafficking and the reasonableness of internal relocation are not sustainable and amount to a material error of law. I set aside those findings.
22. Mr Wain submitted that if I found that there was a material error of law, the issue could be heard in the Upper Tribunal as it was a narrow fact-finding exercise. Mr Dingley submitted that as it related to an assessment of risk and oral evidence could be heard, the First-tier Tribunal was the better venue, and onward appeal rights would be preserved.
23. I am satisfied that the issue is not a narrow one as it relates to the issues of trafficking and the reasonableness of internal relocation. I am therefore satisfied it is appropriate to remit the appeal on those issues only to the First-tier Tribunal to be considered by a Judge other than Judge Turner.
Notice of Decision
24. The Judge made a material error of law. I set aside the findings in relation to trafficking and the reasonableness of internal relocation. I direct that the appeal be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for consequent directions, and that it not be listed before Judge Turner.
Laurence Saffer
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
5 February 2026
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002949
First-tier Tribunal No: LP/00043/2025
PA/67352/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th February 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAFFER
Between
CWS
(anonymity order made)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Dingley of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Wain a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 2 February 2026
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant was born on 12 October 1997. He is a citizen of China. He appealed against the decision of the Respondent dated 11 December 2023, refusing his application for asylum and humanitarian protection. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Turner (“the Judge”), promulgated on 28 January 2025, dismissing the appeal.
2. The Appellant’s Discretionary Leave to Remain was extended on 24 November 2025. Having heard submissions, I agreed that as the grant did not impact on the sole issue before me, namely whether the Appellant was entitled to protection under the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status or Refugees due to the risk of trafficking, the appeal was not abandoned.
Permission to appeal
3. Permission was granted by Judge Turner on 3 July 2025 who, having refused to grant permission to appeal on other grounds raised, stated:
“3. The grounds argue that the IJ failed to resolve the issue of general retrafficking. The determination at paragraphs 29-37 consider the risk of retrafficking from the Appellant’s original traffickers and also whether the Appellant could internally relocate. Whilst the Appellant’s circumstances and any vulnerabilities were considered, the determination did not specifically make a finding as to whether the Appellant was at risk of re-trafficking by others. It could be inferred from the findings on the reasonableness of relocation that he is not .... As such, this is an arguable error of law.
4. The failure to apply the presumption under 339K is consolidated with the above.
5. In relation to any argument under 276ADE in relation to private life, again the point omitted relates to risk of general re-trafficking which is also consolidated with the above.”
4. Upon renewal to the Upper Tribunal, in relation to the matters on which permission to appeal had not been granted, on 19 August 2025 Judge Kabede refused to extend the grant except on the issue of trafficking as follows:
“6…. permission is limited to the trafficking issue, in particular the arguable absence of findings on the risk of re-trafficking. The grant of permission did not specifically address the second part of Ground 3 (risk from the previous traffickers) but I do not exclude the matter from the grant of permission. Permission is therefore granted on all issues relating to trafficking.”
5. Given the limited grant of permission to appeal, I will only hereafter refer to the trafficking issue.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
6. Judge Turner made the following findings relevant to this hearing:
“29. … The Respondent accepted that the Appellant had been trafficked, following the conclusive grounds determination…
…
31. However, it is the Respondent’s assertion that there is sufficient protection and/or the ability to internally relocate on return...
32. … I … conclude that protection would not be available to the Appellant in general terms. … If … the Appellant returned to his home area, there is always the potential for someone to identify the Appellant, even though such a prospect after so many years is minimal.
33. I am however required to consider whether the Appellant could internally relocate to avoid any potential risk. HC and RC considered this issue and is cited at paragraph 5 of the CPIN. The guidance concludes that:
‘China is a vast country and it may be, for example, that in a particular part of China the efforts to eliminate trafficking are determined and the level of complicity between state officials and traffickers is low. If an appellant comes from such an area, or if she can relocate to such an area, there may be no real risk to her (paragraph 82 [2])’ ‘The Chinese state has an obligation to house the homeless and will not allow their citizens to starve. Therefore, a returned trafficked woman without family support will not be allowed by the authorities to fall into a state of destitution.’ (paragraph 82 [3])
34. The guidance also considers the impact of the hukou system. Whilst the guidance considers some of the obstacles faced by people trying to register within the system, there is limited reference to how this may impact upon a person seeking to avoid detection when seeking to internally relocate. Section 12.1.4 of the CPIN notes that there is no information about the ability of victims of modern slavery to be able to relocate.
35. The country expert report does not consider the issue of internal relocation specifically but rather the lack of support available to victims of human trafficking. The report notes a lack of support available to those such as the Appellant. Mr Dingley submits that the evidence indicates a lack of acknowledgment of trafficking offences against men, thus there is no support available to the Appellant as a male victim. I acknowledge that support and protection is likely to be limited. However, the Appellant is a young man of working age. There is no evidence that the Appellant as any health issues that is likely to cause the Appellant issues on his return.
36. I therefore considered the position of a single male such as the Appellant having to return to China without the support of any family or friends. I reviewed the decision reached in ZC & Others (Risk – illegal exit – loan sharks) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00028. The case noted at paragraph 46 that there was a lack of evidence advanced in that case to indicate that internal relocation would be unduly harsh. Whilst that case considered the issue of risk from loan sharks, I find that case comparable to the present appeal. The Appellant claims that he owes money to those who facilitated his exit from China. There is limited evidence of the people involved in his trafficking, the extent of their power or influence and whether they continue to have any interest in the Appellant, noting the lack of contact since 2017. I also find the Appellant comparable to the Appellant in ZC in the sense that there is a lack of evidence that the Appellant has any risk factors in terms of vulnerabilities, as stated above. The only factor which distinguishes the Appellant in ZC from the Appellant in this appeal is that ZC was said to have a wealthy friend who may offer financial support to ZC on return. Paragraph 46 did however go on to say that even if this was not the case, there was no reason why the Appellant could not relocate elsewhere in China. The determination again goes on to consider the implication of the hukou system but concludes that there was no evidence presented to indicate that information from the registration system would be passed on to the loan sharks. I find the same applies in this case in relation to the Appellant’s traffickers.
37. Overall, I find that the Appellant could internally relocate if he felt that he was at risk from the traffickers in his home area.”
The Appellant’s grounds to seeking permission to appeal
7. The grounds dated 5 February 2025 asserted that:
“9. … the Appellant is an accepted victim of trafficking...
10. The Tribunal is asked to consider that the Appellant's has been trafficked in the past, and is someone who is likely to be subjected to further exploitation as a result of various vulnerabilities. The following risk factors were highlighted in support of this argument:
i. Limited education/literacy (screening 2.6 – p1114)
ii No contact with family (screening – p1125 (AIR q5/6 p1056)
iii Limited Mandarin - speaks Vietnamese
iv. Has been present for 8 years
v. Blacklisted by Chinese govt. preventing access to jobs, homes, education etc. as a result of Falun Gong association
vi. Male - so falls through the gap of any victim protection - see expert report p29 (p67)”.
…
12. Further and alternatively, the First-tier Tribunal has failed to apply the presumption at paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules. It being accepted that the Appellant has been trafficked in the past, there is a presumption that this risk is repeatable unless there are “good reasons” to the contrary.
13. … there are no good reasons identified for why the presumption the appellant would be trafficked again does not apply.
…
16. … in the assessments of potential risk of harm from those who previously trafficked him, the Tribunal has failed to engage with the evidence raised by the Appellant on the effect of the Ho Khau system. At [34] the Tribunal considers the Respondent’s CPIN on this, and at [36] considers the conclusions in the case of ‘ZC’ that there was no evidence presented in that appeal to say information from the Ho Khau system would be passed onto loan sharks. The Tribunal was expressly addressed on this question, with extracts from the expert report relied upon, including:
i. The Judge’s attention was specifically drawn to paragraphs 6.3-6.5 (p73 onward) of the expert report, demonstrating that access to location information is facilitated through an app.
ii. The Judge was expressly addressed on levels of corruption, and the ease of bribing for access to local Hokou information, addressed at paragraph 6.5 of the expert report (p74)
iii. there was additionally evidence suggesting that the Appellant would be unable to register for a Hu Khau if he did try to relocate at paragraph 7.21-7.24 (p82)…
17. This evidence addresses the concerns raised by the Judge at paragraph 36 but is not accounted for in the assessment of whether internal relocation is a viable option.
18. Additionally, at [35] the Judge finds that the Appellant would be a young man of working age without health issues, but does not consider the various vulnerability factors addressed at paragraph 10 above.
19. … those same factors highlighted at paragraph 10 above were relied upon in support of the 276ADE argument, and are not accounted for in the Tribunal’s assessments of this question at paragraph 39.”
8. The renewed grounds dated 10 July 2025 will not be repeated as they relate to the Falun Gong issue upon which permission to appeal has not been granted.
The Respondent’s position
9. There was no Rule 24 notice.
Oral submissions
10. Mr Wain submitted in relation to Ground 1 that the Judge dealt with the issue of risk from alternative traffickers implicitly by finding at [37] “that the Appellant could internally relocate if he felt that he was at risk from the traffickers in his home area”. The Judge found that he was a young man with no health issues and of working age at [35]. The challenge in Ground 1 depends on whether the was a failure to consider the report of Dr Tran.
11. He submitted in relation to Ground 2 that the Judge was not obliged to consider [339K] of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules as it was not raised at the hearing, or in the skeleton argument that had been filed on behalf of the Appellant before the Judge. Even if the Judge was obliged to consider [339K], she was required to consider the risk in the context of the availability of state protection and an internal flight alternative. The Judge did not find that there would be state protection, but dismissed the appeal as there was an internal flight alternative. The challenge in Ground 2 depends on whether the was a failure to consider the report of Dr Tran.
12. He submitted in relation to Ground 3 that at [36] of the decision the Judge relied on the conclusions of ZC. The Judge was not referred to clear and cogent evidence to depart from that country guidance. The report of Dr Tran was based on there being no reasonable internal flight alternative as explained in the skeleton argument at [19-25] before the Judge. The Judge dealt with appeal in the way it was presented. She concluded at [32] “that protection would not be available to the Appellant in general terms.” As explained in Lata v SSHD [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), there was no obligation on the Judge to consider points raised that were not “Robinson obvious”. The report from Dr Tran at [6.5] related to the bribery of officials. This was considered in relation to whether the Appellant would be identified in his home area. It was reflected in [35] of the decision that “Mr Dingley submits that that the evidence indicates a lack of acknowledgment of trafficking offences against men, thus there is no support available to the Appellant as a male victim.” It is not clear that the arguments raised in the grounds were argued in the context of internal flight alternative or that the points raised in Dr Tran’s report were argued then. Dr Tran’s views on internal relocation as set out in [7.23] of her report were not considered in the context of corruption or bribery.
13. Mr Dingley submitted in relation to Ground 1 and 2 that it is now not disputed that the issue was whether there was a risk of trafficking. The Judge was asked to consider that on 2 scenarios. The Judge was asked to consider the issue of trafficking and was bound to consider [339K] as it was Robinson obvious. It was not dealt with as an internal flight alternative issue. The findings do not take into account that material consideration. The risk of exploitation exists independently of the relocation issue regarding the original traffickers.
14. He submitted in relation to Ground 3, that the Judge considered the Hokou system at [34]. The factors in [16] of the grounds were raised at the hearing, namely corruption and the App enabling access. The Judge needed to address the points made. At [32] of the decision, the Judge acknowledged the risk in his home area. Dr Tran at [7.12] said “…to settle his life in China, the Appellant must visit his place of origin in China to apply for the new national ID card, as he does not have a national ID card.” This was not considered by the Judge. The skeleton argument was just that, a skeleton argument. The points raised in [10 and 16] set out in the Grounds were raised orally and are directly relevant to the Judge’s findings.
15. Mr Wain made no further submissions in response.
Discussion
16. In assessing the Grounds, I acknowledge the need for appropriate restraint by interfering with the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge bearing in mind its task as a primary fact finder on the evidence before it and the allocation of weight to relevant factors and the overall evaluation of the appeal. Decisions are to be read sensibly and holistically; perfection might be an aspiration but not a necessity and there is no requirement of reasons for reasons. I am concerned with whether the Appellant can identify errors of law which could have had a material effect on the outcome and have been properly raised in these proceedings.
17. At the heart of the grant of permission to appeal made by Judge Turner against her own decision she stated at [3]:
“…the determination did not specifically make a finding as to whether the Appellant was at risk of re-trafficking by others. It could be inferred from the findings on the reasonableness of relocation that he is not...”
18. I am not satisfied that the answer “could be inferred from the findings on the reasonableness of relocation” as that puts the cart before the horse as if there is a risk of being re-trafficked by others, internal relocation is not reasonable. It is not tangential and was an issue before the Tribunal. At [37] she found “that the Appellant could internally relocate if he felt that he was at risk from traffickers in his home area.” She did not specifically consider the risk from others. Nor did she appear to have considered the impact of Dr Tran’s evidence at [7.12] said “…to settle his life in China, the Appellant must visit his place of origin in China to apply for the new national ID card, as he does not have a national ID card” on the risk from the original traffickers - that being the permission extension granted by Judge Kebede.
19. In relation to other traffickers Dr Tran stated:
“7.23 In my view and with the external information explained above, the Appellant is able to freely live in the new area without Hukou registration, but if he is not able to register the Hukou in the area he relocates to, he will not be able to access basic public services such as state-run health care. He will be regarded as a “black person/left behind” with no rights or official existence in society.”
20. The Judge should have considered whether that may have left the Appellant vulnerable to other potential traffickers, and if so, how that impacted on the reasonableness of internal relocation.
21. I am satisfied that the Judge materially erred in not considering, or not considering adequately, these points. Consequently, the findings on trafficking and the reasonableness of internal relocation are not sustainable and amount to a material error of law. I set aside those findings.
22. Mr Wain submitted that if I found that there was a material error of law, the issue could be heard in the Upper Tribunal as it was a narrow fact-finding exercise. Mr Dingley submitted that as it related to an assessment of risk and oral evidence could be heard, the First-tier Tribunal was the better venue, and onward appeal rights would be preserved.
23. I am satisfied that the issue is not a narrow one as it relates to the issues of trafficking and the reasonableness of internal relocation. I am therefore satisfied it is appropriate to remit the appeal on those issues only to the First-tier Tribunal to be considered by a Judge other than Judge Turner.
Notice of Decision
24. The Judge made a material error of law. I set aside the findings in relation to trafficking and the reasonableness of internal relocation. I direct that the appeal be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for consequent directions, and that it not be listed before Judge Turner.
Laurence Saffer
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
5 February 2026