Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003032

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00401/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 21st of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

CO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Farhat, Counsel, Gulbenkian Andonian Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr R Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant]) is granted anonymity owing to the nature of the case.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge J G Richards dated 13th March 2025, which dismissed the appellant, a Nigerian national’s, appeal against the refusal of the Secretary of State dated 12th December 2023 of his protection and human rights claim made on 1st August 2019.
Grounds for permission
2. The appellant claimed he was involved with MASSOB (Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra) and had been agitating for self-determination within Nigeria and who claimed he would have a well-founded fear of persecution should he be returned to Nigeria. The matter hinged on credibility.
3. Ground 1, there was a failure to deal with the major submission and material evidence on historic torture or make findings of typical injuries said to be the result of torture. There was a failure to take into account material matters and the judge was under duty to consider and make the findings in relation to all material evidence.
4. One aspect of CO’s case is that the central aspect was that by 2003 he came to the attention of the Nigerian authorities and was captured, detained and tortured. This was referenced at [14] and [15] of the determination. Despite this introductory reference the rest of the determination contains no explicit findings on whether this torture took place or not. The evidence was in his witness statement and as corroboration he provided photographs of bodily injuries to his head, skull and arm showing very detailed profound scarring by a knife. These were not small injuries which could be opportunistically self-inflicted but were injuries reaching a ‘painful’ (sic) threshold, and the more reasonable inference was that they were traumatically inflicted. These photographs are found in the Home Office bundle, PDF49 and 50.
5. This could be classified as evidence corroborating torture as it showed traumatic injury which remains on CO’s body.
6. There was a photograph of the injuries to the top of the appellant’s head consistent with a knife slash and again there was evidence corroborating torture.
7. Although not confirming torture, this could be classified as such because it shows traumatic injury to the appellant’s body and currently present and indicates they were inflicted by a third party, and the main point was that the judge did not deal with these injuries and made no findings in relation to them. The judge was under a duty to consider them, and the determination simply fails to deal with or address or consider or assess this material in any way. There was a failure to deal with the material evidence.
8. In R (Guinea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 733 the Court of Appeal involves an approach that looked at the totality of the evidence as such, “It has often been said that an isolated finding of implausibility taken against an appellant is legally fragile unless it is clear that the finding has been properly rooted in the context of all the evidence.”
9. That was not the case in this determination, and it could not be said that such evidence had been considered or contemplated, it would not have altered the overall finding of credibility. Whilst it was appreciated there was no special rule for “determination drafting” as per the Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 at [18] to [21], the issues of torture and photographs were not merely peripheral and formed the central plank of the appellant’s claim and Sivakumuran v the Secretary of State [1987] UKHL 1, even if there was just a 10% chance of torture through refoulement the claim could be considered well-founded.
Submissions
10. In submissions, Mr Farhat accepted that there was a single ground but there was a failure by the judge to deal with material evidence in relation to the alleged tortured in 2003 when the appellant was detained by Nigerian officials. He accepted that there were only three photographs in black and white and there was no medical evidence in relation to the photographs. The appellant had referenced the torture in his witness statement, although it was noted at question 5.4 of the screening interview that the appellant said he had not been detained, the detention was rogue and did not think it applied to q5.4 of the screening interview. That the judge did not accept the explanation was not contested.
11. The appellant arrived in the UK in May 2003, and it was in his substantive asylum interview that he referenced the detention and torture. The appellant entered the UK clandestinely, having left Nigeria through Togo on a false passport and then boarded a ferry to the UK.
12. At the hearing before the judge the appellant was a litigant in person but the visual corroboration of torture through the photograph showed the nature of the injuries was reflected in the photograph and were deep scars. A ‘post hearing’ approach should not be taken to the photograph. When looked at through another prism these photographs should have been considered in the course of the hearing and may have affected the assessment of the evidence. Had it emerged at the hearing it would have changed the complexion and the course of the evidence and the line of questioning.
13. Mr Farhat accepted that the letter from the doctor merely referred to depression and nothing of the physical injuries, although he submitted that was not unusual.
14. Mr Tufan submitted that there were a number of credibility findings made by the judge, starting at [14] until [26] and none of those findings were challenged, although it suggested that three photographs, had they been analysed in detail, the conclusions would have differed but that was not the case. In the appellant’s asylum interview the only place that the claimed torture is mentioned is at question 265 and that was not expanded upon at the hearing but the reasons for refusal letter did address the photographs, and there was no way of identifying that the body in the scars were placed was that of the appellant. There was no explanation and those three photographs revealed nothing. The fact that the coloured photographs were provided which were not before the judge, the fact remained that the only three photographs before the judge were in black and white. There was no relevant medical report, no Istanbul Protocol assessment and there was no indication of who these injuries applied to.
15. Mr Farhat submitted, in response, that the largely unchallenged credibility findings were those which had not addressed them, but were not made in the correct context of the photographs. Had the judge been alert to those photographs and had there been a further line of questioning, perhaps credibility findings could have been outweighed. The reference in the reasons for refusal letter does show that the photographs were relevant.
Conclusions
16. Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 264 at [23] confirms that, “An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration.”
17. What is in issue in this particular matter is that the judge, when coming to a conclusion, is said to have failed to consider the three photographs, which it is asserted showed torture.
18. The judge referenced the photographs at [21] of the decision, albeit not specifically in relation to the injuries but identified that “very limited evidence has been served by the appellant toward his case”.
19. Indeed, the reason for refusal letter by the respondent specifically identified that:
“You provided numerous pictures in support of your asylum claim (PE). Some of these photographs show you involved in meetings or demonstrations in the UK with Biafra iconography visible. Other photographs appear to show scars with no way of identifying whose body this is and no explanation as to the origin of these injuries. You have also provided no explanation as to the relevance of these documents and it is noted that they lack dates or context ...”
In the round, the claim, little weight has been applied to the photographs.
20. By the date of the hearing before the judge, no further evidence in relation to these photographs had been provided. There was no confirmation that these were the photographs of the appellant himself and further there was no medical evidence or any evidence compliant with the Istanbul Protocol to indicate the origin of these claimed injuries.
21. The judge was not a medical expert and could not determine from the state of the evidence that these photographs were even of the appellant. It is noted that only black and white photographs were before the judge.
22. The judge recorded that the appellant now claimed that:
“with 6 other men, he was detained, beaten and tortured over a period of several days. He said that 3 of the people captured with him had been killed by the security forces, so the rest decided to run away into the bushes. He said he heard shots, but they missed and he was able to run away and find the main road where he enlisted the help of a lorry driver.”
23. The point was put to the appellant squarely, but in his screening interview on 1st August 2019 in response to question 5.1, he stated he had not been detained and the appellant’s explanation was that it was a “rogue detention in Nigeria, with the intention of harming him or killing him, so he did not think it applied to question 5.4”. The judge specifically stated that he did not find this answer persuasive and the judge was wholly entitled to take that view. There was no challenge to that particular finding.
24. Bearing in mind this is the key plank of the appellant’s asylum claim that he had been tortured whilst in detention, his assertion in the screening interview was wholly at odds with his claim and the judge was entitled to take the view that he did. As set out in YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145, although an individual is not expected to set out their case in detail, the purpose I have explained at 19 of YL, is to establish the general nature of the claimant’s case and:
“Asylum seekers are still expected to tell the truth and answers given in screening interviews can be compared fairly with answers given later. However, it has to be remembered that a screening interview is not done to establish in detail the reasons a person gives to support her claim for asylum.”
And, “in the absence of a proper explanation, an Adjudicator should be very slow to believe evidence introduced at a late stage”.
25. As confirmed by Mr Farhat, there was no reference during the asylum interview of scars experienced by the appellant and indeed he was cross-examined on the contradiction between his screening interview and his later evidence, simply the judge did not accept his explanation [16].
26. At [18] the judge said this:
“18. The Respondent has highlighted a number of the Appellant’s answers in his asylum interview on 22 January 2022, which it says are inaccurate or inconsistent with external evidence. These include:
(a) in response to a question as to how high his membership of Biafra was, he said ‘not any official now’, which he changed when it was put to him that a letter he had produced in support of his membership of IPOB said he was a very active and visible member;
(b) he was unaware of the Biafra passport and currency;
(c) he said that MASSOB and IPOB are the same organisation;
(d) he got the wrong leader of MASSOB.
19. I consider that these answers are vague and lacking in detail. I have considered the CPIN Nigeria: Separatist Groups in the South-East from March 2022, which provides objective evidence of contradictory positions. Other of the Appellant’s answers in his asylum interview are to me of less concern, for instance the apparent issue around identifying the leader of the Biafra movement, which could have been, as he claims, due to the Appellant stuttering.”
These findings are independent of the appellant’s scaring or otherwise.
27. Also concerning were the findings of the judge from [23] onwards. Further to Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, notwithstanding the experiences of the appellant in 2003 immediately prior to his entry into the UK, it was recorded that there was a very long delay before the appellant claimed asylum. It was pointed out that the appellant had not claimed asylum on arrival in May 2003 and indeed his screening interview took place on 1st August 2019.
28. The judge agreed, and it was open to him, that this matter had damaged the appellant’s credibility and these are completely separate from any assessment of the photographs of scarring. Even to take a point that the judge needs to view the evidence in the context of medical or expert report there was none.
29. Notwithstanding, Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at 2(iii) confirms that ‘An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration.’ In these particular circumstances that is the case here. Simply the photographs here did not assist in taking the case further or add to the case being advanced.
30. Looking at the photographs and for the reasons given above there was no realistic prospect these photographs could even arguably make a material difference. A fanciful prospect or an unrealistic argument is not sufficient to constitute any material difference. There was no medical evidence and no way of identifying to whom these scars belonged.
31. The judge clearly took the evidence in the round and concluded at [24] and [25] the judge said this
‘24.The Appellant has had two Nigerian passports since he allegedly arrived in the UK, which he obtained from the Nigerian embassy. While he stated in evidence that his application was initially refused due to being a supporter of the Biafra people, no evidence has been produced of this. What can be said is that the Appellant had no apparent concerns about engaging with the Nigerian embassy in the UK.
25.Taking all of the evidence in the round, it is insufficient for me to find that it is reasonably likely that the Appellant fears persecution due to his political activities or that he would be persecuted for that reason. Likewise, I am unable to find substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in his country of origin. I do not find the Appellant credible as to what happened to him in Nigeria or as to his knowledge of the Biafra movement. While he has attended some meetings in the UK, this is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable likelihood that he would be persecuted on his return.’
32. It was entirely open to the judge to make the credibility findings that he did and the approach to the evidence is not infected by any material error of law and the decision shall stand.
Notice of decision.
33. The FtT decision disclosed no material error of law and the decision will stand. The appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19th January 2026