Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003151

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/61743/2024
LP/00042/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAINI

Between

HM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Hussain, Legal Representative; Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7th November 2025

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Reed dismissing his protection and human rights claims. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal, which was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Keith in the following terms:
“1. The appeal is on two grounds. I deal with the second ground first. It is arguable that the Judges finding at para [47] is in error: “47. The Appellant was also inconsistent regarding the location of his CSID documentation. He had previously stated, in both the Interview and witness statement, that the document had been left at home. However, for the first time, in oral evidence he stated that the CSID had been taken and left in a named Iraqi town near the Iranian border.” In contrast, the appellant appears to refer to the named Iraqi town in answer to question [45] of the AIR. While this is only one finding on credibility, and it relates to a discrete issue, it is arguably material to the analysis of the Appellant’s ability to return to Iraq.
2. Ground (1) consists of a series of references to the Judge’s judgment relating to his assessment of the appellant’s credibility, and then either bare assertions that the Judge’s reasons are inadequate, or rearguments about those findings. While this ground looks very weak, I do not limit the grant of permission, as ground (1) also relates to credibility”.
2. The Secretary of State provided a Rule 24 response and indicated that the appeal was resisted.
Findings
3. At the close of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I shall now give. I do not find that there is an error of law in the decision such that it should be set aside. My reasons for so finding are as follows.
4. In respect of the first ground it is argued that the judge has in essence provided inadequate reasoning. The first complaint is that paragraph 44, wherein the judge finds that the Appellant has been inconsistent regarding the murder of his cousin by his uncles, is incorrect as the Appellant’s evidence has not been inconsistent and he in any event provided further details during cross-examination. As to paragraph 44, the argument made by Mr Hussain was that although there was an inconsistency between his screening interview and his later evidence, he clarified this at the first opportunity. Notwithstanding I accept what Mr Hussain says that errors can be made in screening interviews and it is not the place to find the beginning, start and end of an Appellant’s claim, the point being made in the grounds (not pleaded by him) is that there was no inconsistency and therefore one could not have been found by the judge. However, this is factually incorrect given that there is an inconsistency between the answers given, as Mr Hussain accepted. Albeit that not all judges would have focused upon that inconsistency, the inconsistency was a matter which it was open to the judge to take into account and make findings upon.
5. In relation to the next submission, that the Appellant was not also inconsistent regarding the uncles who had killed his cousin and their positions and influence, it is argued that the Appellant did not know their ranks and expressly said so but .clarified this in his later witness statement stating that two of them are brigadier generals and one is a colonel. It is not in dispute that these details were not provided by him in interview. Turning to question 15 of the asylum interview at page 155 of the composite bundle to analyse this submission with care, the question asked is: “Your uncles that work for the KDP can you tell me what their roles and responsibilities are please?”, and the answer given by the Appellant is “they work inside the building of Peshmerga I do not know their responsibilities or roles exactly, but they have military roles I don’t know if they are colonels or brigadiers”. With that evidence in mind, turning to paragraph 45, the criticism is levelled against the judge’s statement that “In the Interview the Appellant did not know their ranks and expressly said so, however, in his witness statement he is able to state that two of them are a brigadier general and a colonel. He also provides details of their roles that had not been provided in the Interview”.
6. Contrary to what is argued in the grounds, the judge has factually noted the slight difference between the Appellant’s answer and his ignorance of the uncles’ ranks and their roles in interview, and contrasted that with the evidence given in his later witness statement. The implication is that the Appellant has embellished his evidence without explanation even though he was not armed with this knowledge earlier. Again, whilst this is not a detail that all judges would have focused upon, it was open to the judge to do so and it has not been argued, for example, that this or the previous error, indicates perversity by the individual who pleaded the grounds. Thus, on the point pleaded, the finding was open to the judge to make.
7. Turning to the next complaint that the Appellant had not noted the uncles’ affiliations to the PDK/KDP in his interview, merely stating that the KDP and the PUK “share the same authority”, it was argued by Mr Hussain that the KDP and the PUK jointly run Kurdistan and therefore they do share the same authority. Regrettably, I find this to be mere disagreement with the judge’s finding as the judge was plainly aware that the Appellant’s account was that the KDP and PUK share the same authority from the interview and it was thus open to the judge to note the later expansion of their roles and affiliations with the PDK/KDP.
8. As to the argument that the judge has provided inadequate reasons at paragraphs 48 to 49, when rejecting the Appellant’s account of the loss of contact with his family and the Appellant’s reasons for not claiming asylum in third countries on his journey to the UK, although the grounds are that the judge’s reasons are inadequate, there is no illustration of why that is so, or what is omitted from the judge’s consideration that should have been taken into account or any other illustration of the inadequacy. For my part, I cannot see that there is anything inadequate in the judge’s findings at paragraphs 48 and 49 that were not open to them to so conclude. The judge considers both the subject of loss of contact with the family and the Appellant’s journey to the UK in paragraphs 48 and 49 respectively and there is nothing defective in the reasons which are intelligible and adequate from what I can see. Thus, I do not find that any error of law is made out in relation to Ground 1 and the cumulative errors that were raised.
9. Turning then to Ground 2, which is the primary reason upon which the judge granted permission to appeal, this ground specifically relates to the judge’s findings at paragraph 47 versus the Appellant’s answer at question 45 of the Asylum Interview Record in relation to the location of the Appellant’s CSID document. The argument made is that the judge has misdirected himself in relation to the whereabouts of the ID card because, at question 45 in the Appellant’s first Asylum Interview Record taken on 2nd April 2024, the Appellant had confirmed he had his ID card until he arrived in Qalatdize which is inconsistent with paragraph 47 of the judge’s decision. Looking at paragraph 47, the judge first notes that the Appellant previously stated in both the interview and witness statement, that the ID document had been left at home. This is not in dispute and is correct. However, the judge then states that ”for the first time in oral evidence” the Appellant states that the CSID had been taken and left in Qalatdize. The judge notes that this is relevant to whether the Appellant could retrieve the CSID from his family or not. This is an error of fact as the Appellant does state at question 45 that he took the ID card and left it in Qalatdize. I find that the judge has erred in respect of stating that the Appellant’s mention of the document being left in Qalatdize was only mentioned for the first time in oral evidence.
10. However, I must consider whether this was material to the outcome that the judge reached. The chronology of the Appellant’s account in assessing the materiality of this discrete error is of great relevance. Looking at the Appellant’s evidence in chronological order, I note first that the Appellant underwent five interviews. The first was his screening interview on 9th August 2022, the second was an Asylum Interview Record on 22nd December 2023, the third was a first supplementary interview on 12th February 2024, the fourth was a second supplementary interview on 22nd February 2024, and finally the fifth was a third supplementary interview on 2nd April 2024. As rehearsed by Mr Hussain, the Appellant in fact mentioned the identity documents for the first time, at answers 34 to 36 of the first supplementary interview on 12th February 2024 wherein he confirmed that he had all of his documents but they were left at his home. It was not until his third supplementary interview under two months later on 2nd April 2024 at answer 45 that the Appellant confirmed that he passed through the border because when he left his home, he had his ID “until (he) arrived in Qalatdize but no one asked me to present it until (he) arrived in Qalatdize”. Subsequent to that, approximately one year later, in the Appellant’s witness statement dated 4th April 2025 (a statement which was dated and signed by him in manuscript according to page 50 of the composite bundle) adopted by him before the First-tier Tribunal, at paragraphs 20 to 21, he states that he did not have a chance to take his ID documents from home. However, then in his oral evidence, the Appellant states – not for the first time, but for the second time – that he did have his CSID with him but he left it in Qalatdize, near the Iranian border. Thus, in summary, the Appellant first stated he left his ID at home, then said he left it in Qalatdize, then stated it was left at home and then stated once more he left it in Qalatdize.
11. The question I must ask is had the judge not held their mistaken belief that the Appellant stated this “for the first time in oral evidence”, would the true knowledge that the Appellant’s account have made a difference when assessing the Appellant’s credibility. Given my careful rehearsal of the Appellant’s changing account of when and where he left his documentation, were the entirety of the Appellant’s changing account known to the First-tier Tribunal Judge, I do not find that it would have made a difference to the outcome of the judge’s credibility assessment of whether or not the Appellant had left home with his CSID and whether it was available to him now from his family. Given that the Appellant’s account varied on four different occasions, I do not believe that the judge’s awareness of this would have made matters any better for the Appellant, in fact quite the opposite. Therefore, I do not find that this error is material to the judge’s finding on the CSID issue, let alone being material to the judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s credibility and his protection claim overall. Therefore I do not find that any material error of law is established in respect of Ground 2.
12. Thus, I do not find that there is any material error of law established in respect of Grounds 1 and 2.
13. In light of the above findings, I do not find that there is any merit in Grounds 1 or 2 such that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
Notice of Decision
14. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
15. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

P. Saini

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 November 2025