Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003072 & UI-2025-003481
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64384/2023
LP/12379/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

21st August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

AH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Wilcox, Counsel instructed by
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is 30 years old and is a Vietnamese national. On 20 April 2021 he entered the United Kingdom without permission on a small boat. Having arrived he claimed asylum. The respondent refused that claim in a decision dated 1 December 2023 and the appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana (the Judge) on 30 April 2025 (not 30 May 2025 as stated on the decision). In a decision promulgated on 10 June 2025, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The appellant sought permission to appeal to this Tribunal against the Judge’s decision. Permission was granted on three grounds by a different Judge of the First-tier Tribunal and following a renewed application permission was granted on a fourth ground by Upper Tribunal Judge Keith on 3 September 2025. After some delay (which has not been explained) the matter was listed before me. Pursuant to section 12(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the issue for me is whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law
2. I have maintained the anonymity order that was made by the Judge because this is a protection appeal and anonymity is required lest anything said or done in these proceedings gives rise to a risk to the appellant in his home country.
The Decision of the Judge
3. In her decision the Judge considered the appellant’s claim that he would be at risk of persecution or serious harm in Vietnam at the hands of: (1) “loan sharks” who had lent his parents money, (2) separate “loan sharks” who had lent his grandparents money, (3) traffickers who transported him from Germany to the United Kingdom and who, once he was in the United Kingdom forced him to work in a cannabis factory, and (4) Vietnamese state authorities who have become aware of his attendance at demonstrations opposing the Vietnamese government while he has been in the United Kingdom.
4. The Judge concluded that neither the appellant nor his grandfather had ever borrowed money, that the appellant did not owe an outstanding debt, that the appellant was never abused or beaten by traffickers and “his narrative is untrue” (see [27]). The Judge also found that the appellant did not have a genuine political opinion (that was contrary to the Vietnamese government) and that his attendance at two demonstrations against that government held in London was an opportunistic attempt to bolster his asylum claim. The Judge concluded that the appellant would not be politically active in Vietnam and that his attendance at the demonstrations will not have brought him to the attention of the Vietnamese authorities (see [25] and [26]). Whilst the Judge acknowledged that the appellant had been trafficked from Germany to the United Kingdom she did not consider he would be at risk of re-trafficking on return to Vietnam (see [21] and [27]). Accordingly the Judge found that the appellant was not a refugee, and that his return to Vietnam would be compatible both with the United Kingdom’s obligations to provide humanitarian protection and the appellant’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
The appeal to this Tribunal
5. A different First-tier Tribunal Judge granted the appellant permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision on the following three grounds:
i. The Judge failed to take into account relevant evidence about “loan sharks” in Vietnam
ii. The Judge failed to take into account relevant evidence about the risk of re-trafficking in Vietnam
iii. The Judge failed to take into account relevant evidence of the risk to the appellant as a failed asylum seeker
6. Following a renewed application for permission to appeal, the appellant was additionally granted permission to appeal on a fourth ground:
iv. The Judge failed to take into account relevant evidence of the risk posed by Vietnamese state authorities as a result of the appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom.
7. In a brief written response the respondent resisted the appellant’s appeal arguing that the grounds of appeal were disagreements with the Judge’s reasoned findings of fact.
8. I heard oral submissions from Mr Wilcox and Mr Sheikh on behalf of the appellant and the respondent respectively, following which I indicated that I would be allowing the appellant’s appeal, setting aside the Judge’s decision and remitting the appeal for a fresh hearing in the First-tier Tribunal. My reasons for that conclusion follow.
Analysis
9. It is important at the outset of my analysis of the Judge’s decision to remind myself of the principles that apply when considering whether the First-tier Tribunal has made an error of law including:
“(1) The FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the UT should not rush to find an error of law in its decisions simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently, as the appeal is available only on a point of law: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UK HL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678, at [30];
(2) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010 UKSC 49 [2011] 2 All ER 65, at [45];
(3) When it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 [2013] 2 All ER 625, at [25];
(4) The issues that the FTT is deciding and the basis on which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [27], and
(5) The judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so: see A4 (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 [2020] 4 WLR 145, at [34].
10. Despite exercising appropriate judicial restraint and being slow to infer that the Judge has not taken relevant evidence into account simply because it was not expressly mentioned in her decision, I am persuaded that the Judge did err in the ways identified in the four grounds of appeal, such that her decision must be set aside.
11. The Judge gives several reasons for her conclusion that the appellant and his family did not borrow money from loan sharks and therefore he was not at risk as a result of owing an outstanding debt. It is clear that the Judge had legitimate concerns about the plausibility and probability of the appellant’s account about fearing three different set of money lenders in Vietnam to whom he owed debts. Such concern was unsurprising given the fact that, as the Judge identified, the appellant’s first account in his screening interview was that he came to the United Kingdom because he had no family at home and life in the United Kingdom was better for him. The Judge was clearly entitled to consider and evaluate the likelihood of the appellant’s family borrowing money from a second set of money lenders given the experience of owing money to the first set of people, and the likelihood of the appellant borrowing more money to be transported from Germany to the United Kingdom rather than repaying the money lenders with the money was earning while in Germany.
12. The Judge was required however to consider and evaluate the credibility of the appellant’s account about these events in the light of all the evidence that was adduced. I am satisfied that the Judge’s reasoning indicates that she failed to do so. At [10] and [12] the Judge said that did not find it credible that loan sharks would lend money to the appellant’s grandfather when he did not have the means to repay the debt and that “it would be expected that they would ask for collateral or guarantee against property to ensure repayment”. The respondent’s Country Policy Information Note Vietnam: Fear of illegal money lenders (CPIN money lenders) however records that illegal money lending is prevalent in Vietnam and that money is leant without direct meeting, mortgages or formal procedures. There was further evidence to that effect in the report of country expert Professor Bluth who said that formal procedures for lending money are not followed by loan sharks within Vietnam. This evidence is not referenced by the Judge and whilst I am slow to infer that this means the evidence has not been considered simply because it has not been mentioned, the clear and unresolved contradiction between the Judge’s stated expectation that the lenders would ask for collateral or guarantee against property and the contrary evidence in the CPIN and expert report strongly suggests the evidence has not been considered.
13. Elsewhere at [9] the Judge discounts the appellant’s evidence that the loan sharks were looking for him and had been to his area and spoken to his friends saying “I do not find it credible that loan sharks would know who the appellant’s friends are in a sizeable population. This demonstrates that no one had an interest in the appellant”. It is not clear why the Judge considered it incredible that the money lenders who knew where the appellant lived would go to his home area and speak to his friends. More significantly, this conclusion appears to have been reached without an reference to Facebook evidence adduced by the appellant of people actively searching for him. Agan whilst I am slow to infer from the failure to mention this evidence that it has been ignored, there is a clear contradiction between this evidence and the Judge’s conclusion that no one had an interest in the appellant which demands an explanation.
14. The Judge’s silence about these relevant pieces of evidence must also be considered in the context of other credibility findings on the issue of the appellant and his family borrowing money that are hard to understand or follow. At [10] the Judge refers to the amount of money it is claimed that the appellant’s grandfather borrowed (£20,238) and having noted that the amount would have been sufficient for the appellant to pay for his airline ticket and to live for an appreciable length of time in Germany says without further explanation that: “This brings the credibility of the appellant’s claim that his grandfather borrowed money” (sic). At [13] the Judge makes the unexplained findings that the “appellant’s claim that he went to Germany for a job is not credible” but conversely that the appellant “left Vietnam as an economic migrant.” While at [27] the Judge made the apparently contradictory finding that “The appellant has an education and also went to Germany for a job”. Whilst I am conscious of the danger of subjecting the Judge’s decision to a narrow textual analysis these contradictions do give further cause to conclude that evidence not mentioned has not been properly considered by the Judge and that the assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account about money lenders involved an error of law.
15. Similarly when considering ground two and the appellant’s claim to have been trafficked and forced to work in a cannabis factory in the United Kingdom, it is unclear what findings were made by the Judge and why. The Judge recognises at [21] that the respondent had agreed in advance of the hearing that the appellant had been the subject of trafficking from Germany to the United Kingdom and the victim of modern slavery while in the United Kingdom. Despite this, the Judge appears at [14] – [17] of her decision to entirely reject the appellant’s account of these events. The Judge’s rejection of this evidence goes behind the agreed facts that were presented to the Judge without any explanation.
16. At [15] the Judge found that because he had claimed asylum on the day he arrived in the United Kingdom, the appellant “could not possibly have been being captured and work growing cannabis, until the police found him” (sic). This reasoning is incomplete. It does not explain why the appellant could not have claimed asylum when he arrived and subsequently been taken from his hotel and forced to work in a cannabis factory. Likewise, the Judge does not explain why she concluded at [16] that it was not credible that the traffickers would have the appellant’s telephone number and know who he had travelled with to the United Kingdom . I could not follow [17] of the Judge’s decision in which the appellant’s encounter with the police is considered by the Judge and neither party was able to explain this paragraph to me during the hearing.
17. When considering the protection that would be available to a victim of trafficking in Vietnam, at [22] the Judge refers to the “background evidence” about the government in Vietnam’s focus on prosecuting people traffickers and preventing trafficking. The Judge does not however refer to passages in the respondent’s Country Policy Information: Vietnam Trafficking (CPIN trafficking), identified in the appellant’s skeleton argument, about the risk of previous victims of trafficking being re-trafficked in Vietnam. The Judge does refer to the report of Professor Bluth in this context, but at [23] discounts what is said about the attitude of the authorities to trafficking on the basis that “a lot” of the report does not relate specifically to the appellant and on the basis that the appellant was not trafficked from Vietnam. There is no apparent consideration in this passage of the decision of Professor Bluth’s evidence that the authorities in Vietnam are complicit in trafficking and that efforts to tackle trafficking have had no discernible effect. Whilst the Judge was not obliged to accept this evidence, fairness dictates that it was considered and it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that this evidence was overlooked.
18. Similarly, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Professor Bluth’s evidence about the stance taken by the Vietnamese authorities towards those protesting or demonstrating in other countries has also been overlooked. The Judge’s assessment at [24] and at [25] was that the appellant’s involvement in demonstrations will not have come to the attention of the Vietnamese authorities. There is however no reference in that assessment to the evidence of Professor Bluth about the steps the Vietnamese authorities are likely to take to try to identify those protesting in the United Kingdom. The Judge’s analysis is also limited to consideration of whether the appellant’s attendance at two demonstrations will have brought him to the attention of the Vietnamese authorities without any apparent engagement with the appellant’s claim to have been further involved with particular pro-democracy groups.
19. The Judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s involvement in demonstrations will not have come to the attention of the Vietnamese authorities is only explained by the Judge’s comment that “there is no credible evidence that the Vietnamese government authorities were present monitoring the demonstration.” As was identified however in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 it is inherently unlikely that an applicant for asylum will be able to adduce direct evidence of covert surveillance and monitoring by a foreign state. This means, as the Court of Appeal recognised at [38] of MH (Bangladesh) that expert evidence about the intentions and technical capabilities of the foreign state will be particularly relevant and significant. In this context the evidence of Professor Bluth demanded further consideration by the Judge.
20. Overall therefore, despite showing due deference to the specialist fact finding tribunal it is clear in my judgment that the Judge has reached her decision without considering or addressing all relevant evidence. As such the decision involves the making of an error of law and must be set aside with no findings of fact preserved.
21. The parties agreed that in this event the appeal would need to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a re-hearing. I am content that such an outcome is consistent with the guidance of the Presidential panel in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) because of the extensive fact finding that will be required in a rehearing.

Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana involved an error of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted for a fresh hearing in the First-tier Tribunal with no findings of fact preserved.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 August 2026