Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003138

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/51246/2024
LH/06521/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10 November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BARTLETT

Between

NEHEMIAH JOSEPH
Appellant
and

SECRETARY Of STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Pullinger
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo

Heard at Field House on 23 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. On 29 September 2023 the appellant made a claim for leave to remain as a spouse that was refused by the respondent in a decision letter dated 15 November 2023. The appellant appealed this decision to the First-tier tribunal who refused his appeal in a decision dated 12 April 2025. The appellant’s application for permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier tribunal. The appellant made an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal which was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman on 14 July 2025. Permission to appeal was granted on both grounds and the grant of appeal includes the following:

a. that it is arguable that the judge erred at paragraph 35 in finding that the appellant and his sponsor could sell up “their property and possessions in the United Kingdom” in order to fund their relocation to St Lucia. According to the grounds of appeal, their evidence was that they did not own their house and did not have any savings. UTJ Hoffman stated this is arguably material to the judge’s findings in respect of paragraph EX.1 which, if met, would be determinative of the article 8 ECHR appeal;

b. it is said that this ground raises several weak points including what appears to be a near miss argument in relation to the appellant’s ability to meet the requirements of the rules. However, “it is arguable that the judge failed to engage with the appellant’s evidence (a) that he would have no accommodation and no way of supporting himself in St Lucia while he awaited the outcome of an application for entry clearance and (b) the Home Office told his sponsor that he could make his application for leave to remain from within the UK (although contrary to what is asserted in the grounds, I see no reference to this in the sponsor’s witness statement)”.

This hearing

2. At this hearing Mr Pullinger made oral submissions which largely followed the grounds of appeal. In relation to ground one, I asked him how he interpreted the word “property” in paragraph 10 of the determination. He said “a house”. I asked on what basis he had reached that interpretation and he said the use of the phrase “property and possessions” in the judgement and that the judge would not use the word possessions to refer to material objects only. I asked if there was any other basis for his interpretation of the word property and he said that the appellant had not presented any evidence that they had housing or material objects to sell to fund a move to St Lucia. I pointed out that the determination did not make any findings the appellant or the sponsor had a flat or house and Mr Pullinger said paragraph 35 implied that the judge had made that finding.

3. In relation to ground two and the submission that the judge had failed to consider the sponsor’s evidence that the Home Office had told her the appellant could make his application for leave to remain from the United Kingdom, Mr Pullinger made reference to UTJ Hoffman’s comment in the grant of appeal that there was no reference to it in the sponsor’s witness statement and referred me to paragraph 14 of the appellant’s witness statement which set out the following:

4. I asked Mr Pullinger if that paragraph mentioned the Home Office because I could not see those words in it. Mr Pullinger accepted it did not then referred me to the sponsor’s witness statement at paragraph 23 which set out the following:

5. Mr Pullinger also referred me to the what he referred to as the sponsor’s “witness statement” that was submitted as part of the original application to the Home Office and that was included in the bundle in front of the First-tier Tribunal. This is not a witness statement as it does not contain a statement of truth and is clearly set out in letter format. This included the following paragraph:

6. Mr Pullinger submitted that this was a significant feature of the appellant’s case on which the judge made no finding. I asked Mr Pullinger if this argument featured in the appellant’s skeleton argument in front of the First-tier Tribunal and he accepted it did not. I asked if it appeared in submissions in front of the First-tier Tribunal and he said that this argument was made in oral submissions. I asked him on what basis he was able to state this and he said “on the basis of the grounds seeking permission to appeal” and he referred to paragraph 19 of those grounds which sets out the following:

7. I pointed out that this did not make any reference to submissions and I repeated my question as to on what basis Mr Pullinger said that this argument was made in submissions to the First-tier Tribunal to which Mr Pullinger responded “on instructions from my client”. I asked if he was saying that they had expressly told him it was raised in oral submissions and he said yes. I pointed out to him that he had no evidence of this. Mr Pullinger accepted that he had not produced a copy of the record of proceedings or a note from counsel who attended the hearing (and the sponsor’s witness statement prepared for this hearing did not mention it) but he said that generally the appellant and the sponsor’s credibility was not called into question in this case and the evidence was before the first-tier Tribunal at least in written form. He did accept that case law states that a judge is not required to go through all of the evidence with a magnifying glass and it is for counsel to raise relevant parts.

8. I find that Mr Pullinger has failed to establish that this was an argument raised at the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant’s witness statement makes no reference to the Home Office giving an assurance about him being able to make an application from United Kingdom, the sponsor’s witness statement includes one sentence which is vague in the extreme. In the light of the lack of evidence, I do not accept that the judge’s attention was drawn to the sponsor’s witness statement made at the time of the application. Therefore, I conclude that Mr Pullinger is seeking to make an argument that was not made in front of the First-tier Tribunal and is therefore trying to argue the case on new grounds.

Ground one

9. I find that the judge did not make an error in finding that the appellant and his sponsor “could sell up their property and possessions in the United Kingdom”. There is no finding in the determination that the appellant or his sponsor owned a flat or house in the United Kingdom. I do not consider that it can be reasonably inferred that the judge used property to describe real property only such as a flat or house. The word property is used both legally and generally in this country to include many things other than real property. This is evidenced for example by the use of the term “lost property”. There is simply nothing to imply in this judgement that the word property was a relating to a flat or house. I find that the use of the word possessions after property is insufficient in all the circumstances to give meaning to the word property as a flat or a house.

10. Mr Pullinger’s argument was developed from the grounds of appeal to include submissions that the reference to possessions was unclear, it was not put to the sponsor that she had savings and if it was, she would have explained that she had used them up when she and the appellant had lived in St Lucia.

11. I find that the judge made a broadbrush statement that the appellant and sponsor could sell up their property and possessions in the United Kingdom. He did not quantify what these were. This is not a material error in the context of the case which was to consider if there were insurmountable obstacles to the appellant and sponsor continuing their family life in St Lucia. The judge found that both the appellant and sponsor could work in St Lucia and those findings have not being challenged. In those circumstances, the fact that the sale of property and possessions is likely to raise a minimal amount is not material. As set out above, I also note that the judge did not make a finding to indicate that the sale of property and possessions would provide any amount.

12. In any event, I find that it cannot be a material error. This is because, as I have set out in relation to ground two, the judge made sustainable findings as to why the appellant and the sponsor were able to maintain themselves in St Lucia. This included their ability to find work.

13. I find that there is no material error of law in relation to ground one.

Ground two

14. I find that the argument that the judge failed to engage with the appellant’s evidence that he would have no accommodation and no way of supporting himself in St Lucia whilst he awaited the outcome of an application for entry clearance is untenable. The judge made findings [35] that the appellant and sponsor “could find employment in St Lucia and that the appellant has worked there as an auto mechanic”. It was open to the judge to make this conclusion given his findings that the appellant had previously worked there and the sponsor had nothing more than minor health conditions. The judge made no finding that the appellant has accommodation in St Lucia and that is not an error of law. The judge was satisfied that the appellant would be able to support himself which includes being able to obtain accommodation at the point of return. This is the correct approach and does not disclose an error of law.

15. In relation to the claim that the judge failed to engage with the appellant’s evidence that the Home Office told his sponsor that he could make his application for leave to remain from within the United Kingdom, as I have set out above I find that it has not been established that the argument that the appellant and sponsor had relied on the statement from the Home Office was made before the First-tier Tribunal. I find that the appellant’s witness statement did not mention this at all, the paragraph I was referred to did not set out that a statement had been made by the Home Office. I find that the appellant’s evidence is too vague to be relied on as Mr Pullinger submits. Again the sponsor’s evidence in her witness statement was vague, it included one opaque sentence. Without this being raised as part of an argument before the First-tier Tribunal judge, the judge cannot be found to have made an error of law in not considering this. I find that the judge was not obliged to trawl through the bundle to find one paragraph in the sponsor’s letter accompanying the original application and from this to make a legal argument that had not been made before him. To fail to do this is not an error of law.

16. For all the reasons set out above, I find that the First-tier Tribunal decision dated 12 April 2025 does not contain a material error of law.

Notice of Decision

The Decision of the First Tier Tribunal dated 12 April 2025 does not contain a material error of law. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

J Bartlett

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 October 2025