Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003020
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67167/2023
LP/00207/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

H S
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ahmed, Hanson Law
For the Respondent: Mr Lawson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 2 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity whose home area is Kirkuk, appeals against the decision of a judge of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”) promulgated on 21 April 2025, dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 14 December 2023 refusing his international protection and human rights’ claim made on 18 April 2022. The appellant appeals with permission granted by a judge of the Upper Tribunal.
Anonymity
2. I continue the anonymity direction made in the First-Tier Tribunal. The public interest in open justice is outweighed by the public interest in preserving the confidentiality and integrity of the asylum system.
The grounds and their development at the hearing
3. Ground 1 – that the FTJ erred in her consideration of the standard of proof. The asylum claim predated the coming into force of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”), but the FTJ was said to have applied the post-NABA standard. Mr Ahmed added at the hearing that this was a simple confusion of what standard was applicable.
4. In the rule 24 response, the respondent asserted that the FTJ had applied the correct standard at [17] and so the earlier wording was an error of recording only.
5. Ground 2 – Ground 2 averred that the FTJ made factual and legal errors in her assessment of the appellant’s claim to be at risk from Hashd Al-Shaabi. It was said that the FTJ:
(i) Found an inconsistency to be insignificant but then cumulatively significant, and found it to be significant whether the appellant had set fire to cars or generators when the salient point was that an object had been set on fire. Mr Ahmed observed that there were many cases indicating that inconsistencies in screening interview were peripheral and should not be held against an appellant. The rule 24 response averred that the FTJ was entitled to consider the discrepancies to be cumulatively significant and that was a matter within her judgment;
(ii) Required corroborative evidence by holding against the appellant that he was not able to obtain evidence of his employment. Mr Ahmed submitted that an appellant could not be penalised for not producing corroboration. The rule 24 response noted that the appellant had said he would obtain proof of employment and the FTJ was entitled to note that this had not been done;
(iii) The FTJ had found that the evidence of the appellant’s account was unclear because it lacked detail. She had conflated the two concepts which were distinct. In any event that an account was unclear or lacking in detail did not necessarily mean that the claim was false or implausible. Adverse credibility findings should be based on inconsistencies and contradictions rather than absence of detail. The rule 24 response pointed out that in fact the FTJ did distinguish between the two concepts;
(iv) The FTJ had found at [22] that the question was clear, but this was from the perception of an educated and knowledgeable person with good command of the English language. The rule 24 response averred that this was a fact-based assessment and the FTJ had specifically considered whether the appellant understood the questions and the interpreter.
With respect to ground 2 taken as a whole, Mr Lawson submitted that the FTJ looked at the matter cumulatively and explained why she rejected the appellant’s account. The appellant would have had the interview read back to him by his representative and if there were errors, they should have been identified at the hearing. He did correct some areas which he said were mistakes but there were other important points which he had not corrected and he simply denied saying at the hearing. The appellant was under no obligation to produce evidence to confirm his employment, but he said he would obtain the evidence and he had not explained why he had not; altogether this filled up the scales against the appellant when considering credibility overall.
6. Ground 3 – the FTJ had erred in her consideration of sur place activities. The FTJ had a) not considered that there was a deletion delay of 90 days with respect to Facebook accounts, b) had assumed what the reaction of the Iraqi authorities would be, c) had not explained why she concluded that the appellant’s Facebook account was unlikely to be under surveillance contrary to the case of WAS (Pakistan) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 894 and d) made an assumption regarding the appellant’s motivation for posting anti-regime content. Saying that the appellant had done so in order to bolster his claim was speculation rather than an assessment based on objective evidence. Many individuals created social media accounts later in life and the timing alone was not determinative of intent or authenticity. Mr Ahmed added that there had been no proper consideration of the Facebook downloads; there was a mention of the case of XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 but no proper consideration of it.
7. The rule 24 response averred that the FTJ’s finding that the appellant was not anything more than a low-level attendee was firmly rooted in evidence including the appellant’s own concessions that he had not been interviewed, named or photographed beyond his own Facebook page. Her assessment of the Facebook material was also rational and consistent with XX namely that the risk analysis depends on whether an individual’s posts or activities had come to the attention of the authorities. The case of WAS did not establish that mere possibility of surveillance demonstrated a real risk. The FTJ had not substituted her own cultural assumptions but relied on the appellant’s lack of political profile, the absence of external evidence of surveillance and country guidance to find the appellant was not of adverse interest. The argument on deletion timeframes was immaterial as the appellant’s risk profile was negligible and he would not be of interest to the authorities. The FTJ’s findings on motive were also open to them. Mr Lawson added that the timeframe of the appellant’s activities showed that he was not a person dedicated to political activity.
8. Ground 4 – the FTJ was alleged to have erred in risk on return and redocumentation. The FTJ found that the appellant had provided no evidence to show any visit to the Iraqi embassy to obtain a replacement passport or identity document, but SMO2 held that an individual could not be redocumented from the Embassy. The FTJ failed to consider that there was a checkpoint outside Baghdad airport which would be difficult for family members if they were hypothetically to come to the airport to assist with documentation. There were checkpoints at Baghdad, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah but the appellant was not from there and he had no CSID with him. That he could fly direct to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah was failing to consider the point made in SA (Removal destination, Iraq, Undertakings) Iraq [2022] UKUT 37. That precedent should be followed as there was no evidence before the tribunal of returnees as stipulated in the CPIN.
9. In the rule 24 response, the respondent submitted that there was inconsistent evidence regarding the appellant’s documents and that he could not obtain those documents. There was no material error of law. Mr Lawson added that it was perfectly valid for the FTJ to make findings of inconsistency on the documentation and if the family held the appellant’s INID then he could be redocumented.
Discussion; conclusions
Ground 1
10. The FTJ set out the law incorrectly at [9]. She set out the law relating to post-NABA claims, using the framework described at JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 where the tribunal should determine an appellant’s subjective fear first, on the balance of probabilities before going on to consider the other relevant questions to the lower standard of “a reasonable degree of likelihood.” That was not however the relevant law, as this asylum claim predated the coming into force of NABA.
11. However, at [17], the FTJ set out the correct standard. She explained that in reaching her decision, she reminded herself that “the appellant must show that he would face a reasonable likelihood or a real risk of suffering serious harm if he returned to Iraq.” Bearing this in mind, she then continued to make findings. It is apparent that she followed the direction she had given herself at [17], rather than the earlier summary of the law and used the lower standard of proof throughout, because she nowhere determined or considered the appellant’s subjective fear as she would have done if she was applying the post-NABA standard. Instead, her findings are written as if all she had to determine was one matter, whether the appellant would face a reasonable likelihood or real risk of suffering serious harm, i.e. applying the lower standard throughout. I consider therefore that there is no material error of law as alleged in ground 1 – the FTJ in fact applied the correct standard of proof.
Ground 2
12. The FTJ described the appellant’s account as “riddled with inconsistencies which… I found to be cumulatively significant…”. She noted that when faced with a discrepancy in his oral evidence, the appellant stated that he had not made the particular comment in interview. However he had read the interview in his own language and had made some corrections in his witness statement. She referred to three matters the appellant had denied saying at all at the hearing but had not corrected in his witness statement, namely that threats had been made to him using a phone [19], that he had set fire to a generator as well as cars [21], and that the person whom he feared had gone to the family home after he had left Iraq [22]. The FTJ also found that the appellant’s description of Hash Al-Shaabi’s uniform was inconsistent with background material [23], that it was unclear from his account why his discussions and arguments about religion caused him to report his former friend to the police [20], and in the absence of further detail or an explanation it did not seem likely that he would have been informed that the police released his former friend because they established that he worked for the PMF [20].
13. Ground 2 takes issue with various parts of the FTJ’s findings. It is important to bear in mind that those findings must be considered as a whole. The case of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 is a reminder that an appeal court should not interfere with the judge’s conclusions on primary facts unless satisfied that they were plainly wrong and that meant that the decision under appeal was one that no reasonable judge could have reached (see principles i) and ii at [2]). Importantly, an appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis, not should it be picked over or construed as though it were a piece of legislation or a contract (see principle vi) at [2]).
14. Bearing those principles in mind, I consider that ground 2 is simply seeking to reargue the case and taking the FTJ’s sustainable conclusions out of context as I explain in the paragraphs below.
15. It is perfectly open to a judge to find a discrepancy not to be significant on its own, but to consider it to be cumulatively significant. There is nothing in case law to say that a judge must disregard any discrepancies between screening interview and later statements. It is right that an object or objects were set on fire whether they were cars or generators, but the FTJ’s point was not only that the detail was inconsistent but that the appellant denied having said that he set fire to the generator. The FTJ was entitled to consider that this discrepancy had weight.
16. There is nothing to indicate that the FTJ wrongly required corroboration of the appellant’s employment. She merely noted that the appellant said he would obtain proof of employment but had not. Insofar as she held anything against the appellant, rather than merely making a comment, it was that he had not done what he said he would do and had not explained the same.
17. The FTJ did not find that the appellant’s account was unclear because it lacked detail. The FTJ found the appellant’s account to be both unclear and lacking in detail. She said, at [20] “what is unclear from his account, which I find is lacking in detail, is why their heated discussions and arguments about it caused him to report his friend to the police.” Of course, it does not follow from the fact an account is unclear and lacking in detail that a claim is false or implausible, but whether an account is clear and whether it contains details is part of considering the credibility of the overall picture. Credibility findings do not need to be simply based on inconsistencies; rule 339L (iii) of the immigration rules refers to the person’s statements being found to be coherent and plausible which is not simply about consistency. KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 explains in the first paragraph of the headnote that the credibility indicators of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility provide a helpful framework within which to conduct a credibility assessment.
18. The FTJ is criticised for finding the interview question about whether anything had happened in Iraq since the appellant had come to the UK to be clear, but this is simply argument. The appellant did not suggest that he had not understood the interview questions or had not understood the interpreter [18] rather his response was that he had not said what was recorded, despite not correcting it in his witness statement [18], [22].
19. The FTJ did not therefore err as alleged at ground 2.
Ground 3
20. I have already referred to Volpi v Volpi. Another important authority when considering whether a judge has made an error of law is Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201. At [26] the Court of Appeal set out various principles to bear in mind. Principles (ii) to (iv) are particularly important:
“(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27]”.

21. The FTJ referred herself to the decision in BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 which although being country guidance on Iran gives general factors to bear in mind when considering risk on return having regard to sur place activities. The extent of a person’s participation in demonstrations, their role and the publicity attracted are all features to bear in mind, and the FTJ considered those features when considering whether the appellant would draw the attention of the Iraqi authorities. The FTJ was perfectly entitled to conclude that the appellant did not have a profile which would draw the Iraqi authorities’ attention. That was her perfectly sustainable basis for the conclusion that the appellant’s Facebook account was unlikely to have been under surveillance, albeit it is an implicit not an explicit conclusion. As Ullah explains, a judge does not have to set out every step in their reasoning. Laing LJ’s comments in WAS (Pakistan) are not authority for the proposition that a tribunal must infer successful covert activity by a foreign state [84], but rather that a tribunal cannot be criticised if it infers successful covert activity on the basis of limited direct evidence [84] and must not lose sight of the fact that direct evidence about the level and mechanics of monitoring is unlikely to be available to an asylum claimant so one must be careful not to impose too demanding a standard of proof [85]. That the appellant did not come into a category which would draw the Iraqi authorities’ attention, and as he had previously been of no adverse interest to the authorities in Iraq, the FTJ was perfectly entitled to conclude that the appellant would not be stopped and interrogated on return. The grounds say that the FTJ assumed what the reaction of the Iraqi authorities would be. She did not make an unwarranted assumption; she drew inferences from her conclusions about the appellant’s lack of profile. The appellant does not point in the grounds to any background material relied on to show that a person with the appellant’s profile would be stopped and interrogated by the Iraqi authorities on return.
22. It is said that because there is a deletion delay of 90 days the appellant’s Facebook account was a continuing risk factor, but this is only so on the basis that the appellant would be of interest to the authorities so that they would be asking him questions about his Facebook account. As I have concluded above, the FTJ’s conclusion that the appellant would not be stopped and interrogated on return is a sustainable one.
23. The FTJ made no assumption about the appellant’s motivation, neither did she speculate, her conclusion that the Facebook posts were made to bolster his asylum claim was a finding open to her on the facts. The FTJ had already found that the appellant was not credible as to his reasons for initially claiming asylum. The FTJ was entitled to put that finding together with the facts that the appellant only opened a social media account two weeks after his asylum claim was refused, that he had shown no interest in politics previously and that the only posts on his account were political posts, and infer from everything taken together that the posts were not genuine. Principles (iii) and (iv) of Ullah set out above are relevant.
24. I cannot see that the FTJ needed to consider the principles in XX any more explicitly than she did; it is after all country guidance on Iran, and one cannot assume that what it says about the Iranian state’s surveillance ability can be applied to Iraq. It is right that the appellant did produce his Facebook account activity so this was not a case where the appellant had only produced a small part of his social media account, but there is nothing to indicate that the FTJ was referred either in the skeleton argument or in submissions to specific parts of the Facebook documentation or there were obvious points to be gleaned from that documentation beyond the fact there were a large number of anti-regime Facebook posts (as the FTJ recorded at [25]). I see no need for the FTJ to have gone in any more detail through the Facebook documentation.
25. Accordingly the FTJ did not err as alleged at ground 3.
Ground 4
26. The FTJ did not accept that the appellant had had no contact with his family or that he was unaware of their whereabouts [22]. She found that the appellant had been inconsistent about the location of both his passport and his INID card (and I observe the appellant had referred in asylum interview to having both a CSID and an INID – see AIR qn 26). She concluded that the appellant’s family could send him a copy of his CSID or INID or meet him at the airport with his documents [26]. Mr Ahmed has referred to checkpoints at the airport, and difficulties for the appellant’s family passing through, but there is no reason why the appellant’s family would not have their own documents so they could pass through the checkpoint at the airport. Alternatively, although the FTJ referred to the family sending the appellant a copy of his CSID or INID, on her findings the family could equally well send him his original CSID or INID.
27. Therefore, although it is not obvious without more what replacement documents which would assist the appellant to pass through checkpoints could be provided by the Iraqi Embassy following SMO 2, this is immaterial as on the FTJ’s findings the appellant would be able to obtain his original documents from his family.
28. The FTJ made no material error of law as alleged at ground 4 therefore.

Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains no material errors of law and stands. The appellant’s appeal fails and is dismissed.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 February 2026