Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002963

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57468/2024
LP/00942/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STERNBERG

Between

MA
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Applicant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Ahmad, instructed by Hanson Law
For the Respondent: Ms. Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 24 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of Iran, was granted permission to appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Gordon-Lennox (‘the judge’) who dismissed the appellant’s appeal by a determination dated 19 May 2025, following a hearing which took place on 12 May 2025. That appeal challenged the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum claim dated 5 March 2024.
2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Head granted permission to appeal on 4 July 2025. The judge made an order granting the appellant anonymity in their determination. UTJ Blundell set directions, including a direction that the appellant should be anonymised in these proceedings on 9 July 2025. I maintain that order given the nature of the appellant’s claims.
3. The hearing took place before my by CVP on 24 October 2025. At the start of the hearing I confirmed that all parties could hear and see each other sufficiently for the hearing to proceed. I then heard submissions from Mr. Ahmad for the Appellant and Ms. Clewley for the Respondent. I received a composite bundle running to 355 pages in advance of the hearing.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. Given the challenges advanced by the appellant, it is necessary to set out the First-tier Tribunal judge’s decision in some detail. The judge began his judgment (at §§10-16) by setting out the basis of the appellant’s claim, namely his political opinion including his sur place activities in the UK, supported by factors including his Kurdish ethnicity, not having performed military service and illegal exit from Iran. The judge recorded matters not in dispute including that the appellant is a national of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity, that he left Iran illegally in 2022 and entered the UK approximately 3 weeks later and claimed asylum. The disputed issues were recorded as whether the appellant would be at risk of persecution on return to Iran on the basis of his political opinion including through his sur place activities in the UK and whether the appellant would be at a real risk of serious harm on return to Iran. The judge recorded that he heard live evidence from the appellant who was cross-examined.
5. Having recorded the relevant legal framework (at §§17-20) the judge then turned to his findings, summarising the core of the appellant’s claim (at §§22), that in Iran a friend who was a supporter of the Komala party encouraged the appellant to help him fight for Kurdish rights. The appellant took part in two protests, during the second his friend was shot in the leg. The appellant’s mother later called him to tell him that the authorities had raided his house and taken his identity card. Whilst in the UK he has been protesting against the Iranian regime. The appellant says he is at risk of adverse attention from the Iranian authorities for these reasons and is at risk on return to Iran.
6. The judge accepted (at §25) that the appellant’s political opinion was a convention reason. He then turned to his decision on whether the appellant in fact feared persecution for a convention reason (at §§26-30). The judge accepted that the appellant was not a member or supporter of the Komala party in Iran and accepted his account of becoming politically aware around the age of 17. The judge also accepted that the appellant and a friend had distributed leaflets promoting Kurdish rights on five occasions in Iran. The judge found that this was to help his friend rather than because he genuinely held political views and that the appellant did not come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities at that time.
7. The judge then noted a number of inconsistencies and difficulties in the appellant’s account (at §§31-39) including that he made no mention of having attended two demonstrations in Iran in his screening interview, only referring to one demonstration. Nor did he mention his friend being shot or the authorities raiding his property. The judge did not accept the appellant’s explanation when these inconsistencies were put to him; that his friend revealed his details and CCTV footage was used to identify him. The judge noted that the appellant gave a detailed answer in relation to his journey to the UK. The judge found that the appellant’s failure to mention his friend being shot and tortured and revealing the appellant’s activities and a contradiction between whether his friend revealed the appellant’s activities or whether the appellant was identified by the authorities from CCTV undermined the credibility and veracity of his claim. The appellant was also inconsistent over why he went to his uncle’s house after his friend’s arrest and considered the appellant’s explanation of this to be unsatisfactory. The Judge also noted that there were inconsistencies in the appellant’s account over when his mother called him to tell him that his house had been raided, about what his mother was told by the authorities and about the timing of his meeting and discussions with his uncle about leaving Iran. The judge also considered a letter provided by the Komala party in the UK to support the appellant’s claim. The judge attached little weight to it because it made no reference to the Appellant’s circumstances or his activities in Iran1 and referred to risk in general terms. While the judge did not accept the respondent’s criticisms of the appellant’s credibility fully, and found that it was plausible that the appellant’s friend might have revealed the appellant’s details if he was tortured, the judge also found that due to the inconsistencies and difficulties in his account, the appellant had not demonstrated that he had come to the attention of the authorities due to his attendance at demonstrations and his friend being shot and tortured, nor that the authorities raided his property and took his identity. The judge considered that that aspect of his account was fabricated to bolster his claim.
8. The judge then considered the appellant’s sur place activities (at §§40-46). The appellant had attended a number of demonstrations in the UK and had been posting on Facebook since 2023. The letter from the Komala party confirms he is a supporter of the party and states that he regularly attends demonstrations. The judge found that that did not show that his political views are genuine, but the judge accepted the appellant had attended 9 demonstrations at the Iranian embassy between 9 July 2023 and 12 January 2025. The appellant claims he held banners and placards at demonstrations and wore a hi-vis jacket, but he was not an organiser. The photos the appellant produced appear to be some taken some way away from the Iranian embassy and were, the judge found, presented to advance his claim. While some photos were posted on his Facebook page, there was no evidence of him appearing in wider reporting of demonstrations. His Facebook account shows relatively limited activity. The appellant has received a negative message but the judge found that this was not a threat nor did it show he is of interest to the Iranian authorities. The judge found that the appellant had not manipulated the content of his Facebook account. The number of demonstrations was relatively small and there was no evidence of the appellant being other than a low level participant, he has not brought himself to the attention of the Iranian authorities. By wearing a hi-vis jacket the appellant was intending to draw himself to the attention of the Iranian authorities and his account was embellished in this respect.
9. Drawing the threads together, the judge found that the appellant was not politically active in Iran prior to discussing matters with his friend. The judge was not satisfied that the appellant attended protests in Iran, his activities in the UK started 6 months after arriving. This delay, his limited attendance at demonstrations and limited social media activity all supported the judge’s conclusion that the appellant does not hold a genuine political opinion.
10. The judge reached the following overall conclusions on the appellant’s credibility (at §§47-51): the inconsistencies and difficulties in the appellant’s account undermine his credibility, as does his fabrication of detail and embellishment to bolster his claim. Overall the judge found that the appellant was not credible and considered that he had not demonstrated that he had come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities through distributing political materials or attending demonstrations in Iran or through his sur place political activities in the UK. The judge found that on the balance of probabilities the appellant does not fear persecution for a convention reason.
11. The judge then turned to consider whether, in the alternative, the appellant was at risk of harm in Iran if he does fear persecution (at §§52-59). The judge found that the appellant was not at risk due to his activities before leaving Iran or for attending demonstrations there and he had not come to the attention of the Iranian authorities for that reason. His Kurdish ethnicity, illegal exit from Iran and being returned as a failed asylum seeker increase the risk to him but will not in themselves lead to persecutory treatment. The judge concluded that the appellant has not demonstrated that he has come to the attention of the Iranian authorities through his sur place activities or that he holds a genuine political opinion. In terms of future risk, the judge cited a number of relevant authorities, namely HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC), XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC), BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) and S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482. The judge found that the Iranian authorities are not able to carry out wholesale monitoring of social media either in or outside of Iran and only search for those known to be of interest to the authorities, although low-level activity can still cause interest. The Iranian authorities have a hair-trigger approach and the appellant provided objective evidence showing the use of facial recognition by the Iranian authorities on arrival.
12. Importantly, the judge found that the appellant is not likely to have come to the attention of the authorities through attending demonstrations or his social media activity in the UK. It is not reasonably likely that the Iranian authorities will have carried out targeted surveillance of him and his online activity and his Facebook account. He would be able to delete his Facebook account, the Iranian authorities would not have seen it. There was no evidence that he would be identified as being of interest by facial recognition technology. The judge did not accept that the appellant would wish to continue his political activity if returned to Iran because that activity was not genuine. It would be reasonable and appropriate for the appellant to modify his behaviour on return to Iran and to delete his Facebook account before returning, as his belief is not genuinely held he would not be forced to lie about it.
13. The judge further found (at §§60-65) that the appellant’s identity documentation was not taken by the authorities, he has not shown he does not have a passport. The judge considered that the appellant is in contact with his family and would be able to obtain documentation from them or an emergency travel document. He would need to delete his Facebook account and other social media before applying for one to negate any inquiry at the pinch point of return. While he could be called up to complete military service he can do so and is not at risk of prosecution and imprisonment thereby. The appellant has not demonstrated he has come to the attention of the Iranian authorities through his activities in Iran or his sur place activities in the UK, returning as a Kurdish failed asylum seeker would not put him at risk. He has not demonstrated he is at risk on return to Iran as a consequence of his political opinion. The judge confirmed that the respondent accepted that state protection and internal relocation would not be available to the appellant.
14. In conclusion the judge held (at §§66-67) that the Appellant is not at risk of suffering serious harm or of suffering a breach of his ECHR rights. The judge found the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason, does not face a real risk of serious harm and does not face a real risk of suffering a breach of his rights under articles 2 and 3 ECHR.
Grounds of Appeal
15. The appellant advances no less than seven grounds of appeal:
i. Ground 1 argues that the judge failed to apply the Country Policy Information Note (‘CPIN’) in respect of his political activities in Iran.
ii. Ground 2 argues that the judge wrongly held inconsistencies in the appellant’s account in his screening interview against him in making negative credibility findings, relying on a passage from Moore-Bick LJ’s judgment in JA (Afghanistan) v SSDH [2014] EWCA Civ 450.
iii. Ground 3 is that the judge took into account irrelevant matters regarding the appellant’s consistency including whether his friend was tortured, timing of the raid on his house and his illegal exit.
iv. Ground 4 is that the judge erred in his approach to considering the Komala party letter.
v. Ground 5 criticises the judge for his approach to the appellant’s sur place activities and asserts that the judge erred in finding that he took part in activities to advance his claim, noting among other matters that the appellant will not be able to provide evidence of being monitored or of being of adverse attention to the authorities. It also asserts that there is no evidence that the judge applied the case law which he cited.
vi. Ground 6 states that the judge erred in finding that there was no risk to the appellant as a result of his not having undertaken military service.
vii. Ground 7 is that the judge erred by finding (it is asserted) that there would be no pinch point on return if the appellant deleted his Facebook account prior to applying for an emergency travel document.
16. I note in passing that the First-tier judge who granted permission to appeal did not consider each ground in turn and decide whether it was arguable, dealing only with ground 5. Such an approach may not be compatible with the correct approach to considering permission to appeal applications set out in MR (Brazil) [2015] UKUT 29 (IAC). However, the grant of permission did state that it was not restricted and I consider each ground in this decision.
17. There is a substantial overlap between a number of the grounds of appeal, in particular grounds 2-4, which all seek to attack the judge’s findings of fact. I consider those grounds collectively below.
Ground 1: failure to take account of the CPIN
18. Mr. Ahmad relied on the grounds of appeal and submitted that the judge failed to properly apply the CPIN which states that the Iranian authorities arbitrarily target actual or perceived affiliates to Kurdish parties and who participate in protests, strikes or leaflet distribution. The Note also refers to HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430. He submitted that the judge found at paragraph 29 that the appellant was helping his friend and found he had no interest in politics at paragraph 28. However, ‘Discussing matters’ referred to by the judge at paragraph 29 of his judgment is a reference to political matters. It is irrelevant whether he was interested on his own account or not. Mr. Ahmad accepted that the CPIN was not in the bundle before the judge nor was it placed before this Tribunal on appeal, although it was referred to in the appellant’s skeleton argument before the FTT at §24. The judge referred to HB (Kurds), and had to consider it. A person can be perceived as having a political opinion even with low level involvement. That gives rise to a breach of article 3 ECHR. HB (Kurds) reiterates the contents of the CPIN. At paragraph 39 the Judge did not accept the respondent’s argument that the appellant had not come to adverse attention. The judge found the torture of the appellant’s friend was plausible. The judge found it was not clear how the appellant came to adverse attention of the authorities. That indicates that he must have come to adverse attention, although the judge does not know how he did, the judge found it is plausible that his friend was tortured and gave the appellant’s name. There was no consideration of the relevant background evidence at that point.
19. Ms. Clewley submitted that there is no contradiction between paragraphs 29 and 39 of the judge’s decision. They set out the appellant’s case and then make findings on it. There is no issue taken by the judge as to whether the appellant’s motivation to distribute leaflets to support his friend shows he came to the adverse attention of the state. The judge’s issue was with the inconsistencies within the appellant’s claim. The judge found the appellant had not come to the adverse attention of the authorities due to attending demonstrations, his friend being shot and tortured. The judge found those elements of his claim to be inadequate. The background evidence would not assist the appellant if set out in detail given the findings the judge made on credibility.
20. In assessing this ground, I note that it seeks to overturn the judge’s findings of fact on an issue in controversy between the parties, the judge having heard the appellant give evidence and be cross-examined.
21. Therefore, in considering this Ground, the approach I should take is set out by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74; [2024] 1 WLR 1626, by Underhill LJ at [50]-[51]:
50. … I should recapitulate the approach that should be taken in considering whether the FTT made an error of law. At para. 72 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) (but with reference to the appeal in AA (Nigeria)) Lord Hamblen said:
"It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently – see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account – see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out – see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope."
51. Mr Malik relied on that passage but added some further points by way of amplification. The only one that I need mention is that in AA (Nigeria)2 in this Court Popplewell LJ said, at para. 34:
"Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so."
22. In general terms, I agree with Ms. Clewley on this ground. First, the judge gave clear and sustainable reasons for finding that the appellant had not given a truthful or consistent account. The judge was entitled, in these circumstances, to proceed on the basis that the appellant’s evidence was not reliable and not credible. At its core, this ground amounts to a disagreement with the judge’s findings which does not amount to an error of law.
23. Second, against that backdrop the failure to refer to a CPIN, which was not in the bundle and was referred to in only one paragraph of the appellant’s skeleton argument, does not in my judgment amount to an error of law. Whilst it is not dispositive, the approach of the appellant on this ground was to criticise the judge for not taking that document into account, even though it was not in the bundle before the judge, nor was it in the bundle for this appeal and was not provided to me separately. In those circumstances the appellant’s representatives did not assist this Tribunal in carrying out its task of reviewing the judge’s decision. It was incumbent on them to provide the complete document they say the judge should have had regard to (rather than a selected extract from it) and to explain why the asserted failure to apply it by the judge was an error of law. They did not do so.
24. Third, even if there was any error of omission, it would not be a material one in my judgment. The judge rejected the appellant’s account and found at paragraph 46 that the appellant was not politically active in Iran and only participated in two demonstrations to help his friend rather than because of any genuinely held beliefs. In those circumstances, even if the judge had referred to the passages of the CPIN relied on by the appellant, the decision would have been the same.
25. I reject this ground.
Grounds 2-4
26. Grounds 2, 3 and 4 attack the judge’s findings on the appellant’s credibility and the evidence before him in a number of different ways. It is convenient to deal with them together.
27. Mr. Ahmad submitted that under the head of ground 2 the judge was wrong to hold against appellant the omission of matters from his screening interview on 13 December 2022 which lasted 24 minutes, which the judge records at paragraph 33. On its own this issue is not sufficient to overturn the Judge’s findings on credibility, it is a factor in the overall assessment. As to ground 3, at paragraph 34 the judge made findings about inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence. The appellant described being scared and confused. The judge’s approach was in error. There is also the issue over timing and illegal exit at paragraph 35. The judge should have given the appellant the benefit of the doubt on this issue. The judge deals with illegal exit at paragraph 37. The respondent did not dispute the fact of illegal exit. Under the head of Ground 4, the judge’s approach to the Komala party letter at paragraph 38. The letter will not say that a person is subject to check. A banned political party will not provide evidence in their letters to set out the checks they carried out. The letter confirms the appellant took part in activities in Iran and fled, his details were checked and this letter shows there were strict security procedures and his undertaking activities was risky.
28. Ms. Clewley submitted that under ground 2 and under each of these grounds, the weight to attach to the evidence was a matter for the judge. The omissions identified by the judge were significant and it was open to him to draw adverse inferences from that. The judge considered the screening interview was short. The judge complied with YL (China) [2004] UKIAT 00145, considered the explanation given by the appellant and rejected this. There is no error in that approach. The appellant accepts that that point relies on the success of other grounds he advances. As to Ground 3, it was appropriate for the judge to account for internal inconsistencies, including whether there was adequate detail regarding his recollection of events. The judge gave proper reasons for his findings. The matters at paragraphs 34 of the judge’s decision were proper for the judge to take into account and showed why the appellant’s claims were not satisfactory. There was a proper analysis. Paragraph 35 relates to the timing of the raid at his home. Whether the raid took place in the early morning or day time is not a matter that could be easily confused and the judge was correct to find as he did. Paragraph 37 is not about illegal exit but about the sequence of events leading to the appellant’s exit. There is no evidence that any of these inconsistencies were the fault of the appellant’s representatives. Regarding ground 4, the Komala party letter, the judge found the letter does not go to events in Iran, and does not further the appellant’s sur place activity, it is not specific to the appellant’s activities in Iran. The grounds criticise the judge for finding the letter is generic, but the letter is generic. The letter itself says no more than that the appellant came to the attention of Iranian authorities due to his activities there and had to flee.
29. In analysing these submissions I bear in mind the decision in Yalcin, set out above. In my judgment at their height, each of these grounds amounts to little more than a disagreement with the judge’s findings and conclusions, having had the benefit of hearing the appellant’s evidence, cross-examination and submissions from both parties on it immediately thereafter. I do not consider that the First-tier Tribunal judge’s reasoning contains any error of law with respect to the matters raised under these grounds.
30. As to ground 2, the appellant’s complaint is that the appellant made no mention of matters he later relied on in his screening interview. It was not that the screening interview did not properly record what he said. In those circumstances the decision in JA (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 450 is of limited assistance to the appellant. I consider that the judge was properly entitled to take into account the appellant’s omission to mention matters which he later placed at the core of his claim as a part of the overall assessment of the appellant’s credibility. In any event, I do not consider this asserted error to be material. If this was an error, there was ample material in the judge’s assessment to make sustainable credibility findings without these findings. This ground fails.
31. As to ground 3, this amounts at its heart to a disagreement with a number of matters which the judge considered relevant to credibility including a number of inconsistencies in the appellant’s account. These were proper matters for the judge to take into account and included inconsistencies over the circumstances of the appellant’s departure from Iran and the sequence of events leading up to that departure. The respondent did not dispute that the appellant left Iran illegally but that is not the point the judge referred to in paragraph 37 of his decision. Instead the judge found an inconsistency about the contact the appellant said he had with his uncle leading up to his departure. That was a proper matter for the judge to note and to take into account. Overall, I do not consider that ground 3 has any merit and I reject it.
32. Equally, ground 4 criticises the judge for his approach to a piece of evidence before him. I accept that a letter from a political party banned in Iran is unlikely to give details of the checks undertaken there on any particular individual. That may be so, but that was not the criticism the judge made of that letter; the judge noted that that it contained no refence to the appellant’s circumstances or what had happened to him in Iran and referred to the risk in general terms. I agree with Ms. Clewley that the weight attached to this letter was a matter for the judge. In my judgment the weight attached to that document was quintessentially a matter for the judge to determine and none of the criticisms advanced by the appellant undermine those conclusions in my judgment. I reject ground 4.
33. For these reasons, I find that grounds 2, 3 and 4 do not give rise to any error of law.
Ground 5: sur place activities
The Law
34. In FA (Iran) v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 149 at [53]-[60] Elisabeth Laing LJ summarised the relevant country guidance, relating to risk on return to Kurds in Iran, namely BA (Demonstrators in Britain: Risk on Return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 136, SSH and HR (Illegal Exit) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308 and to HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 which I do not repeat for reasons of brevity. In FA, the decision in XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran [2022] UKUT 23 had been promulgated after the First-tier Tribunal’s decision but before the appeal was heard in the Upper Tribunal. Elisabeth Laing LJ concluded at [66] and [69]-[71]:
66. I would be inclined to accept Ms Patel’s submissions about the effect of paragraphs (7) and (9) of HB. A Kurd who returns to Iran with political material on his Facebook account would be likely to be at risk because his Facebook account would be examined, and the material would be found. But, in any event, even if that is not correct, and paragraph (7) is to be read subject to paragraph (9), I agree that the evaluation required by paragraph (9) is not an evaluation of the level of the material, but an evaluation of whether it was political, and, if so, of how it would be seen by the regime.
…
69. The F-tT’s findings about this are limited. In paragraph 81, the F-tT found that the Appellant had used social media to ‘make posts against the government of Iran’. Much of the rest of paragraph 81 is difficult to interpret, if not unintelligible. The last sentence is all but meaningless. In paragraph 84, it found that the Appellant had ‘forwarded on Facebook posts principally created by others’. In paragraph 86, it found that the Appellant had had ‘some involvement whereby he will have anti-government items on his Facebook which he appears to have adopted and forwarded’. In paragraph 95, there is a finding that the photographs on the Appellant’s Facebook account would show that ‘he has two different names’ and a half-finding that ‘There would be seen some forwarding of other people’s posts, and perhaps, if he has not already deleted it, the odd photograph of him attending at an event in London’. This is a half finding because there is material in paragraph 97 which appears to imply (although this is not clearly expressed) that a distinction between the Appellant’s case and that of HB is that HB’s Facebook account did (and the Appellant’s did not) have photographs of himself.
70. There is therefore a crucial gap in the F-tT’s reasoning. The reader of determination 1 does not know, other than in the vaguest terms, what investigation of the Facebook account would show. Such findings or hints as there are suggest that the material on the Appellant’s Facebook account would provoke a hair-trigger response from the Iranian authorities, as the material is both hostile to the government and is said to show the Appellant at an unidentified but potentially relevant event. Ground i. (see paragraph 41, above) summarises the Appellant’s case about what the material would show. Nor does determination 1 explain whether the change of the name on the Appellant’s Facebook account is significant, and, if so, in what way.
71. In the light of even the F-tT’s limited findings, the F-tT’s conclusion that there would ‘be an issue’ for the Appellant on return, but that it would not elicit the authorities’ ‘hair trigger’ reaction is inexplicable. It was only if the F-tT was able to say that the Iranian authorities would find nothing in the Appellant’s Facebook account which was, or which they would construe as, political and hostile to the regime, that the F-tT could have found that he would not be at risk on return. It may be that there is something unusual in the Facebook material which would justify the F-tT’s conclusion, but a reader of determination 1 is left with no idea what that material might be. I consider that the F-tT erred in law, as claimed in ground i., by not giving the Facebook material the anxious scrutiny which it should have had. It also erred in law by failing, in the light of its limited findings and the country guidance cases, to explain how it was able to conclude that the Appellant would not be at risk on return.
Submissions
35. Mr Ahmad made the following submissions on this ground. At paragraph 42, the judge accepted that the appellant had worn a hi-vis jacket at demonstrations against the Iranian regime in the UK and that there were photos of this. The judge found there was no purpose to wear the jacket and he was some way from the embassy. The letter shows he attended demonstrations and undertook activities with friends. The assessment that he is not performing a role and is away from the embassy is not the correct approach. The correct approach is how the appellant will be perceived and whether he is at risk of persecution. At paragraph 43 the judge accepts the appellant’s Facebook account is public, the judge should have considered the risk to the appellant under Immigration Rule 339K, and considered this to be a risk of future harm. There could be a domino effect leading to a threat. At paragraph 56 the judge lists various case law, there is no application of that other than BA (Iran). The judge refers to the hair trigger approach at paragraph 57 but does not make a finding on whether he accepted that the use of facial recognition technology would place the appellant at risk. The judge found that the appellant would not be at risk due to adverse interest in him. WS (Pakistan) [2023] notes that there will not be evidence of a person being of adverse interest. The judge has not said how they made the finding that the appellant would not be of adverse interest at paragraph 58, that is not the judge’s finding at paragraph 39. The appellant should not be expected to lie on return or modify his behaviour. That relies on overturning the Judge’s findings on the appellant’s political activity. The judge makes no finding in relation to the appellant’s TikTok account. That was contained within the bundle under the umbrella of the appellant’s sur place activities. XX (PJAK) cannot apply to TikTok evidence and some of the appellant’s videos have more than 1,500 views. A large number of people have viewed them, that is the important aspect. There is no finding in respect of that. The appellant’s skeleton argument before the judge highlights the CPIN on sur place activity and social media. There is no consideration of that element.
36. Ms. Clewley submitted that the judge gave reasons at paragraph 42 for his findings on the appellant’s sur place activities, stating the appellant did not explain the help he claimed to have provided. He was not performing a role while wearing a hi-vis jacket, he was some way from the embassy. Those are adequate reasons. The appellant’s approach is simply a disagreement with the judge. Nor does the Komala party letter support this element of the claim, it simply says the appellant has attended demonstrations in the UK. The judge is criticised for not applying Immigration Rule 339K, but the judge was correct to characterise the message as not being a threat, the judge was not required to go on to consider that rule. Could it cause a domino effect? That is not the grounds, nor is there any evidence that it has in fact happened. The judge reached findings at paragraph 45 on the appellant’s sur place activity and rejected the appellant’s claims about previous activity, he made proper findings on these issues. The judge found at paragraph 51 that the appellant does not in fact fear persecution for this reason. The judge gave proper reasons for this. The judge was correct to find the burden is on the appellant at paragraph 53 and found that the appellant had not discharged the burden. The judge referred to Country Guidance cases. It has not been particularised what principle should have been applied and was not from these cases. The hair trigger approach was correctly considered. The Judge considered how monitoring occurred, the background evidence, how matters may have moved on, they were all properly considered. The judge did not find the appellant would come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. There was some criticism of failure to give reasons which is not in the grounds. In any case neither are made out. As to HJ (Iran), the judge found that the appellant’s political beliefs were not genuinely held at paragraph 59, the judge applied the correct test, whether the appellant would have to not express a fundamental part of his identity. The judge correctly found that those beliefs were not genuinely held. The TikTok issue is not in the grounds and it is not procedurally proper to raise it at the hearing. In any case, there is only one screenshot of the TikTok account, the appellant only has 54 followers and has made four posts. If the appellant could not succeed in relation to Facebook, he could not succeed on non-PJAK compliant TikTok account which shows less activity.
Discussion
37. First, in relation to the appellant’s activities in Iran, this part of this ground is to a large extent determined by the failure of grounds 1-4 which I have considered above. The negative credibility findings which the judge made were inevitably relevant to his assessment of the risk or lack thereof which the appellant would face on return.
38. Second, applying Yalcin at [51], I do not consider that there was any error on the part of the judge by not citing each and all of the country guidance cases set out above. At paragraph 56 the judge made clear that they had regard to HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC), XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC), BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) and S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482. It is not clear from the judge’s findings that they failed to apply these authorities, indeed they expressly said that they had regard to them. In any event, this criticism, taken at its highest does not amount to a material error of law. The accepted facts of the appellant’s limited political activities before departure, Kurdish ethnicity and not having completed military service are not sufficient to give rise to a risk on return to him on a proper application of the principles set out in HB. Accordingly, had the judge explicitly referred in greater detail to those authorities, the outcome would have been the same. I conclude that this part of the judge’s reasoning does not contain an error of law.
39. Third, as to sur place activities, the Judge accepted that the appellant had attended nine demonstrations in the UK between July 2023 and January 2025 in which he was a participant rather than an organiser or leader. The judge made express findings that the appellant was pictured some way away from the embassy and that the appellant had posted pictures of his attendance at these events on his social media accounts. The judge went on to make findings that the appellant had taken part in these events to bolster his asylum claim rather than as an expression of his genuinely held beliefs. The judge made detailed findings in relation to the appellant’s Facebook account and returned to the relevance of the letter from the Komala party when dealing with this issue. The judge was right to describe the appellant’s social medica activity as limited. In my judgment all of these findings were open to the judge based on the evidence he had heard and there is no basis to overturn them on this appeal.
40. Fourth, it was open to the judge to conclude that there was no evidence that the appellant had come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities. A single negative comment on his Facebook account did not amount to a threat, it described the appellant in denigratory terms. It did not amount to a threat of persecution or serious harm and therefore there was no need for the judge to consider Immigration Rule 339K. Arguments based on a ‘domino effect’ from this threat accordingly fall away. Nor did the judge reverse the burden and require the appellant to show positively that he had come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. The judge found that the appellant did not in fact fear persecution for a convention reason. Accordingly, the judge found no risk on return to the appellant.
41. Fifth, the judge went on to consider the position in the alternative from paragraph 52 of his judgment and found that the appellant had not come to the attention of the Iranian authorities because of his activities before departure. The judge dealt properly with the hair trigger approach that would apply and accepted that facial recognition technology may now be in use. However, that did not assist the appellant in circumstances where he was not of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities. The judge made proper and detailed findings on this issue at paragraph 59 and there is no basis to overturn those conclusions as they do not contain any error of law. The judge also found that the appellant would be able to obtain his travel documents or, alternatively, if he needed to apply for an emergency travel document he could delete his Facebook account before applying for such a document and before returning to Iran. Since his political views were not genuinely held there would be no issue of having to live discretely or to suppress his genuinely held views. I consider all of these findings to be proper and unimpeachable given the findings the judge made.
42. Applying the Court of Appeal’s judgment in FA (Iran), there is no gap in the judge’s reasoning in this case. It is clear that the judge found that the appellant could delete his Facebook account prior to applying for an emergency travel document or prior to return to Iran. In those circumstances the judge reached clear conclusions on what a reader of the appellant’s social media account would understand about his activities in the UK, on the basis that they had been deleted, and that that would not provoke a hair-trigger response from the Iranian authorities in the event of his return to Iran. Those conclusions were plainly open to the judge on the evidence he heard and on the findings he made.
43. It is right that the Judge found that the appellant had sought to bolster his claim by participating in demonstrations in the UK. He concluded that the appellant would not be of adverse interest where he returned to Iran. The judge properly applied the principles elucidated in XX to the appellant’s evidence and reached conclusions about what could be drawn from that evidence on the assumption that the appellant would delete his account. Unlike in FA, the judge did give the appellant’s social media material the anxious scrutiny that it required.
44. Sixth, as regards the Appellant’s reliance on his TikTok account, this did not form part of the appellant’s grounds of appeal on which permission was granted. I have doubts that the appellant should be permitted to raise this issue at the hearing of the appeal, applying due procedural rigour. However, even taking this material at its height, this material does not comply with XX (PJAK) at §96, and if it did, it would show no more than that some videos on the appellant’s TikTok account have been viewed in excess of 1,500 times. That gives no information about who viewed them, when or where and to draw inferences founding a risk on return based on those facts alone would not in my judgment be a proper course for this tribunal to take or for the First-tier to have taken. There is no reason why the judge’s analysis of the appellant’s Facebook account does not apply equally to his TikTok account and this aspect of this ground cannot succeed in isolation. I reject the submission that the principles set out in XX (PJAK) should not apply to analysis of social media posted on TikTok, even if the precise details of how different social media networks operate are different. The judge properly applied those principles. For completeness, I do not consider the fact that the judge did not explicitly cite the CPIN on social media activity gives rise to any material error of law. Had the judge referred to that document their decision would have been the same.
45. This ground of appeal fails
Ground 6
46. Ground 6 can be expressed briefly. Mr. Ahmad submitted that the judge did not give proper consideration to the risk of persecution that the appellant faced as a result of being required to undertake military service and potentially to target other Kurdish people or alternatively to the inhuman prison conditions that he would face if he refuses to undertake military service. The judge should have considered the CPIN, which was referred to in the appellant’s skeleton argument before the judge.
47. Ms. Clewley submitted that the appellant’s argument before the judge was based on his not having completed military service creating a risk on return, not in terms his having to carrying out activities against Kurdish people or detention conditions. The judge cannot be criticised for not dealing with matters that were not advanced before him.
48. I prefer the submissions of the respondent on this ground.
49. The appellant’s skeleton argument before the judge stated that he had not completed military service, referred to a CPIN on military service and stated that at the pinch point of return factors such as his Kurd, leaving Iran illegally and being wanted by the authorities as a result of leafleting would likely lead to a question about why he had not completed military service. There was no reference to having to undertake activities against Kurds or detention conditions in that skeleton argument, nor in the judge’s judgment. Mr. Ahmad did not submit that this point was raised before the judge but not recorded by him.,
50. In my judgment it is unfair to seek to criticise the judge for not dealing with an issue which was not raised in written or oral submissions before him. There was no failure or error of law in the judge’s decision on this issue at paragraph 61 of his judgment. The judge was perfectly entitled to find that the appellant’s failure to complete military service would not place him at risk of persecution. The appellant’s attempt to raise issues of detention conditions and having to take action against Kurds were after the judge had decided it against the appellant on a different factual basis amount to no more than a disagreement with the judge’s conclusions and is an attempt to reargue this point in reliance on matters which were not before the judge.
51. There was no error of in the judge’s approach to this issue and this ground fails.
Ground 7
52. The final ground of appeal relates to the appellant’s assertion that he would be at risk at the pinch point of having to apply for an emergency travel document.
53. Mr. Ahmad submitted that in considering the judgment at paragraph 60, XX (PJAK) establishes that the point of applying for an emergency travel document is the first pinch point. and the judge’s approach to that was in error and is not contingent on deletion of a Facebook account.
54. Ms. Clewley submitted that the judge dealt with this properly at paragraph 60. If the appellant can obtain his own passport then there would be no pinch point. The judge found that the appellant could obtain his documents and therefore this criticism is not material. The judge made a finding in the alternative that the appellant can delete his social media accounts and that his posts were not as a result of his genuine political beliefs. B (internet activity – state of evidence) Iran [2015] UKUT 0257 holds that the Iranian authorities will do an open internet search. It was appropriate for the judge to find that the appellant could delete his accounts as they did not contain his genuinely held views. That is compliant with the country guidance.
55. To a large extent this issue is covered by my decision on ground 5 above and I do not repeat my decision at paragraphs 37-45 above. In my judgment the judge reached proper conclusions in relation to the appellant’s ability to obtain a travel document from family members. In those circumstances the starting point is that the issue of risk arising from a pinch point on an application for an emergency travel document simply does not arise. However, in the alternative, the judge was wholly entitled to find that the appellant could delete his social media accounts before making such an application. Given the credibility findings that the judge had made, that the appellant’s activities in Iran and in the UK did not give rise to a risk to him it was proper for the judge to hold that the appellant could delete those social media accounts. There was no error in the judge’s approach to this issue given the detailed credibility findings and other findings of fact which he made which I have reviewed earlier in this decision. This ground does not show any material error of law in the judge’s decision.
56. Ground 7 fails.
Notice of Decision
57. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
58. The appeal is dismissed.

D Sternberg

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 November 2025