Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003019
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58164/2024
LP/13117/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MERRIGAN

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

VM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J. Nappey, Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr A. Bandegani, Counsel

Heard at Field House on 12 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Secretary of State appeals, with permission, against the decision (“the decision”) of First-tier Judge Sweet (“the judge”) to allow VM’s appeal against the refusal of her application for asylum.
2. To avoid confusion, I will refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal: VM as the appellant and the Secretary of State as the respondent.
Background
3. The appellant, a citizen of the Philippines, was born in 1975. It is common ground that the appellant was trafficked. Although the appellant had been to London before, it was in June 2017, for what was intended to be a two-month visit to London, that the appellant arrived in the UK, where she has since remained. In July 2017 she fled from the family she was then working for, as I shall set out below. At the end of 2020 the appellant discovered the Kanlungan organisation, which advised the appellant and led to her being referred to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM). The appellant received a positive reasonable grounds decision on 10 August 2021. The appellant claimed asylum in June 2022; and had her screening interview on 13 January 2023, followed by her asylum interview on 12 February 2024. On 14 March 2024 her asylum claim was refused; and eight days later her appeal was lodged. It is that appeal that came before the judge, who summarised his decision at [14]:
“…I am satisfied that the appellant has been a victim of trafficking, is at risk of being re-trafficked (though in oral evidence she appeared to fear her ex-partner’s spouse more than being re-trafficked), and as a member of a PSG, her claim for asylum is allowed as she is at risk on return.”
Grounds of appeal
4. Permission to appeal on all grounds was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Kudhail on 9 July 2025. The grounds before her (“the original grounds”) are dated 19 June 2025, and may be summarised as follows.
a. Ground 1: the judge failed to apply the legislative framework under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”) and failed to apply the case law guidance in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 0100.
b. Ground 2/3: the judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant is a refugee.
5. I have combined grounds 2 and 3 as that is how they are expressed in the original grounds: under the heading “Grounds 2/3 - Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters, and failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters”. It is clear however that in this case, whether the judge gave adequate reasons, and whether he resolved matters at issue between the parties, are very much overlapping issues.
6. Permission was given to amend those original grounds. Per the respondent’s letter dated 7 January 2026, ground 2/3 is developed to make explicit the respondent’s case that the judge failed to adequately to address a major issue between the parties – whether or not the appellant is a member of a particular social group (“PSG”) – and failed adequately to explain why he decided that she is.
Analysis
7. To address whether ground 2/3 – which I shall take first – discloses a material error of law, it is necessary to consider in more detail what was at issue between the parties.
8. In her statement dated 15 February 2022, the appellant stated that she had first decided to undertake work abroad in 2010 to support her children. In 2011, she worked as a domestic employee with a family she described as “abusive”. This lasted only a few months; and the appellant went to work for another family, where she once again worked hard for very little food and money. During her time with this family, she visited London for the first time, in 2013. It was however in 2017, with another family again, that she came to London with the employer from whom she ran away.
9. The appellant stated that she would not now be able to support her family if she were to live in the Philippines. She also stated at paragraph 57 of her statement that she was afraid to return as the new partner of her husband “might do something to me as she is now with my husband and does not want me to be there”, adding:
“In 2020 my ex-husband’s wife said to me in a message 'don’t ever talk to my husband and if I see you here, I’ll do something to you, don’t you ever come to our house’.”
10. In her addendum statement dated 25 April 2024 she expanded that the new partner “has threatened me numerous times”. At the hearing before the judge, he summarised her case at [3]:
“The appellant’s claim is that if returned to the Philippines she would be sued and killed by her ex-husband because of her past relationship and that she would be re-trafficked.”
11. The refusal letter dated 14 March 2024 states that the material facts the respondent accepts are:
“8) You were trafficked for domestic work.
9) You are of adverse interest to your ex-husband and his partner due to your previous relationship.”
12. However, as the judge noted at [4], while though the above were agreed facts, the respondent did not accept the appellant’s case. I reproduce [4] in full:
“The respondent did not accept that the treatment which the appellant feared was for a particular social group (PSG) within the meaning of the Refugee Convention. It was accepted that she was trafficked for domestic work, and she was of adverse interest to her ex-husband and his partner due to her previous relationship. The respondent did not accept that there was any real risk of harm, because there was protection available from the authorities. The people which she feared were non-state actors, and she had not shown that it was reasonably likely they would have sufficient power and influence over the authorities in the Philippines. She had not provided evidence that she would be found on return to the Philippines, nor how her former employer would track her down. The letter also confirmed that the authorities supported NGOs within the Philippines which provide shelter, provision and basic needs, and further facilities would be available to her. Furthermore, she could relocate within the Philippines in accordance with CPIN: Women Fearing Domestic Violence, and CPIN Philippines: Human Trafficking. Nor could she succeed in any claim for family or private life or for discretionary leave.”
13. The respondent did not accept that the appellant is a PSG; and relied upon the CPIN: Philippines: Human trafficking (November 2022) (“the CPIN”) for her position. Meanwhile, the appellant claimed that she was a PSG and relied upon the report of Professor John T Sidel, dated 17 May 2024: a Professor of International and Comparative Politics. In his conclusion at [14] as quoted above, the judge prefaced it by explaining: “Taking into account the appellant’s oral evidence and the expert report of Professor Sidel…”. The judge summarised the conclusions of that report at [10]:
“… He concluded that the appellant was vulnerable to being re-trafficked and exploited, and the account that she had provided was plausible. There were serious obstacles to her ability to access employment on her return, and she would in all likelihood find herself drawn to a return to employment as a domestic servant overseas, taking into account her previous experience in Hong Kong and the UK.”
14. It is implicit at [14] that the judge preferred the evidence of Professor Sidel over the evidence of the CPIN. The question is, has the judge provided adequate reasons for his deciding to do so?
15. Mr Nappey, for the respondent, urges me to conclude that the judge has not. The judge was aware that the respondent did not accept that the appellant is a PSG. Professor Sidel does not directly deal with the concept of what a PSG is and whether the appellant falls within such a group. As such, simply to rely on Professor Sidel does not amount to any reason for the judge’s decision at all. But even if Professor Sidel’s expert report is read so as to support the appellant being a member of a PSG, that does not get away from the fundamental point that, despite the material facts accepted by the respondent, the respondent does not concede that she is a member of a PSG. The judge himself recorded this at [4]. It is therefore incumbent upon the judge to accept why he has preferred Professor’s Sidel’s opinion over the CPIN evidence. Nor is the decision saved by reliance on the appellant’s evidence separately from Professor Sidel’s, as the respondent does not accept that her evidence demonstrates that she is a member of a PSG. In sum, relying on Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC), Mr Nappey says the judge has fallen short of the requirement to resolve key conflicts in the evidence; and provide reasons sufficient that the parties can understand why they have won or lost.
16. Mr Bandegani, for the appellant, argues that the judge has done enough. Firstly, there were no significant conflicts of evidence for the judge to resolve. That the appellant had been trafficked was agreed. That she was of adverse interest to her ex-husband and his new partner was also agreed. The judge should not be criticised for failing to provide reasons where there was no need. Secondly, no point was taken in respect of Professor Sidel’s expertise. There was no argument that his analysis was flawed or his credentials criticised: the respondent’s case was, in effect, only that the CPIN should be preferred. In such circumstances, it was enough for the judge simply to have preferred the Professor to the CPIN. Mr Bandegani concedes that the judge might ideally have provided more detail: but reasons, as per Volpi and Another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at paragraph 2, are always capable of being better expressed. The careful summary at [4] demonstrates that the judge was well aware of the issues between the parties; and there was no need to supply further reasons.
17. While there is merit in brevity, I do not consider that the judge gave sufficient reasons to explain why the appellant is a member of a PSG and, therefore, why she is a refugee within the Refugee Convention. I take Mr Nappey’s point that the wording of [14] as a separate clause “and as a member of a PSG” implies that the judge’s reasons for are different – and unexplained – from what precedes it. But even if I do read the decision as a whole, I cannot see why, in adopting Professor Sidel’s opinion at [10] that “serious obstacles to her ability to access employment on her return” or being “in all likelihood find herself drawn to a return to employment as a domestic servant overseas” would make her a member of a PSG. I am left with Professor Sidel’s conclusion that the appellant is “vulnerable to being re-trafficked and exploited”; but the CPIN on which the respondent relies says at 2.3.1 that “Potential victims of trafficking (PVoT) are not considered to form a particular social group (PSG) within the meaning of the Refugee Convention”. The judge has not adequately addressed why he has not followed that guidance. Ground 2/3 discloses a material error of law.
18. As to ground 1, Mr Nappey submits that the judge failed correctly to apply the legislative framework under NABA and the approach as set out in JCK. The staged process therein is nowhere set out in the judgment; and the issues of sufficiency of protection and relocation have not been addressed. The only reference to NABA is at [10]; and there the wrong standard of proof is applied: the judge says that “the balance of probabilities applies to section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022”, where headnote 5 of JCK makes it clear that the standard of proof to be applied to the questions of whether there is a risk of harm, an absence of state protection, and no reasonable internal flight alternative, is that of a reasonable degree of likelihood.
19. Mr Bandegani says again that I need to read the decision as a whole. The judge states at [9] that he heard submissions from the parties; and JCK was referenced in the appellant’s skeleton argument dated 21 June 2024. The judge did not need to set out every argument; and it is plain from the reference to NABA at [10] that he had the correct approach in mind. Moreover, any perceived error should be considered in favour of the appellant: in that the judge found that the appellant succeeded applying a higher standard of proof. It therefore follows that she would succeed on the lower. As to sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, these matters were carefully considered in Professor Sidel’s report: especially at paragraph 36 (where he concludes that the appellant “could not realistically rely on the Philippine National Police (PNP), the judicial system, or local authorities”) and at paragraph 42 (stating: “Relocation to Metro Manila or to other cities elsewhere in the Philippines would not enhance [the appellant’s] prospects for securing stable, sustained, long-term employment that would provide sufficient remuneration for her own wellbeing and help to contribute to her family’s income”). The conclusion at [14] can be taken to adopt this – sufficient – analysis.
20. That the judge stated the wrong standard of proof does not assist Mr Bandegani’s submission that I should infer from [10] that the judge should be taken to have understood the staged process and gone through it in his mind. Headnote 5 of JCK is clear that whether there risk of harm, an absence of state protection, and no reasonable internal flight alternative “must each be determined”. That does not need to be a slavish exercise. But I am unable to read into [10] – or into the decision as a whole – that the judge undertook it. It is right that the judge made plain at [14] he relied on Professor Sidel, but that is to ask of that expert evidence something beyond its remit: it was for the judge to carry out the JCK process, however briefly, not Professor Sidel. Ground 1 also discloses a material error of law.
21. I have been asked by Mr Bandegani to consider whether I am able to preserve any of the findings of the decision. In the light of the decision’s opacity of reasoning, and the points I make above, I am unable to do so. While it is true that there is no substantive factual dispute between the parties, and the parties have proposed that the matter be retained and remade, I am satisfied that the correct approach is to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal to be considered de novo. The respondent’s case was not properly addressed by the judge and fairness demands a fresh approach.
Notice of Decision
1. The judge’s decision involved the making of errors of law and is set aside.
2. I do not preserve any findings of the decision.
3. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.

D. Merrigan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 March 2026