Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003058
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53312/2024
LP/14268/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3rd March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

HG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Rodgers, Immigration Advice Centre
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnwyz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 11 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to India. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of her identity.

2. This appeal came before me to be remade following my previous decision, dated 20 October 2025, that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) involved a material error of law. A significant portion of the FTT fact-finding assessment was preserved. With the appellant’s credibility resolved in the FTT, the issues which remain to be decided on remaking are twofold: can the appellant reasonably internally relocate in India to obviate the risk she faces; whether the appellant can turn to the Indian state authorities in the place of relocation for sufficient protection.

3. As I indicated in the error of law decision, the broad factual background and immigration history is not in dispute between the parties. The appellant’s case was that she had supported criminal proceedings in the UK against her husband for offences of domestic abuse – the respondent did not dispute this background. The marriage had been arranged between the couple’s families.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

4. A range of factual findings were preserved in the error of law decision. It is important to set out the FTT findings of fact in some detail because they will form the factual bedrock of the issues which I must go on to decide.

5. The below is reproduced from the error of law decision:

“In addressing the issues to be decided in the appeal, the judge noted that the appellant’s representative relied on the June 2023 CPIN on internal relocation in which it was noted that India maintained a central registration system known as the Aadhar Card. [3]

The judge recorded the appellant’s evidence that she had family members in positions of authority. One was a sub-inspector, and the other was a Superintendent, both with the police. One was also her husband’s cousin. [5]

After setting out background information and country guidance, the judge reached the following findings of fact at [15]-[17]:

[15] In this case I consider that the Appellant does face some risk of persecution. I accept her history [as did the Secretary of State] of her suffering domestic violence at the hands of her husband and of her husband and wider family having rejected her. As Mr Roger indicated the Appellant’s husband is likely to blame the Appellant for the damage to his own experiences in the UK and of his probably thwarted ambitions. That blame of the Appellant is entirely unjustified. The situation would not have arisen but for the Appellant’s husband being violent towards her. That situation arose because our [sic] own parents were ineffective in selecting an appropriate spouse for her. The Appellant's own evidence of having come to the UK as a 22 year old woman who is now a 25 year old woman who did not know she would find herself needing to claim asylum when she left India appears to me to be an entirely justified conclusion on her part. The Appellant would now be returning to India with her own family having rejected her because of the breakdown of her marriage and her husband and his family almost certainly feeling significant unjustified enmity to her. The responsibility for that situation appears to me to lie with her own parents and her husband and his family.

[16] I accept that the own Appellant’s family and her in laws have positions that mean if she were to return to India it is likely that her place of residence in India could be identified by either family. I have reached that conclusion as it relates to the Appellant’s past, on the balance of probabilities. However, away from those who might seek to persecute her in India, I consider that the Appellant could make a reasonable life for herself. I do not consider the families involved would either know of the Appellant’s return or if they did that their enmity is such as to cause them to harm her outside her home area. I accept using the lower standard of proof that if the Appellant was to return to her home area it might well be that her own family would reject her and that her in laws might seek to harm her. However, I consider that each of those families would not be sufficiently motivated to seek out the Appellant out if she were to live away from her own home area in Gujarat. Whilst Delhi or Mumbai would present their own difficulties this a highly qualified individual and I consider that the Appellant could make a life for herself in any large city in India. The Appellant attempted to play down her qualifications saying that a degree in economics is not highly regarded and commonplace in India. The point about a degree of that nature is not that it would make one an economist but that it would demonstrate an ability to work at a high level on complex matters. Her computing qualification I consider to be potentially more significant in her making a life for herself. I do not consider it unreasonable for the Appellant to be required to rely on her cumulative qualifications, including her ability to speak English to a very high standard, means that the life she could and would make for herself in India would not be unreasonable.

[17] The Appellant is well qualified. She has received support in the UK and would be able to access some support in India. She would also be able to access protection as required from the State albeit possibly not in the vicinity of her family home. The situation faced by single women in India is not entirely straightforward but it is clear to me that the Appellant is an able and resourceful woman who has skills that she could use in India. The life that she could make for herself away from her own family and her in-laws in India would be different from the expectations the Appellant had as to what her life would be but I do not consider the new life the Appellant could make for herself in India would be one that would leave her at risk of persecution at the hands of those she fears being her own family and her in law family including her husband or would be an unreasonable life in terms of internal flight. The new life she would make in India would be different but that does not mean that it would be unreasonable to require her to live that new life that I am satisfied that she would be able to make for herself, standing her life experience and qualifications. That new life would not be simple or straightforward but I do not consider that it would be unreasonable to require the Appellant to take up life in a place away from her family home in a country as large and diverse as India. As a woman who does not originate from a rural part of India I do not consider either that the Appellant forms part of a particular social group or that there is any material risk of serious harm befalling her in India.

[Underlining added]”

6. I gave the following reasons for finding an error of law and preserving aspects of the FTT findings of fact:

“I am satisfied that there are material errors of law in how the judge dealt with the issues of internal relocation and sufficiency of protection when seen against his underlying findings of fact. In my judgement there are gaps in the overall judicial assessment which amount to defects of lawful reasoning.

In his decision, the judge has taken no issue with the proposition that the Aadhar Card system is capable of being used to trace Indian citizens. As a registration system, it would appear to be one of its very purposes to maintain data about where Indian nationals live within the territory. When this is taken together with the appellant’s apparently accepted evidence that members of her, and her husband’s, family work in senior positions with the police, it becomes difficult to understand why the assertive conclusion was reached that those whom she fears would be disinclined to pull those information gathering levers to trace her simply because she might not return to Gujarat. The judge asserted in the underlined passage above at paragraph [16] that the families she fears would not be motivated to cause her harm beyond Gujarat, unlike if she returned to her home area. It is difficult to make sense of what underpinned this nuanced and fine-margins analysis of what might be in the minds of those regarded to be persecutors and how determined they might be to take revenge against the appellant. At the risk of stating the obvious, internal relocation can only be a reasonable proposition if the person at risk of persecution in their home area will not also be at risk of persecution in the suggested place of resettlement. The judge’s reasoning leaves considerable room for doubt as to whether the appellant would be at risk further afield in India.

Equally problematic are the findings going to sufficiency of protection. The findings on this topic appear to be founded, at [17], on the notion that the appellant could not find willing and able police protection in her home area. Reading the decision holistically, this would appear to be founded on the feared families’ police connections which are obliquely referenced at the beginning of paragraph [16]. What the judge pointedly does not address is why the well-connected family members would not at least attempt to use those levers of power to exert influence should the authorities be approached in a different part of India. This comes back to the theme that those whom the appellant fears would not be motivated to use all of the means available to them to persecute her in distant parts of India.

For all of these reasons, I conclude that the judge’s reasoning on the decisive issues of internal relocation and sufficiency of protection is legally flawed and cannot stand. I set aside the decision because it involves material errors of law.

[…]

I preserve the findings of fact reached in the judge’s decision that the appellant is at risk of serious harm from her family and her husband’s family. I also preserve the finding of fact at the beginning of paragraph [16]: “I accept that the own Appellant’s family and her in laws have positions that mean if she were to return to India it is likely that her place of residence in India could be identified by either family”.”

7. At the remaking hearing, I heard oral evidence from the appellant. I then heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any evidence and submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

Legal Framework

8. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

a) Taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a convention reason?
b) Does the appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?

9. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

c) The appellant would be persecuted for that convention reason;
d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
e) The appellant could not internally relocate.

10. Sections 34 and 35 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 provides as follows in relation to sufficiency of protection and internal relocation:

34 Article 1(A)(2): protection from persecution
(1) For the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, protection from persecution can be provided by—
(a) the State, or
(b) any party or organisation, including any international organisation, controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State.
(2) An asylum seeker is to be taken to be able to avail themselves of protection from persecution if—
(a) the State, party or organisation mentioned in subsection (1) takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution, and
(b) the asylum seeker is able to access the protection.

35 Article 1(A)(2): internal relocation
(1)  An asylum seeker is not to be taken to be a refugee for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention if—
(a)  they would not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in a part of their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence), and
(b)  they can reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.
(2)  In considering whether an asylum seeker can reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in a part of a country, a decision-maker—
(a)  must have regard to—
(i)  the general circumstances prevailing in that part of the country, and
(ii)  the personal circumstances of the asylum seeker;
(b)  must disregard any technical obstacles relating to travel to that part of that country.

11. The 2022 Act did not alter the fundamental principles which underpin the concept of sufficiency of protection under the Refugee Convention. The House of Lords decision of Horvath v SSHD [2001] 1 AC 489 remains the touchstone. In his leading judgment, Lord Hope made the following observations:

[495C] It seems to me that the Convention purpose which is of paramount importance for a solution of the problems raised by the present case is that which is to be found in the principle of surrogacy. The general purpose of the Convention is to enable the person who no longer has the benefit of protection against persecution for a Convention reason in his own country to turn for protection to the international community. […]

[497E-G] […] It is an important reminder that there are indeed two tests that require to be satisfied. A person may satisfy the fear test because he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted, but yet may not be a "refugee" within the meaning of the article because he is unable to satisfy the protection test. But it seems to me that the two tests are nevertheless linked to each other by the concepts which are to be found by looking to the purposes of the Convention. The surrogacy principle which underlies the issue of state protection is at the root of the whole matter. There is no inconsistency between the separation of the definition into two different tests and the fact that each test is founded upon the same principle. I consider that it has a part to play in the application of both tests to the evidence.

[500F-H] As regards the third issue, the answer to it also is to be found in the principle of surrogacy. The primary duty to provide the protection lies with the home state. It is its duty to establish and to operate a system of protection against the persecution of its own nationals. If that system is lacking the protection of the international community is available as a substitute. But the application of the surrogacy principle rests upon the assumption that, just as the substitute cannot achieve complete protection against isolated and random attacks, so also complete protection against such attacks is not to be expected of the home state. The standard to be applied is therefore not that which would eliminate all risk and would thus amount to a guarantee of protection in the home state. Rather it is a practical standard, which takes proper account of the duty which the state owes to all its own nationals. As Ward LJ said [2000] INLR 15, 44G, under reference to Professor Hathaway's observation in his book, at p 105, it is "axiomatic that we live in an imperfect world. Certain levels of ill-treatment may still occur even if steps to prevent this are taken by the state to which we look for our protection. I consider that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in this case applied the right standard when they were considering the evidence.

12. In AW (sufficiency of protection) [2011] UKUT 31, the Upper Tribunal (Lord Bannatyne and Senior Immigration Judge Storey) stressed the importance of considering the particular circumstances of an individual’s case and whether that person could expect to receive adequate state protection. Such case-by-case factors cannot be circumvented on the basis that there is, in general, a functioning state system of protection.

13. Likewise to sufficiency of protection, the 2022 Act did not alter the underlying principles which govern the application of the internal relocation alternative to seeking protection beyond the country of origin. The House of Lords judgment in Januzi v SSHD [2006] 2 WLR 397 provides the test to be applied to this issue. Giving the lead judgment, Lord Bingham held:

[7] The Refugee Convention does not expressly address the situation at issue in these appeals where, within the country of his nationality, a person has a well-founded fear of persecution at place A, where he lived, but not at place B, where (it is said) he could reasonably be expected to relocate. But the situation may fairly be said to be covered by the causative condition to which reference has been made: for if a person is outside the country of his nationality because he has chosen to leave that country and seek asylum in a foreign country, rather than move to a place of relocation within his own country where he would have no well-founded fear of persecution, where the protection of his country would be available to him and where he could reasonably be expected to relocate, it can properly be said that he is not outside the country of his nationality owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason. […]

[…]

[21] In arguing, on behalf of Mr Hamid, Mr Gaafar and Mr Mohammed, that internal relocation is never an available option where persecution is by the authorities of the country of nationality, Mr Gill gains support from the conclusions of the San Remo experts in 2001. They considered that where the risk of being persecuted emanates from the state (including the national government and its agents) internal relocation “is not normally a relevant consideration as it can be presumed that the state is entitled to act throughout the country of origin”. The UNHCR Guidelines of July 2003 similarly observe, at para 7 I(b):

“National authorities are presumed to act throughout the country. If they are the feared persecutors, there is a presumption in principle that an internal flight or relocation alternative is not available.”

There can, however, be no absolute rule and it is, in my opinion, preferable to avoid the language of presumption. The decision-maker, taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the claimant and his country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the claimant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so. The source of the persecution giving rise to the claimant's well-founded fear in his place of ordinary domicile may be agents of the state authorised or directed by the state to persecute; or they may be agents of the state whose persecution is connived at or tolerated by the state, or not restrained by the state; or the persecution may be by those who are not agents of the state, but whom the state does not or cannot control. These sources of persecution may, of course, overlap, and it may on the facts be hard to identify the source of the persecution complained of or feared. There is, as Simon Brown LJ aptly observed in Svazas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 1 WLR 1891 , para 55, a spectrum of cases. The decision-maker must do his best to decide, on such material as is available, where on the spectrum the particular case falls. The more closely the persecution in question is linked to the state, and the greater the control of the state over those acting or purporting to act on its behalf, the more likely (other things being equal) that a victim of persecution in one place will be similarly vulnerable in another place within the state. The converse may also be true. All must depend on a fair assessment of the relevant facts.

[Underlining added]

14. I have considered the country guidance provided by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in BK (Risk – Adultery -PSG) India CG [2002] UKIAT 03387. General observations, interspersed with findings of fact in the matter before the panel, were made about sufficiency of protection at [14]:

The final issue is whether the Appellant is able to look to the authorities in India for protection. Mr Buckley submits that the Indian criminal courts are open to all and the authorities would provide protection. In general terms, the Tribunal is inclined to agree with this but we must look at the specific situation faced by the Appellant were she to return to her home area, a rural area in Punjab. There are laws in place in India to protect the rights of women: see the CIPU report April 2001 and in particular paragraph 5.3.11. But at paragraph 5.3.9 it is reported that violence against women has increased in recent years. Wife-beating is a problem cutting across all castes, classes, religions and education levels. There is domestic violence in the context of dowry disputes. At paragraph 5.3.16 it is confirmed that police are reluctant to intervene in family disputes and that crime may be ignored if the perpetrators are influential. The situation may well be improving and there are thousands of grass-roots organisations working for social justice and the economic advancement of women: paragraph 5.3.20. Nonetheless, the Appellant would be returning to an exceptionally vulnerable situation in a rural area. The Tribunal has considerable doubts whether the authorities would be either willing or able to protect her and these doubts must be resolved in the Appellant’s favour.

Discussion

15. Mr Diwnwyz accepted at the outset of the hearing that while sufficiency of protection and internal relocation were the central issues to be decided in this appeal, each issue hinged on the important factual question of whether state actors in the appellant’s home area would be inclined to use the tools at their disposal to locate the appellant and put her at risk of persecution further afield. I was not invited by the respondent to go behind the FTT decision, at [15], that the appellant is at risk of persecution in her home area and that she could not hope to receive sufficient protection in that area because of the deep connections to the police of those against whom she has well-founded fear. This, taken together with the uncontroversial factor that most Indian citizens are required to use the Aadhar Card system (see paragraph 2.1.5 of the CPIN on Internal Relocation) to access civil services and that the data held as a result of using this system would be available to the police officers she fears will be tasked with finding her, are important particular circumstances which fall to be assessed in considering sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.

16. At the remaking hearing, I informed the parties that I would be carefully considering the respondent’s latest iterations of her Country Policy and Information Notes on Actors of Protection, Internal Relocation and Gender-based Violence and invited them to direct me to any passages considered to be of particular relevance.

17. Mr Diwnwyz relied on the assessment at paragraph 2.1.1 of the Actors of Protection CPIN where it was decided that a person with a well-founded fear of a rogue state actor is likely to obtain protection from the state. Ms Rodgers directed me to paragraph 5.1.9 of the Gender-based Violence CPIN which set out difficulties which may be faced by single woman in attempting to relocate. It is fair to say that the passage relied upon also noted that these difficulties alone would not make relocation unreasonable.

18. In addressing my mind to whether the appellant could benefit from sufficient protection away from her home area, I have considered section 4 of the Gender-based Violence CPIN which notes as part of the assessment, that the overall national package of legal measures offers protection to women in fear of such violence. In particular, at paragraph 4.1.6-8, the following protective legal measures were cited:

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 (PWDVA) enables victims of domestic violence to seek interim protection and residence orders, as well as compensation and maintenance. The Act protects women not only from abuse by a spouse, but any kind of violence that occurs in the family. Its definition of violence against women encompasses physical, sexual, psychological, verbal, and economic abuse and dowry demands. […]

The government has implemented women’s police stations, police desks, and One-Stop Centres throughout the country for reporting crimes and accessing support services. According to information from 2021 the implementation of women’s police stations has led to an increase in domestic violence reporting. Training programs on GBV for police, judiciary and medical officers exist. However, policing is inconsistent in cases of GBV, with some police officers either taking no further action, not registering cases or encouraging reconciliation. Victims can be reluctant to report abuse due to social stigma and lack of faith in police. There are individual cases of sexual abuse committed by police officers, including in police stations. On 20 May 2025, the Supreme Court directed all states and UTs to identify and designate Protection Officers (POs) to ensure proper implementation of the PWDVA across the country. In sources consulted it is not clear the progress made by states and UTs in relation to this direction (see Treatment by, and attitudes of, the justice and the police).

Perpetrators of GBV are charged and cases are prosecuted, although there can be delays both at the investigation stage and in the court system. To address court delays, the government has set up 855 fast track courts across the country for cases involving crimes against women, including rape. […]

19. What is missing from the country background information is any consideration whether sufficient protection in a far-flung place of internal relocation is remotely realistic in circumstances where a particular appellant has established that she fears several senior and well-placed police officers in her home area. I have no difficulty in accepting, as a general proposition, that a female victim of gender-based violence in India would be able to secure sufficient state protection from those she fears. The question I must ask myself is different in that I must ask myself whether this female victim of gender-based violence could benefit from sufficient protection in a place of internal relocation. To answer this question, I am bound to consider her particular circumstances and the enhanced level of risk she faces beyond the generality of women fearing such domestic abuse. This approach is consistent both with Horvath and AW (sufficiency of protection).

20. It appears to me to be reasonably likely that the families she fears – principally the family of her estranged husband but also her own family for the perception that they have been dishonoured by her police complaint in the UK – will be determined to do all they can to right the wrong they perceive. I agree with the point made by Ms Rodgers that this goes beyond the intrinsic grievance of complaining to the police of her husbands criminal violence, but the effect that this has jeopardised his economic prospects in the UK. I had no reason to doubt the evidence of the appellant, otherwise found to be broadly credible, that she was informed by a sympathetic aunt that her husband had left the UK to return to India. While Mr Diwnwyz invited me to attach little weight to this hearsay evidence, I must keep in mind the nature of the risk assessment I must perform and the unreality of applying hard and fast evidential rules which might apply in conventional domestic litigation where a party is not necessarily hampered by gathering the best available evidence. In any event, the hearsay evidence is broadly supported by the appellant’s direct evidence that the criminal proceedings in the UK have stalled because her husband appears to have absconded. This coheres with his return to India as the aunt has claimed. It must be borne in mind that it was not in dispute that the appellant is at risk of persecution in her home area; this must be the lens through which the availability of direct evidence from the sympathetic aunt must be viewed.

21. I was not persuaded by Mr Diwnwyz’s perhaps optimistic submission that there would be no obvious impetus for the senior police officers aligned to her estranged husband to interrogate the data accumulated by the Aadhar Card system because they would not know of her return to a distant part of India. Ms Rodger’s submission struck me as far more realistic that sooner or later these checks would be undertaken in the hope that it might yield the relevant information of her return and new place of residence. None of the CPINs I have read on this subject offer any confidence that a female victim of gender-based violence could expect to benefit from sufficient protection if the family she fears has the kind of senior police connections this family has. Applying the required threshold of objective risk, I am left in real doubt as to whether the appellant would be sufficiently protected by the police in a place of relocation where they would have to act against senior fellow police officers from another region. I am bound to conclude that this female victim of gender-based violence will not have access to sufficient state protection even if it is in a distant place of internal relocation. I find that those she fears will be motivated to trace her given the serious consequences her estranged husband now faces.

22. The issue of internal relocation only has purchase if the appellant is not at risk of persecution in the place of relocation. As explained in Horvath, sufficiency of protection is an intrinsic element of whether an individual is at risk of persecution. For the reasons I have expressed above, I am not satisfied that she will have access to sufficient protection. It must follow that it would not be reasonable to expect her to relocate to a place where she will remain at risk of persecution.

Notice of Decision

The appeal brought on asylum grounds is allowed.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 February 2026