Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003036
& UI-2025-003315

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56474/2023
LP/07473/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5th January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

GEN + 4
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Z Malik KC, instructed by K & A Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed her appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse her asylum claim.

2. The appellant, born on 20 April 1989, is a national of Pakistan. She arrived in the UK on 5 December 2020 with a visa as a Tier 4 spouse, valid until 30 January 2022. On 21 December 2020 she claimed asylum. Her claim was refused on 31 August 2023.

3. The appellant’s asylum claim can be summarised as follows. She was forced to marry her uncle’s son in 2015 so that he could get the property which her father had left to her and her brother. Her husband, EA, was mentally unstable and often beat her up. In 2018 she met MR whilst visiting her father-in-law in hospital and she ran away with MR three months later. They got married and had a child in Pakistan. The appellant claimed that her brother came to the area where she was living and her friend told her that he was looking for her and intended to kill her. She fled Pakistan. She feared her brother, cousins, uncle and ex-husband. She had since had two more children with her current husband MR in the UK, and they were all dependents on her asylum claim.

4. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim, accepted that she had disavowed her family and had married MR and had had three children with him, and that her brother had threatened to kill her because she married MR. However the respondent considered that the appellant’s behaviour undermined her credibility, under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004. The respondent noted that the appellant’s husband had failed to attend his classes upon arrival in the UK and concluded that he did not intend to pursue his studies in the UK, that the appellant did not intend to leave the UK, and that the appellant had therefore sought to conceal information and to mislead. The respondent did not consider that the appellant was at risk on return to Pakistan because her first marriage was invalid, as forced marriages were illegal in Pakistan, and she was able to marry her second husband and have three children with him, and managed to live safely in Pakistan for two years after disavowing her family. The respondent considered that there was a sufficiency of protection available to the appellant from the police in Pakistan against her brother and other family members who had no power or influence over the police themselves. The respondent consider that the appellant could also relocate to another part of Pakistan where her husband could find employment. With regard to Article 8, the respondent noted that the appellant’s children were not British and had not lived in the UK for seven years, so that the appellant could not qualify under the immigration rules as a parent. The respondent considered there to be no very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan and no exceptional circumstances outside the immigration rules.

5. The appellant appealed against that decision. Her appeal was heard in the First-tier Tribunal on 15 May 2025. The judge heard oral evidence from the appellant and her husband MR. The judge noted that the appellant had given inconsistent evidence about the status of her first marriage. She concluded that the appellant’s marriage to her current husband was considered to be valid by the State and their children were considered to be legitimate, and that there would therefore be no risk on return to Pakistan. The judge considered that the appellant and her husband and children could relocate to another part of Pakistan, such as Karachi, where there was no reason for anyone to know or suspect that she had disavowed her family, and where her husband would be able to find employment and support his family. The judge found there to be no evidence that the appellant’s brother had any connection to Sindh State, let alone any influence or power there and considered that it was unlikely that the brother would be able to find out where they were or even that they had returned to Pakistan. The judge found further that the appellant could not meet the requirements of the immigration rules on family and private life grounds and that the decision to refuse her claim was proportionate. The judge accordingly dismissed the appeal, in a decision promulgated on 28 May 2025.

6. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the judge’s decision on three grounds. Firstly, that the judge had erred as to the burden and standard of proof; secondly, that the judge had failed to ask the correct question in relation to internal relocation and had failed to consider whether it would be unduly harsh for the appellant to internally relocate to Karachi; and thirdly, that the judge’s approach to the welfare of the appellant’s children was legally flawed as she did not treat the best interests of the children as an integral part of the proportionality assessment.

7. Permission was granted on limited grounds in the First-tier Tribunal, on the first two grounds only. However, permission was subsequently granted in the Upper Tribunal on all grounds, upon the appellant’s renewed application. The respondent produced two rule 24 responses opposing the appellant’s appeal.

8. The matter then came before me for a hearing and both parties made submissions.

Hearing and Submissions

9. Mr Malik addressed grounds two and three first, since those grounds had been considered in the grant of permission to be the strongest. He referred to [40] of the judge’s decision whereby it was recorded that there were two elements to the appellant’s claim, namely a risk from the State because she had married her second husband without getting divorced from her first husband, and a risk from her brother who had forced her into the first marriage. Mr Malik referred to the judge’s findings at [41] to [45] rejecting the appellant’s claim to be at risk from the State and he confirmed that there was no challenge to that finding. With regard to the findings from [46] in relation to the risk from the appellant’s brother, Mr Malik confirmed that there was also no challenge to the judge’s finding at [51] that the appellant’s brother did not have the power or influence to reach her if she relocated to another part of the country far from her home area such as Karachi, and no challenge to the finding at [52] that there was no risk from the State. He confirmed that the challenge, which was the second ground of appeal, was made to the judge’s failure, when making her findings at [52], to apply the correct test for internal relocation, namely whether it would be reasonable to expect the appellant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect her to do so. Mr Malik submitted that the respondent’s answer to that challenge in her rule 24 response relied on [55] and [62] of the judge’s decision, but that that was no answer, because [55] concerned ‘very significant obstacles’ under Article 8 which involved a different test and a different standard of proof, and [62] involved proportionality under Article 8 which again involved a different test to that for internal relocation.

10. With regard to ground three, Mr Malik submitted that the judge had erred in her consideration of the welfare of the appellant’s children, as she only considered that matter after finding the respondent’s decision to be proportionate, at [57], rather than as an intrinsic element of the proportionality assessment which should have been considered at the beginning of the assessment. Mr Malik relied upon the case of Kaur (children's best interests / public interest interface) [2017] UKUT 14 in that respect. He submitted that the respondent had failed to address the actual challenge made in the grounds in that regard in the rule 24 response. As for the first ground, Mr Malik submitted that the judge’s use of the word “unlikely” in [51] and “likely” in [53] was consistent with the civil standard of proof which was the wrong standard of proof to be applied in this case.

11. Ms Clewley submitted, with regard to ground two, that the test for internal relocation was properly considered by the judge, and that her findings at [45] to [51] should all be read together with her conclusions at [52]. The judge considered the question of the reasonableness of relocation extensively in those paragraphs. As for ground three, it was not correct that the judge made her decision on proportionality and then later went on to consider the best interests of the appellant’s children, since what she said at [57] was the introduction not the conclusion, and she went on to undertake a proper assessment, treating the best interests of the children as a primary consideration. With regard to ground one, Ms Clewley submitted that the judge’s use of the words “not likely” and “likely” must be seen in context. The judge applied the correct standard of proof.

12. Mr Malik reiterated the points previously made in response.

Analysis

13. There is no merit in the grounds. The judge’s decision is a detailed and comprehensive one, based upon a full assessment of all the evidence and with cogently reasoned findings, applying the correct standard of proof and appropriate legal tests.

14. The challenge made in the second ground is, in my view, simply one of semantics. Whilst it is the case that the judge did not specifically cite the words “unduly harsh” or “reasonable” in making her findings on internal relocation, it is clear that she applied the relevant principles in those tests as set out in Januzi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors [2006] UKHL 5. As the Court of Appeal made clear at [28] of ASJ (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 282, a case relied upon by Mr Malik, “there is a danger of overanalysing and over-refining the relevant test. As Lord Bingham observed in relation to questions of internal relocation in AH (Sudan) at paragraph 5, "the difficulty lies in applying the test, not in expressing it”.” In this case, the judge may not have expressed the test specifically, but she clearly applied it.

15. The judge had regard to all the relevant circumstances and considered all factors relevant to the question of reasonableness and undue harshness. It was not the case, as Mr Malik’s submissions suggested, that the judge’s findings on the issue were to be found only at [52]. Rather, as Ms Clewley submitted, [52] was a drawing together of the considerations undertaken and the findings made in the previous paragraphs, from [46]. At [46] the judge considered the differing reasons given by the appellant for not being able to relocate to another part of the country, and her claim that they would need a police certificate in order to live in a comfortable area. At [47] to [49] the judge considered the reasons given by the appellant in that regard and explained why she rejected them, finding that the appellant would not need a police certificate and that she had the necessary registration documents to enable her and her family to conduct their lives in an area such as Karachi. At [49] the judge found that the appellant and her family would be able to obtain accommodation in Karachi and that her husband would be able to obtain employment and support them. At [50] and [51] the judge found that the appellant’s brother would not be able to find her in Karachi, a finding which has not been challenged. At [52] the judge found that there was no reason why the appellant’s marriage, or the legitimacy of her children, would be questioned. Clearly these were all factors relevant to the question of whether it would be reasonable, or unduly harsh, to expect the appellant to relocate within Pakistan. Neither the grounds nor Mr Malik’s submissions suggested any factors which the judge had failed to take into account, the submission relying solely upon the omission of the key words themselves. In the circumstances there is no merit in the challenge to the judge’s decision in that ground. The judge addressed the relevant tests and was fully and properly entitled to reach the conclusion that she did. There was no legal requirement for her to cite the key words, provided she applied the relevant tests, which is what she did.

16. The third ground is equally flawed in its undue focus on one paragraph of the judge’s decision, without having regard to the entirety of the findings made in relation to the relevant issue. It is plainly not the case that the judge made her decision on proportionality before going on to consider the best interests of the appellant’s children. The first sentence of [57] was the judge’s introduction to the issue of proportionality. The judge went on to give her reasons for her findings in that regard in the following paragraphs, from [57] to [61], giving her final conclusion on the matter at the end of [61]. The judge addressed the welfare of the appellant’s children in detail at [58] to [61], considering each child in turn. It cannot possibly be said that there was a failure by the judge to take the children’s best interests as a primary consideration. Neither can it be said that the best interests consideration was undertaken after the decision on proportionality had been made. Clearly the judge’s decision on the best interests of the children was an integral part of her proportionality assessment. The grounds asserting otherwise are without any merit.

17. Mr Malik, quite properly, did not focus on ground one. Permission was refused in the First-tier Tribunal on that ground, although subsequently granted in the Upper Tribunal. I agree with what was said in the First-tier Tribunal decision refusing permission, namely that the references at [51] and [53] to the words “unlikely” and “likely” have to be seen in the context of a correct self-direction as to the standard of proof at [36] and the following paragraphs where the standard of proof was correctly applied. It is clear from an overall reading of the judge’s decision that she applied the lower standard of proof to her assessment of the appellant’s claim in all respects. Nothing material arises from the judge’s use of those words. There is no basis for concluding that they demonstrated an error in the application of the burden and standard of proof.

18. For all these reasons I do not find the grounds to be made out. The judge undertook a full and careful assessment of all the evidence, applying the correct legal tests and principles, and she reached conclusions which were fully and properly open to her on the evidence before her. The judge’s decision is accordingly upheld.

Notice of Decision

19. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.

Anonymity Order

The Anonymity Order previously made is continued.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 December 2025