UI-2025-003156

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 30 Apr 2026
• Promulgation date: 23 Jul 2026
• Publication date: 12 Aug 2026
• Last updated on: 12 Aug 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003156
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54004/2023
LP/08742/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Directions Issued:

23rd July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

PCB
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood, Legal Representative at IAS
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer


Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 30 January 2026
and at a part heard hearing at Field House, London (via CVP) on 30 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or full address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.


DECISION AND REASONS


1. I am remaking the decision in respect of the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. The decision was by First-tier Tribunal Judge Ali (“the Judge”) dated 17 February 2025. He had dismissed the Appellant’s asylum appeal, made under s82(1)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“2002 Act”).

Background

2. The Appellant is a national of South Africa. His date of birth is a date of birth (available in the Upper Tribunal file) but he was born in 1958. His wife, CJB relies on his claim. She was born in 1960.

3. The Appellant contends that he will be at risk on return to South Africa due to his race. He also contends that Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights will be engaged if he (or his wife) is returned because of medical ailments.

The FTT Judge’s findings

4. The Appellant’s appeal had been heard at the First-tier Tribunal and was dismissed. The Appellant had sought permission to appeal against that decision.

5. The Judge said the following in respect of those parts of the Appellant’s case which were accepted and those parts which were in issue:

“In respect of the Appellant’s case the following facts and matters had been accepted by the Respondent and thus were not matters in dispute.
A. It was not disputed that the Appellant’s case engaged the Refugee Convention, the relevant category being Race.
B. Respondent accepted that the Appellant is a national of South Africa.
C. The Respondent accepted as credible the Appellant’s account of fear from his former work colleague.
D. The Respondent accepted that both the Appellant and his wife were receiving medical treatment and medication in the UK.

9. The issues to be determined and as agreed upon both in the Appellant’s Skeleton Argument, the Respondents Review and as confirmed during the hearing were as follows:
A. Whether the Appellant would be at risk on return to South Africa?
B. Whether there would be sufficiency of protection for the Appellant in South Africa?
C. Whether there be a viable option of internal relocation for the Appellant and his wife?
D. Whether returning the Appellant back to South Africa would breach the Appellant and his spouse’s Article 3 (medical) rights?
E. Whether returning the Appellant to South Africa would breach the Appellant and his spouse’s Article 8 rights?”

6. The Judge also said in relation to the claim as follows:

“13. The Appellant’s claim is set out in the Appellant’s skeleton argument is as follows. The Appellant is a national of South Africa born on xx.xx.1958, who claimed asylum after receiving repeated threats from a previous work colleague. He approached the South African police for assistance, but no protection was given. He received further threats from the colleague. The Appellant then received a threat from some young black men that they were going to kill the Appellant and rape his wife in front of them. Following the threats, the Appellant and his spouse went into hiding and did not leave their house due to fears of their safety. They sold their house in an attempt to relocate to another area but were found and further targeted. The Appellant and his wife flew to the UK on an already scheduled visit to see their daughters. Whilst in the UK, they were made aware that further enquiries of their location had been made by the individuals and group they feared in South Africa, and so they claimed asylum on 14.7.2019.”

7. In respect of the Respondent’s case, the Judge said as follows:

“The Respondent’s position is set out in detail within the reasons for refusal letter dated 27.6.2023. However, in summary the Respondent disputed the following. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant would be at risk on return to South Africa as a result of general security situation. The Respondent asserted that there would there be sufficiency of protection for the Appellant in South Africa and that there would be a viable option of internal relocation for the Appellant and his wife. The Respondent did not accept that returning the Appellant would breach his or his spouse’s Article 3 (medical) rights or breach his and his spouse’s Article 8 rights.”

8. The Judge refused the appeal noting the following matters:

“In respect of this issue I find that the Appellant’s own actions have to be taken into consideration when assessing whether sufficiency of protection would be available. The Appellant and his wife as part of their evidence confirmed that they have attempted to seek report the people who were threatening them to the local police station in order to seek protection.”
…
I would add in respect of this issue that even if I am wrong on the issue that there would be sufficiency of protection for the Appellant then I find that there would be a viable option of internal relocation within South Africa. The Appellant states that after receiving the threats he sold his house and then moved to stay in a gated community. He states that he and his wife were threatened and targeted by young men black who were associated with his former worker colleague. However, I am not satisfied on the facts of this case or in respect of the evidence before me that the young black men or the Appellant’s former work colleague have either the influence, power or connections to enable them to locate the Appellant or his wife were they to move completely away from the area in which they were living in the gated community.
…
In considering my findings at paragraphs 31 to 37 I am not satisfied that the Appellant has provided a true picture of his financial circumstances in South Africa and for the reasons stated above I find that the Appellant can internally relocate within South Africa and to do so would not be unduly harsh.

The Hearings at the Upper Tribunal

9. Following the grant of permission against the FTT Judge’s decision, the matter had come before Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Frantzis for an Error of Law Hearing on 19 September 2025. In a decision sealed on 9 October 2025. The learned Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge had allowed the appeal on the basis that an expert report relied on by the Appellant had not been taken into account by the FTT Judge. The Deputy Judge noted that:

“At the error of law hearing, Ms Young for the Respondent conceded:
a. the Appellant’s account of (i) attempting to report the people who were threatening him to the local police station in order to seek protection (ii) being told there was no evidence to take matters forward and (iii) being denied any assistance as they were ‘white’, was accepted by the Respondent;
b. the Decision involved the making of a material error of law because the FtT had failed to take any account of the expert evidence of Dr Bulled, which went directly to the issues of sufficiency of protection, internal relocation and Article 3 EHCR;
c. Dr Bulled’s expertise.”

10. The Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge decided also stated that:

“Ms Young’s position was that the Appellant’s account of events in South Africa was not contested. Given the relevance of the expert report of Dr Bullen to the findings made by the FtT in respect of both sufficiency of protection, internal relocation and Article 3 ECHR and the interwoven nature of the factual claims and findings, I am persuaded that none of the findings in [30-37, 40-43] of the Decision can stand. I do, however, preserve the findings which go to the FtT’s analysis of the human rights ground of appeal under Article 8 ECHR as they were not the subject of the appeal to this Tribunal. As such, the findings reached between [44] and [48] of the Decision are preserved.

15. The issues to now be determined by the Upper Tribunal, on the accepted factual basis set out above, are:
c. Whether there is sufficient protection available to the Appellant and his wife in South Africa;
d. Whether the Appellant and his wife can reasonably internally relocate within South Africa;
e. Whether the Appellant’s, or his wife’s, return to South Africa would breach Article 3 ECHR.

11. The matter was then listed before me on 10 November 2025. The expert was required to give evidence but had not been asked to be available for cross examination. She lives in the United States of America. Appropriate arrangements were made for a remote link for her to provide her evidence and to consider timing of her evidence in view of the different time zones with the United Kingdom.

12. The hearing took place before me on 9 March 2026. It was necessary to adjourn the matter for further evidence, including in respect of the respondent’s Voluntary Returns Service package. It was not clear from Mr Diwnycz whether the package was a payment of up to £3000 for the couple or up to £3000 for both the Appellant and a separate up to £3000 for his wife. Whether it was a payment of £6000 or £3000 made a significant difference in this case. The Appellant was also to provide updating evidence in respect of his finances and what had happened with the proceeds of sale of his home in South Africa.

Legal Principles Summarised

13. I consider first the burden and standard of proof. In view of this being an appeal against the Respondent’s decision which was after 28 June 2022 then in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion).  The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.  

14. JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 explains that I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
a. Taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a convention reason? 
b. Does the Appellant fear persecution for that convention reason? 

15. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that: 
c. The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; 
d. There would not be sufficient protection available; and 
e. The Appellant could not internally relocate.  

16. I remind myself that the lower standard continues to apply to Article 3 ECHR claims.

17. The House of Lords in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 489 dealt with the important issue of sufficiency of protection. Lord Hope explained:

“I would hold therefore that, in the context of an allegation of persecution by non-state agents, the word "persecution" implies a failure by the state to make protection available against the ill-treatment or violence which the person suffers at the hands of his persecutors. In a case where the allegation is of persecution by the state or its own agents the problem does not, of course, arise. There is a clear case for surrogate protection by the international community. But in the case of an allegation of persecution by non-state agents the failure of the state to provide the protection is nevertheless an essential element. It provides the bridge between persecution *498 by the state and persecution by non-state agents which is necessary in the interests of the consistency of the whole scheme…

To sum up therefore on this issue, I consider that the obligation to afford refugee status arises only if the person's own state is unable or unwilling to discharge its own duty to protect its own nationals. I think that it follows that, in order to satisfy the fear test in a non-state agent case, the applicant for refugee status must show that the persecution which he fears consist of acts of violence or ill-treatment against which the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection. The applicant may have a well-founded fear of threats to his life due to famine or civil war or of isolated acts of violence or ill-treatment for a Convention reason which may be perpetrated against him. But the risk, however severe, and the fear, however well founded, do not *500 entitle him to the status of a refugee. The Convention has a more limited objective, the limits of which are identified by the list of Convention reasons and by the principle of surrogacy.

The primary duty to provide the protection lies with the home state. It is its duty to establish and to operate a system of protection against the persecution of its own nationals. If that system is lacking the protection of the international community is available as a substitute. But the application of the surrogacy principle rests upon the assumption that, just as the substitute cannot achieve complete protection against isolated and random attacks, so also complete protection against such attacks is not to be expected of the home state. The standard to be applied is therefore not that which would eliminate all risk and would thus amount to a guarantee of protection in the home state. Rather it is a practical standard, which takes proper account of the duty which the state owes to all its own nationals. As Ward LJ said [2000] INLR 15 , 44g, under reference to Professor Hathaway's observation in his book, at p 105, it is axiomatic that we live in an imperfect world. Certain levels of ill-treatment may still occur even if steps to prevent this are taken by the state to which we look for our protection. I consider that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in this case applied the right standard when they were considering the evidence.  

Conclusion
Where the allegation is of persecution by non-state agents, the sufficiency of state protection is relevant to a consideration whether each of the two tests—the "fear" test and the "protection" test—is satisfied. The proper starting point, once the tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has a genuine and well-founded fear of serious violence or ill-treatment for a Convention reason, is to consider whether what he fears is "persecution" within the meaning of the Convention. At that stage the question whether the state is able and willing to afford protection is put directly in issue by a holistic approach to the definition which is based on the principle of surrogacy. I consider that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal was entitled to hold, on the evidence, that in the applicant's case the requirements of the definition were not satisfied. I would refuse the appeal.”

18. Lord Lloyd said in clear terms:

“As for the second part of the protection test, there will not be many cases in which an applicant who is able to avail himself of the protection of his country of origin, will succeed on the ground that he is unwilling to do so. Here the applicant's case, as it appears from his written statement, is that he regards the local police as ineffective and indifferent. But he is not the sole judge of that. The test is objective. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal has found as a fact that the available protection satisfies the Convention standard. There are no special circumstances which would enable the applicant to succeed on the second branch of the protection test, having failed on the first. I would dismiss the appeal.”

19. In AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2018] 1 AC 678 the House of Lords dealt with the issue of internal relocation. This case itself was an appeal from an earlier case of one of the same Appellants before them now and which had also been heard by the House of Lords. Lord Bingham had given his opinion in that case and in this case. He said:

“There is no warrant for excluding, or giving priority to, consideration of conditions generally prevailing in the home country. I do not underestimate the difficulty of making decisions in some cases. But the difficulty lies in applying the test, not in expressing it. The humanitarian object of the Refugee Convention is to secure a reasonable measure of protection for those with a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country or some part of it; it is not to procure a general levelling-up of living standards around the world, desirable though of course that is.”

20. Lord Brown said:

“The ultimate decision to be made is, as stated, whether it is on the one hand “reasonable” or on the other hand “unduly harsh” to require the claimant to relocate. Clearly the conditions and circumstances of his previous way of life may inform that decision, bearing for example upon his ability to adapt to whatever changes and challenges are involved in relocation. But it is wrong to suggest, as the Court of Appeal do, that the critical contrast to be struck is between the circumstances in which the claimant lived when persecuted and those he would face in the proposed safe haven-so that if, for example, he had been rich and lived well but now, if relocated, would face comparative poverty, he would for that reason be entitled to asylum.”

21. In this case Appellant refers to medical issues in respect of Article 3 ECHR for both and him and his wife. In Paposhvili v Belgium (41738/10) [2017] Imm A.R. 867 and AM (Article 3, health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC), alongside THTN v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1222 it is explained that a three-stage test must be considered:

a. Stage 1- the appellant must establish a prima facie case in that:
i. The appellant is ‘seriously ill’ and requires treatment, which they are currently receiving; 
ii. Evidence capable of demonstrating that substantial grounds has been shown for believing that the appellant would face a real risk of either:  
(a) an absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or;  
(b) an inability to access appropriate treatment; 
iii. And that without appropriate treatment the appellant would be exposed to a significant reduction in life expectancy or a serious rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering. 
b. Stage 2- if the appellant establishes a prima facie case, then the respondent must rebut the “serious doubts” raised by the appellant by establishing the foreseeable consequences of removal for the appellant in the receiving state in light of:
a. The general situation there; and
b. The appellant’s personal circumstances
c. Stage 3 - If the respondent fails to rebut the “serious doubts,” the respondent must:
a. present adequate assurances from the receiving state as to the care that the receiving state will have available and accessible to the appellant; and/or;
b. prepare the respondent’s own package of measures as a means for the appellant to overcome accessibility problems (for example: financial support and medication). 

22. AA (Morocco) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 144, explains that if an article 3 claim fails, the Appellant cannot succeed under article 8 without some separate or additional factual element which brings the case within the relevant paradigm for that provision, namely the capacity to form and enjoy relationships, or a state of affairs having some affinity with that paradigm. In any event Mr Wood made clear that there was no reliance on Article 8 ECHR.

The Respondent’s Evidence in Respect of the Voluntary Returns Service (“VRS”)

23. I refer here and shall return to the evidence provided by the Respondent from the National Removal Command of the Home Office dated 12 March 2026. This was specific evidence in respect of this Appellant and his wife. The letter states:

“1. The Voluntary Returns Service (VRS/‘the service’) has been contacted by colleagues from ALAR regarding a query about our service.
2. The service is set up to assist those wishing to return to their country of origin by explaining their options, help with obtaining travel documentations, and paying for their tickets if they are unable to. The service also offers, on application, financial support of up to £3,000.00.
3. Applicants are only eligible for the service if they are present in the UK without valid leave, i.e., an overstayer or a person who has received a negative decision in an application to regularise their stay. Those who have leave to be in the UK or are naturalised/citizens of the UK are not eligible for this service (e.g., where they hold dual nationality).
4. To be eligible for the financial support, applicants must be from a country which is recorded on the Official Development Assistance (ODA) list, published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (ODA recipients: countries, territories, and international organisations | OECD).
5. We understand that the appellants in the instant case are nationals of South Africa which features on the ODA list as an Upper Middle-Income Country. They would therefore in principle be eligible for financial assistance if they applied for help returning home through the Voluntary Returns Service. We have not assessed the appellants for the service as we do not hold a valid application from the appellant at the time of writing.
6. The appellants will need to apply to the Voluntary Return Service to be assessed for the level and type of assistance they will be entitled to. Without prejudice to any application they may make, they may be entitled to a maximum of £3,000.00 each in financial assistance. The maximum total award should both appellants apply to return to South Africa voluntarily through the service is £6,000.00.
7. This letter confirms the current position of the VRS Operations Team which is in line with currently published information about the service. Further information on the service is readily available to applicants here: Get help to return home if you’re a migrant in the UK: Overview - GOV.UK.”

The Evidence Before Me

24. Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367, [2005] I.N.L.R. 377 sets out the importance of considering the expert evidence in the round alongside the remainder of the evidence. I do so by reminding myself of that from the outset.

25. Nicola Bulled PhD provided an expert report. She has a detailed CV with numerous posts and positions over many years of work. I take her evidence into account in the round and I consider it as a tool in my assessment of the case as a whole. She states that:

I am a medical anthropologist, public health practitioner, and an independent consultant “providing consultation on refugee wellbeing and integration, global health conditions, infectious diseases, HIV/AIDS prevention, healthcare access, and healthcare policy to governmental and multilateral organizations. In my recent work, I consulted with Peace Corps and the Millennium Challenge Corporation to revise Lesotho’s National HIV/AIDS policy; and I redeveloped a post-Ebola medical resident research training for USAID in Monrovia, Liberia”

26. Dr Bulled stated in her report that she was born in South Africa and had moved to the USA aged 13. She states she had retained both personal and professional relationships in South Africa, including spending 4-6 months a year in the country during 2011-2019. She set out the task she was asked to perform by the Appellant’s solicitors in terms of her report as follows:

“a. Whether age, race, gender, income level, and mental health status increase risk for experiencing violence in South Africa?
b. Whether the South Africa Police Service (SAPS) can protect individuals?
c. Whether the South African pension is adequate for a reasonable standard of living?
d. Whether South Africa has a well-functioning, accessible, and affordable healthcare system?
e. Whether Mr. and Mrs. Breytenbach will have access to affordable mental health services? f. Whether individuals suffering from mental health conditions are stigmatized and discriminated against?”

27. Dr Bulled said in response to the written question whether the risk of experiencing violence in South Africa is affected by age, race, gender, income level or mental health to state in summary at paragraph that data on crime by race was incomplete. She also said:

“Whites are disproportionately affected by property crimes.19 Although, as the Cape Town case study reveals, this is more related to economic prosperity rather than race. To conclude, everyone in South Africa is affected by crime. The risk of experiencing violence in South Africa is high, with crime rates being one of the highest in the world. Murder rates and targeted killings are also high and increasing. These crimes are not directed at particular groups (race/ethnicity, gender, mental health capacity) but rather driven mostly by economic insentives or personal arguments.”

28. The expert said in response to whether the Appellant could expect to receive protection from harassment and threats from the South African Police (“SAPS”) that data specifically on harassment was difficult to find. The expert said:

“To conclude, I do not think that the [the Appellant and his wife] would be able to received adequate personal protection from the SAPS, should they continue to be harassed and threatened. Harassment claims do not appear to be taken seriously by the police, and the SAPS is understaffed and inadequately trained to enforce harassment rulings. Furthermore, contract killings are increasing in the country, with police themselves being hired to commit crimes. Police have high rates of violence against civilians, with low rates of disciplinary action, and an independent watch dog entity that reports directly to the politically appointed Police Commissioner.”

29. In response to the question whether the South African pension is adequate for a reasonable standard of living, the expert said that it was unlikely that the Appellant and his wife would qualify for a subsidised under the RDP scheme:

“The cost of living in South Africa varies by city. At the most expensive, Johannesburg is estimated at £750 a month, whereas a more rural town of Klerksdorp is at the lower end at £460 a month for a single person. These totals are calculated from a consumer basket for a moderate lifestyle. d. The current housing market in Klerksdorp (selected due to its low cost of living) reveals one-bedroom flats for rent for between £125 and £150 a month.32,33 These prices are for housing that is comparable to a flat in the UK, with running water, indoor bathroom facilities, sewage, and electricity with a secure apartment block in a moderate income neighbourhood. Screen shots from Google Maps show the variation in housing available in Klerksdorp, see Figure 1 a-c.
…

I do not know the details of the [Appellant and his wife’s] financial status. However, with a pension of only 1,100 ZAR (£46) each they are unlikely to be able to afford housing of a standard similar to what they presently have in the UK. The South African social services offers no additional financial support or housing beyond the state pension and offers no state supported elderly housing. The [Appellant and his wife] are not likely to be eligible for state subsidized housing under the RDP program and even if they are, the list of eligible recipients remains very long, with many people waiting decades to receive a house. To conclude, I do not think that the South African old age pension is sufficient to support a reasonable standard of living. The Breytenbach’s would be reliant on their social network, which they no longer have, or private non-profit organizations.”

30. In response to the question whether South Africa has a well-functioning, accessible, and affordable healthcare system, the expert said that South Africa has a two-tiered health care system. The private system offers exceptional healthcare to those who can afford it. The expert also said,

“To ameliorate the lack of quality and access to care, the government plans to establish the National Health Insurance in 2026. It intends to ensure access to all citizens and residents of South Africa to quality health services provided by both the public and private sector, regardless of socioeconomic status. It would be a social health insurance in that it enforces contributions from employers and employees to partially fund the system. South Africans would have federal government-sponsored plans to choose from that will pay directly for health services from all providers. The aim of the program is to encourage the wealthiest to pay into the public system and incentivize them to use public health services. Health economists have suggested that it would be feasible to raise the additional required funding.

58 However, expectations that equity in health care delivery could be achieved at levels close to current private-sector levels appear to be unrealistic. It is clear from the disparities in funding of the private and public sectors and the very large number of additional health care professionals required that this is unlikely and, if achievable, would take a very long time.

59 To conclude, while excellent medical care is available in South Africa, it comes at a high cost. Public health care services are understaffed with facilities underresourced and underfunded. Given the limited income of [the Appellant and his wife] they would be reliant on the public system.”

31. The expert said in response to the written question whether the Appellant and his wife would have access to affordable mental health services, she said,

“The disparities in the South African healthcare system's public and private models also apply to the provision of and access to mental health services. Over 80% of the population rely on the public healthcare system, which historically has seen varied levels of investment across provinces, urban and rural areas, and within metropolitan areas, reflecting the inequities entrenched during the country's apartheid era.
…
To conclude, it is my belief that given the staff shortages, lack of training, and the limited facilities in the public sector, [the Appellant and his wife] will be challenged to find consistent and adequate psychiatric care, including psychotherapy and access to psychiatric medication.”

32. The expert was asked whether individuals suffering from mental health conditions are stigmatised or discriminated against in South Africa. She said:

“a. The South African courts have consistently held that employers must offer reasonable accommodation measures to assist people with disabilities to remain in work and the impact of a psychosocial disability on work performance needs to be taken into account, before starting dismissal proceedings.
b. However, a report released by the South African Human Rights Commission in 2019 found that the South African system excludes or denies people with mental disorders a right to work because it lacks reasonable accommodation or is unable to transition to their needs Unemployment and loss of employment is a major challenge for people living with mental disorders.
c. Qualitative studies of people experiencing mental health disorders and mental healthcare stakeholders found that stigma was commonly experienced and a significant barrier to the inclusion of people with mental health disorders in community activities, healthcare service, workplaces, and accessing education.72,80,81
d. Stigmatization affects patients’ and family members willingness to seek care.73,82 One reason for this is that patients suffering from mental disability are accessing care alongside physically ill patients. As a consequence, family members taking mentally disabled persons to health care facilities might run in to other members of their community and thereby risk stigmatization by association, making them reluctant to put themselves in this situation. The lack of secluded rooms adds to this problem as the mentally disabled and their relatives are mixed with other patients in the waiting rooms. e. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, only 15% of South Africans with mental health conditions receive treatment. Associate Professor, William Gumede of the University of Witwatersrand School of Governance believes this is due largely to the fact that many do not seek help because of the public stigma attached to mental illnesses and because in many cases mental health support is just not available in public medical facilities
f. To conclude, I believe that [the Appellant and his wife] are likely to experience some amount of social stigma and discrimination as a result of their mental health conditions. Specifically, I believe that they are unlikely to be accommodated in the workplace largely because the high unemployment rate ensures there are an ample numbers of workers that do not require accommodations.”

33. Dr Bulled provided oral evidence first in view of the differing time zones between the UK and USA. She adopted her expert report as part of her examination in chief.

34. Mr Diwnycz said prior to commencing his cross examination that Mr Wain (a senior Home Office Presenting Officer) had ‘stewardship of the case’. I was referred to a skeleton argument prepared by Mr Wain. It was submitted that there was a sufficiency of protection in South Africa.

35. Mr Diwnycz referred to paragraph 5 of the respondent’s skeleton argument which referred to the expert report. Dr Bulled said she was aware of there being 3 new bills. The respondent’s skeleton argument stated:

“The updated evidence from the respondent indicated legal measures taken by the authorities to protect individuals against gender-based violence (GBV). These included three new bills introduced in 2020 from South Africa’s President Ramaphosa, including the Criminal and Related Matters Amendment Bill (CB/352), with provisions for victims’ say on aggressors being granted bail and on their parole. There is also the Domestic Violence Amendment Bill, and protection orders that can be applied for online (CB/354), including accountability on the South African Police Service if the right procedures are not followed when someone has reported a case of domestic violence (CB/354). Such failures would result in the police reported to the Civilian Secretariat for Police Service, Alvin Rapea.”

36. The expert said that she had not previously provided any expert evidence to the Immigration Tribunals in the UK. She said she had written numerous reports for an organisation called Communitology. An asylum applicant had been granted asylum in one case, but none of the others. She said she had begun to write the reports in 2024. The current report was written in 2024. She said she had written between 8 to 10 reports in total.

37. The expert said she had not provided any oral evidence before. Not even in the USA. It was put to the expert that no great weight could be attributed to her report and she replied that the questions were equivocating expert testimony with expertise of countries.

38. The expert said that she was familiar with the Respondent’s Assisted Voluntary Returns service. The expert said she was not sure if the Appellant’s wife would be entitled to a separate up to £3000. She said it would depend where in South Africa the Appellant went to assess how long the returns money would last. If it was not the most expensive part of South Africa then it could be a generous amount and if the Appellant was where there was a family support structure. The expert said that housing will be one of the costs and the focus will be on health concerns because there is a 2 tier health system in South Africa. She said the Appellant would need to join the Medicare/medical aid scheme which has an upfront cost. She said the expectation is that the premiums will be very high. On that basis the £3000 would not last very long.

39. Asked about moving to Port Talbot, the expert said that it was hard to say how long the money would last because the housing costs can vary. The expert said that she imagined that the £3000 would cover housing rental costs and it may cover other things and medical costs. There was also a £49 (later said to be £46 because it depends on exchange rate) pension per month. Once the £3000 had been spent, the Appellant would be reliant on family.

40. In respect of paragraph 19(d) of her report, the expert said that she thought that the Appellant would qualify for the £49 pension and so should his wife. Therefore, they would each receive £49 per month for their pension.

41. The expert said that a one bed home would cost in the region of £125 to £150 per month. Therefore, this would mean that the pension payments would lead to little for the couple to have to find for the difference for the housing costs.

42. The expert referred to paragraph 19(n) of her report. She said that each of those figures was in a completely different province. She said that the costs will have gone up. She said that the Appellant and his wife would be able to find some minimal housing. That pension sum would not allow for costs for protection or for their food or transport.

43. The expert said in relation to Klerksdorp area the costs referred to were likely to be for a one bedroom but not for the cost of extra security. There would be a range of costs for security. She said Klerksdorp was a more rural town. Less than Johannesburg which is where the Appellant grew up. This property was secure fences and manned with apartment style buildings. There would be less stuff to steal.

44. Asked about paragraph 20 of her report, the expert said in response to whether the couple’s medical ailments could be treated in South Africa, it was a qualified ‘yes’. She said it was free for primary care, but for tertiary care there was a cost. For chronic conditions, routine 3 to 6 month appointments would be required, but patients were not given an appointment time. They wake up at 3am and wait in line for the 7am opening. Some of the nurses are new and there is a high turnover. They see up to 50 patients per day and they readily acknowledge that they will not ask all the questions.

45. Asked whether it was her opinion that the Appellant and his wife could not receive the required treatment, the expert said that it was not her evidence that they could not. She said it was not that the public health system could not treat them, it was just lower. However, for depression and anxiety there was no treatment at all. In contrast the expert said that the private sector was exceptional and well resourced. She said there was excellent care in the private sector. Asked whether there could be a “mix and match” with private and public treatment, the expert said in theory “yes” it was possible.

46. In respect of Paragraph 19(d) of her report, there was reference to “These prices are for housing that is comparable to a flat in the UK, with running water, indoor bathroom facilities, sewage, and electricity with a secure apartment block in a moderate income neighborhood”

47. The expert said that the apartment block she was referring to was not open to the public and was secure. She said almost half of South Africans do not have their own toilet. Additionally, only a low number of people had private security.

48. In re-examination the expert said that the bills would apply just to the Appellant’s wife.

49. The matter was adjourned to hear from the other witnesses. At the resumed hearing on 30 April 2026 the Appellant provided evidence first. He adopted his witness statement as part of his evidence. He said that after selling his house in South Africa, a small amount of money was left in his bank account primarily for car payments and credit cards. The Appellant said that he had transferred the equivalent of £25,000 or so from South Africa to his daughter’s account in the UK for a holiday. Asked why he had done that he said he was not in a good mental condition. He did not want to leave it in South Africa in case something went wrong. He said he was being sought in South Africa by people who wanted to kill him. The Appellant said he had come across to the UK to have a good holiday and to do lots of things and because transferring money “piece by piece would mean more charges”.

50. The Appellant provided information about how much he was spending for the couple when in South Africa. Such as 8000 Rand for health care, bond (mortgage) payment of 6000, car payment of 2000, food was 5000, armed security of 1000.

51. The Appellant said that if he had the £6000 from the UK Government then for “a place to stay, rent, water, lights food” then that money would last a year and half to 2 years. The Appellant said that hospitals in South Africa were a “death sentence”.

52. The Appellant said he lives in the UK with his wife in Home Office provided accommodation in Wakefield. His daughter lives in Doncaster. His daughter’s husband also lives with them. I do note that there was said to be a separation, but this appears to conflict with this information in the evidence. I assume the couple had not split after all, or there was a reconciliation. The Appellant said that the couple have a 20 year old in college, a 16 year old and a 10 year old. The Appellant said his son-in-law works full time for the Holiday Inn Hotel. The Appellant said his daughter did not work but had been a call centre manager previously. He said she had become ill and decided to stay at home.

53. Asked about whether he had other children, the Appellant said his other daughter lived in Scunthorpe. She works full time as an adviser at a charity organisation. When asked about her income the Appellant said he had “no idea”. He said she had purchased a home and paid off her mortgage. He said his younger daughter’s partner worked for as a carer for mentally ill persons. He said he did not know of his daughter’s partner’s income or about their financial situation. He said he occasionally spoke with this daughter. But “because of religion, our daughter is lesbian, we are actively asking not to associate with her”.

54. Asked about friends and work colleagues in South Africa, the Appellant said he had no close friends there. He said he had been working providing air conditioning and was an electrician. He said he could not work because of his age and health. He said there was mandatory retirement and he had to stop work. The Appellant said that age 65 one could get a state pension or a private pension. He said that the “way work was” that “some guy” and as he put it had “blah blah, yak yak” swindled him with paperwork that he had signed. This was said to be some 6 ½ million Rand. He said a second policy paid him some 3500 Rand per month. He said the “rogue” pension was some 17 years ago. He said he had nothing in terms of paperwork to confirm any of what he was claiming. Not even a police report or a case number. Not even from the pension company.

55. The Appellant said that his wife’s job was as an internal sales manager. Her earnings were between 15000 and 20000 Rand per month. He said she was aged 66 and that most companies do not ask persons to stay beyond retirement.

56. The Appellant was asked why he could not start a business with the up to £6000 that the UK Government say they would give him and his wife. The Appellant said he could not because of various “B-BBEE” and other rules and regulations.

57. Asked about his South African pensions, the Appellant said that he had left South Africa before he was 65 which was before pensionable age. He said the South African authorities had not been in touch with him since he became 65. He said the person who had swindled him out of the large private pension had not shown him identification and the police said the person had disappeared. He said he had no paperwork from South Africa to confirm any of what he had said. I note that it will be worth the Appellant investigating whether his South Africa pension has been building up the £46 per month for him and his wife because it is likely to be a reasonable amount of money.

58. The Appellant’s wife then provided oral evidence. She adopted her witness statement as part of her evidence. She said she was aged 65. She said that after retirement it was possible for a person in South Africa to be self employed/own a business. She thought she could not do it now because she was now living in the UK and not in South Africa. There was also “B-BBEE” requirements (which was the quota of black persons to be employed). She said she had been working in South Africa as a sales manager. She said when she stopped working, she received a lump sum but she gets no pension. Prior to this work, she had worked as a receptionist.

59. The Appellant’s wife was asked about her daughter N. She said she was not working. She said she was “not too sure” about her returning to work. She said N’s husband worked full time but “I have no idea about his earnings”. She said that there was not much interaction with her other daughter. The Appellant’s wife said, “She phones us and asks if we need anything and financially, she gives us £10 or £20”. The Appellant’s wife said that if in the future their other daughter had offered them money then they would accept it. She said that other daughter had worked for a road signage company and that she was now an adviser at the CAB. She said she did not know if that daughter’s house was subject to a mortgage.

60. The Appellant’s wife said that her husband had put in place quite a few policies but a consultant had made him sign lots of documents. That consultant did work for the company. He said he had said he was there to help them, but he had helped himself. She said that there was no paperwork to confirm any of this.

61. In Re-examination, the Appellant’s wife said that if they returned to South Africa and if their younger daughter had offered them money then they would accept money from her. She said she did not know what would happen.

62. Asked why such a very large sum of money from the proceeds of sale were transferred from South Africa to the UK when the couple were only coming to the UK as tourists, the Appellant’s wife said, “to be honest I just paid it to [the Appellant]” She said she did not have a bank account. She had a joint debit account. She said she had been earning around 17000 Rand per month.

63. The next witness to provide oral evidence was the Appellant’s daughter N. She adopted her witness statement dated 10 April 2026 as part of her evidence. She said she thought she had come to the UK in 2003. She said she did not know about the “ins and outs” of her “parents financials”. As for the pension swindle, she said she did not have any information and did not know when it happened. She said neither of her parents had mentioned anything like that to her. She said she could not recall if they talked about that to her in the past.

64. The Appellant’s daughter referred to her HSBC bank account. She referred too to a joint account. She was asked about savings. She said her husband B’s salary went to an account too. The joint account was referred to. Her husband was a general staff member at the Holiday Inn. He receives minimum wage and works 40 hours a week.

65. The Appellant’s daughter said she receives Universal Credit. Asked if she receives any other state benefits, she said she also receives Disability Living Allowance and Carers Allowance for her middle child.

66. Asked about her parents, the witness said that they had planned a trip to the UK. The money they had transferred to her was for sight seeing and for things to do in the UK. She said it was a “holiday fund kind of thing”. She said in the past they had transferred money. They did have access to credit cards. She said she did know why they had done that, but they had.

67. The Appellant’s daughter said that even though the £25000 or so was in her account from her parents which would affect her state benefits, she had still not told the Benefits Agency about this and even though it was raised several months ago at the previous hearing. She said it was horrendous and had not declared it was not her money.

68. The witness was asked about her parent’s arrival in the UK for the purposes of a visit on 5 July 2019 and then followed their claim for asylum the following month. She was pressed to deal with why purchases for a more permanent stay were being made even before the asylum claim. She said that perhaps the purchases were in fact for her children, despite previously saying that her parents’ money was their money, despite it being in her bank. The witness was somewhat frustrated that induvial items from her bank statements were being asked about, such as for McDonalds and Dunelm and the like.

69. The medical evidence included the recent GP letters from December 2025 and October 2025 that I shall I return to. Additionally, the Appellant provided a GP letter dated 18 August 2022. Named medication was prescribed. No evidence was presented to me that the medication prescribed, both in 2022 and in 2026 is not available in South Africa. Whether for the Appellant or for his wife. The Appellant was said to have PTSD and that Cognitive Behavioural Therapy would be required.

70. The Appellant’s wife had provided a letter in fact from South Africa from her GP there called Dr Niekirk. That doctor had said that the Appellant’s wife had required treatment for depression for some 12 years in South Africa.

71. Dr Lodhi, consultant psychiatrist, provided a report dated 4 November 2022. This report refers to the Appellant’s wife’s past depression and treatment in South Africa. Dr Lodhi was told the treatment had been for some 15 years in South Africa with Fluoxetine prescribed. Dr Lodhi also said that the Appellant’s wife said she had suffered with depression for most of her life. The attempts at suicide were 6 years prior to the report which was dated 2022 and so those attempts at suicide were historic and in South Africa. She took tablets. Much of the concerns noted in 2022 were about a return to South Africa and the risks from the men who had mistreated them previously. It was also said they will be jobless and without money. That was therefore the premise of the risk assessment. As the evidence shows, that will not be the position as the couple will have money (the pension and the up to £6000) and a home away from the original location where the incidents took place and whereby their gardener had told them that the assailants were asking about their whereabouts. That was as long ago as 2019. The report suggested treatment, including some 12 sessions of CBT for around 12 to 18 months. Cleary some 4 years later since that 2022 report much time has elapsed.

72. With reference to the past attempts at suicide, it was said that appropriate and consistent medical care will be required for the Appellant’s wife if returned to South Africa. A psychotherapist also provided a report. She works with refugees and asylum seekers. She said the Appellant’s wife has PTSD symptoms and distress about returning to South Africa.

73. After the evidence was completed, I heard closing submissions from both parties, which were built upon following the earlier hearing. I had also been provided with skeleton arguments from both sides. I shall refer to both the oral submissions and the skeleton arguments where necessary in my analysis of the case.

74. I consider the background material. It is not necessary to refer to all of it. I was referred to the CPIN of 2020 by the Respondents’ Presenting Officer at the hearing.

75. The bundles included a US State Department report dated 12 April 2022 relied upon by the Appellant. This included that:

“NGOs criticized the use of excessive force by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the South African National C:>efense Force (SANC:>F) to enforce lockdown measures that began in March 2020. Following 2020 rioting and clashes with police, three officers were arrested and charged with murder. All three officers were released on bail, and their trials began in October. The trial continued as of year's end…

Impunity was a significant problem in the security forces. In June the national police commissioner admitted that SAPS needed to improve its "discipline management" for police officers accused of violence. The lack of police accountability for thousands of annually registered police-brutality complaints was documented by the police watchdog organization IPID. The factors contributing to widespread police brutality were a lack of accountability and training…

Some advocacy groups asserted white farmers were racially targeted for burglaries, home invasions, and killings, while many observers attributed the incidents to the country's high and growing crime rate. According to the Institute for Security Studies, "farm attacks and farm murders have increased in recent years in line with the general upward trend in the country's serious and violent crimes."

76. The Appellant is not a farmer. His issue was in relation to his work colleague.

77. It is the case though that the crime rate in South Africa is very high. Sadly, that is the case in many countries. I shall expand on this further when considering sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.

onsideration and Analysis

78. The First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision was set aside in part, but retained findings remained. Some of those retained findings are positively in favour of the Appellant because of the concessions made by the Respondent. The adverse findings were in respect of the Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim. The Judge’s findings at paragraph 44 to 48 were preserved. Article 8 ECHR has expressly not been advanced before me.

79. I consider that both the Appellant and his wife are vulnerable witnesses. I note the GP’s new letter dated 1 December 2025. It refers to the Appellant having, amongst other things, atrial fibrillation, hypertension Type 2 diabetes, glaucoma and strokes in the past. For the Appellant’s wife there was a separate earlier letter dated 7 October 2025. There is reference to a precancerous condition that can predispose persons to develop mouth cancer. There is nothing that be done other than regular check ups.

80. No particular requirements were sought by the Appellant’s solicitors in terms of vulnerability, despite my order that they seek any special measures. Nonetheless, over and above the usual difficulties that any witnesses experience when giving evidence, I conclude that persons of older years who suffer with PTSD and being in a strange environment in which they are asked questions about their lives is not easy. Nor is it easy to have to explain what has happened in the past when those experiences have been serious. I therefore ameliorate as much as I am able to and give every allowance for deficiencies and inconsistencies in the evidence of each of the witnesses. I accept that both physical and mental ailments can lead to it being more difficult to ‘paint the picture’ when giving evidence.

81. Bearing those matters in mind, it is my function to set out what I consider of the evidence. I set out first my impression of the witnesses who provided oral evidence. I will then provide more details of their evidence. Dealing first with the Appellant. I consider that he is an intelligent man who clearly has much experience of working hard when he was in South Africa. I view those aspects as being positive. My further impression of him though was a tendency to exaggerate and to pretend things will be much worse than they really will be for him and for his wife if they are returned to South Africa. Whilst that is understandable because of the comfortable life they now live here in the UK, the Appellant is still required to tell me the whole truth. I shall return to this, but one example is in respect of his younger daughter and his involvement in her life and her in her parents’ lives. Despite the vulnerability I am unable to conclude that the Appellant did not know what he was saying or that he was at a disadvantage or that he was being misunderstood.

82. My impression of the Appellant’s wife’s evidence was that she was mostly attempting to provide details as she knew them and was being mostly truthful, but she relied very much on her husband in the past and does so now. For example, when she was in South Africa, she worked but her salary was, in effect, given to her husband who then dealt with it and spent it for them.

83. My impression of the Appellant’s daughter, N’s evidence was that she was a daughter committed to ensuring that her parents are cared for. She was combative and not surprisingly so because she wants the best for her parents. That is perhaps what all parents would like from an adult child.

84. I turn to assessing the evidence in more detail. I do so on the basis that Mr Wood said that he does not assert that being white in South Africa is of itself sufficient for this claim to succeed. I also have the expert report and other background material in mind.

85. The Appellant said in his witness statement dated 4 December 2023 in respect of his younger daughter (not N) as follows:

“I see my youngest daughter every couple of months. We go and stay with her, and her partner.”
…
This statement was made with my legal representative over the course of multiple appointments.”

86. In my judgment this is somewhat different to the Appellant’s attempts at minimising the relationship that he and his wife have with their younger daughter.

87. Before me, the Appellant sought to refer to his younger daughter’s lesbian relationship conflicting with his Christian beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness and so he claimed the relationship with his daughter was one of “not associating”.

88. In my judgment, it is clear that the truth is closer to what the Appellant’s wife told me. Namely that if the Appellant’s younger daughter offered assistance, including financial assistance, then it will be accepted by the Appellant and his wife. I also take into account, that whilst modest, the Appellant’s younger daughter gives her parents small amounts of money even now. I do not see why the Appellant’s younger daughter would not provide assistance if her parents required it on return to South Africa and why the Appellant and his wife would reject such assistance. The impression that the Appellant sought to give me of being so distant from his daughter that the relationship is extremely limited is clearly not true. That is because even the Appellant’s own witness statement explained that he even stays over at her home.

89. It is obvious, for example, that staying over at his daughter’s house, with her partner has not been a bar to the close parent child relationship continuing. Albeit I accept that the Appellant’s evidence when he states that his Christian beliefs require him to disapprove of his daughter’s lesbian relationship. I conclude that there is a line of assistance available to the Appellant and his wife via their younger daughter. I have not been given much in the way of financial details about the younger daughter, but their younger daughter has a home without mortgage and both she and her partner work. I note too the complete lack of reference to the younger daughter in the Appellant and his wife’s most recent witness statements dated just a few days before the resumed hearing which is surprising lack of reference.

90. Despite providing previous witness statements, including a more recent one for the resumed hearing, the Appellant said for the first time at the resumed hearing that there is a mandatory retirement age for persons in South Africa. This was not something he had previously raised in this manner. Mr Wood was not able to refer to any background material to confirm this oral evidence from the Appellant.

91. In my judgment this was once again an attempt by the Appellant to present his “difficulties” as being impossible to surmount when that is not the case. I do not accept that, for example, persons once aged 60 (for women) or 65 (for men) have to stop working in South Africa. In my judgment, even without background evidence, it is clear that South Africa would not want to deprive its skilled and vital older workforce from continuing to work if they wished to. Whether as self employed persons, consultants or in companies who may wish to employ them. Whilst I accept that employment contracts might say that a current employee will stop work with that company at aged 60 or 65, that is not the same as persons of that age never being able to work again. I acknowledge too that just as in the UK there is age discrimination, that does not mean I can accept the Appellant’s new evidence to me that persons cannot work beyond retirement age. Indeed, even a modest enquiry during the hearing of the Appellant’s evidence about setting up a business showed that the Appellant is wrong. Even though I cannot be satisfied that the Appellant is capable of work, it was the pretence and downplaying about even the possibility of work which has concerned me about the Appellant’s evidence. It leads me to be unsure about other parts of his evidence. People lie for all sorts of reasons, but I cannot see why the Appellant would lie other than to seek to succeed in his appeal.

92. Whilst the Appellant referred in his earlier witness statement to his younger daughter, he has failed to do so in his witness statement provided just shortly before the resumed hearing on 30 April 2026. Whilst the Appellant states his daughter N could not support him financially, the lack of reference to his younger daughter is conspicuous by its absence. The younger daughter is full time employed, without children and she has a partner in paid employment. Despite the mortgage apparently being paid, it is not possible to decipher why there was a failure to mention her in the most recent witness statement. This also highlights to me the Appellant’s attempts at not giving me the full picture.

93. Similarly, the Appellant’s relatives feature little in the evidence until pressed. Whilst I accept that the Appellant’s relatives will not greet the Appellant and his wife with money and accommodation, they are still able to offer company and some assistance, even if just companionship, advice and guidance. Mr and Mrs S have provided letters to say they cannot assist financially.

94. It is a curious aspect of cases of this nature that the worse an Appellant portrays what life will be like on return to their own country, the more likely they are to succeed in their appeal. It is unfortunate that the Appellant has that mindset in his approach to his case and to his evidence. Perhaps understandably he cannot look at his own case objectively, but I must. I therefore assess the Appellant’s evidence on that objective basis.

95. I found the Appellant to be expecting far too much. The lifestyle he had with armed security, cars, high end property, living in more affluent areas, going out, gardeners and the like were all at a time when he had a job which paid him well and when his wife was working full time. That lifestyle stopped when he stopped work and when his wife stopped work. I cannot somehow replicate within this decision that lifestyle for the Applicant and his wife. With respect to the Appellant, he is expecting too much when seeking to return to such a lifestyle. One asks how the couple would have continued with that lifestyle if they had no pension, no savings and no job and if they had not come to the UK. Even without the difficulties with the black men, that was what was around the corner for them if the Appellant’s evidence is to be accepted. That is because the Appellant said he had been swindled out of his pension and he was soon to be forced to retire because of mandatory retirement rules. Yet he would still have to find money for food, medical bills and the like. All on the claimed £46 per month for each of them.

96. The contrast with what the Appellant and his wife receive now is that all is paid for their housing costs via the UK Government. They also receive adequate amounts for food etc. They receive free NHS treatment. The medical records show they have used it extensively. I accept that having to pay for their rent, food and medical treatment is not something they want to do. I have to assess the asylum claim which is before me and the Article 3 medical claim which is before me.

97. I accept that the Appellant and his wife will not enjoy asking the non-profit organisations that Dr Bulled referred to in her report for assistance, but that is an available option for them and it is a source for them. Just as seeking benefits from UK authorities is an option for them.

98. In my judgment it is obvious that the Appellant well knew he was intending to come to the UK and that is why he sent the proceeds of sale of his South African house to his daughter N’s UK bank account. It is a curious feature of the case that the Appellant had provided documents from the purchasers’ solicitors in his bundle. That is because the Appellant was the seller and not the purchaser. I note it is now said that this was via a WhatsApp message.

99. I do not accept that the sale proceeds were intended to be used for a visit as tourists for a limited few weeks or months. It is verging on the absurd to think that the Appellant would sell his home just for a holiday in the UK for a few weeks or months. It is clear to me that the Appellant was unable to explain this. Even if assailants were seeking him. The Appellant’s continued insistence that he sent the money to his daughter’s UK account because he wanted to spend it as a tourist in the UK is not something that is remotely capable of belief. Again, I conclude that this is another example of the Appellant not giving me the complete or true picture.

100. What makes this more difficult is that the Appellant’s daughter N has been claiming UK state benefits but failed to inform the authorities in the UK that she had some £25,000 in her bank account from her father. Unfortunately, it appears that remained so even after the several months between the original hearing and the resumed hearing because N told me in her oral evidence that she had still not informed the UK authorities.

101. The Appellant’s Rule 15(2A) application for the admission of new evidence dated 2 days before the hearing was a HSBC bank statement for the Appellant’s daughter. That showed that on 5 July 2019 the Appellant had transferred the funds from the sale of his house in South Africa to his daughter. The Appellant’s solicitors say that they received that statement only at 18.08 hours on Monday 27 April 2026. Therefore, the house was sold at the end of June 2019. A few days later the sale proceeds were sent to the Appellant’s daughter’s HSBC account in the UK and a few days after that the Appellant and his wife came to the UK for the purposes of their claimed short holiday. Asylum was claimed a month or so after their arrival. The Appellant and his wife have been in the UK ever since.

102. I found Dr Bulled’s evidence to be of assistance. I have set much of it out above, but I take the whole report and her oral evidence into account.

103. I deal first with the nature of the type of home that the Appellant and his wife might be able to live in on return. I use the approximate equivalent exchange rates for ease of following. A property costing around £125 to £150 per month (£1500 to £1800 per year) is available in a secure block. Not in the best area, but the pictures provided show it is clean, modern and suitable for a couple of older years. It has modern conveniences such as shower and WC even though Dr Bulled’s evidence was that 50% of South Africans do not have access to a toilet. On top of that there will be the cost of food, utilities, transport, medical care, clothing and the like. The Appellant’s evidence was that if the up to £6000 was provided as part of the returns package by the UK Government, then that would last around 1 and half years to 2 years. The accommodation is at least of an adequate standard if not a good standard in my judgment. Dr Bulled described it in her report as follows: “These prices are for housing is comparable to a flat in the UK, with running water, indoor bathroom facilities, sewage, and electricity with a secure apartment block in a moderate income neighborhood.” On any fair reading, this is more than reasonable accommodation.

104. I accept that the pension of £46 (£92) (noting the figure was also referred to as being £49 x2,) is not very much money. The obvious reason it is low compared to the UK is because the cost of living in South Africa is low. As Dr Bulled said, that £92 monthly pension can go towards the Appellant’s monthly rent of £125 to £150.

105. I accept that the Appellant is not well. He has medical ailments. I have referred to the GP’s most recent letters. The Appellant had also been getting some psychological input in 2022, including from a trainee who has provided a report which appears in the bundle. Counselling had not been possible in the UK it would appear. Dr Bulled referred to the difficulties in getting treatment at public hospitals in South Africa. She also said in oral evidence that treatment for things like depression are virtually non existent. The Appellant’s wife takes medication for depression and so has had treatment in the UK and knows what medication she requires. She also requires a check up in respect of the mouth issue as a precaution in the future against cancer. I take judicial notice that psychotherapy and the like will have been provided to millions online during Covid (noting this couple arrived in the UK in 2019 and so have lived in the UK during Covid). I will be surprised if talking-type treatments online are not available if one is in South Africa too. Being online it could obviously be accessed from another part of the world or even from within South Africa.

106. I note too that unfortunately; the evidence of Dr Lodhi (the UK psychiatrist) in the 2022 report appears to contradict Dr Bulled’s 2024 report. Dr Bulled suggested in oral evidence that treatment for depression is not available in South Africa. It is clear to me that the Appellant and/or his wife appear to want to suggest that treatment is not available when it clearly is. Indeed, for well over a decade the Appellant’s wife was receiving treatment. In fact, one part of the Dr Lodhi’s report suggests that the Appellant’s wife was receiving treatment for 12 years, another part says 15 years and another says that the Appellant’s wife in fact has had depression all her life.

107. In my judgment, treatment is available in South Africa for the Appellant and his wife. Dr Bulled said it was for the physical ailments albeit Dr Bulled said it would be of a lower standard. I accept it will not be the excellent treatment which the private sector offers in South Africa and which is world class. That is really no different to any part of the world though. Where persons have the means, they can pay for the best medical treatment. I accept Dr Bulled’s evidence that persons wait for 4 hours (3am to line up for the hospital to open at 7am) to get seen in public hospitals in South Africa for routine appointments. Sadly, waiting for treatment is an issue across the world. The reality it that it is not always easy to get seen in the UK or USA at public hospitals either. It is well known that waiting lists in the UK are in the years for some ailments and for some mental health issues.

108. With reference to AM (Zimbabwe) and to which I have referred above in detail, the treatment in any event is available for both the Appellant and his wife within South Africa, albeit the standard will be lower.

109. In relation to the asylum claim, the Appellant and his wife are fearful of the non-state actors who were after them previously. The Appellant left South Africa in 2019 and it is now 7 years later. There is no real evidence of anything recent showing interest in the Appellant or his wife. I accept that there were some attempts by the assailants asking the Appellant’s gardener where the Appellant had gone 2 weeks after his arrival in the UK in 2019. I accept too that the experiences must have been awful for both the Appellant and his wife. I note there is still no real evidence from the police in South Africa. The Respondent pointed out the lack of evidence to the Appellant some years ago.

110. In my judgment the basis of the claim that the work colleague that the Appellant has the issue with (“F”) was many years ago. The problem arose because F thought he would get the managerial role, but instead the Appellant got it. F was black. A brick was thrown through the Appellant’s window at home. 4 occupants in a car followed the Appellant and his wife. They were black. The tyres had been slashed on their car when they got back to the car. The police said that due to a lack of evidence there was nothing that could be done for them. Seeing aggressive black men became a problem for the Appellant’s wife. The Appellant sold his house, his furniture and his wife’s car. Their gardener told them that people were asking about them when the couple had moved to their friends’ high security home and also 2 weeks after they arrived in the UK in 2019.

111. The Appellant states in his witness statement dated 19 September 2020 that “South Africa is now predominantly a country full of young angry black men”. The Appellant said in his witness statement dated 21 December 2022 that “white people are discriminated against throughout South Africa-and we are at risk wherever we would be because of our race and background”. Mr Wood disavowed any reliance on being white as a reason for the appeal to be allowed of itself. Indeed, Mr Wood said that the evidence did not support such a conclusion. Mr Wood is unarguably correct to have said that, albeit any criminal event is frightening wherever it might occur. Mr Wood is entirely correct to say what he did though. Further, I see no basis whatsoever for such broad and unevidenced assertions from the Appellant. Things are not perfect for any race in any country, but the Appellant’s claim in respect of a convention reasoned based on race is utterly hopeless. Not even Dr Bulled was able to assist the Appellant with such exaggerated assertions and claims. Consequently, I dismiss the claim based on race.

112. Unfortunately, the Appellant’s daughter N in her e-mail to the Home Office of 17 August 2022 does not show her objective approach either. She said in support of her parents’ case that:

“There is no chance of a safe return to South Africa. White people are being hunted, abused, set upon, robbed, raped, tortured and murdered. It's every day that more and more white people go "missing" only to be found murdered, raped and maimed. They will never stop.”

113. I note the background material and in respect of white farmers, but this case comes nowhere close to a claim which requires international protection. Indeed, it is not surprising that the South African police were not able to assist the Appellant when the Appellant merely referred to some black people following him in a car, that his car tyres were slashed and when a brick was thrown through his window at home. The police need evidence. It is no different in the UK, albeit I would expect the police here to be politer here than the South African police were to the Appellant when he, in effect, remonstrated with them for not taking matters seriously. In any event, nothing untoward has happened in the 7 years since.

114. I must look at matters objectively. I seek to do so here without legal jargon for the Appellant and his wife’s benefit. I have referred to the law extensively above. Being the victim of crime wherever in the world is horrific. Perhaps especially more so in respect of crimes of violence. Putting it succinctly, I am not required to assess whether safety can be guaranteed because that would be absurd because even in the UK there are very high levels of violent crime, especially in busier towns and cities.

115. As I said above, the issue is whether there is a “sufficiency of protection” in South Africa for this couple with what they went through with the Appellants’ work colleague and the black people F seemed to have engaged. I conclude that there is a sufficiency of protection available in South Africa.

116. In my judgment, the Appellant and his wife will be able to seek the protection of the police in South Africa. Whilst the Appellant’s complaints were dismissed when seeking assistance previously, the couple will be able to notify the authorities of the occasions if further harassment and pursuit occur. Paragraph 339K adds nothing of any real substance in my view. The fact that the Appellant and his wife were the victims of relatively minor crimes 7 years ago from the work colleague and his henchmen, is not indicative of what might happen in the future in this case for the reasons I have set out.

117. I am unable to see from within the expert report or from the background material that the police will not seek to investigate matters. I accept that there can perhaps sometimes be an issue if the police officers receiving the complaint are not minded to take white complainants seriously. It appears that further efforts to improve the police have developed since the Appellant left South Africa 7 years ago. As Dr Bulled accepted in cross examination, various new bills have been introduced to tackle crime in South Africa. I am not suggesting that crime has been eradicated, but I conclude that the appropriate Horvath test which I have referred to extensively above is met. I conclude that the authorities in South Africa are both able and willing to provide assistance to the Appellant and to his wife from the non state actors they fear.

118. If I am wrong and there is thought not to be a sufficiency of protection in South Africa, I consider whether it is reasonable to expect the Appellant and his wife to relocate internally within South Africa. Again, I have referred above extensively to the House of Lords decisions in respect of this issue. Section 35 of NABA is in similar terms.

119. In this matter, there is concern about the suicidal ideation. The Appellant’s wife is recorded to have historically attempted suicide twice by taking painkillers in South Africa over a decade ago. She does not wish to return to be homeless in South Africa. This case was not advanced before me on a clear J v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 629 basis. In my judgment, difficult as it has been, the suicide attempts in South Africa had not been ‘caused’ by the receiving state and nor are they the responsibility of the receiving state. As the Respondent states in her refusal letter, “…the UK will take all appropriate actions to ensure that your safety during removal from the UK”. Obvious things such as the Appellant and his wife taking a list of their medication and some extra medication, along with their medical notes and clear summaries from their GP/other medical practitioners/psychologists will assist them and will assist those who will treat them in South Africa. The Appellant and his wife are well educated and have had managerial or senior posts and I do not doubt that they will be able to explain themselves well from those in South Africa from whom they seek medical treatment for their physical and mental well being. The suicide risks, such as they are clearly well ameliorated in this case.

120. In respect of medical treatment and Article 3 ECHR I referred to the law in some detail above, but I refer here to the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department v OSB [2026] EWCA Civ 647. Bean LJ provided the only reasoned judgment and with which Singh and Baker LJJ said in respect of Article 3 medical cases as follows:

“36.      That remained the applicable test until Paposhvili v Belgium [2016] ECHR 1113. At [183] the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR said:-
“The Court considers that the ‘other very exceptional cases’ within the meaning of the judgment in N v The United Kingdom (para 43) which may raise an issue under article 3 should be understood to refer to situations involving the removal of a seriously ill person in which substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she, although not at imminent risk of dying, would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy. The Court points out that these situations correspond to a high threshold for the application of article 3 of the Convention in cases concerning the removal of aliens suffering from serious illness.”
37.      In AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 [2021] AC 633 (“AM (Zimbabwe)”), the Supreme Court considered what modification needed to be made to the Article 3 test in order to comply with Paposhvili. The court held that, in order for an applicant to succeed on Article 3 ill-health grounds, they must provide evidence demonstrating that:
i) They are seriously ill,
ii) They have provided substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that, if returned to the receiving country,
a) Appropriate treatment would either be absent (i.e., unavailable to anyone) or inaccessible to them in particular; and
b) This absence or lack of access to appropriate treatment would expose them, either,
i) To a serious, rapid, and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
ii) To a significant (i.e., substantial) reduction in life expectancy.
38.      AM’s case then returned to the Upper Tribunal, whose decision is reported as AM (Article 3, health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC). The UT reviewed AM (Zimbabwe), Paposhvili, and the Grand Chamber case of Savran and Denmark [2021] ECHR 1025. The UT gave the following guidance at [3]:
“… It is insufficient for P to merely establish that his or her condition will worsen upon removal or that there would be serious and detrimental effects. What is required is “intense suffering”. The nature and extent of the evidence that is necessary will depend on the particular facts of the case …”

121. The Appellant and his wife have done no more than to say that their medical conditions will worsen on removal and/or that there will be serious and detrimental effects. There is no sufficient evidence of “intense suffering” before me. I therefore must dismiss the Article 3 medical claims too.

122. I note that Dr Bulled referred to evidence showing that things might begin to improve in South Africa, such as the national health insurance plans in South Africa. I do not need to refer to them because the above shows how hopeless the Appellant’s case is on each aspect but I refer to it because it might assist the Appellant and his wife to know that things look might be better in South Africa than they did when they left 7 years ago.

123. Article 8 ECHR was not pursued before me, but it would appear to me that the Appellant and his wife have moved across various properties in North East England and have been able to make friends quickly at each location. They will be able to do the same with similar church groups in South Africa. Additionally, there is no reason to believe that their relatives in South Africa will not also wish to assist them. As I have stated above the Appellant’s youngest daughter will continue to assist the Appellant and his wife, even if to start off with in a modest way as she currently does. It may even be that their older daughter N will consider at some stage she is ready to return to work now that her older child is aged around 21 and the youngest one is soon to be at senior school. The middle child receives disability benefits but is approaching adulthood too. These are matters for the Appellant and his wife, but I say these things because it appears to me that the Appellant and his wife have much to look forward to.

Conclusion

124. The VRS payment of up to £6000 is a significant sum for use by the Appellant and his wife in South Africa. Even if a lesser amount, even as low as £4000, is given to the couple, that in my judgment will still ensure that the Appellant and his wife can secure a reasonable and viable internal relocation alternative in South Africa. The VRS funds, along with the couple’s South African pension plus even just modest occasional support from their youngest daughter will provide a reasonable standard of living. I do not accept that the caselaw requires that I must be satisfied that the income streams must be available forever. Even if I am wrong, in my judgment it will be for the Appellant and his wife to work out what they will do that after about after a year and half to 2 years. That is the time period that the funds will last, even according to the Appellant.

125. If the Appellant and his wife have to then, they will also be able to seek support from non profit organisations in South Africa for further assistance. Medical treatment for both physical and mental health conditions, including for suicidal ideation is available in South Africa. In any event it cannot be ignored that the Appellant’s was accessing treatment for depression for at least a decade before she arrived for her holiday here in 2019 and possibly even for the whole of her adult life. That is according to the Appellant’s own evidence in his bundle of documents.

126. Therefore, in responding to the issues I am asked to deal with:

(1) There is sufficient protection available to the Appellant and his wife in South Africa;
(2) In any event the Appellant and his wife can reasonably internally relocate within South Africa; and
(3) Neither the Appellant’s, nor his wife’s return to South Africa would breach Article 3 ECHR in respect of the medical claim.

127. Accordingly, despite Mr Wood having said and done all he could on behalf of the Appellant I dismiss the appeal on all grounds.


Notice of Decision

The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law.

I remake the decision. I dismiss the appeal.

The Appellant’s appeal is therefore dismissed on all grounds, including asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.


Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

15 July 2026