UI-2025-003022
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003022
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55665/2022
IA/00762/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th of September 2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
Between
H.A.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. By a decision dated 9 July 2025 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Seelhoff granted the appellant permission to appeal the decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Callaghan (the judge), promulgated on 24 February 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) dated 25 November 2022 refusing the appellant’s asylum application.
2. The appellant, a national of Iran, contends that the judge failed to treat him as a vulnerable witness and that, contrary to the judge’s determination that recorded that no application was made to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness, there was in fact express agreement between the parties that the appellant was a vulnerable witness. The grounds maintain that the appellant’s representative and the judge agreed at the start of the hearing that the appellant was to be treated as a vulnerable witness. This was supported by an affidavit from the solicitor who represented the appellant at the hearing. This error was said to be material as the judge did not direct herself according to the 2010 Joint Presidential Guidance Note on vulnerable individuals and may have approached the appellant’s evidence differently if she had done.
3. In a response to the grant of permission, pursuant to rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the SSHD did not oppose the appellant’s application for permission to appeal. In other words, the SSHD accepted that the judge made a mistake in law in the manner described by the appellant. The SSHD invited the Tribunal to determine the appeal with a fresh oral hearing to consider afresh the appellant’s asylum claim.
4. In a response pursuant to rule 25 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 the appellant’s legal representatives noted the concession by the SSHD but submitted that the appeal should be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) as the entirety of the judge’s findings were now unsafe and the appellant had in effect been deprived of a fair hearing.
5. It is apparent from both the rule 24 and rule 25 responses that both parties are in agreement that the judge’s decision is legally unsafe and will need to be remade.
6. Under rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 the Upper Tribunal may make any decision without a hearing having regard to the views of the parties. In his rule 25 response the appellant invited the Upper Tribunal to allow the appeal without a hearing. Although the respondent did not express any direct view on whether a hearing was necessary, I am satisfied from the wording of the rule 24 response that the respondent did not contemplate the need for an ‘error of law’ hearing. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to determine whether the judge made an error of law without a hearing.
7. Given the joint views of the parties that the judge erred in law in her approach to the issue of whether the appellant was to be treated as a vulnerable witness, and having regard to the decision and the affidavit from the solicitor representing the appellant at the hearing, I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal decision is vitiated by a material legal error.
8. Having considered both the rule 24 and rule 25 response, and having regard to the judge’s decision, I am satisfied that the appropriate course of conduct is to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) for a fresh hearing on all matters.
9. I have made an anonymity direction because the appeal concerns an individual who claims to have a fear of persecution from the Iranian authorities and the risk to his personal safety if his identity is disclosed outweighs the public interest in open justice.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on the basis that the First-tier Tribunal’s decisions contains a material error of law; the matter is remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before a judge other than Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Callaghan
D. Blum
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8 September 2025