Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003090

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52985/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOWARTH

Between

DH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. C. Holmes, Counsel instructed by Legal Justice Solicitors
For the Respondent: Miss C. Newton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Somalia. He appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss his appeal on protection and human rights grounds (“the Decision”).
2. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that if he were returned to Somalia he would be at risk of persecution from Al Shabaab. The appellant claims to have worked as a driver for the Ministry of Internal Security in Somalia. He says that during the course of his employment, he was contacted by telephone, by an unknown person who said he was from Al Shabaab and told he had to work for them or he would be killed. The appellant claims to have fled from Somalia in fear of the threat made upon his life.
3. Although the Secretary of State accepts the appellant is a national of Somalia and that he would be at risk of persecution if his account is true, she refused his claim for a lack of credibility.
4. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”) agreed with the Secretary of State and dismissed the appeal. In so concluding, the judge accepted the respondent’s submission that the appellant had given inconsistent accounts in interview about who he had been a driver for, and that this undermined his credibility and meant that his appeal should be rejected [35 and 42]. The respondent had pointed to the appellant having said he was a driver for the police in his screening interview, and having said that he was a driver for the Ministry of International Security in his asylum interview. According to the respondent the appellant had not said he was a driver for the Ministry of Internal Security until he made his witness statement, and no issue had been taken about the accuracy of the transcripts of interview until the day of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal.
5. Permission to appeal was granted on three grounds. First, that the judge’s decision not to adjourn the hearing to permit the respondent’s transcript of the substantive asylum interview to be checked against the audio recording of the interview was procedurally unfair. Secondly, that the respondent’s practice of not making an audio recording of screening interviews also gave rise to procedural unfairness. Thirdly, the judge had failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the appeal.
6. After the grant of permission but prior to the hearing before the Upper Tribunal, the appellant obtained a certified translation of the relevant part of audio recording of the asylum interview and made an application under Rule 15(2)(A) for it to be admitted into evidence. This was accompanied by an application to amend the grounds of appeal, to add a fourth ground. The certified translation demonstrated that the respondent’s transcript of the interview was inaccurate because it did not record that the appellant had said he worked for the “Ministry of Internal Security” when he had in fact done so, and the transcript had incorrectly recorded that he had said the “Ministry of Information” (in answer to question 18) when he had not, and not reflected that it was the interpreter rather than the appellant who had said “Ministry of International Security” (in answer to question 20). As noted above, at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal the respondent had relied upon the transcript of interview to demonstrate the contradiction between the appellant’s account in his witness statement and in interview, to support the submission that his evidence was contradictory and could not be relied upon. The judge in turn relied upon this submission in finding against the appellant. The appellant’s proposed fourth ground of appeal was that the certified translation demonstrated a mistake of fact had been made by the judge, which had been material to the outcome of the appeal.
7. At the hearing before the Upper Tribunal, Miss. Newton, on behalf of the Secretary of State, adopted an entirely sensible and pragmatic position and did not oppose the admission of certified translation of the asylum interview, or the application to amend the grounds of appeal. Miss. Newton conceded that the certified translation of the recording of the asylum interview demonstrated that both the respondent and the judge had proceeded on an incorrect factual basis, which the judge had then relied upon in dismissing the appeal. Miss. Newton, with whom Mr. Holmes agreed, submitted that the error of law appeal should therefore be allowed on ground four alone, and it was unnecessary for the Upper Tribunal to consider the remaining grounds.
8. For the avoidance of any doubt, the certified translation was admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 15(2)(a) of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules, and the appellant was permitted to amend his grounds of appeal under Rule 5, to include the fourth ground.
9. As I indicated at the hearing, Miss. Newton was entirely correct to make the concession in relation to the fourth ground of appeal. It was not the judge’s fault, but it is now entirely clear that the appellant did say in his asylum interview that he had worked for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the judge’s decision rested upon a submission made by the respondent that the appellant had not said this in his interview and that his account was contradictory and incredible. The mistake of fact is plainly material. The appeal will need to be considered again and the appellant’s credibility assessed as against the certified translation.
10. Given the fourth ground of appeal contains a material error which is fatal to the Decision as a whole, it is unnecessary for me to consider the remaining grounds.
11. I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). However, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal because the error of law concerns a matter of procedural unfairness, so the appeal will need to be considered de novo and substantial findings of fact will need to be made.
Notice of Decision
1. The First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law. Accordingly, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 7 May 2025 is set aside.
2. The decision will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal sitting in Manchester, but to be heard by a different judge. No findings of fact are preserved.

Kathryn Howarth

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 January 2026