UI-2025-003014
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003014
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62617/2023
LP/11502/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 6th March 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LAWRENCE
Between
IK (ALBANIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: N Ahmed of counsel
For the Respondent: M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 4 March 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against a decision by Judge Bunting of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”), dated 5 June 2025, to dismiss an appeal by the Appellant against a decision by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”), dated 23 November 2023, to refuse protection and human rights claims that were made by the Appellant on 28 February 2020.
Anonymity
2. I maintain or make an order for anonymity because the Appellant continues to rely upon international protection grounds. The importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (“UK”) under the Refugee Convention and European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. In the 23 November 2023 decision and a Review dated 23 August 2024, the Respondent accepted the Appellant’s claimed identity including her claimed age (making her 26 year’s old presently) and that she is a national of Albania. The Respondent also accepted the Appellant’s claim to have been forcibly detained and sexually exploited by a criminal gang in Albania during April 2019. The Respondent however asserted that the Appellant had engaged in behaviour of a sort that is referred to in Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004, and that was damaging to her credibility, namely that she had not claimed asylum in countries the Respondent considered were safe counties that she had passed through on her way to the UK.
4. The Respondent did not accept the Appellant’s claim to be at a real risk of persecution if returned to Albania, because the Respondent considered that there would be sufficient protection for the Appellant in that country against the non-state actors she feared and that she could relocate within Albania without any real risk of being located by those whom she claimed to fear.
5. The Appellant’s appeal against the 23 November 2023 decision was heard on 2 June 2025 by Judge Bunting who found in the 5 June 2025 decision that there was no real risk of serious harm on return because there was no reasonable likelihood that the Appellant would be found by the gang that trafficked her originally, and that there was no real risk of being trafficked by others, including that there would be sufficiency of protection against such trafficking. Judge Bunting also made a finding that the decision did not breach Article 8 of the ECHR.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. The Appellant applied to the FtT for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”), on the following grounds:
“…
5. While the IJ made findings at [60] that there was no evidence to indicate that the traffickers tried to friend [sic] the appellant, it is submitted that the IJ failed to consider whether the traffickers are interested in finding the appellant.
6. This is especially relevant in light of the appellant’s claim that she saw illegal gambling, usage of illegal drugs and politicians and presenters attending events.
7. The IJ mentioned at [59] that when the appellant was initially trafficked, she was not “targeted for any particular characteristic personal to her (such as a familial relationship)”. However, the IJ failed to consider whether the appellant might be targeted by the traffickers in the future, or be of particular interest to the traffickers, due to a characteristic personal to her, namely due to what she had witnessed.
8. The IJ also failed to take into account the account the country expert’s comments that the traffickers are known to re-capture escapees in order to punish them and remove the risk of insider knowledge. The IJ failed to make findings on whether the traffickers might seek the appellant because of wanting to punish her.
…”
7. Permission to appeal to the UT was granted by FtT Judge Saffer in a decision dated 9 July 2025. Judge Saffer’s reasons were as follows:
“It is arguable that inadequate reasons have been given for rejecting the account of an ongoing adverse in her for the reasons given in the application. All grounds may be argued.”
8. The SSHD has subsequently made a reply under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, dated 17 July 2025, which materially asserts as follows:
“…
2. The respondent opposes the appellant’s appeal. In summary, the respondent will submit inter alia that the judge of the First-tier Tribunal directed himself appropriately.
3. The FTTJ, at paragraph 32/32, has clearly considered the expert report and explicitly refers to the experts’ conclusions that he was aware of a number of cases where traffickers had re-captured escaped victims.
4. The Judge was however tasked to consider if there was a real risk, and not a hypothetical risk, of the Appellant being re-captured. In this case the FTTJ applied the accepted factual matrix, in this case that despite knowing all of her personal details in over 6 years her traffickers had seemingly made no attempts to locate her or had ever been to her home village.
5. Based on the specific evidence of this appeal, and not on the generic evidence of the expert, the FTTJ was entitled to conclude that in the Appellant’s case the traffickers had evidently displayed no intention to re-capture her or punish her further.
…”
The hearing
9. I heard oral submissions by Mr Ahmed and Mr Parvar in turn. Before that, I had raised two points that I had identified as arguably obvious errors of law in the FtT’s decision, relating to the FtT’s consideration of the extent to which the gang who trafficked the Appellant might be motivated to locate her in order to punish her for escaping, and to the potential impact of stigma relating to the Appellant being accompanied by her unmarried partner and the child of that relationship. On considering those issues, Mr Parvar conceded that the FtT had materially erred in law in relation to the first of those matters, including that the error had affected the FtT’s assessment of the issue of sufficiency of protection.
10. Both representatives agreed that the appropriate disposal would be to set aside the decision in its entirety and remit the appeal to the FtT for a fresh consideration by a different judge. I stated that that would be my decision and reserved my reasoned decision to follow in writing.
Error of law
11. The error that was conceded by Mr Parvar is as follows. The FtT noted at paragraphs 32 and 33 the comments by the expert witness Dr Korovilas that he was aware of a number of cases when a woman who has been trafficked escapes from her traffickers were re-captured and “punished” and that there is an incentive on gangs to do this, both to protect themselves, and also to ensure that (if applicable) they recoup the financial outlay on the initial trafficking. The FtT also at paragraph 88 made a finding of fact that the Appellant does not have contact with her family in Albania. However, the FtT found at paragraph 63 that there was no reasonable likelihood that the Appellant would be found (and subsequently) re-trafficked by the gang that trafficked her originally, for reasons including that there was no evidence that the traffickers had gone to her home area, or otherwise tried to find her after she escaped (paragraph 60) and that, even if they had looked for her when she initially left, given the passage of time the FtT did not consider that there is a reasonable likelihood that the gang would still be actively trying to find her (paragraph 61). Mr Parvar conceded that there was a lack of adequate reasoning to the FtT’s conclusion that there was no such reasonable likelihood owing to the passage of time given the motivation identified by Dr Korovilas, and the fact that the Appellant would apparently not have any contacts in her home area whom she could ask whether or not the traffickers had been looking for her there more recently than initially after she escaped. Mr Parvar agreed that it was not possible to consider that the likelihood of the trafficking gang being motivated to actively seek out the Appellant as being irrelevant to the FtT’s assessment of sufficiency of protection.
12. I consider Mr Parvar’s concessions to have been rightly made. The identified material error of law undermines the FtT’s assessment of risk of persecution, including sufficiency of protection, and therefore the decision must be set aside.
13. I will add for completeness that I was not persuaded that there was any material error of law in the FtT’s consideration of the potential impact of stigma relating to the Appellant being accompanied by her unmarried partner and the child of that relationship.
Disposal
14. The error of law in the FtT’s decision is such that none of the findings made by the judge can be preserved, and therefore I consider it is appropriate that the appeal to the FtT be remitted to the FtT for hearing afresh I am satisfied that the nature and extent of judicial fact finding that is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective, it is appropriate to remit the case to the FtT.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the FtT involved the making of a material error on a point of law.
The decision of the FtT is set aside with no findings preserved.
The remaking of the decision in the appeal is remitted to the FtT, to be remade afresh by any FtT judge other than Judge Bunting.
T Lawrence
Judge Lawrence
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
5 March 2026