UI-2025-003108

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 26 Jan 2026
• Promulgation date: 27 Mar 2026
• Publication date: 13 Apr 2026
• Last updated on: 13 Apr 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003108
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63924/2023
LP/13854/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27 March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

LG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Gazzain of Counsel, instructed by MF Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keertly, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. In a decision promulgated on 12 November 2025, the Upper Tribunal found an error of law in the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Reed promulgated on 22 April 2025, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse her protection and human rights claim dated 29 November 2023 was dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside, with preserved findings of fact on human rights grounds as at April 2025 (although the Article 8 claim could be revisited if further findings on the protection claim were relevant and/or there had been any change of circumstances since that date). A copy of the decision is annexed to this one, the contents of which shall not be repeated here. This is the remaking of the Appellant’s appeal.
2. The Appellant was granted anonymity by the First-tier Tribunal and I continue that order due to the nature of the Appellant’s asylum claim which includes a claim to have been raped. To protect the Appellant’s identity, the claimed perpetrator, his associates and witnesses have all been anonymised as well in this decision and not all details about them have been included to avoid the possibility of identification by piecing together information.
3. The Appellant is a national of Malaysia, born in 1985, who first entered the United Kingdom on 29 July 2007 as a visitor and who has remained here unlawfully since. The Appellant claimed asylum on 22 December 2020, which was refused by the Respondent on 29 November 2023 and it is that refusal which is the subject of this appeal. In broad terms, the Appellant’s asylum claim is that she is at risk on return to Malaysia from a person who raped her in 2003 (S) and his associates (led by F).
4. The Respondent refused the application on asylum and human rights grounds. The Respondent did not accept any of the Appellant’s asylum claim considering it not to be credible, including because her evidence was inconsistent, lacked detail, was implausible and at points was inconsistent with external evidence. The Appellant failed to answer a number of questions put to her in interview and there was no reasonable explanation for the inconsistencies in her evidence. The specific points raised included that the Appellant had given a different account of how she escaped from hospital or whether she was released; a different account of her encounter with those she feared in Kuala Lumpur and that S was the son of F, a politician, although publicly available information about F showed he had no children. The Respondent also considered the Appellant’s credibility to be damaged by section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 given she made her asylum claim over 13 years after arriving in the United Kingdom with no explanation for the delay. For these reasons, the Respondent did not accept that the Appellant would be at risk on return to Malaysia and in any event if she was, there would be a sufficiency of protection available to her there and the option of internal relocation.
5. In relation to sufficiency of protection, the Respondent referred to country information showing that there is a functioning police force in Malaysia and whilst there are issues in some areas of corruption, steps have been taken to fight this. In addition, the person(s) the Appellant fears are non-state actors and she had failed to demonstrate that they had sufficient power or influence over the authorities in Malaysia to prevent them from acting, particularly taking in to account that F died in March 2023 and there was nothing to connect S to F prior to that.
6. In relation to internal relocation, the Respondent considered that the Appellant could relocate to Seremban, Malacca or Johor. There is freedom of internal movement in Malaysia and the Appellant had previously lived and worked in Seremban for over a year without any difficulties. There was a lack of evidence of any recent visits to the Appellant’s family home and no recent contact with any of the individuals feared; who would not in any event have sufficient power or influence to locate the Appellant on return anywhere in Malaysia.
7. For essentially the same reasons the Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim for humanitarian protection.
8. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s human rights claim on the basis that she did not meet the requirements for a grant of leave to remain in Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules on family life grounds nor those in paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds. There were no exceptional circumstances for a grant of leave to remain outside the Immigration Rules nor on any mental health grounds as treatment would be available as needed on return to Malaysia.
The appeal
The Appellant’s evidence
9. In her written statement signed and dated 31 May 2024, the Appellant sets out her background in Malaysia and circumstances in the United Kingdom. Much of this statement is materially the same as an earlier statement made to the Respondent on 5 March 2021 in support of her claim. In the 2024 statement, the Appellant describes in some detail events in 2003 when she was raped by S, a Malaysian national whose father is an influential politician in Malaysia; although not blood related, but close enough that S is regarded as his child and S calls him father. S was a classmate in the Appellant’s tuition group and after the attack, the Appellant did not return to her studies. She did not initially tell her family about what happened, but when they realised, they tried to go to the police to report it. The Appellant states that because the people were influential, the police worked for them and did not help her, instead wanting to arrest her; that there would be no punishment for S and it would be covered up.
10. The Appellant became pregnant as a result of the rape. She states that S and his father knew about the pregnancy and looked after her. S’s father forced them to get married and wanted the Appellant to convert to Islam, S’s religion. The Appellant refused. S’s father came to look for the Appellant at her house and was worried that she may reveal the truth about what happened and if the religious authorities found out, it may lead to negative scandals and rumours affecting S’s father.
11. Some people went to the Appellant’s house one day, dragged her into a car and took her to a place for a few months; she does not know where as she was blindfolded. When the Appellant was ready to give birth, she was taken to a small private surgery and after giving birth to a daughter, S’s father visited and again tried to convince her to marry S. When she refused, the Appellant was kept alone in a room, with only essentials provided and her daughter was taken away. She has never had any contact with her. During this time, the Appellant’s mental health deteriorated and she tried to harm herself. After the Appellant had attempted to kill herself on numerous occasions, the people holding her sent her to a mental asylum, from where she later escaped. The Appellant corrected an earlier statement that she had been released as a ‘translation error’ and stated that she escaped via a delivery cart outside an open back door.
12. After the Appellant’s escape from the mental asylum, S’s father continued to look for the Appellant and visited her parents’ house to try and find her. The Appellant’s family were harassed every day about her whereabouts. The Appellant lived in fear and in hiding; and was persuaded to go to Kuala Lumpur where she found a job and worked normally. On a break from work, she saw someone she recognised as one of F’s people and ran to find a police station. When the police found out that the politicians were behind this, they advised her to go back to S.
13. The Appellant then went to hide in a small village in Seremban with her friend, A. This person suggested and sponsored a trip to Europe for the Appellant, arranged for a friend to accommodate the Appellant in the United Kingdom and the intention was for her to stay 3 to 6 months to escape the harassment.
14. After her arrival in the United Kingdom, the Appellant did not claim asylum as she wanted to have a period to cool down and think about it. Her family advised her not to return and the Appellant only knew about the asylum procedure once she sought legal advice. The Appellant continued to fear S, who married in Malaysia and threatened the Appellant not to return, and F, who said that they would kill her if she did and revealed the truth as that would affect S’s marriage. The Appellant states that S and his associates are still in touch with her family in Malaysia, the last time was around last year (sometime in 2023).
15. In the United Kingdom, the Appellant feels safe and comfortable and she can live without fear here. She has friends, previously had a boyfriend and had worked as a waitress for a short while.
16. In her written statement signed and dated 25 March 2025, the Appellant provided additional information to her earlier statement and corrected an address given previously. The Appellant gave S’s name (his first name only, she does not know his surname) and his father’s identity as F, a minister of state in Malaysia (with dates and location given). He was not S’s biological father, but may have been his godfather, the Appellant is not sure. F passed away in March 2023 but the Appellant states that he still has significant influence and his associates have contacted her family over the years.
17. The Appellant adds to the information given about going to the police in 2003, with a location and being told that the police would update them as soon as possible about the incident but they never heard back. The Appellant was not given a written record of her report. S, F and their associates visited the Appellant’s home a few days after she had been to the police and realised she was pregnant when they saw her; threatening to kill her if she disclosed the rape as the scandal would damage F’s reputation and political career. In a correction to the earlier statement, the Appellant stated that S and F did not look after her whilst pregnant, but kept an eye on her and later kidnapped her until after she had given birth in September 2003.
18. The Appellant also adds to the information given about relocation. She moved to her aunt’s house in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, in the city centre and worked there as a salesperson. After a few months, on a break in a restaurant, the Appellant saw associates of F nearby in the restaurant which she left and avoided being caught by them. The Appellant believes that they could find her workplace through information given to the government with her tax details.
19. In 2006, around a year later, the Appellant relocated to Seremban with A, who advised her not to work and stay at her home for safety. The Appellant did so most of the time and occasionally helped A clean her hair salon when A was there, once or twice a month. A suggested leaving Malaysia for her mental health, which she did in July 2007. Since then, F visited her family in Malaysia to establish her whereabouts almost every year. In 2023, the Appellant’s parents told her F’s associates were still looking for her and would park their car outside the house for surveillance, about twice a week and would visit the home every two weeks. The frequency increased after F passed away in 2023.
20. In March 2025, the Appellant spoke to her mother who stated that F’s associates visited every two to four weeks in 2024 and 2025 and she recognised them from previous visits. The most recent visit was in February 2025. The visits included surveillance from a car outside the house and coming to the home to interrogate her parents; repeating threats to kill the Appellant if she returned to Malaysia. The Appellant’s mother believes the Appellant would be killed on return to prevent the rape ever being disclosed. The Appellant does not know S’s current whereabouts or if he is still in Malaysia; but states that it is clear someone is providing instructions to F’s associates and that there is a continuing interest in tracing the Appellant.
21. In her final written statement signed and dated 12 January 2026, the Appellant provides an update as to her current circumstances. She states that she lives with a friend and is supported for accommodation and her essential needs by various friends, who also give her practical and moral support. In the United Kingdom she has a close support network of friends that have helped her cope with her past trauma and who would not be able to offer the same support if she were forced to return to Malaysia, including financial support and they would likely lose contact.
22. In relation to her mental health, the Appellant describes this as consistently poor and that she has been taking anti-depressant medication from 2023. She often feels down and depressed and fears that returning to Malaysia will mean a significant decline in her mental health by reliving her trauma. The Appellant has not been able to access any form of therapy such as counselling as just discussing her past trauma has led her to relive it and she suffers from flashbacks and nightmares. The Appellant relies on the psychological report from Dr Shea and has been unable to get this updated due to lack of funds and not wishing to change solicitors to instruct one with the option of legal aid.
23. The Appellant is only in contact with her elderly parents in Malaysia and is not able to find out anymore information about S or his accomplices, but from time to time they visit her parent’s home, the last time being in February 2025. The Appellant believes that S would have followed F’s footsteps and gone in to politics as well, although she has no evidence of that, the manner in which her parents have been threatened has led her to conclude that he has significant influence and power. The Appellant believes that she is still at risk despite the passage of time as if anyone discovered what happened, or her daughter discovered her real background, it would ruin S’s life and career.
24. The Appellant does not feel safe returning to Malaysia and could not be protected there by her parents. Her mother suffers from heart disease and was hospitalised in June 2025 due to symptoms of a stroke and is generally in poor health. The Appellant’s father is in the early stages of dementia and is weak and fragile.
25. The Appellant attended the hearing, adopted all of her written statements (with one minor correction not material to the summary above) and gave evidence through a court appointed Cantonese interpreter.
26. In cross-examination, the Appellant answered questions about her being taken from her home when pregnant consistently with her written evidence and as to the relationship between S and F, she explained that S was treated like a son by F. The Appellant had previously stated that if the religious authorities found out about the rape, it would affect F’s standing as a politician and was asked how the religious authorities would find out and how F’s standing would be affected. The Appellant stated only that it was because S was treated like a son by F and that no one would know what happened as only she was involved in the issue and knew the details. The Appellant claimed that even after F passed away, if someone knows about what happened his reputation and status would still be affected as he is a public figure in Malaysia.
27. The Appellant did not initially tell her parents what happened because of the shame, but they realised she was unwell and told her to see a doctor, and her parents reported it to the police. When asked how S and F knew the Appellant was pregnant, she stated that they were monitoring her, she was arrested and detained and there was someone outside monitoring her. When asked again, she stated that when the case was reported to the police, they told her to go home and wait for an update, when they came to her home to investigate, her parents told them the issue and that is how S and F found out. The Appellant was referred to her statement that said there was no follow up from the police and asked why she now said they came to her home. She clarified that after her parents reported her to the police, it was S and F who attended her home with gangs, forced her to marry S, which her parents did not allow and then forcibly took her somewhere else where she was held for several months. The Appellant did not know if her parents contacted the police after she was taken and after she returned, she did not ask them or know how to follow up the issue. She stated that her parents are very traditional and did not know how to express or have a conversation about the issue and her parents didn’t know who would help or support the Appellant.
28. Whilst held against her will, the Appellant did not know where she was or for how long, nor did know the location of the hospital she was taken to; she just assumed it was a small surgery as the clinic was just on one floor. During that period, S and F visited her home, but not her personally, she was just monitored and a doctor was arranged to see her.
29. The Appellant does not remember details of her daughter’s birth, such as the date, time, doctor treating her, or what happened next; only that she gave birth by c-section. The Appellant has never had any contact with her daughter.
30. When asked why the Appellant was taken back after the birth, she said maybe it was because there was ongoing concern about her disclosing information about the issue. The Appellant pleaded to be released after the birth and she attempted suicide, after which she was taken to a mental asylum, from where she escaped and any earlier reference to being released was maybe an interpretation error. In the hospital, the Appellant was observed and told she would be discharged if she was getting better. She was concerned about the future and when she was told she would be discharged, she thought of escape and took the opportunity to do so when she saw a delivery van coming. When she left the hospital, the Appellant returned to her parents’ home, which she found after dropping off the delivery cart she escaped on.
31. The Appellant moved to Kuala Lumpur around 2005, after her escape from the hospital around the end of 2004. She did not know if S and F would find her at her parents’ house at that time, but she did not know where to go and her parents then took her to her aunty’s house; although she then stayed with a friend of her aunty as her aunty was worried F would find her as well. The Appellant could not name the person she stayed with, she was just called aunty because she was her aunty’s friend and she couldn’t ask for her name. The Appellant stayed there for around a year, not a whole year and during that time she worked as a sales girl. On a lunch break one day, she saw some of F’s associates, or guessed they were as they looked similar and this was confirmed as they started chasing the Appellant when they saw her. She remembers realising something was wrong, running and slightly remembered someone chasing her. The Appellant had not previously mentioned being chassed and stated that at the time, she thought she was hidden so she went to find a police station afterwards. She denied giving two different accounts about what the police said.
32. The Appellant only knew the first name of the person she stayed with in Seremban, based on her culture she could not ask her surname. She stayed with her for around a year and during that time she was not found by the people she feared as she was asked to stay at home and not go outside. However, she was also told to go out for a walk and to help the person she was staying with with cleaning at her business, but not to go outside of the salon; all for her mental health.
33. The claim for asylum was made after 13 years in the United Kingdome because the Appellant did not know she could apply before that. In her time in the United Kingdom, she has not been contacted by S, F or their associates. She confirmed that F passed away in 2023 and that after this, the frequency of visits to her parents’ house increased and they checked to see if she had come back home. When asked why this would increase, the Appellant suggested that maybe they thought she would return after F’s death. There are no statements from the Appellant’s parents as the she did not know clearly what her parents did. They remain in the same family home as at the time the Appellant left Malaysia.
34. In relation to medical treatment, the Appellant stated that she had not registered with a GP before covid and after she did, she mentioned her mental health at the first consultation and she was asked to take medication.
35. I asked the Appellant some supplementary questions to clarify her claim and current circumstances. The Appellant stated that she had never tried to get any police or medical records from Malaysia, that she was never given anything from the police after her parents reported the rape. She never sought any mental health treatment in Malaysia after she escaped the hospital. The Appellant was first treated in the United Kingdom around 2023, as based on her previous experience in Malaysia, she did not want to be labelled with mental health problems or stigma. Anti-depressants were first prescribed around the end of 2023.
36. At the present time, the Appellant fears S and his members (the people working with him in the same political group) on return to Malaysia. The Appellant was not sure if S was a politician, but F could bring him in to the political party as well. I asked the Appellant how anyone she feared would know if she returned to Malaysia, to which she stated that the Malaysian administration is not transparent and all departments talk, so if she returned, it could be known from the politics department. The Appellant stated that if her issue was disclosed on return, she may threaten the political regime, so they would know if she went back.
Other witness evidence
37. In a written statement signed and dated 24 May 2024, SW states that he is a close friend of the Appellant’s having met her in the United Kingdom over ten years ago. They used to see each other two to three times a month, go out and go on trips/breaks together and continue to be in contact by phone every few days. SW has only limited knowledge of the Appellant’s life in Malaysia as she does not talk about it and he doesn’t want to ask too many questions.
38. SW attended the oral hearing, adopted his written statement and gave evidence using a court appointed Cantonese interpreter. In cross-examination, he stated that he knew roughly what had happened to the Appellant in Malaysia, she told him about it on a day they went to Birmingham, just outline details.
39. In a written statement signed and dated 9 December 2025, OC states that he is a very good friend of the Appellant who he met around August 2008 when she came to the restaurant he was working in with a group of friends; following which they kept in touch. The Appellant became an important part of OC’s group of friends, who meet several times a year, mostly during festivals such as Chinese New Year, Christmas and Mid-Autumn festivals to celebrate. OC meets the Appellant separately as well for meals.
40. OC only knew about the Appellant’s immigration status about two weeks before making his written statement and comments on her life being difficult at the moment; living a very humble lifestyle supported by friends in the United Kingdom for her day to day needs, including accommodation. OC always offers to pay for the Appellant’s meal whenever possible. The Appellant has never asked for financial support from OC but he states that he is ready to support her if she did. OC does not know about the Appellant’s reasons for claiming asylum but has noticed on occasions that she is down and depressed, so he gives her positive encouragement.
41. OC attended the oral hearing, adopted his written statement and gave evidence through a court appointed Cantonese interpreter. He gave details of the brief account the Appellant had given him of what happened in Malaysia.
42. There were a number of similar, brief written statements from friends in the United Kingdom from around May 2024.
Documentary evidence
43. There is a psychological report from Dr Shea dated 15 November 2023. In the report the Appellant’s history is set out in a similar way to that contained in her written statements and records a number of mental health symptoms and sleep problems over many years, worsening in 2020 after the asylum claim. It is stated that the Appellant has not consulted her GP about her symptoms due to fear of being reported to the police and the Respondent. The report proceeds on the basis that the Appellant’s past experiences are all true and considers the impact of those traumatic experiences on her mental health; including distress leading to the increase in her low mood, fear, anxiety and suicidal thoughts; with flashbacks of her traumatic life, irrational thoughts and paranoia; feeling anxious and frightened with symptoms of avoidance, increased arousal and mood disturbance. In particular, the Appellant is said to be tearful most of the time, with constant suicidal and self-harm thoughts. The Appellant was socially isolating herself and that she had stopped going out socialising with friends and family since the rape. In the United Kingdom, the Appellant is said not to go out and socialise because she is afraid and anxious, with a lack of trust in people, especially men and the police. At the time of the report the Appellant had worked in a takeaway for the last year which she enjoyed, but her traumatic experiences had a negative impact on her work as she is often tearful.
44. The psychological testing scores showed the Appellant to have had a severe impact on her life as a result of current issues and traumatic experiences and indicates severe symptoms of low mood and anxiety. Dr Shea’s opinion, prognosis and treatment in the report is relatively brief and therefore wroth recording in full:
“10. Opinion
[The Appellant] is a vulnerable individual who has unfortunately suffered from a number of significant mental health issues following her traumatic life in Malaysia. The stress and worries of her immigration issues have added to her distress and the worsening of her mental symptoms as her depression and anxiety continue to deteriorate. She feels that her life will be ruined and in danger if she returns to Malaysia. Her mental health is too fragile for her to cope with life there as she strongly believes that she will be isolated and lonely as well as tracked and killed by her rapist and his father. [The Appellant] will also not be able to receive any psychological treatment and care that she can receive in the UK and she would not be able to find a job, accommodation or survive financially. This adds to her worries, low mood, panic attacks, depression and suicidal thoughts.
Her significant mental health issues include:
a) Symptoms of severe low mood with suicidal thoughts and attempts of self-harm;
b) Anxieties and panic attacks about most things;
c) Flashbacks of the traumatic events in her life;
d) Regular suicidal thoughts;
e) Social isolation;
f) Feeling shame and guilt;
g) Loss of appetite and loss of weight;
h) Poor concentration and memory due to constant thinking and worrying;
i) Lack of confidence and self-esteem mainly due to her rapist and his father, and
j) Sleep problems with nightmares.
In my opinion, these symptoms fit the diagnostic criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
11. Prognosis and Treatment:
I believe that the thought of returning to Malaysia triggers off bad memories and worsens her psychological symptoms (including her anxiety and low mood), particularly because she strongly believes that she will be killed by her rapist and his father if she returns to the country.
In my opinion, [the Appellant’s] psychological symptoms will improve if she is able to stop being frightened about being deported to Malaysia and if her future is secured by being allowed to stay in the UK where she will feel safer and not threatened by her rapist and his father. She will also be able to receive regular care and treatment for her psychological problems including her depression and anxiety.
I recommend [the Appellant] starts taking anti-depressants regularly under the care of her GP and also receives some therapy sessions which ideally should include a combination of CBT and psychotherapy.”
45. A letter from the Appellant’s GP dated 19 December 2025 states that she suffers from mixed anxiety and depression and post traumatic stress disorder secondary to sexual assault in the past, takes listed medication (as above) on a regular basis and also complains of chronic headache, right knee pain and subclinical hypothyroidism.
46. The Appellant’s documents included a number of NHS letters and records, including from her GP with whom she was registered either in November 2019 or March 2021 (the record shows both dates). An entry on 20 November 2023 refers in brief to the incident in Malaysia and that the Appellant had been sectioned to a psych hospital where she had treatment, but no care after discharge and her symptoms improved until recently following interviews, with the Appellant feeling very anxious, having palpitations, insomnia and shortness of breath, but “no dsh ideation”. The record states “Diagnosis: Post-traumatic stress disorder” and refers to a number being given for Chinese counselling and prescription for propranolol and sertraline. The medication was reviewed in December 2023, with the Appellant recorded as feeling better overall and not having been able to get through to counselling and no further prescriptions were given until medication restarted in March 2024 when there is reference to the Appellant having a ‘mixed anxiety and depressive disorder’. The record ends in May 2024 with a further prescription for 28 days.
47. The bundle also contains various letters addressed to the Appellant (none of which were specifically relied upon) and background country information about Malaysia, including the US State Department report from 2022; the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Country Information Report on Malaysia from December 2019; a news article from the BBC from April 2017 about rape victims marrying their rapists; and a UN policy brief on violence against women and girls in Malaysia (from unknown date).
Submissions
48. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Keertly relied on the reasons for refusal letter and Respondent’s review before the First-tier Tribunal. In relation to the Refugee Convention, it was accepted that the Appellant was a woman but not that she was a survivor of rape and in any event has no distinct identity or fear of persecution for that reason such that she is not a member of a particular social group. The Appellant fears non-state agents and there is no evidence of any adverse perception in Malaysia because of a background of experiencing sexual violence and at its highest would amount only to discrimination and not persecution. However, if the claim was accepted, no one would in any event know or be able to identify the Appellant as a victim of sexual violence.
49. The primary issue in this case was identified by the Respondent as the Appellant’s credibility and the following points were submitted in relation to it:
(i) In her screening interview the Appellant stated that she had never been exploited but also claims that she was held against her will to give birth. However, Ms Keertly accepted this would be a non-traditional form of exploitation that may not fit within the standard definition.
(ii) The Appellant stated that she intended to return to Malaysia when first coming to the United Kingdom, which is inconsistent with her claimed fear and initially she failed to give any reasons why she could not return to Malaysia.
(iii) The Appellant claimed that S was the son of F, but this was only corrected after the Respondent had identified that F had no children from publicly available information.
(iv) The Appellant’s account was implausible that a politician would go to such lengths to protect someone who was not a biological relation for over twenty years. There was a lack of evidence establishing any relationship at all between S and F and no real evidence about S at all, the Appellant does not even know his last name, nor has the Respondent been able to find any information about S.
(v) The Appellant’s story changed about the report of the rape to the police in terms of what her parents knew, the level of detail and as to what happened afterwards. The Appellant has said both that there was no follow up at all by the police, and that they wanted to arrest her; then in oral evidence said that the police came to her house which was then changed to S coming to her home. Although the Appellant says she was given no record of the report, she stated that when she complained to the police in Kuala Lumpur they took no action because of the police record of her previous complaint. Despite being in touch with family in Malaysia, the Appellant has made no attempt to obtain a copy of the police report.
(vi) The Appellant offered no explanation as to whether or if not, why, her family did not report her missing to the police after she was in essence kidnapped. She was also very vague as to the details of her kidnapping, where she was taken and how long for and it was not plausible for her not to realise the passage of time until she gave birth.
(vii) The Appellant may not have known the date or have had access to a calendar when she gave birth, but there is no explanation for her lack of medical records or previous disclosure of her having a c-section. The Appellant has given different accounts for where she was taken to give birth and overall her account lacked detail and consistency.
(viii) There is no explanation as to why the Appellant was taken to a mental health hospital following suicide attempts in circumstances where those who were detaining her had also threatened to kill her. There was an inconsistency in the account as to whether the Appellant was released from the mental hospital or escaped and the Respondent did not accept that this was due to a translation error. It is also unclear how the Appellant could have escaped when she described being tied up in the mental hospital.
(ix) After leaving the mental hospital, the Appellant returned to her family home for some time between a month and a year before moving to Kuala Lumpur and it is inconsistent with her claim that her family home was visited every two to four weeks for her not to have been located during that time. The Appellant’s evidence was inconsistent as to whether it was her parents or her aunt who encouraged the move.
(x) The Appellant was unable to identify who she stayed with in Kuala Lumpur by name and inconsistent about how she was identified by those she feared while there and nothing to suggest it was not just a coincidence to see them. There were different explanations as to whether or not the Appellant was chased and what happened when she went to the police, both that she was told to go back to S and that they would not help because of the previous record.
(xi) The Appellant did not know the surname of the person she lived with for over a year, who also paid for her trip to the United Kingdom and organised her accommodation here. The Appellant was not located here either, despite working there and it was unclear if she was encouraged by her friend to go out or stay at home.
(xii) Finally, the Respondent relied on section 8 and that significant weight should be attached to the very long delay in the Appellant claiming asylum in the United Kingdom, with no satisfactory explanation for it.
50. Ms Keertly accepted that the Appellant’s evidence may be affected by PTSD, but submitted that only little weight should be attached to the medical evidence given how poor the report submitted is. The author takes all of the Appellant’s account at face value with no consideration of the lack of medical records, whether the symptoms could have been fabricated or exaggerated; nor does it consider the impact of the Appellant’s immigration status on her mental health. The report refers to the Appellant not socialising and being isolated, which is inconsistent with the witnesses who attended and her working for a year in a takeaway (also noted to be illegal working). At its highest, the report refers to symptoms consistent with PTSD but does not formally make any actual diagnosis. It also includes a statement that the Appellant would not be able to obtain accommodation or treatment in Malaysia, but the author has no expertise on such matters and no reasons are given for this.
51. There was evidence the Appellant registered with her GP in 2019, following which there were various routine records; which is inconsistent with her claim in oral evidence that she did not register until after covid and discussed her mental health at the first appointment. The Appellant was also recommended counselling for her mental health which she has not taken up.
52. As to whether the Appellant would be at risk on return to Malaysia, Ms Keertly submitted that there has been no contact with the Appellant from those she fears in the United Kingdom and it is highly implausible that her parents were so regularly visited and more so after F’s death. The Appellant has not submitted any written statements from her parents and they have continued to live in the same family home for over twenty years with no harm to them.
53. There is nothing to suggest that those the Appellant fears are state actors and there is sufficient background country evidence to show that Malaysia has a functioning police force which would offer a sufficient of protection to the required Horvarth standard.
54. The Appellant was able to internally relocate within Malaysia twice. She was not located at all in Seremban and unclear that she had been tracked down in Kuala Lumpur either. There is no evidence as to how the Appellant could be traced on return or even that she continues to be at risk if she was. The Appellant’s mental health is not a barrier to her return, particularly given that she worked in Malaysia, relocated to the United Kingdom without support, has worked and established herself here.
55. In relation to the Appellant’s medical claim, at its highest this does not meet the threshold in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 and there is no evidence to suggest that any treatment required would not be available in Malaysia. Sertraline is available in Malaysia which has been prescribed in the past and there is background country evidence as to mental health treatment being available in Malaysia. In any event, there is nothing to show the Appellant is currently in receipt of any treatment and lived here for at least 16 years before seeking any assistance for her mental health. There is no credible evidence of any suicide risk. Ms Keertly suggested that the Appellant’s current mental health concerns are more likely to be related to her uncertain immigration status than any past trauma. The Appellant’s parents could support her on return as well.
56. Ms Keertly submitted that the Appellant’s human rights claim stands or falls with her protection claim; with the same points as above made in relation to it. The Appellant has failed to identify very significant obstacles to her reintegration to Malaysia so she does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules and her removal would not be a disproportionate interference with her right to private life established here taking into account her poor immigration history and the factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
57. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Gazzain relied on his skeleton argument, supplemented with oral submissions. In relation to the Refugee Convention, it was submitted that the Appellant was a member of a particular social group, at risk as a female victim of rape and survivor of a sexual offence with an associated risk of re-traumatization, stigma, targeted violence and silencing by the perpetrator and/or their associates. It is said that women who report sexual violence in Malaysia are perceived as deviating from entrenched patriarchal norms and are then subjected to coercion, punishment, ostracism and violence. The background evidence relied upon, an Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Country Information Report from June 2024 (the “DFAT report”), was not contained in the bundle prepared for the hearing, but instead a link to it was provided at the hearing. Reliance was placed on the following paragraphs from that report:
3.113. There is strong social stigma attached to pre-marital sex and pregnancy. Rape within marriage is not a crime. In-country sources reported that girls were sometimes married at a young age to reduce stigma following a teenage pregnancy, and that marriage sometimes occurs in cases of rape, allowing the perpetrator to go unpunished.
…
3.118. According to in-country sources, police often failed to follow up on reports of GBV. It was not uncommon for a woman who has experienced GBV to be denied a police report, not be informed whether the offender has been charged, and not advised of the next steps in their legal process. In-country sources said specialist GBV investigative units (…) tended to respond to GBV more sensitively and effectively than regular front-line police officers.
58. Mr Gazzain was unable to explain how the Appellant would be identified as a victim of sexual violence on return to Malaysia beyond saying it could be by lots of different people and submitted, without any evidential basis, that she would be persecuted by individuals in society because of the sexual assault.
59. In any event, even if it were not accepted that the Appellant falls within a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention, the same factual matrix and submissions would be relevant to consideration of whether she qualifies in the alternative for humanitarian protection and/or whether her removal to Malaysia would be in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In relation to humanitarian protection, Mr Gazzain highlighted the background country information in the DFAT report as to a moderate risk of gender-based violence in Malaysia and difficulty leaving abusive relationships. In relation more specifically to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Appellant faces a risk of being killed, of violence, abduction and/or severe ill-treatment by non-state actors. In both cases, there is no sufficiency of protection or internal relocation available to her.
60. In relation to sufficiency of protection, Mr Gazzain submitted that this was not available for this Appellant as the police were unwilling to provide support in the past. She had previously reported the rape to the police with no effective protection taken and the report was shortly followed by the perpetrators attending her home and kidnapping her for months; as well as being told she could not be helped by police in Kuala Lumpur. The background country evidence also includes serious human rights concerns and deficiencies in accountability, with corruption and a lack of confidence in law enforcement highlighted in the DFAT report, as well as a lack of state protection generally and lack of effectiveness of protection by the police.
61. In relation to internal relocation, Mr Gazzain submitted that this would not be safe or reasonable for this Appellant given the risks to women generally; the prevalence of gangs in Malaysia, the financial cost of living there; the lack of support on return as friends who do so in the United Kingdom would not do the same if the Appellant returned; the time spent in the United Kingdom and due to the Appellant’s mental health problems. Further, the Appellant was traced in Kuala Lumpur, so her previous attempt to internally relocate was not successful.
62. Mr Gazzain made a number of submissions in support of the Appellant’s credibility as follows:
(i) Any concern that the Appellant failed to answer questions or gave incoherent answers in interview should not be given significant weight in light of the fact that the interview was conducted via an interpreter during a video conference call; that the questions asked were not precise or clear; that the Appellant was suffering from PTSD, anxiety and depression and her symptoms included poor concentration, poor memory, anxiety/panic, social withdrawal and severe distress triggered by the immigration process; and her answers were in any event internally consistent in relation to key events.
(ii) In relation to the alleged inconsistency as to how the Appellant left the hospital, Mr Gazzain submits that this is no more than semantics or a translation issue rather than a true contradiction or inconsistency given the term ‘released’ is frequently used by trauma survivors to no longer begin detained and could also be affected by trauma-consistent memory disturbance and anxiety.
(iii) There was also no actual contradiction as to what happened when encountering those she feared in Kuala Lumpur, as the Appellant described how she was found, using employment and tax records, and what happened when she was, that she was encountered in the street.
(iv) In relation to the relationship between S and F, the Appellant has explained that she was told by S that F was his father and she had no reason to believe otherwise, having seen S call F father and that they had a close relationship and in any event could still be at risk from S individually or his associates and not solely from F and his associates. The Appellant has detailed increased frequency of visits to her parents home in 2024 and 2025, after F died.
(v) The medical evidence demonstrates long-term impact consistent with the claimed trauma.
(vi) The GP medical records show a registration date with the practice of 3 March 2021, which is consistent with the Appellant’s claim to have registered after covid and on explanation could be given to the entries from 2019. The GP records also show a diagnosis of PTSD, although it is unclear whether this was done by the GP or whether it followed the expert report from a few days before. The Appellant had also given a credible explanation for not previously seeing a GP due to her experiences in Malaysia.
(vii) Little weight should be placed on the delay in claiming asylum in circumstances where the Appellant reported long-standing depression and thoughts of self-harm with avoidance and isolation as coping strategies; trauma-related avoidance, fear and mistrust of authorities and reliving the trauma; and that in any event, delay is not inconsistent with genuine trauma claims, particularly involving sexual violence.
63. On behalf of the Appellant a distinct Article 3 claim was also made on health grounds that by reason of her serious mental ill-health, risk of suicide and severe psychological deterioration on return, her removal would meet the threshold set out in AM (Article 3; Health Cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131 (IAC). The psychological report confirms the Appellant is a seriously ill person with longstanding, significant symptoms and combined with her GP records shows a well documented risk of self-harm and suicide. Further, it was submitted that the Appellant would face a real risk of exposure to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her health resulting in intense suffering, or a significant reduction in life expectancy due to the absence of appropriate treatment or lack of access to it in Malaysia. The Appellant is at increased risk of suicide from the prospect of removal, particularly as she would be returning to the place where the original trauma occurred and where she continues to fear harm. Mr Gazzain submitted that the psychologist report shows that the risk of suicide is objectively well-founded and in any event her subjective fear is real and overwhelming. In any event, there is no evidence as to any effective mechanisms in place to reduce the risk of suicide on return, no identified care plan or assessment of continuity of psychological care following removal. The Appellant’s condition is said to require stability, ongoing treatment and a safe environment, without interruption to her current treatment and support in the United Kingdom.
64. Finally, in relation to the Article 8 aspects of the appeal, Mr Gazzain submitted that there are very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration in Malaysia, primarily due to her mental health and re-traumatisation returning to the place where the initial trauma occurred and where she remains at risk and disruption to her current treatment and support, which would increase the risk of non-integration on return.
65. If not accepted that the Appellant meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds, it was submitted that in any event her removal would be a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private life in the United Kingdom due to her 19 years’ residence in the United Kingdom, level of integration and exceptional circumstances considered in the round. That is the case even taking into account almost all of the residence was unlawful.
Findings and reasons
66. The first issue in relation to the Appellant’s protection claim is whether or not the claim falls within the scope of the Refugee Convention. If not, the second issue is whether she is entitled to a grant of humanitarian protection and if not, the third issue is whether her removal would breach Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (for protection reasons). The fourth issue is whether the Appellant’s removal would breach Article 3 on medical grounds, either for mental health or suicide reasons. The final issue is whether the Appellant’s removal would be a disproportionate interference with her private life established in the United Kingdom, which encompasses consideration of whether she would meet any of the requirements of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds.
Refugee Convention
67. The test for whether a person is a member of particular social group and entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention as such is set out in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex p Shah and Islam [1999] 2 AC 629, followed by Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46. In essence, a group shall be considered to be a particular social group where (i) members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and (ii) that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. There is then a separate test of causation as to whether there is a real risk of persecution because of membership of that particular social group. Whether or not a person is at real risk as a member of a particular social group is a mixed question of fact and law.
68. In DH (Particular Social Group: Mental Health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 223 (IAC) the Upper Tribunal found that depending on the facts, a ‘person living with a disability or mental ill-health’ may qualify as a member of a particular social group either as (i) sharing an innate characteristic or a common background that cannot be changed, or (ii) because they may be perceived as being different by the surrounding society and thus have a distinct identity in their country of origin. It is a fact specific assessment, with the key issue being how an individual is viewed in the eyes of a potential persecutor.
69. In the present appeal, the background country evidence relied upon by the Appellant falls very far short of establishing that she can meet the second requirement set out in the case law above, that she, as a victim of sexual violence has a distinct identity as such perceived as being different by surrounding society. Whilst the background country evidence refers to difficulties for women and in particular problems of gender-based violence, it does not establish that victims of sexual violence have a distinct identity or are seen as different by society in Malaysia.
70. There is a further difficulty in that there is no explanation at all as to how anyone would know the Appellant is a victim of sexual violence or why she would be perceived as such in Malaysia. The whole tenor of the Appellant’s evidence and history since 2003 is very much that she would not voluntarily disclose what happened to her (for reasons of shame as opposed to due to fear from the perpetrator and their associates) and there is nothing that would require her to disclose such information to society in general. There is no plausible way in which the Appellant could be identified as falling within such a group given her history and circumstances.
71. In any event, the Appellant’s claim fails on this ground as there is no evidence whatsoever to establish the final element of causation, that the Appellant would be at risk of persecution because she is a victim of sexual violence. It is not sufficient to simply say that she is at risk from the attacker himself and his immediate associates, more is required that she would be at risk from society more generally because of this innate characteristic and there is simply nothing to support any such claim in the background country information.
72. For these reasons, the Appellant’s protection claim does not fall within the scope of the Refugee Convention and her appeal must be dismissed on this ground.
Humanitarian Protection & Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
73. As the Appellant’s claim does not fall within the scope of the Refugee Convention, the next issue is whether she is entitled to a grant of humanitarian protection and/or whether her removal to Malaysia would be in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Although these are legally distinct and Mr Gazzain invited me to consider them separately, I consider both together initially given the significant overlap on both issues; both of which require findings to be made as to the Appellant’s credibility and whether there is a risk on return to her in Malaysia.
74. In light of the nature of the Appellant’s claim and claimed poor mental health, the Appellant has been treated as a vulnerable witness in accordance with the Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: ‘Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance’ and I apply the same when considering the credibility of her claim. The extent to which the Appellant’s mental health in particular is relevant depends significantly on the weight to be attached to the medical evidence, which I consider first.
75. The report of Dr Shea, (a Psychologist/Psychotherapist) dated 15 November 2023 follows an assessment made on 6 November 2023. Whilst I appreciate the Appellant’s reasons for not producing an updating report were of a financial nature, it remains the case that the report was, by the time of hearing, quite significantly out of date and there is no detailed assessment of her current mental health by an expert, such that the weight to be attached to it is somewhat limited to the Appellant’s circumstances in late 2023 rather than her current presentation as at the hearing.
76. In any event, I attach very little weight to the expert report for a number of reasons as follows. First, the report does not outline what documents were provided to Dr Shea for the purposes of the instructions and does not refer to the provision of any GP records for the Appellant. This omission is important for the reasons set out in HA (expert evidence, mental health) [2022] UKUT 00111. The limited reference in paragraph 5 that the Appellant has not consulted a GP in the UK for her psychological symptoms due to her fear of fear of being reported to the police and the Home Office does not sufficiently address such concerns and in fact raises further questions as to why there is no further assessment or consideration of this. There is no explanation as to why the Appellant would hold such a fear, particularly when at that time she had already claimed asylum and was in contact with the Home Office. The Appellant was registered with a GP either in 2019 or 2021 (the GP records show both dates) and with entries showing routine engagement with the GP, but with no entries at all in relation to mental health until shortly after Dr Shea’s report. It was encumbent on Dr Shea to consider objectively why, given the Appellant’s claimed longstanding psychological problems since arrival in the United Kingdom in 2007, no medical support was sought for this.
77. Secondly, Dr Shea accepts at face value the entirety of the Appellant’s claimed history in Malaysia, describing these in paragraph 6 as traumatic experiences which have been distressing and have led to the increase in poor mental health. There is no assessment of, nor even any consideration of whether these claims were true or even consistent with the symptoms reported by the Appellant. There are a number of references also to a worsening of symptoms or deterioration after the Appellant claimed asylum, with no real assessment of the impact of this on the Appellant’s mental state distinct from the claims of trauma in Malaysia. Dr Shea fails to undertake any assessment of whether the Appellant’s symptoms are fabricated or exaggerated, to frustrate removal despite the assessment being undertaken for the purpose of supporting an asylum claim. The importance and need for doing so is also outlined in HA.
78. Thirdly, the description given by Dr Shea of certain behaviours, in particular symptoms of re-experience and avoidance, that the Appellant is stopped from going out, socialising and talking to people is inconsistent with her presentation and witnesses at the hearing. In paragraph 7 the Appellant is said not to go out and socialise even in the United Kingdom because she is afraid and anxious, she does not trust people, especially men and the police and spends most of her time at home alone, crying and worrying about her future. That description is wholly inconsistent with the written and oral evidence from her friends, including a number of male friends, about their close friendship, regular and active social life, as well as the Appellant’s ability to undertake employment.
79. Fourthly, Dr Shea’s report includes a number of vague statements which fail to quantify or specify a relevant period of time for which symptoms are described. For example, there is reference to restricted sleep for a few years following her various ordeals and that the Appellant confirmed there was no improvement to her sleep – from which is it entirely unclear what the Appellant’s sleep pattern is, when it deteriorated and arguably inconsistent as to whether or not it improved for a number of years before the asylum claim. Another example is the reference to loss of weight, without quantification or reference period, the latter in particular is important given the Appellant’s claimed trauma was well over 20 years ago. A final example is the statement that there has been no reported improvement to the Appellant’s fear and anxiety, however there is nothing to suggest either had previously been assessed and again, no relevant timeframe, so it is unclear whether Dr Shea considers that such symptoms had been present consistently since 2003 or for some other period of time.
80. Fifthly, Dr Shea concludes that the Appellant will not be able to receive any psychological treatment and care in Malaysia that she can in the UK and that she would not be able to find a job, accommodation or survive financially. There is nothing to suggest that Dr Shea has any particular expertise or knowledge of healthcare, accommodation, employment or financial support available to individuals in Malaysia; nor are any reasons given as to why the Appellant would not be entitled to or able to access any of these, particularly given she does have family support in Malaysia. There is also an absence of any consideration of the fact that the Appellant had not had any mental healthcare in the United Kingdom since arrival in 2007, no current treatment, no current entitlement to work or accommodation and had only been supported by friends here.
81. Sixthly, Dr Shea does not make any specific diagnosis of the Appellant’s mental health. At its highest, there is reference, without more, to scores from psychological testing as to impact of trauma, anxiety and depression and a single sentence that the Appellant’s significant mental health issues fit the diagnostic criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. That falls significantly short of any actual diagnosis.
82. For all of these reasons, I attach very little weight to Dr Shea’s report. The evidence from the Appellant’s GP is very brief and limited, with the letter from her GP dated 19 December 2025 referring to her suffering from mixed anxiety, depression and PTSD and she is prescribed sertraline. There is however little to explain where these diagnoses came from, they are referred to in a summary entry in the GP records from 20 November 2023 which describes a long history of anxiety and depression and a diagnosis for PTSD. However, the latter is not referred to in the summary of conditions, or active problems (as at the date of printing in May 2024, the latest available) and it would be highly unusual for PTSD to be diagnosed by a GP at a single appointment. It seems more likely that much of this is taken from Dr Shea’s report dated shortly before this appointment and which included a recommendation for medication and counselling. The former was prescribed, the latter offered but not taken up by the Appellant.
83. Considering all of the medical evidence available, I accept that the Appellant suffers from a mixed anxiety and depressive disorder (albeit the severity of which is not specified, nor is there sufficient credible evidence on the impact of the same on, for example, her ability to recall details or give an account of her claim to attach any significant weight to this) but not that she has ever been diagnosed with PTSD. Whilst little weight can be attached to Dr Shea’s report, I do take into account the potential impact of anxiety and depression on the Appellant when assessing the credibility of her claim and later on in this decision, the impact of the same on a return to Malaysia.
84. I turn next to the Appellant’s credibility, taking into account all of the above and the guidance on vulnerable witnesses. At the outset I also take into account that the events the Appellant’s claim is focused on happened primarily in 2003 and up to 2007 when she left Malaysia for the United Kingdom; since when there had been a significant passage of time before she claimed asylum in December 2020 and was interviewed in relation to it. It would be natural to expect a person to be unable to remember every detail even of significant life events after thirteen to seventeen years, such that it is entirely plausible for the Appellant to simply not recall such details, particularly by the time of hearing before me which was well over twenty years later. The lack of such detail of itself at this point in time does not significantly adversely affect the Appellant’s credibility, although there are certain points of the Appellant’s evidence where it would be reasonable still to expect greater detail than she has given, in particular, on matters which the Appellant has claimed to have simply forgotten over the passage of time but never knew even at the relevant time.
85. The passage of time does however raise a separate credibility issue pursuant to section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 in that I am required to find the delay in the Appellant’s asylum claim of around 13 years as damaging to her credibility. Whilst by far not the most significant point, I deal with it here as it conveniently follows consideration of the passage of time for other reasons. The Appellant’s only explanation for the very long delay is a lack of knowledge of the asylum system prior to seeking legal advice. I reject that as a reasonable explanation for the delay given the sheer length of delay, that the Appellant was aware she had no leave to remain in the United Kingdom from 2007 which would have impacted her daily life in many ways, had friends and support here and there is no indication of any attempts to seek legal advice during such a long period.
86. I have set out above the detailed submissions on credibility from both parties, some of which carry greater weight than other points and all of which I have taken into account in the assessment which follows. I consider the relevant factors for and against the Appellant’s credibility in turn by theme/aspect of her claim as different aspects involve different considerations.
87. I attach no weight to the Respondent’s first and second points in paragraph 49 above. The first of which was not a fair criticism given that it was not reasonable to assume that the Appellant would define her claimed experiences as exploitation, in the context of a brief screening interview, where I do not find that such an interpretation would be commonly used for this type of scenario. The second point adds nothing of substance at all to the assessment.
88. In relation to the discrepancy in the Appellant’s claim as to the relationship between S and F and why F would take the claimed action he did to protect someone who was not his biological son does give rise to some concerns. I do not find that the Appellant’s reference to the relationship being one of father and son to damage her credibility in circumstances where they were not biologically related given her explanation for it was that this was the nature of the relationship she saw and heard them refer to and had no reason to doubt it. However, there remains an unanswered question as to what the relationship actually was, combined with the lack of any evidence connecting S and F (particularly where the Appellant has not given or does not even know S’s surname) and lack of any reason as to why such an extreme level of protection would be offered by F. The explanation of potential damage to F’s political reputation if the religious authorities found out what S had done makes little sense, particularly without any clear connection between the two of them and is not fully explained. It is not implausible, but this aspect of the claim lacks detail and it is not said that such details were forgotten due to the passage of time, there is nothing to suggest the Appellant ever knew any more about S or his relationship to F.
89. In relation to the issue as to what, if any, action was taken by the police when the rape was initially reported, there was a difference in the Appellant’s evidence as to whether the police took no further action, whether they made a report but did not follow up on it, or whether they subsequently attended her home. There was no clear explanation for the differences in the account, but given the passage of time, I do not find that anything really turns on this point of detail in the claim, particularly when the background evidence in the DFAT report highlights that police often failed to follow up on reports of gender-based violence. In any event, I do not find it would have been reasonable to expect the Appellant to have sought to obtain a copy of the report, particularly given the background violence in the DFAT report suggests that these are not routinely given and this does not damage her credibility.
90. The lack of detail given by the Appellant as to her kidnapping, where she was held and for how long, as well as the lack of detail about the birth of her daughter (including things like the time of birth, name of the doctor) are not matters which I find to be damaging to her credibility and the lack of knowledge is entirely plausible in the context of the nature of a claim of being held against her will and monitored, being without the usual references of daily life and given the passage of time.
91. There is a more significant inconsistency in the Appellant’s account of how she left the mental hospital, on one account she was discharged following an improvement in her mental health (which is consistent with the record of the same in her GP appointment in November 2023) and on the other account, despite being tied down and monitored, she managed to escape via a delivery cart and find her way home after getting out the back of the delivery cart at a junction. There is no clear explanation for the different accounts given. Mr Gazzain’s attempt to submit this was mere semantics rather than an inconsistency is not accepted, nor was there any evidence to suggest that the use of the word ‘release’ by this Appellant was being used in a common way to other victims of trauma. That formed no part of her evidence (which instead put the difference down to an interpretation issue) nor was it supported by any evidence of such common usage.
92. On the latter account, the Appellant says she escaped soon after the possibility of discharge was discussed with her. It is unclear why at this point the Appellant would have thought that escape was necessary if she were to be discharged soon due to improvements in her mental health. There is also another significant unanswered question as to why the Appellant was taken to a mental hospital by those she feared in the first place – she states that this was because she was self-harming and had attempted suicide, but those who took her for treatment were also the same people who had kidnapped her and threatened to kill her to prevent her disclosing the rape.
93. There was a lack of detail from the Appellant as to who she stayed with in Kuala Lumpur, stating that she did not know the person’s name who she lived with for around a year, only calling her aunty and nor did she know the surname of the person she lived with in Seremban for a similar period of time and who organised and paid for her travel to the United Kingdom. These are not details the Appellant claims to have forgotten, but ones she claims not to have ever known. I find this lack of detail is damaging to her credibility.
94. In relation to the Appellant’s claim to have seen those she feared in Kuala Lumpur, I do not find there was an inconsistency as such as to her claim of how she was found or what happened next. However, on the Appellant’s account, she was tracked down by those she feared through tax or employment records, but was never encountered at her workplace and even after being seen in a nearby restaurant, there was no further contact for a not insignificant period before she relocated to Seremban. If the Appellant had been tracked to her specific workplace, there is no explanation as to why there were no visits there and no further contact whilst she remained in Kuala Lumpur.
95. Overall, taking into account all of the evidence and the guidance on vulnerable witnesses, I make the following findings. First, I find that the Appellant was raped by S as claimed; that she became pregnant as a result; was kidnapped until she gave birth and that her daughter was taken from her the same day with no contact between them since. The Appellant’s claim up to this point is largely consistent and a number of aspects of it, such as the lack of police response and the request to marry S are consistent with background country evidence. The Respondent has not identified any specific matters which undermine the credibility of this part of the Appellant’s account and on the lower threshold applicable I find the Appellant has established this part of her claim.
96. Secondly, I do not find that the Appellant has established that she was taken to a mental hospital from which she escaped back to her parents’ home. This aspect of the claim lacks cogency, is internally inconsistent and raises serious questions of plausibility both as to why those who she claims wanted her dead would take her for treatment to prevent further self-harm or suicide and as to how she managed to escape given her claim to have been tied up and monitored, at a time when she was likely to be discharged in any event. I also note the previous monitoring by those she feared whom it would be reasonable to infer would do similar even when she was in a different location or who would learn of her escape, given her account of their determination to track her to prevent disclosure. The Appellant then remained at her parents’ home for at least a month (and possibly much longer as precise dates are not given by the Appellant as to when she moved to Kuala Lumpur) without being discovered by those she feared who knew the address and who she claimed were harassing her parents every day.
97. Thirdly, I find that the Appellant did internally relocate both to Kuala Lumpur, where she worked and to Seremban, where she claims to have had no issues and was not located by those she feared. However, I do not find that the Appellant was tracked down in Kuala Lumpur and that if she saw people who she thought were those she feared in a local restaurant, (it was put no higher than that in her evidence) it was no more than a chance encounter which led to no further contact, no specific threats and no harm to her. The Appellant remained in Kuala Lumpur for some further period of time without incident and did not claim to have stopped work or otherwise gone in to hiding to avoid such contact.
98. Fourthly, I find that whilst the Appellant was monitored and visits were made to her family home in the immediate aftermath of the rape and for a time thereafter; I do not find that she has established such visits continued on a frequent basis for so many years and find it more likely that these stopped sometime after she had the baby and had not disclosed any details of the rape by that point. The evidence from the Appellant as to frequency of visits is inconsistent with her returning to the family home after release/escape from a mental hospital; there is no evidence from her parents as to these visits and a lack of detail as to what they entailed; and in any event there is no rational or plausible explanation for an increase in the frequency of visits after F’s death in 2023 given he was the person with the power and faced reputational risk and bearing in mind this was already 20 years after the rape. In any event, the Appellant’s evidence at the hearing was that the last visit was in early 2025 and there had been no visits in almost a year. The latter does not indicate any continuing or frequent interest by the time of the hearing.
99. Overall, whilst I find that the Appellant’s initial claim of rape, kidnap and having a child to have been established, I do not find the remainder of her claim to have been tracked with continuous threats and visits to her parents since to have been established, even to the lower standard of proof applicable in protection claims.
100. In these circumstances, I do not find that the Appellant is at any continuing risk on return to Malaysia now from S or his associates, nor F (who is deceased) or his associates. There is no longer any reputational risk to F even if he was associated with S as claimed. The Appellant was able to live in three different locations (including her own home) and work in Kuala Lumpur between 2004 and 2007 without further incident. It has now been over twenty years since the initial events, during which time one of those feared, F, has passed away (some three years ago) and there is nothing to indicate any continuing adverse interest in the Appellant by S, nor anything to indicate he, or any associates would have the ability to identify or locate the Appellant if she returned to Malaysia now, nor the means to threaten or actually harm her. There is almost no information about S, his surname is unknown, he is married, although it is suspected he may have entered politics there is no evidence of this, and it is not even known if he is still in Malaysia. It is in these circumstances unknown how the Appellant could identify S on return either, or in any way disclose the rape and following events in a way that posed any risk to him; nor in any event is there any indication that the Appellant would plan to do so.
101. For these reasons, the Appellant does not meet the requirements for a grant of humanitarian protection, nor would her removal breach Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights for fear of harm or persecution on return to Malaysia. In any event, even if I am wrong about the risk on return to the Appellant, I find that there is a sufficiency of protection available to her in Malaysia and it would not be unduly harsh for her to internally relocate.
102. In relation to sufficiency of protection, whilst there are issues identified in the background country evidence as to the efficiency and effectiveness of the police force and state authorities, particularly in relation to gender-based violence; there is also evidence of a functioning police force and improvements in relation to the latter. The evidence overall is sufficient to establish a sufficiency of protection to the appropriate Horvarth standard.
103. In relation to internal relocation, as above, the Appellant had between approximately 2004 and 2007 internally relocated to both Kuala Lumpur and Seremban without any significant incident; with no specific threats of or actual harm by any of those she fears on return. The Appellant was able to work in Kuala Lumpur during her time there and in both locations she was able to find accommodation through with a friend or through a family member. For the reasons already given above, there is no credible basis upon which S or any of his associates would even know that the Appellant had returned to Malaysia, nor be able to track her down thereafter. The Appellant does not know anything about S’s current circumstances and there is nothing more than speculation that he may be in politics and therefore may have connections within the state. I do not find that it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant to internally relocate, taking into account all of her personal circumstances set out above and below, but not repeated here (in particular in relation to her mental health, access to medical treatment and familiarity to reintegrate in to Malaysia generally). There is nothing to suggest that she faces any particular risk as a woman, or from gangs, nor that she would be unable to afford the financial costs of living in Malaysia and there is no reason to suggest friends in the United Kingdom would not continue to support her emotionally and financially as they do now.
Article 3 – health grounds
104. The test for a breach of Article 3 on health grounds is set out by the Supreme Court in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 and helpfully distilled following this and the case of Sarvan v Denmark (application no> 57467/15) by the Upper Tribunal in AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC) as follows:

1. In Article 3 health cases two questions in relation to the initial threshold test emerge from the recent authorities of AM (Zimbabwe) … and Savran v Denmark …:
(1) Has the person (P) discharged the burden of establishing that he or she is “a seriously ill person”?
(2) Has P adduced evidence “capable of demonstrating” that “substantial grounds have been shown for believing” that as “a seriously ill person”, he or she “would face a real risk”:
(i) “on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment,
(ii) of being exposed
(a) to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
(b) to a significant reduction in life expectancy”?
2. The first question is relatively straightforward issue and will generally require clear and cogent medical evidence from treating physicians in the UK.
3. The second question is multi-layered. In relation to (2)(ii)(a) above, it is insufficient for P to merely establish that his or her condition will worsen upon removal or that there would be serious and detrimental effects. What is required is “intense suffering”. The nature and extent of the evidence that is necessarily will depend on the facts of the case. Generally speaking, whilst medical experts in the UK may be able to assist in this assessment, many cases are likely to turn on the availability of and access to treatment in the receiving state. Such evidence is more likely to be found in reports by reputable organisations and/or clinicians and/or country experts with contemporary knowledge of or expertise in medical treatment and related country conditions in the receiving state. Clinicians directly involved in providing relevant treatment and services in the country of return and with knowledge of treatment options in the public and private sectors, are likely to be particularly helpful.
4. It is only after the threshold has been met and thus Article 3 is applicable, that the returning state’s obligations summarised at [130] of Savran become of relevance – see [135] of Savran.
105. The Appellant’s claim under Article 3 for health reasons falls at the first hurdle as there is insufficient evidence to establish she is a ‘seriously ill person’. I do not repeat here the reasons set out fully above as to why very little weight can be attached to Dr Shea’s report. I have found only that the Appellant has a mixed anxiety and depressive disorder but nothing more in terms of a mental health diagnosis. A mixed anxiety and depressive disorder does not of itself mean that a person is a ‘seriously ill person’, unfortunately, such conditions are relatively common and not, particularly on the evidence in this appeal, serious. The Appellant did not specifically rely for the purposes of Article 3 on any physical illness, however I note she also had an ongoing problem (as at May 2024) of subclinical hypothyroidism; but nothing to indicate that alone, or together with a mixed anxiety and depressive disorder; would amount to her being a ‘seriously ill person’ either.
106. In any event, there is an almost complete lack of credible evidence of the Appellant demonstrating that she would face a real risk of absence of appropriate treatment on return to Malaysia such that she would be exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in her life expectancy. The only treatment the Appellant was receiving as at May 2024 was a prescription for sertraline which is available in Malaysia and propanalol (with nothing to suggest that is not available in Malaysia either) and no reason why the Appellant would not be able to access such medication on return. Even at its highest, the report of Dr Shea falls very far short of establishing the required serious, rapid and irreversible decline in the Appellant’s health on return, nor any objective reasons for such a conclusion. The appeal on health grounds under Article 3 is therefore dismissed, although I deal with whether there is a suicide risk separately below.
Article 3 – suicide risk
107. In the specific circumstances of a claimed risk of suicide on return to a home country, the test to be applied is set out in J v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 629 [paras 26 to 31], as reformulated in Y (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 362 [paras 15 and 16] as follows:
26. First the test requires an assessment to be made of the severity of the treatment which it is said the applicant will suffer if removed. This must attain a minimum level of severity. The court has said on a number of occasions that the assessment of its severity depends on all the circumstances of the case. But the ill-treatment must ‘necessarily be serious such that it is ‘an affront to the fundamental humanitarian principles to remove an individual to a country where he is at risk of serious ill-treatment’.
27. Secondly, a causal link must be shown to exist between the act or threatened act of removal or expulsion and the inhuman treatment relied on as violating the applicant’s Article 3 rights. Thus, in Soering at para [91], the court said:
‘Insofar as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the extraditing contacting state by reason of its having taken action which has a direct consequent the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment’ (emphasis added).
See also [108] of Vilvarajah where the court said that the examination of the Article 3 issue ‘must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the removal of the applicants to Sri Lanka …’
28. Thirdly, in the context of foreign cases, the Article 3 threshold is particularly high simply because it is a foreign case. And it is even higher where the alleged inhuman treatment is not the direct or indirect responsibility of the public authorities of the receiving state, but results from some naturally occurring illness, whether physical or mental. This is made clear in para [49] of D and para [40] of Bensaid.
29. Fourthly, an Article 3 claim can in principle succeed in a suicide case (para [37] of Bensaid).
30. Fifthly, in deciding whether there is a real risk of a breach of Article 3 in a suicide case, a question of importance is whether the applicant’s fear of ill-treatment in the receiving state upon which the risk of suicide is said to be based is objectively well-founded. If the fear is not well-founded, that will tend to weigh against there being a real risk that the removal will be in breach of Article 3. To which is added, what may nevertheless be of equal importance is whether any genuine fear which the appellant may establish, albeit without an objective foundation, is such as to create a risk of suicide if there is an enforced return (para 16 of Y).
31. Sixthly, a further question of consideration relevance is whether the removing and/or the receiving state has effective mechanisms to reduce the risk of suicide. If there are effective mechanisms, that too will weigh heavily against the applicant’s claim that removal will violate his or her Article 3 rights.
108. The Appellant’s claim on this specific aspect of Article 3 also falls at the first hurdle as there is a lack of any up to date or credible evidence of a suicide risk on return to Malaysia now. At its highest, there is a record in the Appellant’s own evidence, in Dr Shea’s report and in the GP record of one or more historic suicide attempts in the period around 2003-2004 in Malaysia; but no suicidal ideation recorded in November 2023 when mental health was first raised with the GP. There was no subsequent reference in the GP records, nor the letter from 19 December 2025 and at its highest, Dr Shea refers to the Appellant continuing to have some suicidal thoughts in the UK (later referred to as ‘regular’ suicidal thoughts). However, there is no follow up assessment by Dr Shea of when, how regular, the nature of such thoughts, whether the Appellant has a plan, what, if any protective factors would mitigate the risk of suicide nor any objective assessment of the level of risk of suicide on return to Malaysia, nor whether that country has effective mechanisms in place to reduce the risk. The Appellant’s own most recent evidence does not specifically assert a risk of suicide on return now.
109. In the absence of any up to date or credible evidence of a real risk of suicide if the Appellant were returned to Malaysia now, it can not be concluded by applying the test set out above that her removal would breach Article 3 on this ground. Further, as I have found above, there is no objective risk on return to the Appellant such that any fear on return is not well-founded and even if it was accepted that the Appellant had a genuine fear without an objective foundation, then it has not been established that this gives rise to a real risk of suicide if there is an enforced return. Finally, the Respondent has set out evidence of the healthcare system available in Malaysia and the Appellant would have at least some degree of family support form her parents there, even if they are now elderly and also in poor health.
110. For these reasons, the Appellant’s appeal on this aspect of Article 3 is dismissed.
Article 8
111. The final issue is whether the Appellant’s removal would be a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private and family life contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Appellant does not claim to have any established family life in the United Kingdom and her claim is therefore solely focused on her private life established here since her arrival in 2007.
112. The appropriate starting point to consider is whether the Appellant meets any of the requirements in paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules (as was at the date of decision under appeal). The only potentially relevant provision in the Immigration Rules relied upon by the Appellant is that contained in paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) which refers to an applicant who has lived in the United Kingdom for less than 20 years and “there would be very significant obstacles to their integration in the country of return”. Integration was explained in Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813 as follows:
“14. In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal’s ‘integration’ into the country to which it is proposed that he would be deported … is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal to simply direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of ‘integration’ calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life.”
113. The very significant obstacles requirement was considered by the Court of Appeal in Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932, who in paragraph 9 held:
“9. … It is fair enough to observe that the words “very significant” connote an “elevated” threshold, and I have no difficulty with the observation that the test will not be met by “mere inconvenience or upheaval”. But I am not sure that saying that “mere” hardship or difficulty or hurdles, even if multiplied, will not “generally” suffice adds anything of substance. The task of the Secretary of State, or the Tribunal, in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as “very significant”.”
114. Although the Appellant has spent a considerable number of years in the United Kingdom since 2007, she had spent her formative years up to the age of around 22 in Malaysia. She remains in contact with her parents there, speaks Cantonese which is a language spoken in Malaysia and has some employment experience in Kuala Lumpur as well. As already considered above, there is a functioning health care system in Malaysia, with mental health treatment and sertraline available and nothing to suggest the Appellant would not be able to access appropriate treatment on return, particularly with support available from her parents.
115. Overall, I do not find that the Appellant’s mental health would be a very significant obstacle to her reintegration in Malaysia given her retained ties to the country and given her experience of being able to establish herself in the United Kingdom, a country with which she was entirely unfamiliar and where she has had no leave to remain; all at a time when she claims to have also had the same longstanding poor mental health. Whilst I appreciate that a return to Malaysia and re-establishing herself there after a period of nearly twenty years absence will undoubtedly be difficult for the Appellant, her circumstances overall do not amount to very significant obstacles to reintegration. She will be enough of an insider to have a reasonable opportunity to re-establish herself there and rebuild her private life there. The Appellant does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds.
116. Outside of the Immigration Rules, I consider whether the Appellant’s removal would breach her right to respect for private life contrary to Article 8 in accordance with the five stage test in the case of Razgar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27, with reference to the factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the “2002 Act”) when considering the public interest as part of the proportionality balancing exercise.
117. It is not in dispute that the Appellant has established a private life in the United Kingdom in the time that she has been living here since 2007, building up a number of friendships and with at least some employment (around a year up to November 2023 in a takeaway but no evidence of anything before or after that). It is however relatively limited and given that it has been built up at a time when the Appellant has been in the United Kingdom unlawfully, little weight is to be attached to it.
118. The Appellant’s removal would be an interference with her private life established in the United Kingdom, however it would be in accordance with the law as she does not meet any of the requirements of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain and in accordance with the legitimate aim of immigration control.
119. The final question to be considered is whether removal would amount to a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s private life. On the Respondent’s side of the balancing exercise, is the strong public interest in removing a person who has been in the United Kingdom unlawfully since 2007. On the Appellant’s side of the balancing exercise, Mr Gazzain relied primarily on the length of residence here, even with the acknowledgment that almost all of it has been unlawful. I also take into account the Appellant’s friendships and mental health, albeit with no ongoing treatment beyond prescription medication that can be obtained on return to Malaysia.
120. In all of the circumstances, the public interest in this case clearly outweighs the Appellant’s right to respect for what is a relatively limited private life established whilst she has remained here unlawfully and therefore to which only little weight can be attached. Her removal would not in these circumstances be a disproportionate interference with that limited private life and her appeal is dismissed on Article 8 grounds.

Notice of Decision

For the reasons set out in the decision annexed, the making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law and as such that decision was set aside.

The appeal is remade as follows:

The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed on protection grounds.

The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.


G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25th March 2026


IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003108
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63924/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

LG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Gazzain of Counsel, instructed by MF Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Reed promulgated on 22 April 2025, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim dated 29 November 2023 was allowed.
2. The Appellant is a national of Malaysia, born in 1985, who first entered the United Kingdom on 29 July 2007 as a visitor. She has remained in the United Kingdom unlawfully since, making a claim for asylum on 22 December 2020 which was refused by the Respondent on 29 November 2023.
3. The Respondent refused the application the basis that the Appellant’s claim did not fall within the Refugee Convention and in any event it was not accepted as credible given the claim lacked consistency and coherence; as well as being contrary to background country information. The Appellant’s credibility was also damaged pursuant to section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 due to the delay in her claim. Further, there was in any event a sufficiency of protection and option of internal relocation available to the Appellant in Malaysia. The Appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private or family life grounds and her removal would not breach Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
4. Judge Reed dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 22 April 2025 on all grounds. In summary, although it was accepted that the Appellant had been the victim of a sexual assault, other material facts of her claim were not accepted and overall, the Appellant was not found to be a credible witness. The Appellant was not found to be at risk of any harm on return to Malaysia and in any event there would be a sufficiency of state protection and the option of internal relocation. The Appellant’s appeal under Article 8 was also dismissed as there were no very significant obstacles to her reintegration in Malaysia and no disproportionate interference with her private life established in the United Kingdom, taking into account the factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
The appeal
5. The Appellant appealed initially on two grounds, both broken down into three parts as follows. First, that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in its assessment of the Appellant’s evidence in (i) applying the wrong standard of proof and assessment of plausibility by referring to it being ‘highly unlikely’ that associates of a politician would now pursue the Appellant or her family; (ii) failing to consider material evidence and/or give adequate reasons as to why the Appellant was not credible, bearing in mind her mental health difficulties and history of sexual assault in circumstances where her claim was consistent with background country information; and (iii) failing to consider whether the Appellant would still be at risk from her attacker. Secondly, that the First-tier Tribunal material erred in law by failing to consider and apply the relevant law in (i) failing to give adequate reasons for finding that there would be a sufficiency of protection and internal relocation option in Malaysia which was against the background country evidence; (ii) failing to consider material factors as to the Appellant’s private life and ability to reintegrate given her background and length of residence in the United Kingdom; and (iii) failing to consider the medical report dated 15 November 2023 from Dr Shea, and/or failing to adjourn to request a copy of the report.
6. At the oral hearing, on behalf of the Appellant, Mr Gazzaine did not pursue the final part of the second ground of appeal on the basis that it was accepted there was no evidence that the medical report dated 15 November 2023 had been submitted to the First-tier Tribunal; nor could it have been the document referred to in the Respondent’s review as it post-dated that. The remaining grounds were all pursued.
7. In relation to the first ground of appeal, Mr Gazzaine submitted that the First-tier Tribunal applied the wrong test to assessing risk, it should have been whether there was a reasonable degree of likelihood and not whether something was ‘highly unlikely’. Mr Gazzaine did not accept that this was in essence the same test expressed from the other direction.
8. In relation to the assessment of credibility, Mr Gazzaine highlighted that there were only two points on which material concerns as to the Appellant’s credibility were raised, in relation to the death of the politician and ongoing risk; the latter of which was a bare dismissal without adequate reasons. As to credulity, the First-tier Tribunal accepted that the Appellant was a vulnerable witness, accepted that she had mental health problems, accepted that she had been the victim of a sexual assault and accepted that her claim was not inconsistent with background country evidence; but made no findings as to whether her vulnerability had any impact on her credibility. Although there was no medical report before the First-tier Tribunal, her GP notes were which referred to a diagnosis of PTSD, albeit accepted that there was no evidence of the effect on this on the question of credibility of her evidence on the plausibility of ongoing risk in Malaysia beyond the frequency of visits to family members there.
9. The final part of the first ground of challenge was that the First-tier Tribunal had failed to make any findings at all as to whether the Appellant would be at risk from her attacker; as opposed to from the politician he was associated with. Although Mr Gazzaine was unable to point to any claim of ongoing risk from the attacker personally and unable to identify any evidence before the First-tier Tribunal of any contact from him with the Appellant or her family directly. Although Mr Gazzaine said it could be inferred that the Appellant’s claim that the frequency of visits to her family had increased after the death of the politician must have been from the attacker or people connected with him.
10. The second ground of challenge was in essence a reasons challenge, that the First-tier Tribunal had simply failed to give any reasons at all as to why there would be a sufficiency of protection or option of internal relocation; particularly without any reference to the background country evidence which suggested otherwise.
11. In relation to the Article 8 aspects of the second ground of challenge, Mr Gazzaine submitted that the First-tier Tribunal failed to consider all relevant factors to the Appellant’s obstacles to reintegration, particularly without reference to her mental health, even in the absence of any specific medical evidence on the impact of removal or reintegration on this. He did however accept that the Appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal in relation to Article 8 was fairly limited, referring to her life in the United Kingdom and the protection claim on return, with no identification of any significant obstacles to reintegration.
12. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Isherwood resisted the appeal on all grounds. In relation to the first ground of appeal, it was submitted that this was in essence only a disagreement with the conclusions of the First-tier Tribunal and an attempt to seek to reargue the claim rather than identify an error of law in the decision. When reading the First-tier Tribunal’s decision as a whole, it can been seen that the Appellant’s vulnerability was expressly considered and taken into account, as was the background country information specifically referred to. There is a lack of clarity in this case as to how the Appellant’s case was put to the First-tier Tribunal and what was expressly relied upon, as it lacks detail and there is no indication of whether any additional oral submissions were made at the hearing.
13. Ms Isherwood submitted that in consideration of the protection claim, the First-tier Tribunal decision shows a detailed assessment of the evidence, which includes identification of inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence; reference to the background country information and consideration of the plausibility of, or reasons for, for example, the claimed increase in visits to the Appellant’s family in Malaysia. Following the death of the politician previously involved, there would logically be less motivation to protect his position and the passage of time of twenty-two years since the assault was also relevant to the plausibility of risk now. The delay in claiming asylum was also relevant given the explanation for it was unsatisfactory. Overall, the First-tier Tribunal gave clear reasons as to the weight to be attached to the evidence before it and made a sufficient cumulative assessment of it when concluding the Appellant would not be at risk on return.
14. On the Article 8 aspects of the appeal, Ms Isherwood submitted that the First-tier Tribunal had accepted that the Appellant had established private life in the United Kingdom and that she had mental health problems (albeit there was a lack of evidence on this) but this was not sufficient for a grant of leave to remain under the rules. Clear reasons were then given as to why the decision was not disproportionate by reference to the statutory factors and the likely position for the Appellant in Malaysia. On the whole, the decision did not contain any material errors of law.
Findings and reasons
15. I deal with the grounds of appeal in two main themes, first, matters in relation to the protection appeal and secondly, matters in relation to Article 8. As to the protection appeal, the key issue is whether the First-tier Tribunal gave sufficient reasons for finding that there was no risk on return for the Appellant and for finding that there was a sufficiency of protection and option of internal relocation available. The latter is not material unless an error is found as to the assessment of risk.
16. In paragraphs 41 to 53 of the First-tier Tribunal, there is a detailed assessment of the Appellant’s credibility and claim. Although a number of inconsistencies were noted, undue weight was expressly not placed on these; nor on the long delay before an asylum claim was made (even absent a satisfactory explanation for it) and certain matters were accepted, primarily the fact of the sexual assault. The key parts in this section relevant to the findings that followed are found in paragraph 46, which questions why there would be a dramatic increase in the frequency of associates visiting the Appellant’s parents and/or making threats so long after the assault; and in paragraph 47, the plausibility of this continuing at all following the death of the politician in March 2023. The Judge notes in particular that objectively, there is now significantly less motivation for associates to protect a politician who has now died and concludes that “it is highly unlikely that the associates of the rapist and/or the Politician would continue to view the Appellant as a threat and continue to actively pursue her family.”.
17. The findings that follow included in paragraph 56 that the Judge was not satisfied that the attacker was associated with the politician, nor of adverse attention from him or any associates as alleged; nor that the Appellant’s family have been nor continue to be harassed because of the sexual assault. Beyond the matters referred to above, there were no express reasons for all of these conclusions. In conclusion in paragraph 57, the Appellant was not found to be at risk of harm on return to Malaysia.
18. The First-tier Tribunal’s conclusions were it seems in large part based on adverse credibility findings against the Appellant in that the only material part of her claim that was accepted was that she had been sexually assaulted. There are no express findings on other key parts of her claim, including that she was pregnant as a result of the assault; that she was confined to give birth and the baby taken from her; that she was, immediately following the attack and birth both of adverse interest to the attacker whom she refused to marry and confined to a mental institution. There are further aspects of the Appellant’s claim as to her internal relocation in Malaysia upon which no findings were made.
19. In circumstances where only little adverse weight was given to inconsistencies and delay and plausibility referred to only in relation to current contact and risks; it is entirely unexplained by the First-tier Tribunal as to why all of these other aspects of the Appellant’s claim were rejected such that she was not, overall, considered to be a credible witness. There are no reasons given at all as to why it was not accepted that the Appellant had in the past been of adverse interest from the attacker and associates (whether or not specifically of the politician as claimed). Past adverse interest will normally be relevant to the assessment of future risk, albeit the passage of time and change of circumstances may mean that it is not determinative. Further, the overall credibility assessment would be relevant to current risk in this particular appeal as that hinges significantly both on credibility and plausibility of any current adverse interest claimed.
20. In these circumstances, I find that the overall conclusions which appear to have been based only on the adverse credibility findings; contained an error of law. The adverse credibility findings were made without any express findings on significant parts of the Appellant’s claim and I find that there was a lack of sufficient reasons given for the overall conclusion on credibility. Given the very limited reasons given for the finding that the Appellant would not be at risk on return, to which the credibility assessment was key; those are material errors of law.
21. I find that the overall finding of the Appellant being of no risk on return to be based on insufficient findings and reasons; amounting to an error of law. This is not a case in which the Appellant could reasonably understand the conclusions reached to dismiss her protection claim, or even understand what parts of her claim were expressly accepted or not, or why. The findings overall as to risk, particularly in the context of a protection claim, were inadequate. For these reasons, the decision on the protection aspects of the appeal contain a material error of law and must be set aside.
22. I do not find that in the absence of specific medical evidence as to the Appellant’s mental health (as in a formal diagnosis or the impact of any specific condition on her evidence) there is any error of law in failing to take her vulnerability more specifically into account in assessing credibility and for the reasons already given; this in any event would add little if anything to the errors already identified.
23. It is not necessary to give any detailed consideration to the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation as the conclusion on these will either have to be revisited if it is established that the Appellant is at risk on return when the appeal is remade, or will remain immaterial if not.
24. Before turning to the human rights part of the claim, I also note one further Robinson obvious point which will need to be addressed by the parties when the appeal is remade on protection grounds; which is that there were no findings by the First-tier Tribunal as to whether the Appellant fell within the Refugee Convention at all and if not, no separate consideration of humanitarian protection, nor Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The issue of the applicability of the Refugee Convention was firmly in dispute between the parties and should have been resolved. It will need to be when the appeal is remade.
25. In relation to the Article 8 aspects of the claim, I find no error of law in the First-tier Tribunals’ decision. There is nothing to suggest that the Appellant’s claim before the First-tier Tribunal in this regard contained any other detail or evidence than the bare bones of the human rights claim set out in the Appellant’s evidence and skeleton argument. The latter contained only two points. First, that the Appellant’s English is serviceable and secondly, that if permitted to remain, she would be financially independent. The only other factors obvious from the Appellant’s evidence was her length of time in the United Kingdom (almost all of which was unlawful) and that during the time here, the Appellant has made friends and briefly worked as a waitress. The Appellant’s mental health issues were apparent, but there was no formal diagnosis or medical report on this before the First-tier Tribunal.
26. Against the backdrop of a very limited private life claim which lacked detail and supporting evidence, the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of the Article 8 claim was appropriately detailed and comprehensive. All of the relevant factors relied upon before it were expressly referred to in the decision and taken into account; balanced against the public interest. The conclusion that the Appellant did not meet any of the requirements for a grant of leave to remain in the United Kingdom on private life grounds and that her removal would not be disproportionate was entirely lawful, rational and reasonable on the very limited evidence before it.
27. The only difficulty in the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of Article 8 is the potentially contradictory findings in paragraph 60 that the Appellant has established a private life in the United Kingdom and in paragraph 61 that the refusal was not of sufficient gravity to engage Article 8. However, that is plainly immaterial given that the Judge in any event went on to undertake a full proportionality balancing exercise and lawfully concluded that there was no disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s right to respect for private life.
28. For these reasons, I find no error of law in the dismissal of the Appellant’s Article 8 claim and preserve the findings made in relation to it as at the date of that decision in April 2025. However, the fresh findings on the Appellant’s protection claim when the appeal is remade on that part of the appeal may impact on the Article 8 claim and if they do, the human rights aspect will be revisited. If there has been any change of circumstances in the Appellant’s private and family life since the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, she is also at liberty to submit further evidence in relation to this for the next hearing in accordance with the directions below.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision.
I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

Directions for listing
1. The appeal to be relisted on the first available date before UTJ Jackson for a face-to-face hearing at Field House, with a time estimate of 3 hours. If an interpreter is required, the Appellant’s solicitors should confirm the language and any dialect as soon as possible.
2. Any further evidence upon which the Appellant wishes to rely must be filed and served no later than 14 days before the relisted hearing. For any other person who intends to give oral evidence at the hearing, a written statement (or updated written statement) is required to stand as their evidence in chief.
3. The Appellant must file and serve a comprehensive composite bundle no later than 14 days before the relisted hearing. It is noted in particular that the bundle prepared for the first hearing did not include the Respondent’s reasons for refusal letter, the Appellant’s skeleton argument, nor the medical report referred to in the grounds. These documents should all have been included and will need to be for the next hearing.
4. Any further evidence upon which the Respondent wishes to rely must be filed and served no later than 7 days before the relisted hearing.


G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24th October 2025