The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003066
UI-2025-003067


First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/65269/2024; LP/01531/2025
PA/50330/2024; LP/01530/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12 September 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WEBB

Between

Secretary of State for the HOme Department
Appellant
and

AM
IM
(Anonymity Order Made)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs Nolan (Senior Presenting Officer)
For the Respondent: AM (Representing herself and IM)

Heard at Field House on 12 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondents are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the respondents, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State against the decisions of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (the Judge), promulgated on 16 and 22 June 2025, allowing the appeals of AM and IM. Those decisions were made following an oral hearing on 27 March 2025. Permission to appeal was granted by a different First-tier Tribunal Judge on 11 July 2025.
2. I have decided to make an anonymity order because the importance of properly discharging the obligations of the United Kingdom under the refugee convention outweigh the principle of open justice. This case raises issues about the respondents’ potential risk on return to their country of nationality and it is appropriate that their identities be protected.
The hearing
3. At the start of the hearing AM told me that she was not expecting a representative from the law firm who had been assisting her to come to this hearing.
4. I had before me a 445 page bundle that contained the decision being appealed, grounds of appeal, decision on permission, and all the documents that were before the First-tier Tribunal. I also had a skeleton argument provided by AM’s previous law firm. Page references will be to the PDF pages in the bundle unless otherwise stated.
5. I heard arguments from Mrs Nolan and AM in relation to the grounds of appeal. To assist AM the arguments were split; each ground was dealt with separately giving AM an opportunity to make her arguments before moving to the next ground.
6. After hearing the arguments, I said that I would not be able to give my decision at the hearing. I now give my decision in writing.
Errors of law
7. When assessing if there have been errors of law the starting position is that I should exercise judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal, as explained by the higher courts on many occasions.
Ground 1
8. In this ground the Secretary of State says that the Judge did not properly deal with section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004. This law requires a judge to consider if certain behaviour damages the credibility of an appellant.
9. In this case the behaviour was AM misleading an Immigration Officer on her arrival in the UK and the delay in her claiming asylum (PDF 371).
10. The Judge dealt with section 8 at [45] of their decision. The finding was tht that AM’s intentions were not clear at the time she entered the UK and because of that her misleading an Immigration Officer on arrival did not damage her credibility. The Judge’s finding about the delay was simply that it did not damage AM’s credibility.
11. Mrs Nolan argued that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for his decision on section 8 and that was a material error of law.
12. I agree with the submission put forward by the Secretary of State that the section 8 assessment of the Judge was flawed for two reasons.
13. First, the finding that AM’s intentions were not clear on arrival in the UK was not supported by her evidence. She has always said she did not claim asylum at the airport because she did not know about asylum (para 25 PDF 59 and Q122 and 126 PDF 432-433). As the Judge does not use the reasons given by AM for her actions in their assessment, that assessment is flawed.
14. Secondly, when assessing the delay in claiming asylum the Judge does not refer at all to the reason given by AM. The informed reader does not know what the Judge thought about the reason given for the delay, or why that meant that the delay did not damage AM’s credibility.
15. For those reasons, the Judge’s approach to section 8 contains an error of law.
16. Those who were previously acting for AM had argued in their skeleton argument that any error was not material as the positive credibility findings at [46] –[47] were in any event open to the Judge on the lower standard of proof.
17. While I acknowledge that section 8 is only one factor of the credibility assessment required of a judge I can not say in this case that, had the Judge properly assessed the section 8 point, the decision would have remained the same.
18. For that reason, I find the error of law is material.
Grounds 2 and 3
19. Although my finding in relation to ground 1 determines this appeal, I briefly address grounds 2 and 3. The grounds relate to the Judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
20. Having considered the arguments put forward by the Secretary of State and Mrs Nolan, I find the grounds are in reality a disagreement with the findings that were open to the Judge on the facts as he had found them.
21. Grounds 2 and 3 do not disclose material errors of law.
Conclusion on errors of law
22. I find for the reasons set out above that the decision of the Judge did contain a material error of law.
Remaking or Remittal
23. Mrs Nolan agreed with me in her submissions that, if there was a material error of law in relation to the first ground, the case appeared to be one that was suitable for remittal to the First-tier Tribunal rather than a remaking in the Upper Tribunal.
24. I have considered what was said by this Tribunal in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC) and the terms of the Practice Direction and Practice Statement.
25. I have concluded that the Judge made an error of law related to the credibility assessment that was relevant to the findings throughout the decisions. For that reason, none of the findings of the Judge can be preserved.
26. That will require AM to give significant evidence, for a full examination of her credibility to be undertaken and a reassessment of the internal relocation and sufficiency of protection points to be carried out following findings of fact. I consider therefore that the case must be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal to be determined.
Notice of decision
27. The decisions of the Judge promulgated on 16 and 22 June 2025 contain material errors of law and are set aside with no preserved findings.
28. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Directions
29. I direct that the remitted case is to be listed in the First-tier Tribunal, Taylor House hearing centre, before a different judge.
30. Further directions will be issued by the First-tier Tribunal.


N Webb

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
12 September 2025