Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003154

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/58672/2022
LH/04104/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

Kifayat Ullah
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K. Pullinger (counsel instructed via Imperium Chambers)
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 21 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
2. In this matter the Appellant (born in 1990) appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Austin (“the Judge”) dated 10 March 2025. The Judge had dismissed the Appellant’s human rights appeal in respect of his application for Indefinite Leave to Remain which had been refused because the Appellant had used deception in a previous application.
3. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal Judge.
4. Following a renewed application, permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick on the papers by way of a decision dated 21 August 2025.
Bundles of Documents and Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal
5. I have been provided with a very large bundle of documents comprising 1939 pages. It is not clear why such a large bundle of documents was provided. I do invite the Appellant’s legal representatives to ensure that only those documents which might be useful and referred to at the hearing be included in bundles to the Tribunal. I deal with this further in the judgment. Mr Pullinger has helpfully taken me to the pages which he asks I consider and I shall turn to them shortly.
6. The grounds of appeal have been drafted by Mr Paul Turner of counsel with a date of 17 July 2025.
7. The grounds of appeal have not been drafted in accordance with the clear guidance provided by the Upper Tribunal in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal-Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC). That decision had explained:
“2. Whether a party is represented or not, they are required to identify the arguable errors of law in the grounds of appeal, adequately, so that the arguable error can be considered by a judge.
3. Each point of law, where there is more than one, must be clearly and succinctly identified as a numbered ground of appeal with sufficient detail so that the Tribunal and the parties are able to identify the essential issue raised by that ground. The grounds of appeal will rarely need to be lengthy. Each ground of appeal should identify succinctly, in clearly numbered paragraphs or (sub paragraphs)”
8. Ground 1 contends that the Judge misapplied the principles which derive from the decision in Devaseelan (Second Appeals-ECHR-Extra-Territorial Effect) Sri Lanka [2002] UKIAT 00702*.
9. Ground 2 contends that the Judge failed to consider the relevant circumstances, submissions and evidence.
10. The grounds then state that Grounds 1 and 2 overlap. Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce in a decision dated 18 December 2017 referred to the Appellant having admitted cheating in his Test of English for International Communication (“TOEIC” tests). The Appellant had sought to resile from his admission of deception which he had made in a witness statement to First-tier Tribunal Judge Heynes in 2016. In summary, the issue before me is whether there was new evidence which might have persuaded First-tier Tribunal Judge Austin on 10 March 2025 to come to a different conclusion about the Appellant’s previously admitted cheating. There was said to be a photograph of the Appellant, medical evidence and attempts to seek recordings from the ETS.
11. It is said further that Appellant was granted Leave to Remain on the 5-year route in 2021 despite his cheating and that therefore this was relevant to the proportionality assessment in respect of Article 8 ECHR. The grounds said that nor was Dr Saima Latif’s expert report considered adequately. Additionally, the Appellant had a wife and child in the UK and that was not adequately considered either by the Judge.
12. Ground 3 contends that the Judge made a serious allegation that the Applicant ‘got into a relationship’ yet the Appellant and his partner have had a child together which shows the important nature of the relationship. It is said in the grounds that inappropriate to reduce the weight to be attached on the basis of the Judge’s speculative finding.
13. Finally, the Appellant had said in his grounds that he was providing new evidence that he had made complaints against his former representatives. It was admitted that these documents were not before the Judge. As I understood it, Mr Pullinger conceded that I could only take those documents into account if I was to find that there was a material error of law in the Judge’s decision as part of a Rule 15(2A) application. In any event though, I was not taken to such documents. I shall return to this.
Procedural Background
14. The relevant procedural chronology is that on 8 November 2022 the Respondent made a decision to refuse the Appellant leave to remain. That decision refers to the Appellant having arrived in the UK as a student on 20 March 2011. On 11 August 2012 the Appellant applied to extend his leave. He was granted leave to remain until 20 December 2013. He made a further extension leave application on 20 December 2014 and he was then granted leave to remain until 15 October 2015. However, on 9 February 2015 the Applicant was served with a notice for liability for removal because it was alleged that he had obtained leave to remain by deception.
15. On 13 February 2015 the Applicant was placed on Temporary Admission. On 2 March 2015 the Applicant had made an out of time application for leave to remain based on Family and Private Life Grounds. Here the Appellant referred to having a partner. She was called Ms Deeanne Grace Ashurst and was born in 1975. The Appellant states he married Ms Ashurst on 8 July 2015. Later there was a separation and there must have been a divorce (according to the Appellant in 2021 and the decree absolute states 2022) because the Appellant later married someone else from Pakistan. I shall return to this. The 2 March 2015 application was refused by the Respondent on 9 April 2015. That decision had stated that for his application on 11 August 2012 the Applicant had submitted a certificate from Educational Testing Services (“ETS”). The decision further states, “ETS undertook a check of your test and confirmed to the SSHD that there was significant evidence to conclude that your certificate was fraudulently obtained by the use of a proxy test taker. The decision stated, “Your application falls for refusal on grounds of suitability under Section S-LTR of Appendix FM under paragraph 276ADE(1)(i) of the Immigration Rules because you cannot meet S-LTR 1.6 and 4.2 for the reasons given above with regards to the deception used in relation to the English language test.”
16. The decision also stated, “You advised us that you are now separated from your British spouse. You have also provided no evidence that you have maintained any relationship with her children. You have also not told us about a partner, parent or dependent children in the United Kingdom…”.
17. On 22 April 2015 the Appellant filed an appeal against the Refusal of 9 April 2015. That appeal had come for hearing before First-tier Tribunal Judge Heynes. The Appellant’s appeal was dismissed on all grounds on 25 April 2016.
18. The Appellant had sought permission appeal to against the 25 April 2016 decision. Permission was granted. The appeal had then come for hearing before Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce who had allowed the appeal on human rights grounds by way of a decision dated 18 December 2017.
19. On 22 January 2018 the Appellant was granted leave to remain until 22 July 2020.
20. On 17 July 2020 the Applicant had made an application for leave to remain as the spouse of Ms Ashurst. On 26 April 2021 he was granted leave to remain until 31 October 2021. I note that the Appellant stated that the couple had divorced in 2021. The decree absolute is dated 5 September 2022.
21. On 7 September 2021 though, the Appellant made an application for Indefinite Leave to Remain on the basis of his length of residence in the UK. That application was refused on 8 November 2022 and it is that matter which is before me. The Appellant admits in a skeleton argument that there was a ‘gap’ in residence when the TOEIC matters had come to light.
The Submissions Before Me
22. In his oral submissions before me, Mr Pullinger took grounds 1 and 2 together. He referred to paragraph 6 of the grounds which states:
“6. The Appellant addressed these issues in the current appeal. He provided medical evidence from around the time of his statement from January 2016, he had been to the GP to discuss stress and anxiety, he had significant, chronic back pain, his medication had changed and was having a number of other investigations and issues.”
23. Mr Pullinger said that the Judge had completely failed to acknowledge or consider this evidence or these explanations and that therefore it was a plain error.
24. In relation to Article 8, it was said that the judge had failed to deal with a number of important matters, the significance of which was that the allegation about deception “had been dropped” and the Appellant had been granted leave to remain by him in 2021. It is also said that there had been a need for consideration of proportionality and the effect on the Appellant’s partner and child. It was acknowledged that whilst the Appellant’s partner only had a skilled worker visa the only consideration of the circumstances by the Judge was that the Appellant’s partner had family members in Pakistan. Ground 3 contends that the judge seemingly ‘went into speculative mode’ whereby the Appellant was said to have entered into his current relationship to bolster his immigration status. It was submitted that this was a very serious allegation to make. But in any event Mr Pullinger submitted that the Judge’s speculation was contradictory and irrational, given the Appellant had child with his partner.
25. Mr Pullinger amplified the grounds of appeal further. He said all he could on behalf of the Appellant. He took me to various documents within the bundle, for example, to the medical evidence, such, at pages 947 to 960 of the bundle. These were entries in the General Practitioner records. Such records are never easy to read, as anyone who has ever looked at such records will know, but I accept that they show that the Appellant visited his General Practitioner. He suffers with low back pain. It is chronic which means it has been long standing and will continue. I was taken to entry for 11 September 2015 with back pain too, and for example, on 24th February 2015. I also note that there is an entry for 24 July 2015 which states that the Appellant had low mood. He had attended the GP with his wife. The entry states, “married 2 weeks ago. Think marriage is a scam. Have taken away right to leave…work even driving [licence]. Obviously affecting mood…Feels drained/useless and guilty. No thoughts of self harm. Next appeal in Jan. one in Oct has been cancelled.”
26. Mr Pullinger said that the relevance of this evidence was that it went to whether or not the Appellant was or was not under physical and mental strain when he signed the ‘admission’ in respect of his TOEIC witness statement in 2016.
27. Mr Pullinger said that other aspect was whether or not a photograph was taken on the day the Appellant attending his English language test. It was further submitted why would the Appellant be trying to get documents for his English language test if they did not exist? Mr Pullinger stressed the point in relation to the 5-year settlement route, in which he said that there was no refusal or rejection based on suitability grounds. Mr Pullinger said that there was a legitimate expectation that it would not be used against him since the TOEIC test. Mr Pullinger referred to paragraph 29 of the Judge’s decision which he said was reference by the Judge to the Appellant’s mental health in an abrupt way because in fact there was an expert report specifically obtained on 25 May 2023.
28. In relation to ground 3, Mr Pullinger said that the Judge referred to the Appellant’s new relationship and that he had a child shortly before the hearing before Judge Austin, He said too that as it happens, the Appellant and his wife had a second child a few days ago. Mr Pullinger said that the point was that the Home Office had accepted that the relationship was seen as genuine, whereas the judge said at paragraph 30 that this was just a way to post to the immigration status. The Judge had thereby reduced the impact that the Appellant had with his biological child and thereby indicating that there was some dishonest intention and it was not open to the Judge and amounted to an error of law.
29. I heard from Mr Tan in reply. He referred me to various parts of the judge’s decision. He said that it had been necessary for the Appellant to comply with the decision of the former IAT in BT (Former solicitors’ alleged misconduct) Nepal [2004 UKIAT 00311 which stated,
“If an appeal is based in whole or in part on allegations about the conduct of former representatives, there must be evidence that those allegations have been put to the former representative, and the Tribunal must be shown either the response or correspondence indicating that there has been no response.”
30. Mr Tan said that the Appellant’s appeal had been dismissed in 2016 based when fraud by the Appellant had been alleged. The Upper Tribunal had upheld that decision.
31. Mr Tan said that if the Appellant really had been ill as significantly as he claimed when he signed the documents admitting his fraud, then he would have had had such evidence. Mr Tan said that Judge Austin did not see that a new issue had been raised. He applied the facts to the other findings. It would have made no material difference in any event said Mr Tan.
32. Mr Tan said that it was a slight oddity that the Applicant was granted leave on the 5 year route but there was no evidence that the grant of that leave, in view of the Appellant’s immigration history, meant that there was a ‘free pass’ in respect of suitability matters.
33. Finally, Mr Tan referred to the report of Dr Latif which said that the Appellant was taking antidepressants and such treatment is clearly available in Pakistan. Nor was there any evidence to suggest that the Appellant could not integrate in Pakistan or access support and assistance there. Mr Tan said that at paragraphs 29 and 32 of the decision, the Judge had undertaken the proportionality assessment on the basis that the relationship exists and that there was a child from the relationship. Mr Tan said it was of note that there was no oral evidence from the partner at the hearing before the Judge.
34. Thereafter Mr Pullinger made further submissions including referring me to page 358 of the bundle in respect of the GP records which were about the time of the Appellant signing his witness statement and he invited me to allow the appeal. I set out here that the entry for 10 March 2016 show that the Appellant had blocked ears and was prescribed ear drops. Chronic back pain was referred to. The Appellant was advised to take painkillers and antidepressants but did not want either. He had low mood. He had “problems with home office and immigration status”. Guilt and low mood are also referred as was that the Home Office think he committed fraud. It also states, “low mood, frustrated, angry”. There is reference to moving to New Zealand with his then wife.
Consideration and Analysis- The Law on Appeals
35. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
36. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
37. The Appellant is sitting here in Court and I pause to stress 2 things of which I am sure he will have been made aware by Mr Pullinger and Mr Turner: Firstly, the two tier appeal system does not mean that his appeal simply starts again. The hearing was at the First-tier Tribunal. This hearing before me is not merely another attempt at a hearing on that same basis. I stress that I must respect the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal. I should also be slow to conclude that relevant factual matters were not considered or taken into account. Similarly, when it comes to the reasons given by the first instance judge, I must exercise judicial restraint and I should not assume that there was any misdirection. Secondly, decisions of the First-tier Tribunal are not to be read like a piece of legislation and nor can there be an expectation of absolute perfection of expression within them. There are different ways in which judges express themselves, especially when dealing with findings of fact.
Consideration and Analysis- Including the Factual Matters and Issues
38. The sheer number of documents in this case have been presented in a very unhelpful way. It is necessary therefore to look to the actual issues and then to locate the relevant documents. These are matters which the Appellant’s representatives will be well aware of and I should not have to remind them. It is rare indeed that a bundle of almost 2000 pages is required for a hearing of this type. It is noteworthy that very few of those 2000 pages were actually referred to during the hearing before me. As was made clear in Lata (FtT: Principal Controversial Issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC):
“3. The reformed appeal procedures are specifically designed to ensure that the parties identify the issues, and they are comprehensively addressed before the First-tier Tribunal, not that proceedings before the IAC are some form of rolling reconsideration by either party of its position.
4. It is a misconception that it is sufficient for a party to be silent upon, or not make an express consideration as to, an issue for a burden to then be placed upon a judge to consider all potential issues that may favourably arise, even if not expressly relied upon. The reformed appeal procedures that now operate in the First-tier Tribunal have been established to ensure that a judge is not required to trawl though the papers to identify what issues are to be addressed. The task of a judge is to deal with the issues that the parties have identified.”
39. It is therefore also necessary for me to add that the bundle of documents provided by the parties must also comply with the underlying theme of the important decision by the Presidential panel in Lata. The parties must not seek to provide thousands of pages of documents which merely make the task for the Judge more time consuming. It is obvious that I am not going so far as saying what occurred in this case was deliberate, but much more care must be taken in the future when providing bundles of documents to the Tribunal, both here at the Upper Tribunal, but also at the First-tier Tribunal.
40. I would go so far as to say though that Appellants providing unnecessarily large bundles of documents for no apparent reason are likely to cause a Judge to be concerned that there is no substance to the case and that the reason why unnecessarily excessive documents had been provided was to attempt to add padding to a weak case. Therefore, care with preparation of the bundle and providing the Judge with only relevant documents will always be beneficial for Appellants. Such an approach will also further the overriding objective.
41. I note that electronic page 1867 shows that there is a letter from the Home Office to the Appellant dated 11 June 2015 that there had been an investigation into the marriage with Ms Ashurst. The letter states that the couple had both complied with the investigation. It was said that the compliance with the investigation, “…does not constitute a determination as to the genuineness of the relationship on which it is based”.
42. There is a psychological report dated 19 May 2023. It has been prepared by Dr Saima Latif, a psychologist. She states that she prepared the report following a 2 hour WhatsApp video assessment. She states that the Appellant meets the diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder. It is said that the Appellant’s mental health issues will affect his capacity to reintegrate into Pakistan and would lead to a significant deterioration in his mental health and a worsening of his depression conditions. An ongoing course of therapeutic intervention was required to stabilise his mental heath which the Appellant was receiving from “Mindsmatter”. Dr Latif said that the risk of suicide would significantly increase if was forced to return to Pakistan “at this point”.
43. Paragraph 7.3.3 of Dr Latif’s report refers to the Appellant working as an Aviation Security Officer at Manchester Airport. He had said he works shifts and struggles with his job due to problems sleeping.
44. There was a Rule 15(2A) application. One was very recent application dated 14 November 2024 whereby the Appellant provided a marriage certificate dated 18 August 2025 that he married Taskeen Gul. There is also a short note from a midwife dated 29 August 2025 that Taskeen Gul was due to give birth in the week of 21 November 2025. The earlier Rule 15(2A) application is referred to within the grounds with the complaints by the Appellant of his previous legal representatives, but I was not referred to such documents at the hearing.
45. The Appellant’s witness statement of 21 June 2024 refers to his new partner Taskeen Gul. He stated at paragraph 3 of that witness statement that, “When she arrived in the UK, I met her at the airport. She was tired from the long journey, so I had made temporary arrangements for her to stay at my place until she felt comfortable and we could find her a place to stay”.
46. Taskeen Gul’s witness statement dated 19 June 2024 states that she arrived in the UK on 28 August 2023 as a Skilled Worker Migrant. She refers to expecting their first child in July 2024.
47. I note that the Appellant’s previous solicitors, Messrs Joyya Law Associates in a letter dated 2 March 2015 at p839 of the bundle before me, states that on 9 February 2015 “the Respondent had curtailed the Applicant’s leave to remain because he submitted a non genuine ETS certificate”. The Appellant’s solicitor’s letter states,
“The Appellant in the set off unambiguously admits the findings of the SSHD in her Notice dated 8th February 2014. He submits that it was a mistake due to the inducement from the college. The College told the Applicant that he did not need to appear in the same part of the test because they were satisfied from his English skill though his previous tests and through conversation. If the applicant had known that the college will arrange a proxy. He would have appeared in person in the test because he did not have any English language problem…”.
48. The Appellant’s former solicitor’s letter is important because not only was there an admission by the Appellant in his witness statement that he had cheated, his former solicitor’s letter had also had admitted from the ‘set off’ (which must mean from the ‘outset’) that the Appellant admitted the findings of the Secretary of State. Importantly therefore, whilst the focus in the grounds has been on the admission by the Appellant of deception in his witness statement, there is also the admission in the Appellant’s solicitor’s separate letter too.
49. Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce had allowed the appeal on the basis of the marriage but had also made very clear and important findings in respect of the Appellant’s credibility and in respect of his deception in respect of TOEIC issues. The learned Upper Tribunal Judge had referred to the following matters:
(1) First-tier Tribunal Judge Heynes had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal by way of a decision dated 25 April 2016. Judge Heynes had found that the Appellant had used a proxy. Judge Heynes had found the allegation against the Appellant about the ETS allegation to be proved.
(2) There were various procedural hearings thereafter about the scope of the remaking task at the Upper Tribunal. This culminated in the hearing before Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce at which she was considering 3 issues: Those issues being: (i) whether the Respondent had demonstrated that the Appellant had relied on a fraudulently obtained English language test certificate, (ii) if that had not been proved, whether the Appellant’s appeal could succeed under Appendix FM (partner) Immigration Rules, (iii) if the Appellant could not succeed on those 2 avenues, whether the refusal to grant the Appellant leave to remain would nevertheless disproportionately interfere with his protected Article 8 rights.
(3) Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce concluded that the Appellant enjoyed family life with Ms Ashurst and her children. She also concluded that there was a genuine parent-style relationship with Ms Ashurst’s children. On that basis the Judge allowed the appeal.
(4) Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce made very clear adverse findings against the Appellant though in respect of the ETS matters.
(5) The Judge noted that the evidence before her was that the Appellant had said he had attended the ETS test in person and had taken the test himself. The Judge said thought that the Appellant in his witness statement at the First-tier Tribunal had “given markedly different evidence: “On the day of the test the college advised me that I did not need to take the spoken English test because I already had passed it in June 2012. My leave was extended until 20th December 2013. If I had known that the college will be arrange a proxy to accommodate a few of candidates, I would not accept their advice at all because I could pass spoken English test very easily as I have had adequate knowledge and command of English language which is established through my previous English test results of 2012. However, I regret this unintentional and innocent mistake and submit my absolute apology”;
(6) Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce noted that the “look-up tool’ specifically identified the Appellant. The Judge said that even though there was the use of poor English in the witness statement “That does not change the fact that the Appellant signed that statement”. She also said, “I do not accept that he would sign such an important document without reading it”.
50. There were therefore 3 aspects for Judge Austin at the hearing in 2025 to have been aware of in terms of the reasons put forward by the Appellant which should find favour, despite Upper Tribunal Judge Bruces’s adverse findings of 18 December 2017.
51. Judge Austin correctly cited the issues at paragraph 10 of his decision which included (i) whether the Appellant had used deception in obtaining his English language certificate following a test at Darwin College on 11 July 2012 and (ii) whether the Appellant had shown exceptional circumstances which warranted a grant of leave under Article 8 ECHR. At paragraph 12 the Judge provided a self direction that it was necessary to consider whether in this case a refusal would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences.
52. At paragraphs 13 and 14 the Judge referred to some of the findings made by Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce including that she had said at paragraph 53 that, “I find that on 11th July 2012 the Appellant’s English language speaking test was taken by a proxy, and that he must have known that to be the case when he later relied on that certificate in order to extend his leave to remain.”
53. The Judge referred to the starred decision in Devaseelan. The Judge set the judicial headnote out in full and which I now also refer to. I stress paragraphs 2, 4, 6 and 7 of the judicial headnote for particular relevance:
(1) The first adjudicator’s determination should always be the starting-point. It is the authoritative assessment of the appellant’s status at the time it was made. In principle issues such as whether the appellant was properly represented, or whether he gave evidence, are irrelevant to this.
(2) Facts happening since the first adjudicator’s determination can always be taken into account by the second adjudicator.
(3) Facts happening before the first adjudicator’s determination but having no relevance to the issues before him can always be taken into account by the second adjudicator.
(4) Facts personal to the appellant that were not brought to the attention of the first adjudicator, although they were relevant to the issues before him, should be treated by the second adjudicator with the greatest circumspection.
(5) Evidence of other facts, for example country evidence, may not suffer from the same concerns as to credibility, but should be treated with caution.
(6) If before the second adjudicator the appellant relies on facts that are not materially different from those put to the first adjudicator, the second adjudicator should regard the issues as settled by the first adjudicator’s determination and make his findings in line with that determination rather than allowing the matter to be re-litigated.
(7) The force of the reasoning underlying guidelines (4) and (6) is greatly reduced if there is some very good reason why the appellant’s failure to adduce relevant evidence before the first adjudicator should not be, as it were, held against him. Such reasons will be rare.
(8) The foregoing does not cover every possibility. By covering the major categories into which second appeals fall, the guidance is intended to indicate the principles for dealing with such appeals. It will be for the second adjudicator to decide which of them is or are appropriate in any given case.
54. The Appellant’s argument is that his General Practitioner records show that at the time of signing his witness statement and him appearing at the First-tier Tribunal he was suffering with physical and mental ill health.
55. I had invited Mr Pullinger to assist me with precisely which of the hundreds of pages of medical records it was that he relied on. In my judgment despite spending a long time during before and during the hearing, ultimately all they show is that the Appellant has been suffering with chronic back pain for some years and had investigations for other matters. He has had anxiety, stress and depression for some time about his immigration status. Medication was provided to him. The anxiety, stress and depression included that the Home Office had investigated whether his claimed relationship with Ms Ashurst was genuine. Whilst I accept that there are some entries in the GP records and that medication was provided, I must consider whether this really was something that could possibly have been of significance which might have enabled Judge Austin to come to a different conclusion.
56. The difficulty for the Appellant is that Devaseelan makes it very clear that Judge Austin was required to remind himself that “facts personal to the appellant that were not brought to the attention of the first adjudicator, although they were relevant to the issues before him, should be treated by the second adjudicator with the greatest circumspection.” Additionally, “the force of the reasoning underlying guidelines (4) and (6) is greatly reduced if there is some very good reason why the appellant’s failure to adduce relevant evidence before the first adjudicator should not be, as it were, held against him. Such reasons will be rare.”. It was for the Judge to decide if this was one of those rare cases that there was some good reason for the Appellant’s failure to adduce his medical records for the period of 2015/2016 at the hearing before Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce in December 2018. The Appellant was legally represented at that hearing. The Appellant had also provided copious documents at the hearing before Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce. The Appellant provided detailed witness statements. The Appellant knew the issues. The medical records are not new documents. They existed in 2015 and 2016 and even in 2017. They were not difficult to obtain documents or documents that have been recently found or the like. They were easily accessible and obtainable.
57. I conclude that the Judge was perfectly entitled to conclude at paragraph 16 of his decision that, “There is no new evidence or guidance placed before me which allows me to consider revisiting or remaking the decision of the Upper Tribunal on this issue, and I shall summarise the matters which I considered in reaching that view.”
58. In my judgment the Judge referred at length to the correct law and then applied it correctly in respect of the Devaseelan principles. The Judge specifically highlighted at paragraphs 17 to 21 of his decision the ‘new’ evidence. This included the Appellant’s oral evidence in which the Appellant had said he had not cheated, he did not intend to say in his previous witness statement that he had used a proxy and he was sorry for it and he had told his barrister not to concede he had cheated. The Judge unarguably correctly stated that the Appellant has been legally represented throughout but had failed to show he had provided any evidence that he had taken up the matter with his previous legal representatives as to why he had been asked to sign a witness statement stating he had cheated when he had not. The Judge was clearly well aware that the Appellant accepted that after obtaining the voice recording of his English language test, he conceded it was not him taking the test. There was no new evidence provided of the voice recording or of the claimed photograph before the Judge. There was no material error of law when the Judge concluded that it was merely an argument being put forward by the Appellant of “why would he request the photograph and recording if he knew it was not him on them? The Judge said this was not new evidence. The Judge was entirely correct in my judgment. I note that in Mr Turner’s grounds of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, he attempted to introduce reasons why the complaints about the Appellant’s former solicitors ought to be taken into consideration after the hearing. It is regrettable that such an attempt was made because it was a hopeless attempt because the Judge could not take into account matters which were not put before him at the hearing. I am sure that was well known when the grounds were submitted.
59. Importantly, the Judge said in the alternative that even if he was in error there was nothing within the Appellant’s (detailed) skeleton argument which would lead him to revisit the decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce. The Judge concluded that the Appellant did use deception in reliance on the TOEIC in 2012.
60. I refer to further reasoning. In my judgment when having the case law I have referred to in respect of the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal firmly in mind and when genuinely standing back to look at the Judge’s decision as a whole, I conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
61. In any event, the Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant when coming to his conclusions and when making his assessment of the Appellant’s evidence.
62. Additionally, the Appellant had the benefit of counsel appearing for him at the hearing before the Judge. The Judge clearly firmly had in mind the matters referred to by counsel both in oral submissions and in the skeleton argument.
63. In my judgment, even if the Judge was required to detail further the medical notes from the GP in some manner (I have referred above to the nature of the poor presentation of the GP/ medical notes), they do not begin to show that the Judge could have come to a different conclusion. All that the GP notes show is that the Appellant has had chronic back pain for some years, he has had investigations for other matters and he had anxiety, was stressed, depressed and upset about his immigration status. Even angry. Even if these matters really could somehow overcome paragraphs 2, 4, 6 and 7 of the judicial headnote in Devaseelan, which I conclude they do not because they GP records could and should have been raised at the time of the previous hearing, it is fanciful to suggest that there was a valid reason for the Appellant to sign his witness statement admitting he had cheated without reading it. I note too that even before the signing of the witness statement, the Appellant’s solicitors had categorically said that the Appellant had admitted that the matters set out in the Secretary of State’s decision about the use of deception by him with the English language certificate. I referred to this previously.
64. In my judgment the Appellant has to face reality. He states that in 2015/2016 the reason for his failure to read his witness statement was because he was physically and mentally under strain. I conclude that this is fanciful.
65. It cannot be that on the one hand the Appellant states his English reading and speaking is fluent, but that he did not or could not read what he was signing. I appreciate he does not suggest he could not read his own witness statement admitting his deception, but I cannot begin to understand why the Appellant was not able to read his witness statement ‘just because’ he had chronic back pain or that he was, anxious or stressed or depressed. As I discussed with the parties during the hearing, the nature of cases at our tribunals and courts are very often stressful and raise highly anxiety inducing and depressing matters concerning the most serious life events. Such as in our criminal courts, family courts and in tribunals. I need not refer to them. Many of those persons have back pain or are going through extreme stress or extreme anxiety, but also often much worse. I do not accept that such persons can somehow disavow their own witness statements because of the back pain and/or stress and depression. Nor can I accept that for some reason the Appellant here had anywhere near a reason for Judge Austin to revisit the issues. Even if Judge Austin had done so, the findings would have remained precisely the same in my judgment.
66. When one adds that Judge Austin was bound by caselaw to consider the Appellant’s arguments with the ‘greatest circumspection’ it is impossible to see how the Judge could have come to any different conclusion.
67. Had it been necessary which it is not, I would go so far as to say that this case is nothing less than one in which the Appellant refuses to accept his deception because he knows how silly he was not to have taken the TOEIC himself. It is the Appellant’s regret and his failure to own up to his own deception and nothing more which is surfacing.
68. In so far as the alleged complaint about the Appellant’s former legal advisers is concerned, I am troubled that even now that no such complaint document/replies have been provided. That is despite the very large bundle but whereby the complaint and or the response are not within it. I make it clear that if the Appellant (or anyone else) has deliberately kept those things away from the Upper Tribunal then that would be a very serious matter indeed. I make no finding that there has been anything deliberate, but I note that the Appellant was represented by experienced counsel at the hearing in 2016 and again in 2017. Solicitors were also on record acting for the Appellant in 2016 and in 2012. The Appellant has been legally represented throughout since. I am unable to even get close to seeing how it can be said that the Appellant’s solicitors were at fault for him signing and agreeing to what was set out in the witness statement. In any event, there is nothing which was put before Judge Austin to suggest that there was now some new evidence which met the strict Devaseelan principles to mean that the earlier findings could be revisited. The best one sees is that the Appellant asks, “why would I be trying to get evidence that it was me at the test centre taking the test if it was not me?” That is not new evidence. It is, as the Judge said, an argument he was advancing. The Judge rejected that argument with adequate reasoning. The Judge said at paragraph 21:
“The Appellant accepts that having obtained the voice recording of the language test it is not his voice which is heard taking the test. I emphasise that there is no new evidence of either the recording nor of the photograph, but merely the Appellant’s concession that it is not his voice heard and I do not consider this to be new evidence. He has used the request and his own private analysis of the recording to suggest that he must be truthful in saying he took the test otherwise why would he request the voice recording. I consider that this is not new evidence but an argument which could have been before the previous Tribunal. I note that the Appellant did not address the issue of the Look up tool before me and no new evidence was introduced in that regard. I considered the report of Mr Stanbury, although no reference was made to it during the hearing. It does not provide a basis for revisiting the decision as to the TOEIC test. It criticises the respondent’s position on the TOEIC “saga”, as the skeleton argument puts it, but does not provide evidence which suggests to me that I should revisit the original adverse decision. If I am in error in so considering any of the matters which in my view the Appellant refers to in the skeleton as new evidence, I do not consider that it leads me to revisit the decision of the earlier tribunal, following the principles in Devaseelan.”
69. Any photograph adds noting against the background and weight of evidence which showed the Judge that the Appellant had not taken his own test.
70. Therefore, individually or cumulatively Grounds 1 and 2 have no merit and I dismiss them. As was stated when permission was granted, the grounds were barely arguable in any event, Having heard full argument, I conclude that there is no substance to them.
71. Ground 3 overlaps but that on the other grounds also focus on the Appellant’s new marriage, his child and the reintegration in Pakistan. Here I note that the Appellant had left the UK 4 times and for up to 3 months. This is referred to in the application made to the Home Office and the cover letter from the Appellant’s former solicitors for an application for leave to the Home Office.
72. Relevant factors therefore include that the Appellant’s visits included to Portugal and Pakistan. He saw his family in Pakistan. They remain there for him. The Appellant’s wife is from the same area as the Appellant in Pakistan. The families seemingly know each other. The grandparents of the Appellant’s children are in Pakistan. The Appellant’s wife does not have permanent leave of any form. She arrived knowing that. When she struck up her relationship with the Appellant, she knew about his poor immigration status and deception. It is impossible to see what other decision the Judge could possibly have come to against such a background. The Judge referred to the Appellant’s, anxiety and depression, but even if he had referred at length to Dr Latif’s report, it could have made no material difference to his decision in my judgment.
73. It would have made no difference, not least because Dr Latif’s report was from May 2023 but since then Appellant, now had a new wife and time had moved on because the couple now also had a child by the time of the hearing in 2025. This was never an Article 3 ECHR case and could not have been because it was not presented as such, but there was no evidence that the medical treatment required for the Appellant whether, medication or other psychological input is not available or accessible in Pakistan. The Appellant will have his family around him in Pakistan whom he said he missed very much. It is obvious that they miss him too and they keep in regular touch with the Appellant. The Appellant, his wife and the respective families in Pakistan will be hoping to meet them and the children that they have never seen. Whilst the Appellant referred previously to his area in Pakistan being a Taliban stronghold, in any event, the Appellant has been visiting Pakistan without issue and his wife also hails from the same area as him.
74. The judge said at paragraph 30 in respect of the new relationship (which since that hearing has become the marriage to Ms Gul):
“30. I am concerned that there is an element in the Appellant’s new relationship of seeking to bolster his immigration status. I do not accept the characterisations of the relationship as a difficult one because A and TG are Muslims and therefore to start a relationship together whilst cohabiting placed them in a difficult situation. The evidence suggests that their relationship was pre-planned and arranged as TG appears to have arrived in the UK with a plan to meet the Appellant and then started living in the same residence with him. If they were concerned about their position it seems like a highly unusual arrangement to have entered into by coincidence, and I do not accept that it was a meeting or a relationship which was not foreseen before they met.”
75. In my judgment there is no material error in the Judge referring to the way in which the couple struck up their relationship. This observation of the Judge was not mutually exclusive to the Secretary of State accepting there was a new relationship and indeed that the couple had a child. But, in my judgment, it is not wrong for the judge to say on the one hand that the Appellant’s new relationship was seeking to bolster his immigration status, but at the same time, accepting that this is a genuine relationship. It was because the Appellant wanted to bolster his immigration status that he was relying on his new relationship. It might well seem offensive to the Appellant, but this was something entirely open to the judge to observe in view of the Appellant’s poor immigration history. In my judgment it certainly does not indicate anywhere near a material error of law. Judges are entitled to observe matters. In view of the protracted history of this Appellant, the number of applications he has made and the two different relationships, these were matters open to the Judge. In any event, the Judge fully had in mind that the relationship when undertaking the proportionality assessment and the Article 8 aspects of the case as a whole.
76. Dr Latif concluded as follows and for which in my judgment it would be fanciful to suggest that such treatment cannot be obtained in Pakistan:
“The medical evidence, narrative and the clinical history of Mr Ullah indicate that he has experienced a persistent lowering of mood, symptoms of fatigue, lack of energy and motivation and a loss of interest and enjoyment in activities. He has also experienced a reduced concentration, reduced self esteem and self confidence: bleak and pessimistic views of the future, disturbed sleep and a diminished appetite and this has been for a considerable length of time.”
77. The psychologist also referred to there being treatment and medication for the anxiety and referred suicidal ideation.
78. The Judge had referred to matters briefly but sufficiently in my judgment when he said as follows at paragraph of his decision:
“29. The respondent takes no issue that A and TG are in a relationship and have a child together. I take into account that there is some medical evidence to show that A has been treated for Anxiety and depression as a result of his lengthy litigation in regard to his status in the UK. However, such a strain is likely in most cases where a person’s situation is precarious and is yet to be finally resolved.”
79. Even if one accepts that the Judge slipped when referring in the final paragraph to “unduly harsh” or “unjustifiably harsh” the Judge plainly took into account all matters and it is mere semantics as to whether it was unduly harsh or unjustifiably harsh which was referred to a limited part of the Judge’s overall decision. In any event the Judge referred to the correct test at the outset and which I have highlighted previously.
80. Ultimately, the public interest in removing the Appellant who had used deception to obtain leave was a weighty matter and the Judge was correct to say so. Despite accepting that Article 8(1) was engaged, there were no exceptional circumstances why the Appellant’s recently arrived partner from Pakistan should remain in the UK. If she did, it was a matter for her if she elected to remain in the UK. In my judgment, difficult decisions are made by couples all the time about where they should live and when work takes them to a different part of the world. That is what this case is about and it is for the couple to work that out. It did not somehow mean that there were exceptional reasons why the Appellant ought to succeed in his appeal and be permitted to remain in the UK. Standing back, it is the deception which has caused the Appellant to be in the situation that he is in. His new wife knew about the deception when she entered into the relationship with him. The Appellant has left the UK for 4 times for up to 3 months and has visited Pakistan in that time too. His family are bound to want to accept him and to assist him, including with the medication or psychological input that he might require. Dr Latif’s report from 2023, if required, can be used by the Appellant to seek that assistance from the available and accessible treatment in Pakistan.
81. In my judgment the Appellant’s grounds and arguments which contend that the grant of leave to remain meant that there was a legitimate expectation or some form of ‘free pass’ in respect of the Appellant’s past deception is misconceived. The deception matter was not ‘dropped’ as the grounds misleadingly state. As the Appellant knows, the grant of Indefinite Leave to Remain is very different from further temporary grants of leave to remain. The Appellant was granted a temporary grant of leave following the hearing before Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce allowing his appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds in respect of his marriage to Ms Ashurst. Sadly, that marriage appears to have broken down thereafter. Indefinite Leave to Remain requires the Appellant to show he is of good character. The fact that he used deception to obtain leave previously was clearly a matter which was relevant. In my judgment it is unarguable that Judge Austin could have come to any different decision about the Appellant’s leave. The fundamental issue is that it is the Appellant’s previous deception which means that the Indefinite Leave to Remain application clearly was correctly refused by the Respondent. The argument that there was some form of legitimate expectation that the deception would be ignored is hopeless.
82. The Appellant has continued to work and has been working at Manchester Airport in security. That is an important job. It shows he is able to function. The Judge was entitled to note that such matters. The Judge did not need to refer specifically in minute detail to all of the matters referred to in grounds of appeal. In my judgment, even if they had all been considered in more detail, no material error of law is shown in the Judge’s decision. I make a further observation, which I hope is fair to Mr Turner who drafted these grounds of appeal. It is not sufficient to set things out within a skeleton argument and for them to be buried amongst other documents. I do not know precisely how large a bundle it was in front of the First-tier Tribunal, but if it was anything like this bundle before me, it is not surprising that certain minutia aspects be missed by a judge and that would not be the fault of the judge, it would be the fault of those who presented the bundle and adopted it in such an usual way. My findings though are that the Judge did not miss anything and even if he did, there is no material error of law which arises.
83. I am going to take at face value that the Appellant’s alleged complaints against his former solicitors and counsel have not led to a reply , but if it transpires that there have been replies and and that they have been withheld from the Upper Tribunal and/or Respondent then that would be a very serious matter indeed.
84. In any event, I come to the clear view that the backache, the stress, the anxiety and all of all the other matters relied upon were wholly insufficient to lead to a revisiting of the decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce. The Appellant is referred to as being intelligent and educated. It is fanciful to suggest that he would not have been able to read or understand his witness statement making admissions of cheating, even when into account that he was taking painkillers and the like. I metaphorically scratch my head to think how it might be that a solicitor came to make up the Appellant’s witness statement. It is not possible to fathom such an event, yet that is the Appellant’s case. In my judgment, it is abundantly clear that all that is happening here is that this Appellant fails to face the reality and instead continues to make excuse after excuse for what has really happened. He used deception when cheating in his TOEIC. He knew what he was doing.
Conclusion
85. In my judgment, although Mr Pullinger has said and done all he possibly can, it is plain that there is no material error of law in the decision of Judge Austin. In my judgment this case is really no less than an attempt to reargue the case and is a mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision which is adequately reasoned.
86. I therefore conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
87. Accordingly, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.

Notice of Decision
There is no material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal on all grounds stands.
I do not make an anonymity order.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 November 2025