Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003038

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51152/2024
LP/01307/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

13th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STERNBERG

Between

MKS
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Applicant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Madhani of CB Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms. Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 24 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of Syria and Russia, was granted permission to appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hawden-Beal (‘the judge’) who dismissed the appellant’s appeal by a determination dated 3 June 2025, following a hearing which took place on 20 May 2025. That appeal challenged the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum claim dated 12 December 2024.
2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Kudhail granted an extension of time of 2 days and granted permission to appeal on 9 July 2025. The judge made an order granting the appellant anonymity in their determination. I maintain that order given the nature of the appellant’s claims.
3. The hearing took place before my by CVP on 24 October 2025. At the start of the hearing I confirmed that all parties could hear and see each other sufficiently for the hearing to proceed. I then heard submissions from Mr. Mahani for the Appellant and from Ms. Clewley for the Respondent. I received a composite bundle running to 322 pages in advance of the hearing.

Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. The judge began her judgment (at §§1-2) by setting out the appellant’s background and the circumstances of his travel to the UK including leaving Russia in October 2019, travelling through the Netherlands where he claimed asylum, and on to France before arriving in the UK on 22 December 2021 and claiming asylum. She then set out the respondent’s reasons for refusing the appellant’s claim (at §§3-9). The respondent did not accept the appellant was attacked in Russia before or after his marriage, that he had no life or dignity or faced discrimination or harassment there because of his religion and ethnicity. The respondent relied on inconsistencies in his account, his failure to mention his claim that in Russia that he had been beaten so badly he suffered brain damage until his second interview, his credibility was damaged by his failure to claim asylum in France. The respondent decided the appellant was not at risk in Russia; there was no evidence he had been targeted because of his religion and ethnicity. While he claimed that his brother in law was a police officer in Sochi, there was no evidence he could not seeking protection and internal relocation was also available to him. The respondent therefore refused his claim for asylum and humanitarian protection, found there was no claim under article 8 ECHR and that no exceptional circumstances were raised or found.
5. The judge then set out the course of the appeal, the material before her and the appellant’s evidence (at §§10-24). The respondent accepted that the appellant would not be returned to Syria and accordingly the principal controversial issue before the judge was risk on return to Russia. The appellant gave evidence before the judge and was cross-examined. He gave an account that he was sent a summons in 2023, after he had left Russia, because of his opposition to the Russian Government’s support for the Assad regime in Syria. His daughter received it at his old address and sent it to him. He claimed that he had been attacked by his wife’s family because of his opposition to the Putin regime. He also feared persecution by his wife’s brother who is a police officer although he does not know his rank in the police, he said his wife’s brother would be able to find him if he relocated. He accepted he had claimed asylum in the Netherlands on the same basis and that that claim had been refused. The judge noted that she heard submissions from both parties. The judge then recorded the relevant law (at §§25-30).
6. The judge set out her findings (at §§31-50). She found that there was no evidence that the appellant faced discrimination in Russia because of his religion. He had no issues in Russia because of his religion. He relied on the risk from ex-wife’s brother, however, there was no evidence that his ex-brother in law is still a police officer. The judge accepted that if he is, he may still have contacts. Nor was there any evidence that the appellant’s ex-brother in law would have power or influence over the appellant in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The judge was not satisfied to the requisite standard that the appellant is at risk from his ex-brother in law or family. As to the summons, the judge noted that it was sent to his ex-wife’s address four years after the appellant left Russia. The judge found that this shows that the Russian authorities were not aware he had left the country. The appellant has no idea why it was issued. The appellant said he had criticised the Russia regime on Facebook but did not produce evidence of this and in any event this took place some years prior to his leaving Russia and there were no consequences of that criticism. He was never in trouble in Russia for his criticism of the Putin regime’s support for Assad. It was highly unlikely that there would be a summons issued against him in 2023 for that criticism 8 years earlier. He had never been involved in any protests or political activity in Russia or the UK because he was too afraid. There was no evidence that the Russia authorities are looking for him. Nor was there evidence that he opposes the war in Ukraine. The judge was not satisfied that the appellant is at risk on return to Russia, due to his religion, from his ex-brother in law, from his ex-wife’s family or the authorities. It would not be unduly harsh for him to relocate to Tatarstan or Bashkortostan if he cannot go back to Sochi. The judge found the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason, nor does not qualify for Humanitarian protection. There was no claim relying on private and family life and the judge found that the appellant could reintegrate into Russian society and his removal is proportionate. There were no exceptional circumstances to grant leave outside the rules. Accordingly, the judge dismiss the appeal.

Grounds of Appeal
7. The appellant has advanced two grounds of appeal: the first ground of appeal asserts that the judge accepted that the appellant holds anti-regime views, the background evidence shows he is at risk as an opponent to the Putin regime, per HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31, the judge should have considered the position on return, whether he would be required to conceal his views, whether his behaviour on return would place him at risk and whether he would be at risk if he relocated internally. The second ground of appeal asserts that the judge reached conclusions that were not open to her in relation to sufficiency of protection. The appellant’s account was that the police abused him and told him to leave Russia, that does not evidence sufficiency of protection.
8. At the hearing Mr. Madhani made admirably concise and focussed submissions in support of both grounds of appeal. He submitted that the appellant should not be expected to return to Russia where he cannot freely express himself, contrary to the principles set out in HJ (Iran). He is opposed to Putin. The judge recorded this opposition in paragraphs 17, 19, 33 of her decision, including that the appellant had been assaulted and injured due to his political opinions and his views. Internal relocation cannot cure the fundamental issue relating to his political opinions and it would be unduly harsh. SA (political activist – internal relocation) Iran [2011] UKUT 30 (IAC) is referred to in the grounds at [13], which confirms the fundamental basic right of free expression cannot be cured by internal relocation. The appellant did not confine his opposition to Putin to the position in Syria. Paragraph 17 of the judge’s determination records that he was opposed to Putin. In terms of sufficiency of protection, the appellant’s leg was broken which he referred to in his asylum interview. Internal relocation will not suffice in relation to this either and there will not be sufficiency of protection. There was a material error of law.
9. Ms. Clewley relied on the respondent’s rule 24 response. She submitted that the appellant’s opposition to the Russian regime was for its activities in Syria, not general opposition to that regime. He did not participate in any activities in the UK. The focus in the Russian mind has now moved on to Ukraine. The judge found that the state had no reason to be interested in him and there was no reason for the state to be interested in him. The judge found at paragraph 40 that the Russian state was not particularly interested in him, they had not established that he had left the country. Paragraph 41 deals with the appellant’s criticism of the government for its activities in Syria and that it had not attracted the attention of the authorities then and would not do so now. While the judge did not refer to HJ (Iran) explicitly, the correct considerations were made. The judge looked at whether the appellant would, be of adverse attention, whether he would continue his past political activities and the risk that this would create. The judge found that the focus was now on the war in Ukraine. Relevant matters of substance were considered. The matters the appellant relied upon were not ongoing. The Appellant’s skeleton argument before the judge does not refer to HJ (Iran) or any political activities by the appellant. As to ground 2, irrationality is a high threshold. The judge found the appellant’s contact with the police was only in one locality and there was no longer a risk in place. The appellant has no reason to go to the authorities for protection. The failure of the local police to protect him in 2015 is confined to his ex-brother in law in one area and the prospect of internal relocation means that this is not material to the judge’s determination.

Discussion
10. Both sides made their submissions on both grounds collectively. Although the grant of permission to appeal only focussed on ground 1, permission was not restricted and I consider both grounds.
Ground 1
11. As I have noted, the appellant’s case on ground 1 is that he holds anti-Putin regime views and, it is asserted, that the judge accepted this at paragraphs 39 and 41 of her decision. However, it is important to carefully consider the basis for the appellant’s claim as it was put before the respondent and the judge in assessing this ground. The appellant mentioned the difficulties he had in his second asylum interview in answer to question 26, explaining how his step-son wanted to join the Russian army to fight in Syria. The interview record records that he said this: ‘This is where the problem started. I always opposed the Russian intervention in Syria, despite the fact I tried to express my views to him and deter him volunteering as it was not mandatory… this is when my life was turned into hell. The problems started and that assault – that was carried out by my in-laws. My wife’s brother, her brother in law and their friends -they broke my leg and threatened my life.’ The appellant confirmed this was because of his views in Syria. In his witness statement for the hearing before the judge, he gave a similar account, that his concerns about Russian intervention in Syria caused members of his wife’s family to be violent towards him. Nowhere in the appellant’s evidence in writing or in his oral evidence before the judge, summarised in the judge’s judgment at §§15-23 did he suggest that he was opposed to the Putin regime more widely. At §17 the judge records the appellant’s evidence that he was beaten by his wife’s family because he opposed Putin, but this follows the preceding paragraphs which explain the appellant opposed the Putin regime’s intervention in Syria rather than for any other reason or on any wider basis. Accordingly, the judge’s findings in her decision at paragraphs 39 and 41 must be considered in this context. They do not constitute findings that the appellant was opposed to the Putin regime in general or in any way which goes beyond being critical of its intervention in Syria.
12. It was clear and not disputed before the judge that the appellant had not participated in any political activity or demonstrations critical of the Putin regime in Russia or in the UK.
13. Analysed in its proper context, the judge was perfectly entitled to consider the risk to the appellant on return, not as a general opponent of the Putin regime but as someone who had been critical of that regime’s previous military intervention in Syria. Accordingly I reject the appellant’s submission on this ground that the judge failed to deal with this issue properly. The judge heard the evidence, made findings that were open to her and properly applied the law to the facts. No error of law arises from her consideration of this issue on the evidence that was presented to her.
14. Nor, for completeness, do I consider there is any merit in the judge’s approach to the summons that the appellant said he had received from his daughter, nor the assertion that the appellant would be at risk for opposing the war in Ukraine. There was no evidence that the appellant had expressed any views in relation to Ukraine at all before the judge. Equally the judge’s findings in relation to the risk the appellant asserted he faced from his ex-brother in law and the risk asserted to flow from the summons were proper and open to her.
15. It follows that I accept and prefer the submissions of the respondent on this matter. I accept the judge did not expressly refer to HJ (Iran) in her determination. However, she found that the appellant did not have any political profile, had not been involved in any demonstrations and his opposition to the Putin regime was limited to criticism of its conduct in Syria. In those circumstances, I do not consider that any omission in not citing the decision in HJ (Iran) was material to the judge’s decision on this issue. For completeness, I agree with the submissions made on behalf of the respondent that the judge applied the correct test and concluded correctly that the appellant would not be at risk as a result of his opposition to Russian involvement in Syria, a summons dating back to 2023 nor from his ex-brother in law. The appellant would not have to live discretely or conceal his true views in relation to the Russian government’s conduct in Syria as his opinions on this matter would not place him at any risk. It follows that the issue of the fundamental right to free speech not being available in the event of internal relocation does not arise. I reject ground 1.
Ground 2
16. Ground 2 is, to an extent, parasitic on ground 1 and I can express my decision on it briefly. The appellant criticises the judge’s approach to internal relocation and sufficiency of protection. In my judgment the judge’s decision on this issue is unimpeachable. The judge correctly found that the appellant could relocate to another region of Russia if he was at risk in Sochi and that he would not be at risk and could avail himself of sufficient protection from the state if he did so.
17. There was no evidence before the judge that the appellant’s ex-brother in law had any reach or influence beyond the area where the appellant had lived previously. I accept the respondent’s submission that the failure of the local police to protect him and the abuse he suffered at their hands was limited to one locality and that internal relocation was properly available to him and the judge was correct so to find. The judge reached proper conclusions that were open to her on the facts and on the evidence she heard.
18. Ground 2 fails.

Notice of Decision
19. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
20. The appeal is dismissed.

D Sternberg

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 November 2025