Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-002971
UI-2025-002972, UI-2025-002973
UI-2025-002974

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/52274/2024
PA/52313/2024, PA/52328/2024
PA/52319/2024
LP/09975/2024, LP/09976/2024
LP/09977/2024, LP/09979/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKUP
SITTING IN RETIREMENT

Between

MD DH & Ors
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Badar of counsel, instructed by Saint Martin Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the appellants’ linked appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Boyes) promulgated 5 March 2025 dismissing on all grounds their appeals lodged on 21 January 2024 against the respondent’s refusal on 24 January 2024 of the family’s claims for international protection and on human rights grounds.
2. In relation to the protection grounds, the appeals of the second to fourth appellants are entirely dependent on that of the first appellant.
3. In summary, the first appellant’s factual claim was that he had been a member of Jamat E Islam (JEI) since 2005 and had worked for them since 2013. He claims that he is at risk on return from the Awami League (AL) as he had been targeted and threatened. He does not know the non-state actors behind those threats, but he assumes that it could only be at the direction of AL.
4. The first appellant left Bangladesh and came to the UK in September 2022. However, he did not claim asylum until March 2023. Ostensibly, that delay was to enable all his family members to join him in the UK before making the asylum claim.
5. Although the First-tier Tribunal refused permission to appeal on 24 June 2025, when the application was renewed to the Upper Tribunal, Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran granted permission on 7 August 2025.
6. In summary, the grounds as originally drafted argued that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law by (i) not admitting the “country expert report” lodged late on 27 February 2025, responding to the CPIN on Bangladesh: Political Situation’ issue on December 2024; (ii) incorrectly assessing credibility, rejecting the first appellant’s account for minor inconsistencies, failing to have regard to his evidence regarding the points the judge took issue with, and by requiring corroborating evidence; (iii) placing “over reliance” on the CPIN in assessing future risk; and (iv) failing to adequately engage with and assess the best interest of the child MSH, who has autism.
7. In granting permission, Judge Loughran considered all grounds arguable but provided no reasons in support of that decision.
8. The Rule 24 response of 12 September 2025 submitted (i) that the judge had given all appropriate consideration to the admission of the expert report, with cogent reasons open to the Tribunal for declining to admitting it. Reliance was placed on Maleci (non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT00028, for the entitlement of the judge to refuse to admit the report. In relation to the other grounds, the respondent submitted that (ii) the judge was entitled to reject the explanation for the delay in claiming asylum and the decision does not disclose that corroborative evidence was required by the judge; (iii) it was reasonably open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that the appellant would not be at risk on return by reason of sufficiency of protection, as highlighted in the CPIN; and (iv) the judge considered the availability of treatment for autism at [69] to [70] of the decision.
9. The matter was listed before me on 2 December 2025 as an error of law hearing.
10. Having taken account of all lodged documentary material, including Mr Badar’s skeleton argument dated 21 November 2025, together with the helpful oral submissions before me, for the reasons summarised below I am satisfied that the grounds disclose no material error of law in the making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
The Country Expert Report
11. A preliminary issue was raised at the First-tier Tribunal as to the admission of a late-served Country Expert Report by Mr Md Solaiman Tushar, dealt with between [6] and [17] of the decision. The report was not admitted, and this forms the subject matter of the first ground of appeal.
12. In relation to this first ground, it is clear that as a preliminary issue the judge gave full and careful consideration to the report and must have read it. Mr Badar argued that the judge inflexibly relied on the practice direction requirements and should have taken into account the importance of the expert evidence to the appellant’s case. In short, it is complained that the judge did not take a balancing exercise approach to the report’s admission.
13. The first concern addressed by the judge was that the report was served late, and the respondent’s representative at the hearing had not had the chance to consider it. The appellants had had over a year to prepare their case and even though the report was available to their legal advisors on 10 February 2025, it was not served until 27 February 2025, with no adequate explanation for that failure. In point of fact, Ms Clewley pointed out that although the First-tier Tribunal assumed it had been served after hours on 27 February 2025, it was in fact not uploaded to the portal until 28 February 2025. It follows that there were only two working days for the respondent to be able to address it. It seems likely that the presenting officer had not even seen it by the date of the First-tier Tribunal appear.
14. There is no adequate or satisfactory explanation for the delay in commissioning the report, which was not done until 4 February 2025. The hearing date of 5 March 2025 was set on 3 October 2024 with the appellants directed to serve their evidence no later than 26 September 2024. Mr Badar pointed out that it formed the subject matter of a supplementary skeleton argument but this was only uploaded on 28 February 2025, at the same time as the report.
15. Mr Badar also submitted that at [16] of the decision, the judge seems to have decided against admission of the report before going on at [17] to make a “side note” comment as to whether the author could even be considered an expert.
16. I accept the appellants’ reasoning, that there had been significant regime change in Bangladesh and that the expert report was prepared in response to the revised CPIN of December 2024. However, as Ms Clewley pointed out that regime change took place in August 2024 and the appellants’ representatives should have been alert to the significance of the removal of AL from power for the appellant’s case; they did not need to wait until the CPIN in December 2024. Further, it would have been good practice to communicate with the court and the respondent. More importantly, the commissioning of such a report should have taken place very much sooner. Nevertheless, it remains the case that no indication was given either to the First-tier Tribunal or to the respondent that a report had been commissioned and was awaited, nor was any thought apparently given to providing a timeframe for that report to be served. More significantly, although the report had been in the hands of the appellants’ legal representatives since 10 February 2025, it was not served until some 18 days later, on 28 February 2025, less than five working days before the listed hearing. Whether it was in fact served on 27 or 28 February does not really matter; the respondent did not have any reasonable time to respond to it. There was no adequate or satisfactory explanation provided to the First-tier Tribunal for the delay in serving the report. Whilst the judge was obliged to apply the overriding consideration of dealing with cases fairly and justly, that included fairness to the respondent.
17. I also bear in mind that any prejudice to the respondent could have been overcome by an adjournment, reserving a decision on the payment of costs wasted. However, neither party sought an adjournment, either before or after the ruling declining to admit the report. Ms Clewley points out that it would have been for the appellants to seek an adjournment since they were the ones seeking the report’s admission. On the other hand, Mr Badar said that the respondent could have sought an adjournment. However, there was no reason for the respondent to seek an adjournment when the report was not admitted in evidence.
18. Of course, all of the above begs the question as to whether the report justified admission on its “merits’. As to that issue, for the following reasons, I endorse the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s query whether this was even an expert report.
19. The author of the report is said to be a “barrister trained in the UK and a practicising advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh”. It is also said that he is a “legal and political editor with clear competence in Bangladeshi political affairs”, and Head of Chambers. With all due respect, neither of those claims even begins to address the requirements for a country expert. Mr Badar was unable to explain how a lawyer practising in Bangladesh becomes by that reason alone an expert on the political climate and hostility between political parties. The report is remarkable for the absence of any proof of the supposed expert’s qualifications to act as an expert witness. There is no reference to his depth of experience, etc. Frankly, on that basis any lawyer in Bangladesh still in the early years of practice would qualify as an expert. I cannot accept that premise.
20. Even if the judge erred in not considering the merits and utility of the report in relation to the matters at issue in the case before deciding not to admit it, I am satisfied that on the basis of the information available to the First-tier Tribunal, no judge properly instructed could or should have admitted such a report from this author as expert evidence.
21. It is also significant, as the judge noted at [12] of the decision, there was no application to exclude the CPIN, on the basis that the appellants had not been able to respond to it.
22. It follows that if there was an error in the decision whether to admit the report, it was not material as the report cannot properly be regarded as expert evidence. Furthermore, no application was made for an adjournment or to exclude the CPIN. It follows that no error of law is disclosed by this first ground.
Assessment of Credibility
23. The second ground in relation to the assessment of credibility complains that “the judge’s conclusions were not based on a cumulative assessment of plausibility but on isolated discrepancies and a speculative view of credibility”. Mr Badar had to accept that because of NABA the burden of proof was different, on the balance of probabilities. After careful consideration and for the following reasons I am satisfied that no error of law is disclosed by this ground.
24. The primary findings in relation to credibility arising from the judge’s assessment of the first appellant’s factual account. Cogent reasons open to the Tribunal are set out in the decision, particularly at [45] to [52] of the decision, which followed the judge’s summary of the evidence. Nothing in the decision demonstrates that the judge was relying on minor inconsistencies and ignoring an overall assessment of the evidence. The judge had set out the relevant evidence and made clear at [43] that the findings were only made after consideration of all of that evidence.
25. The judge was also entitled at [53] of the decision to take into account the delay and to reject the explanation for not claiming asylum sooner. Even if it had been accepted, to await the arrival of his family before claiming asylum is not a justifiable reason and is entirely unmeritorious.
26. Neither do I see any merit in the claim that the judge required corroborative evidence. That is not made out on a reading of the decision as a whole, in the round.
Over Reliance on the CPIN
27. Even if the judge was wrong on the factual findings or the assessment of credibility, the fact is that once the so-called expert evidence was excluded, there was no evidence to contradict the updated country evidence demonstrating that even if the appellant’s factual claim had been accepted, the appeal fell to be dismissed by reason of sufficiency of protection and availability of internal relocation, as explained at [54] to [66] of the decision and as outlined in the CPIN, which takes me to the third ground claiming over reliance on the CPIN.
28. Mr Badar took me to various parts of the CPIN, suggesting that the situation remains volatile with a bleak outlook for the future. In particular, he points out that there has not been a complete clear out of AL and some remain in positions of power as a political expediency. Nothing in the decision suggests an “over reliance” on the CPIN. The fact is that the appellants could not contradict the country background evidence. However, the CPIN does make clear that the first appellant is not at risk from rogue non-state actors and they are not in a position to cause him harm.
Best Interest of the Child
29. The fourth ground asserting that the judge failed to adequately engage with and assess the best interests of the child MSH who is diagnosed with autism. The judge specifically addressed the article 8 ECHR claim from [67] onwards and the autism issue in some detail at [69] of the decision. Mr Badar criticised the shortness of the judge’s address of this issue, when the welfare of a child should be the paramount consideration.
30. However, it was fatal to the appellants’ protection claim case was the absence of evidence that adequate treatment would not be available and accessible in Bangladesh. Frankly, the evidence in support was weak in the extreme. Even though there is a report addressing the autism, nothing suggests that the disadvantages caused by autism could not be overcome. Ms Clewley pointed out that the diagnosis took place in Bangladesh, suggesting appropriate care is available. No specific treatment is required, the absence of which would render removal disproportionate.
31. Furthermore, nothing in the fact of a child having autism begins to reach the threshold of circumstances which would render a refusal to permit the child, and therefore the family, to remain in the UK, disproportionate, or unduly harsh, or amount to exceptional circumstances. This head of claim was weak in the extreme and had no real prospect of success. There is no error of law in the judge dealing with it shortly. The family would be returning together to Bangladesh and had only been in the UK a short time. In the circumstances, no error of law arises on this ground.
32. It follows that the appeal cannot succeed.
Notice of Decision
The appellants’ appeal is dismissed on all grounds.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands, and the underlying appeal remains dismissed.
I make no order as to costs.

DMW Pickup

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Sitting in Retirement
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 December 2025