Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003153
UI-2025-003149
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58370/2023
PA/58371/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

1. HD
2. JDD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms E Atas of Counsel, instructed by MBM Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr P Lawson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 16 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants and their family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants and their family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants appealed against the decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) dated 21 April 2025 dismissing their appeal against the respondent's decision to refuse their protection and human rights claim.
2. The appellants appealed to the Upper Tribunal only against the First-tier Tribunal’s dismissal of their appeal on human rights grounds. No challenge was made to its dismissal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds. In a decision dated 14 October 2025, Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Sills found that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the appellants’ appeal on human rights grounds involved the making of an error on a point of law and set it aside to that extent. Judge Sills’s error of law decision is annexed to this decision.
3. Judge Sills formally recorded that the decision to dismiss the appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds stood. He further recorded the respondent’s concessions that the relationship between the first appellant and his partner, F, was genuine and subsisting and that he had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with their daughter, the second appellant.
4. Judge Sills ordered that the matter be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking of the decision on human rights grounds. This is that remaking.
5. For the sake of ease, I refer below to the first appellant as ‘the appellant’ and the second appellant as ‘J’.
Primary Findings of Fact
6. The appellant is a male citizen of Algeria born in July 1986. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 14 May 2016 on a 6-month visit visa. He claimed asylum on 28 February 2020 on the basis of membership of a particular social group: he claimed to be bisexual and to be at risk of consequential persecution from his family, the general public and the state.
7. The judge accepted that the appellant was bisexual [50] and that he had experienced some level of public hostility, and at least one physical attack in 2015 [68]. However, the judge rejected the remainder of the appellant’s account of events in Algeria, even to the lower standard. The judge’s findings of fact on the appellant’s protection claim are undisturbed by Judge Sills. He did not, however, preserve any of the judge’s findings under Article 8.
8. Consequently, I make the following findings.
9. The judge’s findings in favour of the appellant in his protection claim were made on application of the lower standard of proof. However, the appellant’s evidence at this hearing maintaining the truth of those matters was not challenged by Mr Lawson. Neither are those matters inherently improbable. Consequently, I accept on balance that the appellant is bisexual and that he was attacked as a result on at least one occasion in 2015. I should add that there was before me medical evidence apparently not drawn to the judge’s attention: a report concerning the scar on the appellant’s neck, corroborating his account of a second attack. No challenge is made to the judge’s decision on international protection; however, in considering the proportionality of removal I am satisfied that the appellant was probably attacked in Algeria on at least two occasions.
10. On 27 May 2017, the appellant was convicted in Algeria in his absence of drink-driving on 10 February 2016 and sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment and a fine.
11. The appellant and F met in August 2019 and began a relationship shortly afterwards. They have cohabited since then and, as conceded by the respondent, that relationship is genuine and subsisting.
12. F is a citizen of the Philippines who has been granted limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom, having been recognised as a victim of trafficking. Her account of the circumstances giving rise to her becoming a victim of trafficking are in short that she was the victim of domestic abuse in the Philippines, at the hands of her husband, the father of her first child. After around 7 years of abuse, she fled to Manilla and, after training there for domestic work, obtained a visa to work in Qatar. F worked there for 4 years for the extended family of her employer and then was brought with them to the United Kingdom, first in 2018 and again in 2019. She was exploited throughout this time. This account was not challenged by Mr Lawson, is not inherently improbable and so I accept it on balance as true.
13. F and her family are Catholic. She describes all of her family disapproving of her relationship with the appellant, save for her mother and then only in secret. F’s evidence that she is from a poor family and is poorly educated was not challenged. It is, in any event, consistent with her training for domestic work and then leaving the Philippines to work in Qatar. I accept her evidence in that regard, as well as her evidence that she would not by choice return to the Philippines, and certainly not whilst she has extant leave to remain. Given her experiences in the Philippines, I do not find that to be an unreasonable position.
14. The appellant and F are not legally married. They were married in an Islamic ceremony but have not provided any certificate of the marriage or record of any formalities observed. The appellant’s unchallenged evidence was that his family would not approve of his relationship with F and would not support them.
15. The couple’s daughter, J, was born in July 2020. She has therefore lived her entire life in the United Kingdom. The respondent appears to accept that J would be entitled to leave to remain consistent with her mother. J is established in education in the United Kingdom and is described by the Deputy Designated Safeguarding Lead at her Primary School as ‘thriving’ and exceeding age-related expectations. J was baptised Catholic on 18 April 2021. F states that J speaks only English. That is consistent with the information given in her primary school registration form and was not challenged in any even by Mr Lawson. I accept it to be true.
16. The appellant does not satisfy any of the primary requirements of the Immigration Rules. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether he satisfies the ‘exceptional circumstances’ provisions of GEN.3.2 or whether otherwise refusal would be a disproportionate interference in the Article 8 rights of any of this family. In reality, this involves the same test: whether refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for any affected person.
Analysis
17. I start, of course, by recognising the public interest in maintaining effective immigration controls. That aspect of the public interest should be given considerable weight. The appellant gave evidence in English, and so the public interest is not fortified by an inability to speak English. The appellant’s claim to be financially supported by friends rather than being reliant on the state was not challenged in cross-examination; however, it is clear that he has used the services of the NHS and so I find the public interest to be enhanced (but not as much as if he were reliant on welfare support).
18. The judge found that the appellant’s conviction in Algeria added to the public interest (upholding public safety and the rule of law). However, I do not take the same approach. First, this was not a matter raised in the refusal letter or in submissions. It would be unfair to take the point against the appellant. In any event, there is no suggestion of any repetition or other criminal conduct in the United Kingdom, and so I would not have found the public interest thereby to be materially fortified even if the matter were fairly in issue.
19. The appellant relies on a report by Dr Hasan Hafidh, an academic consultant on Middle East studies. He has served as a Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London and a Senior Teaching Fellow at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) London and the University of Leeds. Whilst his CV shows a particular focus on the Middle East, his work has covered the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and he has researched and lectured on the political and socio-economic issues surrounding Algeria, including state-societal relations, LGBTQ+ and Women’s rights, as well as Algerian authorities, minority groups such as Amazigh (Berber) and role of the military and insurgency groups. I accept that Dr Hafidh has the expertise to express opinions on the matters below (something which was not challenged by Mr Lawson in any event).
20. Dr Hafidh reports that discrimination against women persisting in Algeria with unemployment rates being 20.4% for women compared to 9.7% for men. A foreign woman would need to be legally married to an Algerian man in order to be able to settle in Algeria. As an unmarried couple, the appellant and F are likely to face societal hostility and/or social rejection for their interfaith relationship. J would potentially be viewed as a ‘love child’ and would inevitably experience stigmatisation in Algeria given the society’s common adherence to strict Islamic norms. Whilst religious freedom is legally guaranteed under Algeria’s constitution, Christians can face discrimination, harassment and pressure to follow Islamic customs from family members as well as the wider community (especially in rural or more religiously conservative parts of the country). Christians have become very vulnerable to state pressure alongside the ongoing societal pressures that can come from families and communities.
21. The respondent suggests in her refusal letter that the appellant could live with F and J in the Philippines. However, as noted above, F would not willingly return to the Philippines, at least while she has leave to remain in the United Kingdom. In any event, the respondent’s position appears to be based on the appellant's ability to obtain a spouse visa. However, the couple are not legally married, and the respondent has not adduced any evidence of the ability of non-married partners to gain leave to enter and remain in the Philippines. Consequently, I am not persuaded that this family could live together in the Philippines.
22. I have not been provided with any social worker report on the effect on J of the appellant’s removal. However, both the Safeguarding Manager and Deputy Designated Safeguarding Lead at her Primary School express concerns for her wellbeing if she were to leave the United Kingdom. I am persuaded on balance that it would be J’s best interests for her to remain in the United Kingdom, not only to preserve continuity of education but also because of the overall effect on her private life which has begun to develop beyond the bounds of family life with her parents. Furthermore, the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with F and J. They have lived together as a family unit all of her life, and I readily accept that their remaining together would be significantly in J’s best interests.
23. I am satisfied that it would be unreasonable to expect J to leave the United Kingdom, and certainly that it would be contrary to her best interests to go to Algeria in light of the matters above. However, J is 5 years and 8 months old and so is not a qualifying child. Had she been, the public interest would not have required the appellant’s removal. Nevertheless, the impact of the appellant’s removal on J’s best interests remains a primary consideration. It cannot be outweighed by any other single consideration.
24. Also weighing in the balance in the appellant’s favour is the likely social hostility and sigma likely to be experienced by F and J as the member and issue respectively of an unmarried partnership, members of a non-Muslim religion and as females (perhaps even more keenly felt by F as a victim of modern slavery). I also weigh in his favour the hostility he has previously experienced as a bisexual man (albeit that he is not at real risk of persecution on return).
25. I have had regard to the statutory consideration that the appellant’s private life in the United Kingdom was developed whilst his presence was precarious and so should be given little weight. F is not a qualifying partner, and their relationship developed almost entirely (if not entirely) whilst the appellant was present unlawfully. Consequently, I have had regard to the consideration that their family life should also be given little weight. However, little weight does not mean no weight at all, and I am satisfied in all of the circumstances as found above that the effect of the respondent’s decision on the appellant’s and F’s private lives and family life together can add material weight to the balance. In any event, the primary factor weighing in the appellant’s favour is the impact of removal on J.
26. As noted above, the public interest in maintaining effective immigration controls is (slightly) enhanced by his reliance on the NHS. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the appellant’s removal on this family unit would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the family such as to render it disproportionate.
27. For these reasons, I allow the appeal.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss the appeal on human rights grounds (Article 8) involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside.
2. That decision is remade and the appeal allowed on human rights grounds (Article 8).
3. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss the appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds stands.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
17 March 2026

Annex

Case No: UI-2025-003149
& UI-2025-003153
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58370/2023 &
PA/58371/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

04/11/2025
Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SILLS

Between

HD & JDD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hudson,
For the Respondent: Mr Tufan, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants and the First Appellant’s partner are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant and his daughter J, the Second Appellant, appeal against the decision of the FTT Judge (the Decision) dated 21 April 2025.
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2025
BACKGROUND
2. The Appellant is an Algerian national born in 1986. He entered the UK in 2016 and claimed asylum on 28 February 2020. He claims to be bisexual and to have suffered mistreatment in Algeria. He states he entered into a relationship with F, a national of the Philippines, in 2019. He claimed asylum on 28 February 2020. The Appellant and F had a child, the Second Appellant, born on 22 July 2020. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s protection claim, upon which F and the Second Appellant were dependent, on 7 October 2023.
3. Before the FTT, the Appellant pursued the appeal on protection grounds, and on human rights grounds relying on this relationship with F and the Second Appellant. F has been granted leave to remain as a victim of trafficking and is no longer dependent upon the appeal. In the Decision, the FTT Judge accepted that the Appellant was bisexual and had been a victim of at least one assault in 2015. However, the FTT Judge did not accept the entirety of the account about events in Algeria. The FTT Judge found aspects of the Appellant’s relationship with F not credible, but accepted the evidence about the Appellant’s relationship with his daughter. The FTT Judge found that it was not reasonably likely that the Appellant would be persecuted on return and dismissed the appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds.
4. In relation to Article 8, the FTT Judge found that the Appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration on return to Algeria. In relation to family life, the FTT Judge proceeded on the basis that the Second Appellant would be granted leave in line with F in due course. It was not suggested that the Second Appellant would relocate to Algeria with the Appellant. The family could relocate to the Philippines. The FTT Judge considered the best interests of the child, but found that the Appellant’s removal was proportionate and dismissed the appeal on ECHR Article 8 human rights grounds.
5. On 2 May 2025 the Appellant applied for permission to appeal. There was no challenge to the decision to dismiss the protection grounds of appeal. The grounds of challenge, as categorised by the Judge who subsequently granted permission, assert that the FTT Judge erred in the following ways in dismissing the appeal on ECHR Article 8 human rights grounds:-

i) In making unnecessary comments/conclusions as to the extent to which the First Appellant and their partner were in a genuine and subsisting relation (in circumstances where the Respondent had not challenged whether the relationship was genuine and it had been accepted that the Second Appellant was the five year old daughter of the couple).
ii) In allowing the aforementioned conclusions/comments to impact or otherwise infect the wider Article 8 assessment.
iii) In failing to properly consider the impact upon removal of Appellant to include how the Second Appellant would be cared for following the Appellant’s removal
iv) In considering only the insurmountable obstacles test set out in EX.1(b) and not the test in EX.1(a)(ii).
v) In failing to give adequate reasons.
6. The FTT granted permission on 14 July 2025. The permission Judge found no reference to the Respondent taking issue with the genuineness of the relationship and so considered that the first ground raised an arguable error of law.

The Hearing
7. At the hearing, Mr Tufan produced a Rule 24 Response which conceded that the FTT decision contained an error of law. The Rule 24 Response states:
‘R does not oppose A’s application for permission to appeal and invites the Tribunal to determine the appeal with a fresh oral (continuance) hearing.’
8. Mr Tufan confirmed that the Respondent accepted that the decision contained an error of law and must be set aside. He accepted in particular that grounds 1 and 2 identified an error of law and maintained that ground 4 was not an error. I therefore confirmed that in view of the concession, I would set aside the decision. Mr Hudson argued that the appeal should be remitted to the FTT, Mr Tufan argued the matter should be remade in the UT. I confirmed that the matter would be remade in the UT with reasons to follow.
Remaking or Remittal
9. I have considered whether the matter should be retained in the UT or remitted to the FTT. Paragraph 7 of the current Practice Direction deals with the procedure to be followed on an appeal to the UT when the UT has found that the FTT contains an error of law:
‘Disposal of appeals in Upper Tribunal
7.1 Where under section 12(1) of the 2007 Act (proceedings on appeal to the Upper Tribunal) the Upper Tribunal finds that the making of the decision concerned involved the making of an error on a point of law, the Upper Tribunal may set aside the decision and, if it does so, must either remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal under section 12(2)(b)(i) or proceed (in accordance with relevant Practice Directions) to re-make the decision under section 12(2)(b)(ii).
7.2 The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to re-make the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:-
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.
7.3 Remaking rather than remitting will nevertheless constitute the normal approach to determining appeals where an error of law is found, even if some further fact finding is necessary.’
10. I have considered the guidance in the cases of Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 00046 and AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512. In particular, Begum states at Headnote [3]:
‘Not every finding of an error of law concerning unfairness will require the appeal to be remitted: the nature of the unfairness and the extent of its impact on the findings made overall will need to be evaluated as part of the decision as to whether the general principle should be departed from.’
11. In relation to para 7.2(a), I do not consider that the effect of the errors has been such as to deprive the Appellants of a fair hearing or other opportunity for the Appellants’ case to be put. Only the first two grounds, as distilled in the grant of permission and conceded by the Respondent, concern procedural fairness.
12. The accepted procedural error is that the Judge had made adverse findings on matters which had been not in dispute, namely the Appellant’s relationship with F, in circumstances in which the Respondent had accepted that they had a genuine and subsisting relationship. These findings infected or may have infected the Article 8 proportionality assessment. However, the effect of the error has not been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal. It was not argued that the unfairness had any impact upon, and there is no challenge to, the decision in relation to the appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds. The unfairness related to one particular issue concerning the appeal on human rights grounds. The unfairness did not have any impact upon the decision under ECHR Article 8 so far as it concerned private life under ECHR Article 8 and Rule 276ADE(1). It did not impact on the decision that the Appellant enjoyed family life in the UK. The impact of the unfairness was confined to the proportionality assessment under ECHR Article 8. While that is significant and means that the decision on ECHR Article 8 grounds must be re-made, the unfairness concerned a discrete issue and does not mean that overall, the Appellant was deprived of a fair hearing or was unable to put his case.
13. In relation to para 7.2(b), the Respondent accepts that the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with the Second Appellant, and that the Appellant and F are in a genuine and subsisting relationship. Only limited further fact finding is required.
14. I take account of the procedural implications for the Appellants in that remaking in the UT deprives the Appellants of a further right of appeal to the UT. Nonetheless, given that the unfairness related to a discrete issue and did not render the hearing unfair, and the limited fact finding required, remaking in the UT is appropriate.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the FTT to dismiss the appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds stands.
The decision of the FTT to dismiss the appeal on ECHR Article 8 human rights grounds contains an error of law and is set aside.
That decision will be remade in the UT.
Directions
1. The appeal should be listed for further hearing in the UT on the first available date after 14 November 2025.
2. The Appellants must file and serve a consolidated bundle no later than 2 weeks prior to the relisted hearing date.

I record here the following concessions made by the Respondent at the hearing before me:

1. The Respondent accepts that the relationship between the Appellant and his partner F is genuine and subsisting.
2. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with the Second Appellant.

Judge Sills

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 October 2025