Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002950
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66444/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SWANEY

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

GA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L Clewley, senior presenting officer
For the Respondent: Mr O Sobowale, counsel

Heard at Field House on 5 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity order
1. I have considered whether to maintain the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal and have decided that one is necessary because the need for the United Kingdom to discharge its obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the public interest in open justice.
Background
2. The Secretary of State appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal judge (the judge) promulgated on 9 May 2025, allowing the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his international protection and human rights claims. For ease of reference, I refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal in this decision.
3. The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran for reason of his religious beliefs. He claims that he is a Christian convert.
4. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 1 November 2022 and claimed asylum on 5 November 2022.
5. His claim was refused on 2 May 2024, with the respondent accepting the appellant’s nationality and identity; that he was born in the Muslim faith; and that he left Iran illegally. The respondent did not accept that he was a genuine Christian convert or that he had come to the adverse attention of the authorities in Iran. The respondent considered that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by inconsistencies and a lack of detail in his evidence. The respondent relied on the decisions in Dorodian v SSHD (01/TH/01537) and TF and MA v SSHD [2018] CSIH 58 in attaching little weight to the letter from the appellant’s church and photographs of his baptism.
6. The appellant appealed the respondent’s decision. His appeal was heard on 22 April 2025 and was allowed on 5 May 2025 on asylum grounds. The judge made the following findings:
(i) The appellant provided a broadly consistent account in his witness statements, his interviews and in his oral evidence.
(ii) His explanation of why he stopped practising Islam in 2002 was credible and adds weight to his account of his conversion to Christianity.
(iii) The appellant provided consistent oral evidence about his detachment from Islam and his later conversion to Christianity.
(iv) The appellant’s failure to mention certain matters prior to his witness statement on appeal was not material.
(v) The appellant’s evidence about who told him that the arrest warrant had been destroyed was not clearly recorded and is not a significant inconsistency.
(vi) Less weight attaches to the letters from the Church because they were not tested in cross-examination, but they are consistent with the appellant’s account of his practice in the United Kingdom. The same is true for the evidence regarding his baptism, his online posts and his attendance on the Alpha course.
(vii) The appellant is credible and is a genuine convert to Christianity.
7. The respondent sought permission to appeal on the basis that in considering the evidence from the Church, the judge made a material misdirection of law by failing to following the guidance given in Dorodian, specifically that contained in paragraph 8(c) of the decision.
8. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal on 20 June 2025. The respondent renewed her application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the basis that the judge failed to apply the Dorodian guidance, again with reliance of paragraph 8(c). Permission was granted on 6 August 2025. Permission to appeal was granted in the following terms:
The minister was not called and it is unclear whether the Judge considered the absence of such oral evidence in evaluating the Claimant’s credibility. While the Judge carried out a detailed assessment of the remainder of the narrative, there is an arguable gap in the assessment.
9. The matter came before me to determine whether the judge’s decision contains an error of law. If I conclude that it does, I must decide whether to set it aside in consequence, either in whole or in part. If I do, I must then either remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal or re-make the decision in this Tribunal.
The hearing
10. The hearing was conducted by video and there was no objection to this being a suitable method of hearing. Directions were issued on 30 July 2025 requiring the respondent to provide a response pursuant to rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (the Procedure Rules) and any application to adduce new evidence under rule 15(2A) of the Procedure Rules. The appellant was also directed to provide a composite bundle which complies with the President’s Guidance on the Format of Electronic Bundles in the Upper Tribunal (IAC) by no later than 14 days before the date of hearing. I note that in these directions, the appellant is the Secretary of State, and the respondent is GA.
11. No rule 24 response was received and the respondent failed to comply with the requirement to provide a composite bundle in accordance with directions. Ms Clewley indicated that one was sent, but from an inbox to which she did not have access. Neither I nor Mr Sobowale had access to it, and it does not appear that the respondent complied with the requirement upload the bundle using the CE-file E-filing service in accordance with the Practice Direction for the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal: Electronic filing of documents online – CE-File – Courts and Tribunals Judiciary. This is not acceptable. Ms Clewley was able to provide a copy of the bundle by email during the hearing. Mr Sobowale confirmed that he had received it, and we proceeded.
12. Mr Sobowale sought clarification as to the precise grounds of appeal argued. Ms Clewley stated that there was a single ground of appeal, divided into two parts, which was the same as that pleaded in the application for permission to appeal refused by the First-tier Tribunal. I asked Ms Clewley whether it is the respondent’s case that the credibility of events in Iran stands or falls with the credibility of the appellant’s claimed conversion. She confirmed that it is.
13. Ms Clewley submitted that that the judge failed to apply the Dorodian guidelines and as a result, the judge failed to engage with the respondent’s criticisms of the two letters from the church relied on by the appellant. This in turn resulted in a lack of adequate reasons for finding that the appellant’s conversion was genuine. She relied heavily on paragraphs 8(a) and 8(c) of the decision in Dorodian.
14. When Ms Clewley referred to paragraph 24 of the judge’s decision in which he records the submission that the writer of the letters was not mentioned on the church’s website, I noted that in fact he is. I referred Ms Clewley to the web address set out at the foot of the letter, above the church’s physical address. I noted that I had accessed the web address on the morning of the hearing and that it is a direct link to a picture of the writer of the letter and information about the position he holds within the church.
15. Having considered that, Ms Clewley submitted that the respondent’s more serious complaint is that the judge failed to engage with her criticism that the evidence does not show whether the writer of the letter is an ordained minister or whether the appellant was baptised by an ordained minister.
16. Ms Clewley went on to submit that the judge failed to have regard to the guidance that where the respondent does not accept an appellant is a committed member of the children in advance of the hearing, the minister should invariably be called to give evidence. She submitted that this was a misdirection of law, particularly as there was no evidence to support the claimed reason for the church member’s absence from the hearing. Ms Clewley submitted that this misdirection of law was material, because the it goes beyond simply affecting the weight to be given to the letters and goes instead to the willingness of the witness to attend at all.
17. Ms Clewley acknowledged that the judge considered the two letters from the church were consistent with other evidence but submitted that the judge failed to engage with the fact that the letters appeared to be pro forma, written in identical terms on two different dates.
18. Ms Clewley submitted that there were significant gaps in the judge’s findings on material issues, which are material to the judge’s overall conclusion on credibility. She submitted that it was incumbent on the judge to make findings on all material matters.
19. Mr Sobowale submitted that it was wrong to suggest that credible or reliable evidence could only come from a person who is an ordained minister or who holds a position of seniority within the church. He submitted that it must instead be someone who has sufficient seniority, experience and knowledge of the appellant who can give a view about the appellant’s activities. Mr Sobowale submitted that the respondent’s focus on whether the appellant was baptised by an ordained minister or whether the writer of the letters had a particular position within the church was misplaced and not material.
20. Mr Sobowale submitted that the guidance in Dorodian envisages the respondent being able to carry out basic checks of the evidence and given that the respondent had had a letter from the church as far back as November 2023, she could have done so in the present case. He submitted that as a matter of law, there is no requirement for an appellant to tender a witness for the respondent to have an opportunity to cross-examine them. He submitted that had the respondent considered that it was essential the witness ought to attend, she could have requested that the tribunal issue a witness summons. I noted that the respondent’s point here is that it is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate his case. Mr Sobowale accepted that is the case but submitted that the respondent did not take issue with the witness’s inability to attend at the time and has only now taken issue because the appeal was allowed. He submitted that Dorodian is not authority for the general proposition that an appeal can never succeed if a witness fails to attend.
21. Mr Sobowale relied on SR (Iran) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 460. He also relied on the Upper Tribunal’s decision in PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 46 (IAC) §10 for his submission that baptism may be an indicator of a genuine conversion but is not of itself determinative.
22. In relation to the judge’s consideration of the evidence, Mr Sobowale submitted that the judge attached less weight to the letters from the church given their writer was not cross-examined but that it does not follow that he should not have attached any weight to them. The question of weight was a matter for the judge, in the light of all the other evidence considered. Mr Sobowale submitted that the judge had regard to all of the evidence relied on, including the appellant’s account of events over many years, before reaching the conclusion that the appellant’s conversion is genuine.
23. Given that the respondent relied on TF and MA in the refusal letter, I asked Ms Clewley to address me on it, as the judgment of the Court of Session arguably develops the guidance given in Dorodian. I asked her to address me on whether that development impacts on the materiality of any error given that it places the focus on the totality of the evidence, with a relevant witness simply being one aspect of that evidence. Ms Clewley maintained her submission that the judge failed to grapple with the suitability of the person who wrote the letters and that the gaps in the judge’s findings are material.
Discussion
24. Given the respondent’s heavy reliance on the guidance in Dorodian, it is helpful to set it out here:
(a) no-one should be regarded as a committed Christian who is not vouched for as such by a minister of some church established in this country: as we have said, it is church membership, rather than mere belief, which may lead to risk;
(b) no adjudicator should again be put in the position faced by Mr Poole in this case: a statement or letter, giving the full designation of the minister, should be sent to the Home Office at least a fortnight before the hearing of any appeal, which should give them time for at least a basic check on his existence and standing;
(c) unless the Home Office have accepted the appellant as a committed church member in writing in advance of the hearing, the minister should invariably be called to give oral evidence before the adjudicator: while witness summonses are available, adjudicators may reasonably expect willingness to do so in a genuine case;
(d) if any doubt remains, there is no objection to adjudicators themselves testing the religious knowledge of the appellant: judicial notice may be taken of the main beliefs and prayers of the Church. (Emphasis added)
25. The respondent makes two points in relation to this guidance. The first is that there was no information or evidence as to the position in the church of the writer of the two letters relied on by the appellant. The second is that the writer of the letters did not attend the hearing to give oral evidence and there is no evidence to support the explanation as to why he did not.
26. In TF and MA, the Scottish House of Session considered the genuineness of conversion. I accept that the Court’s decision is not binding, but it is one which carries significant persuasive weight.
27. The Court held that active participation in a Christian church is likely to be a very powerful consideration but is one to be assessed alongside any other evidence pointing to the sincerity or otherwise of the claimed conversion. When considering the paragraph 8(a) of the guidance in Dorodian, the Court said at [58]:
It was suggested in Dorodian (Ali) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (supra) at paragraph 8(a) that no one should be regarded as a committed Christian who is not vouched for as such “by a minister of some church established in this country”. We would respectfully disagree. While it would no doubt be desirable that the individual concerned be vouched for by someone in a position of leadership within the relevant church, it is more important that the evidence be given by someone who has knowledge of the individual whose commitment is in question… What matters is that they have sufficient knowledge of the practices of the church of which they are a member; sufficient experience of observing and interacting with those seeking to become members of the church; sufficient knowledge and experience of others who have gone through similar processes of engagement in church activities with a view to becoming members of the church; and, in cases such as these, sufficient knowledge of the individuals concerned and of the manner in which they have thrown themselves into church activities.
28. The Court considered the weight to be given to evidence from church members and in doing so, made it clear that it is for the witness to explain the basis of their evidence. The Court considered that:
They will be able to say that, in their opinion, based on their experience of this individual and many others, the individual in question is or appears to be genuine (or in other cases they are not satisfied, or not yet satisfied, of the genuineness of their self-proclaimed faith).
29. The Court held that such evidence is admissible opinion evidence which is entitled to respect, while it remains for the court or tribunal to make the final decision, and to that extent, it is legitimate to question the witnesses on their opinions and as to the basis for them. The Court did not go so far as to suggest that it is ‘invariably’ the case that the witness should be called to give evidence.
30. In the present case, the appellant relied on two letters, written by the same individual, who according to the information found using the hyperlink provided in those letters, is the Head of Pastoral Integration, e-Learning and Safeguarding. The description of his role states that he heads up pastoral integration at the church, ‘helping people on their journey of joining, is responsible for safeguarding across all of KingsGate and additionally has key responsibility for courses and online training’.
31. It appears therefore that the letters were written by someone in a senior position within the church and someone who has responsibility for new members and courses. The difficulty with the evidence is that it is exceedingly brief, provides no details of the appellant’s level of engagement other than his attendance on an Alpha Course and the fact of his baptism. The letter does not provide any information about whether the writer of the letter knows the appellant personally and does not provide the basis for the information other than the fact of his position within the church.
32. At paragraphs 42 to 50 of his decision, the judge gives reasons for finding that the appellant is credible in his account of being a Christian convert. The judge considers all of the evidence before him, consistently with the general approach to credibility contained in binding authorities and consistently with the approach outlined in TF and MA.
33. The judge placed little weight on the letters, which in my view he was entirely correct to do. In giving them little weight the judge expressly acknowledged that they had not been tested in cross-examination. The judge found that the letters were consistent with the appellant’s account of his practice in the United Kingdom, which he was entitled to do. The judge did not consider the church letters in isolation. He also considered the other evidence regarding the appellant’s baptism, his online posts and his attendance on the Alpha course, all of which was consistent with the appellant’s account.
34. Ms Clewley criticised the judge for failing to consider the fact that the two church letters were written in identical terms. This of itself is not an indication that the content is not true. The first letter was written on 29 November 2023 while the appellant’s asylum claim was outstanding. The second letter was written on 10 November 2024, after he lodged his appeal. It appears likely that the letters were written at two different times and for two different purposes. The fact that the content is the same is unremarkable in my view.
35. I find that the judge did not make a material misdirection of law and that the guidance in Dorodian when read with the further guidance in TF and MA is not authority for the proposition that an appeal cannot succeed where a witness does not attend to be cross-examined, particularly where the other evidence relied on is found credible for sustainable reasons as here.
36. If it were the case that the judge had relied solely or mainly on the letters from the church and/or had given them significant weight, I would have agreed that the judge had made a material error of law. However, this is not the case. The judge expressly acknowledged that the letters were not tested in cross-examination and gave them little weight. The judge accepted that the letters were consistent with the other evidence, which he was entitled to do. Moreover, the judge made positive findings about the appellant’s account in other respects, none of which are challenged. The judge plainly considered all of the evidence regarding the appellant’s conversion in the round and reached an overall conclusion that he is credible. In these circumstances, I do not accept that there is a lack of reasoning in the judge’s decision, and it is clear as to why he accepted the appellant’s account of his conversion to Christianity.
Notice of Decision
37. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law.
38. The appeal is dismissed.

J K Swaney

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
21 November 2025