Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003003
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56069/2024
LP/04024/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st of May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

MA
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: E. Banham, instructed by Barnes Harrild & Dyer
For the Respondent: A. Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order in this appeal because the appellant has made a claim for international protection. I consider that it is appropriate that that order continue at this time. The public interest in the UK’s compliance with its international obligation to protect the safety of asylum-seekers and refugees and in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweigh the public interest in open justice at this stage in the appellant’s claim.
2. The appellant is a Kurdish citizen of Iraq, born in 1993. He arrived in the UK on 28 October 2022, together with his wife R. The couple claimed asylum, with MA being treated as the main claimant and R as his dependant. They said that they were from different tribes, and that R’s tribe is powerful and culturally conservative. They had fallen in love and been intimate, and the appellant had twice approached R’s family to propose marriage. He had been rejected because R was expected to marry a cousin. The couple eloped and after the elopement, R’s family had threatened to kill the couple and burned down the appellant’s family home. The couple unsuccessfully sought mediation through a local charity and then fled the country. They say that they fear that they would be killed by R’s family if they returned to Iraqi Kurdistan.
3. On 8 February 2024, the respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim. The appellant appealed, and in a decision dated 2 June 2025, the FtT found that the appellant’s account of events in Iraq was not credible and dismissed his appeal.
4. On 8 July 2025, a different FtT judge granted the appellant permission to appeal against that decision.
The challenged decision
5. In the challenged decision, the FtT recorded that it had decided that the appellant’s wife should be treated as a vulnerable witness: [3]. It then set out a brief summary of the claim ([5]) and referred to the respondent’s refusal decision for the respondent’s position ([6]). It briefly set out the legal framework for the appeal at [7]-[10]. At [11]-[16], it set out the agreed issues in the appeal and identified the documents before it. At [17]-[21], the FtT recorded that it had heard evidence from the appellant and his wife, and a short adjournment had been required when the latter became very distressed during cross-examination. It further recorded that it had heard submissions from both representatives and reserved its decision. These sections of the determination are concise but clear and unchallenged. Nothing further needs to be said about them here.
6. The FtT considered the couple’s account of events in Iraq at [23]-[50], taking into account the their oral evidence, the documents they relied on, the respondent’s CPIN, Iraq: Blood Feuds, Honour Crimes and Tribal Violence (July 2024), and the parties’ submissions. At [51], it found that the appellant’s account was not credible “on the lower standard of proof” and that R’s family had not threatened him and there would be no risk to him on return to Iraq.
7. The FtT’s reasoning proceeded in the following steps. First, it set out the respondent’s reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account as set out in the refusal decision ([23]) and the Presenting Officer’s submissions ([24]-[29]). It then set out the submissions of the appellant’s representative at [30]-[33].
8. At [34]-[35], the FtT reminded itself of the requirement to take the structured approach to credibility described in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach: Pakistan) [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) and to consider the evidence in the round.
9. The FtT assessment of the appellant’s credibility begins at [36]:
“A core aspect of the Appellant’s claim is that he met his wife when she visited his mother’s shop to get clothes sewn. They exchanged phones numbers talked regularly on the phone and his wife asked him to visit the family home when no one was at home where they were intimate. In evidence he said that he was unaware she was Mirawdale tribe until the relationship started and he did not know that they would not allow her to get married.”
10. This was followed at [37] by a series of excerpts from the CPIN:
“‘Iraqi society is organized differently from Western, post-industrial society. There is a strong orientation to the family and the clan (which consists of several families). About 40 percent of the population are also loyal to their own tribe (which consists of several clans). There are about a hundred large tribes and twenty-five tribal confederations.
‘… There is a rigid hierarchy in the traditional extended family, in which several generations (parents and their children, grandparents, brothers with their families) live under the same roof. Authority lies formally in the hands of males, who are ranked according to age and social position. Among women, authority increases with age and number of children
‘… These traditional social relationships impose immense social pressure and control. Individual conduct is tightly regulated, and violations of unwritten laws are punished. Family honour is regarded as the highest good and defines a family’s prestige in relation to other families. [§7.1.1]
….
In April 2023, the EUAA report entitled ‘Iraq: Arab tribes and customary law’ (the April 2023 EUAA report), citing various sources, stated:
‘It must be noted that the tribal system in Iraq is highly complex, sensitive, extremely difficult to research, and variable based on a wide range of factors and specific circumstances on the ground.’
‘… “Tribalism” is a defining characteristic of modern Iraqi society… Tribes in Iraq exercise social influence across the country, and social capital for Iraqis is “often” or “primarily found in tribal, clan, and ethno-sectarian communities”
‘A report by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimated that 75% of Iraqis are either members of, or have kinship to, a tribe, and “around 70 percent of Iraqis identify themselves as part of the tribal system” [§7.1.5]
…
‘…The April 2023 EUAA report noted, citing sources from 2020 and 2023 respectively: ‘In the nahwa tradition, the cousin, uncle or other male relative of a girl or woman can prohibit or end her marriage to a person outside of the family, or tribe. Nahwa is the practice where a male cousin is entitled to marry his female cousin or decide on whom she can marry, and enables any clan to “reject marriage proposals from men who belonged to another clan, forcing the girl to marry from her own, without her parents’ consent or hers…’[§ 9.6.4]
…
‘…Traditional societies do not permit unsupervised contact between males and females who are not married to one another and who could have sexual relations with one another. For minor violations the punishment is a beating or confinement at home for the woman…The consequences are more serious when illicit sexual contact has taken place. In these cases the woman involved may be killed by her father or brothers, in order to cleanse the family’s honour…’[§11.5.1]
‘Violations of honour (“honour crimes”) that contravene tribal social norms and codes and that can spark honour-based violence against a person can be due to a range of reasons, including examples such as these for women/girls:
• sexual relations or male contact outside marriage; “fornication”; adultery”; flirtation or even rumours or suspicion of an offence; “real or perceived unfaithfulness”; or if a girl/woman has texts/has correspondence “deemed inappropriate” between her and a man she is not married to; [§11.5.2]”
11. At [38], the FtT expressed its conclusion that when the appellant’s claim was assessed against this evidence, the Presenting Officer’s submissions were persuasive. At [39]-[41], it explained why. The FtT did not accept that the appellant would not have known what wife his tribe was from until after the relationship started. At the very least, he would have known that she was not from his tribe. This was because “From the CPIN (2024) Tribalism is a defining characteristic of modern Iraqi society.” It would have been “an issue discussed at a very early stage because of its significance in Iraqi society”.
12. At [40], the FtT turned to the appellant’s evidence that “he did not know that the family would not allow her [his wife] to get married to him.” This was not accepted. Here, the FtT pointed to the CPIN for the finding that there “are serious consequences” for the wife because of her relationship with the appellant. Even their telephone conversations “would have sparked honour-based violence.” In addition, the FtT considered it clear from the CPIN that marriages between cousins were common and that a male cousin can reject proposals from men from other clans. In these circumstances, the appellant would have known that his marriage proposal would not be accepted and that this would have serious consequences for his wife.
13. At [41], the FtT agreed with the Presenting Officer’s submission that because the appellant was from a different tribe, his two marriage proposals would have raised suspicions, and that his wife would have been placed “under close scrutiny”. The FtT quoted from the CPIN: “traditional social relationship[s] impose immense social pressure and control. Individual conduct is tightly regulated”. In this context, the effect of the two marriage proposals would have meant, at a minimum, that the appellant’s wife would have been placed under scrutiny and elopement would have been impossible.
14. At [42], the FtT stated its conclusion that the appellant’s claim was “externally inconsistent”.
15. At [43]-[48], the FtT considered three letters relied on by the appellant, said to be from Resa Organization for Human Rights and gave reasons for finding them unreliable. At [49]-[50], it gave reasons for placing no weight on ID cards, a Facebook profile and photographs. At [52]-[53], it gave reasons for finding that the appellant and his wife would have access to civil identification documents on return. There has been no separate challenge to these aspects of the FtT’s reasoning, but as they rest in part on the adverse credibility findings already made, they would rise or fall with those findings.
16. In the remainder of the decision, the FtT gave its reasons for dismissing the appellant’s humanitarian protection and human rights claims. There is no separate challenge to the aspects of the decision.
The grounds of appeal
17. The appellant raises a single ground of appeal, entitled “Misapplication of objective evidence”. Under this heading, he raises three separate complaints. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to them as Ground One, Ground Two and Ground Three.
18. Ground One is that the FtT erred in finding it implausible that the appellant did not know that his wife was a member of her tribe until after their relationship started. The grounds identify the basis for this finding as the CPIN’s description of tribalism as a “defining characteristic of modern Iraqi society”. The appellant submits:
“However, the CPIN does not universalise or absolutize tribal affiliation. Indeed, it also explains (in the extracts set out by the FTTJ himself at para. 37), that “[a]bout
40 percent of the population are also loyal to their own tribe”, that “the tribal system in Iraq is highly complex, sensitive, extremely difficult to research”, and that “75% of Iraqis are either members of, or have kinship to, a tribe, and around 70 percent of Iraqis identify themselves as part of the tribal system” (emphases added). When this background evidence is combined with the (accepted) facts in the present case, viz. that A met his wife when she visited A’s mother’s shop, it cannot reasonably be said – absent further evidence and reasoning – that A was aware of his wife’s tribal affiliations.”
19. Ground Two is that the FtT’s finding that the appellant would have known that R’s family would not allow her to marry him was based on a “mis-construal of external evidence”:
“As in para .39, the FTTJ has absolutized the objective evidence, which gives a more nuanced picture of honour-based risk. If all tribes rejected all other tribes on pain of death, and risk was uniformly severe, then honour-based violence would not exist, or at least would be extremely rare. The FTTJ’s determination is wrong in its conclusion, or at the very least required further reasoning to explain why – in the instant case – A’s narrative of attempted marriage and risk is incredible.”
20. Ground Three is that the FtT erred at [41] in its finding that the facts that the appellant was from a different tribe and had made two marriage proposals “would have raised suspicion about the Appellant and his wife which at a minimum would make any elopement not possible and at a maximum spark honour-violence.” The appellant submits:
“This is to conflate the question of risk based on external evidence, with the contingent factual matrix of how harm was avoided in the instant case. It is precisely A’s case that there was indeed suspicion, leading to serious risk, and that – in the contingent circumstances – the risk was obviated by a relatively expeditious escape. Again, The FTTJ’s determination that A is not credible is wrong in its conclusion, or at the very least required further reasoning to explain why – in the instant case – A’s narrative of attempted marriage and risk is incredible.”
21. The FtT judge who granted permission to appeal found that “The FtJ did not appear to make an assessment as to the credibility of the appellant’s core account and its consistency with the objective evidence” and that she “gave no further reasons as to why she found the appellant was aware that his wife was from a different tribe or why she rejected the account that two refused marriage proposals created risk for the wife, given the objective evidence.” She concluded, “The FtJ arguably erred in her findings and arguably failed to provide adequate reasons for them.”
22. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response. I will not set its contents out in detail here, but I confirm that I have taken it into account. I will refer to any specific submissions made, where relevant, in my discussion below.
The hearing
23. At the hearing, all parties had sight of the appellant’s bundle of 516 pages and the respondent’s Rule 24 response.
24. I heard submissions from Mr Banham. He clarified that there were two prongs to the appellant’s appeal. The first was that the FtT had misunderstood the country evidence by “absolutizing” it. He accepted that this was a rationality challenged. When I asked him to explain what he meant by “absolutizing”, he clarified that the FtT had erred by treating the country evidence as establishing that tribe is so important to all Iraqis that inevitably it would be the first thing that the appellant and his wife would have asked each other when they met.
25. This discussion was with regard to what I have named Ground One. With regard to Ground Two, Mr Banham repeated that the FtT had erred by absolutizing the country evidence. Here, he submitted, the FtT had found the couple’s account of their behaviour implausible in light of the risk of honour violence that would have arisen. This was irrational, because the country evidence established that couples in Iraqi Kurdistan did engage in conduct that led to honour violence, otherwise there would be no such violence. I note that the logic here is similar to the submission made by appellant’s counsel below, recorded at [30]:”there would be no honour violence if potential threats or violence never materialised, it must be quite a common occurrence.”
26. Ground Three begins by criticising the finding that the appellant’s membership of a different tribe and two marriage proposals would have raised suspicions, making elopement impossible and at worst leading to violence. In his submissions, Mr Banham accepted that the FtT had given reasons for this finding, namely that the importance of tribe and honour and the strict control over individual behaviour made it likely that R would have been placed under strict surveillance after the two marriage proposals. He submitted, however, that the ground was in fact a challenge to the wider rejection of the appellant’s “narrative of attempted marriage and risk”. The reasons for this wider finding were either inadequate or irrational.
27. I then heard from Mr Sheikh. I mean no disrespect by not rehearsing his submissions here. They were clear, concise and helpful.
Discussion
28. I consider that all three of the appellant’s grounds are based on a misreading of the FtT’s reasoning.
Ground One
29. Neither I nor the respondent was entirely clear what the appellant meant by “absolutizing” the country evidence. In her Rule 24 response, the respondent treated it as a submission that the CPIN should not have been followed. Following my discussion with Mr Banham, I understand it to be that the FtT acted as if tribe were so important to all Iraqis that this would inevitably be the first thing the couple would have discussed when they met, and that this was irrational in light of the country evidence that the tribal system is complex and significant percentages of Iraqis are not members of a tribe (25%), do not identify themselves as part of the tribal system (30%) or do not express loyalty to a tribe (40%).
30. As I expressed to Mr Banham and he accepted, the FtT did not find that tribe would have been the first thing the couple would have discussed. It found that they would have discussed it “at a very early stage”.
31. I read the FtT as finding at [39] that what the FtT meant by this is that they would have discussed tribe in their multiple phone conversations between when they met for the first time and when they became intimate. This is because at [36], immediately prior to setting out the country evidence, the FtT had set out not only how the couple met, but also that “they exchanged phones [sic] numbers [and] talked regularly on the phone and his wife asked him to visit the family home when no one was at home where they were intimate” and that the appellant had said in his oral evidence that the appellant was “unaware” of his wife’s tribe “until the relationship started”.
32. I have also considered where in the appellant’s evidence he said he had not known his wife was from a different tribe before their relationship began. This appears to be something that he said for the first time in his evidence to the FtT ([36]). It does not appear in his answers at his substantive interview. At his first substantive interview on 19 December 2023, he was not asked any relevant questions. At his second substantive interview on 20 February 2024, he was asked at question 31, “[d]id you foresee any issues with you falling in love with her?” His answer is recorded as “We were in love, that’s the business in heart [sic]”. Nowhere in his appeal statement does the appellant say that he did not know what tribe his wife was from before their relationship started.
33. The question before me is therefore whether the FtT erred by finding it implausible that the couple would not have discussed their tribe during the daily phone conversations during which they fell in love. As noted above, Mr Banham accepted that this ground is an irrationality challenge. The standard for an irrationality finding is a high one and I do not find it is met here. It is the appellant’s account that both he and his wife identify as members of tribes, and that his wife’s tribe is powerful, well-known and strongly committed to its tribal identity. The country evidence excerpted by the FtT in its decision was not only that tribe is a defining characteristic of Iraqi society and 70% of Iraqis identify themselves as part of a tribal system, but also that in the “nahwa” tradition, male cousins can prohibit their female cousins from marrying outside their clan. This makes tribe a particularly important issue for a young couple to discuss. Although the FtT did not repeat all of this evidence at [39], it was aware of all of it, and in this context it cannot be said that it was irrational to conclude that the appellant and his wife would have discussed their tribal affiliations at an early stage, and before becoming intimate.
34. Ground One is not made out.
Ground Two
35. I do not accept the appellant’s submission that the FtT found that the appellant and his wife would not have behaved in ways that would have put them at risk of honour violence. Its finding was more nuanced and specific. It was that under the circumstances that, first, the appellant was from a different tribe and second, that he had made two marriage proposals, the importance of tribe and the tendency towards intra-tribe cousin marriage would have meant that the proposals would have aroused suspicion in R’s family. Given the country evidence about the strict surveillance and control of individual behaviour, R would then have been, at the very least, under surveillance as soon as the proposals were made, and elopement would not have been possible. Here, the respondent was giving reasons for agreeing with the respondent’s submission, recorded at [26] of the decision. This was that:
“The wife’s family would have been suspicious of the Appellant and his wife because he was from a different tribe and proposed twice. This would raise a suspicion but nothing happened between 4 to 11 September and the wife was able to go to her mother-in-law’s house at that point when all eyes would have been on her."
36. Although Mr Banham did not formally concede the point, he acknowledged at the hearing before me that the decision could be read in this way. I find that Ground Two is therefore not made out. The FtT did not fall into the error identified in the grounds because it did not find that it was implausible in light of the country evidence that the appellant and his wife would have put themselves at risk of honour violence. It found that given the facts of their own account, it was implausible that the appellant’s wife would have been able to elope, because she would have been under the strict surveillance of her family. This finding was clearly open to the FtT on the evidence before it.
37. Ground Three. Once the FtT’s reasoning is properly understood, Ground Three fails for the same reasons as Ground Two. The FtT did not conflate “the question of risk” with “how harm was avoided in the instant case”. It found that the account of how harm was avoided was not plausible, in light of the country evidence. For the reasons set out immediately above, that finding was one that was open to the FtT on the specific facts of the appellant’s account and the specific aspects of the country evidence excerpted in the decision.
38. As to the more general assertion that the FtT gave insufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account, I consider that the reasons were as follows:
(i) The appellant’s claim not to have known his wife’s tribe before their relationship began was not plausible in light of the country evidence. This undermined the credibility of a core aspect of his account, which was how their relationship began;
(ii) The appellant’s account of their elopement was not plausible in light of the country evidence. This undermined the credibility of another core aspect of his claim;
(iii) The purported letters from a human rights charity in Iraq adduced by the appellant were not reliable. This was because: (a) it was not plausible that the appellant would have thought that the charity could assist him, given the country evidence and the appellant’s claim that by the time he sought the charity’s help, R’s family had already burnt down his family home; and (b) the letters state that the appellant approached them on 26 September 2022 and that they had attempted to assist the appellant for 15 days. This meant that the letter should not have been dated any earlier than 15 days after 26 September, but it was dated on that day;
(iv) No weight could be placed on the ID documents, which were untranslated;
(v) No weight could be placed on the Facebook page, which had few details of the person’s profile;
(vi) No weight could be placed on what were said to be pictures of the appellant’s wife’s relatives with guns, given the other adverse findings.
39. The reasons I have labelled (iii)-(vi) have not been challenged.
40. The appellant has not made detailed submissions with reference to the caselaw concerning the error of law of inadequacy of reasons. This is not surprising, as the heading for the appellant’s single ground of appeal was “mischaracterisation of country” evidence. The principles concerning adequacy of reasons are well known and I will not repeat them here. I consider that the FtT’s reasons were adequate. The parties had agreed at [14] that the appeal turned on the appellant’s credibility. The FtT gave clear and sustainable reasons for rejecting his credibility: core aspects of the account were inconsistent with the country evidence and the documents he had adduced were not reliable. This is sufficient for the appellant to know why his appeal failed.
41. Ground Three is not made out.
42. She described the appellant’s submissions as “strange”, in particular that claim that “the CPIN on honour-based violence does not universalise tribal affiliation.” She understood this as a criticism of the CPIN and submitted that if the appellant wished to assert that the FtT should not have applied the CPIN, he should made this argument before the FtT and submitted alternative country evidence.
43. She then submitted that the sections of the CPIN the appellant had cited in his grounds did not assist him. The fact that the system was complex, sensitive or extremely difficult to research did not detract from the finding that it was a defining characteristic of modern Iraqi society. The appellant did not appear to dispute that a majority of Iraqis “are either members of, or have kinship to, a tribe” and a clear majority “identify themselves as part of the tribal system. It was therefore reasonable for the FtT to have concluded that the appellant would have know of his wife’s tribe, especially in light of his evidence at his interview that they had extensive interactions after their first meeting.
44. The respondent further submitted that the appellant

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 2 June 2025 contained no material errors of law and is upheld. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 April 2026