Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003041

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52230/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

28th October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAE-REEVES

Between

RHR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Coburn
For the Respondent: Mr Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule fourteen of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I have continued the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal.  I have considered the public interest in open justice, but consider it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.  
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Malik (hereafter “the Judge”) promulgated on 05/06/2025 which dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 15/01/2024 to refuse his protection claim.
Background
3. The appellant is a national of Iraq and made his application on 14/08/2022 and exercised his right of appeal against the refusal pursuant to Section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2022 and the matter came before Judge Malik on 14/05/2025 sitting in Manchester.
4. The appellant claims to be a member of a particular social group because he is the potential victim of an honour killing due to his relationship and subsequent marriage to BSO. He claims that BSO’s family objected to their relationship and he tried to mediate a peaceful solution through his maternal uncle who approached the KDP. This organisation wanted him and his uncle to act as spies or join the military and as a result he left Iraq having registered his engagement/marriage.
5. The appellant, his wife and children left Iraq on 07/10/2021 and travelled through Turkey and unknown countries, arriving in the UK on 08/11/2021 and claimed asylum on 14/08/2022.
Position of the Respondent before the First-tier Tribunal
6. The respondent considered the appellant’s application and that of his family under the family asylum claims process. The respondent accepted the appellant’s nationality but rejected his claim for protection because she stated that he had “provided inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation as well as lack of detail. There are some elements of your account that were implausible and inconsistent with external information”. The respondent set out specific elements of the appellant’s case that she rejected which could be summarised as his fear of the KDP, fear of his in-laws and his account of his departure from Iraq.
7. It was not considered that the appellant had a well founded fear of persecution on return but was conceded that if his credibility was accepted there would not be sufficient protection nor the opportunity to relocate.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
8. The Judge sets out the issues in dispute which “are whether the appellant’s claim is credible, sufficiency of protection, internal relocation and feasibility of return”[8].
9. In a detailed decision, the Judge went through the appellant’s account as presented across his evidence. At paragraph 12 (a) to (g), she rejected all elements of the appellant’s case. She dismissed the appellant’s account of how he married and developed a relationship with BSO and continued their relationship in light of the risk from her family because it lacked credibility. She found the appellant’s wife’s evidence to lack credibility in relation to family marriage arrangements based on her oral evidence.
10. She rejected the appellant’s claim to fear the KDP because his uncle has remained in Iraq and due to the lack of threats. She dismissed his account of his departure given in oral evidence as lacking credibility. She found that he had identification with him or could obtain it in order for him and his family to return.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the sole ground of procedural unfairness. Specifically, that the Judge did not address the five reasons set out in the respondent's refusal letter for not accepting the appellant’s account but that she prosecuted a case of her own.
12. As submitted by Mr Coburn, the specific point is that it is a procedural unfairness not to raise a point with a witness because it deprives them of the opportunity of responding. It is submitted if the appellant had been on notice of the Judge’s approach “he may have sought to produce background evidence as to the prevalence of men take risks to commence relationships with women with their family’s approval”.
13. Permission was granted by Judge Kudhail on 09/07/2025.
14. The respondent filed no Rule 24 response.
The Error of Law Hearing
15. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains a material error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either remake the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. The parties rely on a hearing bundle amounting to 525 pages. Despite an earlier indication from the appellant, no Rule 15 (2A) application was made.
16. The hearing was attended by representatives of both parties as above. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties and I discussed the fact that although the crux of the appeal is procedural unfairness, no listening appointment has been requested nor is a transcript available of the hearing. Mr Coburn confirmed that he did not rely on any note of the hearing and that no request for a listening appointment had been made. Both parties were content to proceed, no objection being made. Both representatives made submissions, and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
17. The appellant relies on a sole Ground, that the Judge permitted a procedural unfairness. Specifically, that she did not make findings on the reasons in the refusal letter and decided issues not put to the appellant and his wife.
18. At the end of the hearing, I gave an indication that the appeal was dismissed, and this decision now sets out my reasons in full.
Discussion
19. I conclude that there was no material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal in this case for the following reasons.
20. The appellant’s application was rejected by the respondent on grounds of credibility and his credibility was the issue identified before the Judge. She considered his whole claim in reaching her conclusion that it lacked credibility and based her findings on the evidence advanced by the appellant including his oral evidence. As noted below she addressed key factual issues identified in the refusal letter.
21. Fear of the KDP and the appellant’s in-laws are at the heart of his application and were raised in the refusal letter and were considered by the Judge in commendable detail. She considers the risk from the KDP at [12(f)].
22. Similarly, at [12(g)] the Judge did not find his evidence in relation to the circumstances of his departure to be credible and this also was raised in the refusal letter.
23. The issue of the appellant’s fear of his in-laws is raised in the refusal letter and is dealt with in the decision at [12(d)]. I reject the submission that she did not engage with the reasons in the refusal letter or that these issues were not anticipated by the appellant.
24. In the Grounds it is submitted that there is procedural unfairness because points taken by the Judge were not put to the appellant [6, 8] although no direct, specific references to the oral evidence were submitted by Mr Coburn. I cannot accept that this is correct because the Judge’s findings on credibility were based on the oral evidence that she heard and which she is obviously entitled to consider. As a secondary issue without a listening hearing, transcript or note of hearing, it is not possible to determine what points were or were not put to the appellant.
25. As noted above the Judge does consider the oral evidence. At [12(a)] the Judge finds that the appellant and BSL have fabricated their account of being at risk from her family. No reference is made to oral evidence. [12(b)] makes clear and direct reference to “at the hearing he said” and “he also claimed” which indicates clearly that the Judge’s finding was based on the appellant’s testimony.
26. Similarly, at [12(c)] the Judge found BSO’s account to lack credibility directly based on “her oral evidence” and that “she then tried to rationalise her answer”. Similarly, at [12(d)] the Judge clearly states, “the appellant claimed at the hearing” and “further the appellant claimed at the hearing”. She expressly addresses the appellant’s oral evidence about his early relations with BSO and the potential risk from BSO’s family. She found the appellant’s rationale to be nonsensical and it incredible that his family would have colluded in the way described due to the risk claimed.
27. [12(e)] is silent on oral evidence and [12(f)] refers to there being no explanation and without a transcript I do not know if this refers to there being no explanation in oral evidence or in the evidence as a whole. Finally, at paragraph 12(g) there is also reference to the appellant giving evidence on the method and detail of his departure.
28. Specific guidance in relation to immigration appeals is provided in ABDI v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455. It has value to quote Lord Justice Popplewell as follows:
HA v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2010] SC 457 [2010] CSIH 28 was a decision of an Extra Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session presided over by Lord Reed (now PSC), who delivered the Opinion. It made a number of general points about procedural fairness in the context of immigration cases, amongst which the following emerge at [4]-[13]. Subject to the procedural rules governing first instance tribunals, the tribunal has power to decide the procedure it adopts, but in doing so must act fairly. What fairness requires is essentially an intuitive judgment which is dependent on the context of the decision; although it is possible to identify a number of general principles, they cannot be applied by rote identically in every situation. An overall judgment must be made in the light of all the circumstances of a particular case. Whether there is procedural unfairness is fact sensitive. See [4] and [13]. The tribunal may identify an issue which has not been raised by the parties to the proceedings, but it will be unfair, ordinarily at least, for it to base its decision upon its view of the issue without giving the parties an opportunity to address it upon the matter (see [7]). As an expert body, the tribunal is entitled to reject evidence notwithstanding that the evidence has not been challenged before it. Fairness may, however, require it to disclose its concerns about the evidence so as to afford the parties an opportunity to address them (see [8]). There is, on the other hand no general obligation on the tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing of all the matters on which it may relay in reaching its decision (see [10]). Where an applicant can generally be expected to be aware that the tribunal will have to assess their credibility, there will generally be no unfairness in a tribunal proceeding without drawing attention to a point which the applicant could reasonably expect to be plainly relevant to that assessment (at [11]-[12])
29. Each case is fact sensitive. For example, if a document is relied on by a judge and not put to an appellant that may well be unfair. In the present case I do not find it to have been procedurally unfair because the Judge was dealing with the appellant’s credibility and based her findings on all of the evidence put before her, including his oral evidence. She rejects his oral (and other) evidence in making her adverse findings and is entitled to do so.
30. As Lord Justice Popplewell notes “fairness may in some such circumstances require the inconsistencies to be put to the witness but that will not usually be the case”. Insofar as the Judge relied on evidence outside of oral testimony, the appellant was aware that his credibility was being challenged, he proffered his evidence in his statements and interviews, and the Judge cannot be criticised for considering it in a holistic approach to the issue agreed at the hearing. There is no evidence that she was furthering a prosecution of her own.
31. I conclude that there has been no error of law, and the appeal fails.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on appoint of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

V Rae-Reeves

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13/10/2025