Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003112

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/51555/2024
LH/01034/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Appellant
and

MOHAMMAD GHAITH ALKHIOTY
(NO ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sheikh, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Omar Alkhioty, Sponsor

Heard at Field House on 5 February 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. Although this is an appeal by the Entry Clearance Officer, I shall refer to the parties as they were in the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant is a Syrian national born on 1 November 2007. His appeal against the refusal of entry clearance under the family reunion (protection) provisions of the Immigration Rules was allowed on human rights grounds by First-Tier Tribunal Judge G D Davison (the judge) on 10 April 2025.
Grounds of appeal
2. The respondent appealed on five grounds:
(1) The judge took an oversimplistic approach in finding there was family life between the appellant and the sponsor;
(2) The judge failed to consider the precarious nature of that family life and failed to place weight on the public interest;
(3) The judge wrongly attached weight to the circumstances in Syria and Lebanon when assessing proportionality;
(4) The judge erred in law by considering the Article 8 rights of the appellant when he should only have considered the Article 8 rights of the sponsor in the UK;
(5) The judge failed to consider section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
3. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi on 22 September 2025 for the following reasons:
“3. The respondent challenges the decision on five grounds set out to the First-tier Tribunal and then further enunciated in the renewal application to the Upper Tribunal. Some of those grounds have little apparent merit (Ground 2 for example) and some of the caselaw cited has little relevance to the real issues in this matter. I also find the grounds clumsy but the essence of what they amount to is that whilst the judge found (impermissibly according to the respondent) Article 8 engaged on family life grounds, he then proceeded to allow the appeal by giving undue weight to factors relevant to private life rather than concentrating on the impact of the respondent’s decision on family life and this is an entry clearance case for someone who has not formerly had a private life in the United Kingdom so in those circumstances private life does not bite.
4. I am just about persuaded that the grounds are arguable particularly with relevance to whether or not the judge erred in law in finding on the evidence before him that there was an Article 8 family life (Ground 1) and whether or not he carried out a proper proportionality balancing exercise taking into account only those factors open to him (Ground 3).
5. Whilst the other grounds do not have as much arguable merit I do not limit the grant of permission.”
Judge’s decision
4. The respondent was not represented before the First-tier Tribunal. The sponsor attended and gave evidence. The judge asked the sponsor some questions, addressing the points made in the refusal decision of 6 February 2024. He concluded there were misunderstandings in the application form which amounted to simple errors. He found that neither the appellant nor sponsor were attempting to deceive the Tribunal. The judge found the sponsor was a credible witness and relied on his account recorded at [9] to [14] to support his conclusions.
5. The judge’s factual findings are not in dispute. The appellant is the sponsor’s younger brother. Before the sponsor came to the UK in 2015, he lived with the appellant, his other siblings and his parents as part of the family unit. Sadly, that family unit no longer exists and the appellant has been living alone since 2021 at which point he re-established contact with the sponsor. The sponsor sends financial support to the appellant who also receives some income from the family farm.
6. In summary, the judge made the following relevant findings.
“19. The appellant and sponsor our (sic) brothers. He is not therefore a parent or child of the sponsor. His application stands to be refused under FRP 5.1 of the Immigration Rules due to the nature of the relationship.
20. I do however find there to be more than the normal emotional ties. The family situation is set out above. The appellant finds himself residing in what is left of the family home with no support save his sponsor. The sponsor himself came to the United Kingdom as a refugee. He is remitting money and attempting to take care of his younger brother, in the absence of any parental figures, from a great distance. The appellant is dependent upon his brother, save for the small amount of money they get from the farm. Affection and/or caring for a sibling is not enough, I find on the facts of this appeal that there is more which justifies a finding of family life. I find that the brothers resided together prior to the sponsor coming to the United Kingdom. Whilst that was some time ago, again from the chronology of events are set out above, there was an understandable gap in their contact.
21. I accept the sponsor’s reasons for being unable to go to Lebanon. He is now married in the United Kingdom with a young child of his own. He came here as an asylum seeker and has concerns about possible military service, and the general situation, should he be made to return. I do not therefore find that the respondent’s suggestion that the brothers could visit each other in Lebanon to be realistic.
22. The Immigration Rules provide legitimate channels for people to enter the United Kingdom. A failure to satisfy one of these options therefore carries significant weight in the public interest. However, the appellant is presently 17 years old, injured following a bombing raid, living in the remains of his family home, with no support network save his brother in the United Kingdom and a small remittance from a piece of land owned by the family. I find these circumstances are compelling such that a grant of leave outside the Immigration Rules is appropriate.”
Submissions
7. Mr Sheikh relied on the grounds of appeal and R (IA) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516. He submitted the judge had failed to apply the principles in Kumari v The Netherlands (Application 440151/20) and consider whether family life had elements of dependency that went beyond normal emotional ties. The judge had failed to apply the test in IA. The appellant had not lived with the sponsor for several years and, on the facts of this case, the judge’s finding that there was family life was not open to him.
8. In assessing proportionality, Mr Sheikh submitted the judge had failed to place weight on the public interest and had failed to consider factors weighing against the appellant, for example, the appellant had no connection to the UK. The appellant’s case was not exceptional and his family life was so precarious it could not outweigh the public interest. Further, the judge erred in giving weight to the circumstances in Syria and failing to apply section 117B. Mr Sheikh submitted ground 4 was dependent upon ground 1. The judge’s findings were not sufficiently clear to show that he had not taken into account Article 3 and Article 8 private life.
9. The sponsor was assisted by Mr Bashir who acted as a McKenzie friend. I stated that I would hear from Mr Bashir then confirm his submissions, translated in Arabic, with the sponsor. Mr Sheikh did not object to this course of action. The sponsor relied on the Rule 24 response and skeleton argument of the appellant dated 29 January 2026 (RSA) and the points made by Mr Bashir which I summarise as follows. The appellant was a child living alone in dire circumstances since 2021. There had been significant delay in his application. The appellant’s circumstances were exceptional and the judge had properly considered all relevant matters. The sponsor was worried that the appellant would be forced to fight in Syria. The judge’s findings were open to him on the evidence before him. The public interest is outweighed by the appellant’s and sponsor’s family life.
Conclusions and reasons
10. In coming to my conclusions I have taken into account the documentary evidence, in particular the grounds of appeal and the appellant’s RSA dated 29 January 2026, in addition to the oral submissions and case law to which I was referred.
11. In the case of Kumari at [35], the Court referred to previous authority and stated that family life for the purpose of Article 8 of the Convention is normally limited to the core family and there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”.
12. The Court of Appeal in IA (at [116]) held that this was the correct test to be applied. At [125] of IA, the Court stated:
“In our judgment, it is undesirable to lay down hard and fast rules as to how the additional elements of dependency test should be applied. It obviously requires some dependence, and dependence is more than the existence of support, even if that support is qualified by the adjectives real, committed or effective. Kumari makes clear that it is harder for adults to demonstrate the necessary dependency because family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family. The examples in Kumari at [38]-[39] (see [50] above) make clear the kinds of physical or mental dependency that might qualify. They are not exhaustive, and dependency may take many forms, as Kumari at [37] and [41]-[43] also reminds us. So far as exclusive dependency is concerned, on the particular facts of that case, Alvarado made clear that it was not always required to establish family life. Moreover, whilst one person being completely dependent on another might normally satisfy the additional elements of dependency test, it is not the only way that the test can be satisfied as the cases we have cited demonstrate.”
13. There is no material error of law as alleged in ground 1 because it is apparent from [20] that the judge applied the test in Kumari. The judge acknowledged that the sponsor was not the appellant’s parent and therefore something “more than normal emotional ties” was required. The appellant was 17 years old at the date of hearing and the judge found that the sponsor was caring for the appellant in the absence of parental figures and supporting him financially. The judge found there was family life before the sponsor came to the UK and there were good reasons for the gap in contact. There was something more than affection between siblings.
14. The judge’s finding that family life existed between the appellant and the sponsor was open to him on the evidence before him. The appellant and sponsor lived together before the sponsor came to the UK. There had been a complete collapse of the appellant’s family unit and he was living alone with no parental support. The appellant was dependant on the sponsor both financially and emotionally. This is not an over simplistic approach and there was no challenge to the sponsor’s credibility or the judge’s factual findings. I am persuaded by the appellant’s submissions at [13] to [17] of his RSA. The judge carried out a fact-sensitive assessment and there was no material error of law in his conclusion that family life existed between the appellant and sponsor such that Article 8 was engaged.
15. There is no merit in ground 2. There was no dispute on the facts and the judge’s findings adequately demonstrate that he considered the nature and quality of the appellant’s relationship with the sponsor. At [22], he attached significant weight to public interest acknowledging at [19] and [22] that the appellant could not satisfy the Immigration Rules.
16. There is no material error of law as alleged in ground 3. The judge carried out a holistic assessment and put all relevant factors into the balance when assessing proportionality. The appellant’s connection to the UK was through his brother, the sponsor, on whom the judge found the appellant was dependent. The appellant’s circumstances in Syria are relevant to the proportionality assessment given the appellant was 17 at the date of hearing and the judge was obliged to consider the best interests of the child as part of that assessment. I am not persuaded the judge strayed into a consideration of Article 3 or Article 8 private life. The judge considered the appellant’s circumstances as part of his assessment of whether there was family life at [20] and there was no material error of law in his assessment of whether the refusal of entry clearance was proportionate at [22].
17. Mr Sheikh accepted that ground 4 stands or falls with ground 1. In my view, ground 4 is misconceived and contrary to the Court of Appeal’s analysis in IA. The judge was bound to follow Al Hassan and Others (Article 8; entry clearance; KF) Syria [2024] UKUT 00234 (IAC).
18. The judge directed himself on section 117B at [4] and I am satisfied he applied it at [22]. In any event, the judge attached significant weight to the public interest and the failure to refer to the appellant’s ability to speak English was not material. There was no challenge to the judge’s finding that the appellant was 17 years old at the date of hearing and he was financially dependent on the sponsor.
19. Accordingly, I find there was no material error of law in the judge’s decision of 10 April 2025. The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
Appeal dismissed.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 10 April 2025 is upheld.

J Frances

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 February 2025