Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003161

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59049/2023
LP/03581/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DOYLE

Between

TD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
And

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Mazumder of Wildan Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I make an anonymity direction because this appeal arises from the appellant’s protection claim.
2. This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hussain, dated 21/04/2025, which dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
Background
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. The appellant entered the UK as a student in 2010. He claimed asylum in the UK on 08/09/2022. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s protection claim on 11/10/2023.
The Judge’s Decision
4. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. On 21/04/2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Hussain (“the Judge”) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.
5. The Appellant lodged grounds of appeal, and, on 17/09/2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick granted permission to appeal. She said
2. Ground One is arguable. It is arguable that the FTT erred by failing to take into account the psychologist’s report in assessing the appellant’s credibility. I note that the appellant’s representatives have sent a letter to the Tribunal discussing the psychologist’s qualifications, but the connection between this and the grounds of appeal is unclear. It does not appear that the report was rejected by the FTT because of the author’s qualifications; rather, there appears to be no mention of the report in the FTT decision.
3. I take Ground Four and Ground Three out of turn. Ground Four is arguable. It is arguable that the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) erred in the approach it took at [26] to assessing the risk to the appellant on return. The question before the FTT was whether this particular appellant would face a real risk of persecution on account of his Hindu religion. It is arguable that it was an error to approach the assessment of risk as requiring a mathematical calculation that there was, specifically, at least a 10% chance of persecution, and to then assess whether that mathematical threshold was reached with reference to such factors as the number of Hindus in Bangladesh, their percentage in the national population, and the number of districts in which a newspaper article reported that attacks had taken place. See paragraphs [26], [27] and [34].
4. Ground Three is arguable. It is arguable that the FTT failed to engage properly with the independent country evidence. Not only was its approach to the evidence arguably distorted by the use of a mathematical formula, it is also arguable that the FTT erred by imposing its own speculation about what is plausible (see [35]), and by expecting highly specific confirmation of aspects of the appellant’s account (see [28], where it is noted that there was no specific report of anti-Hindu attacks in the appellant’s district, and the sentence “No background material has been presented before me to show that Muslims who attend Friday prayers wearing their customary head-cap, afterwards go out on a loot and attack spree!” [exclamation mark in original] at [41]). It is further concerning that at several places, the FTT appears to make findings based on its own research on Wikipedia ([27] and [43]).
5. Ground Five is arguable, as the FTT did not give any reasons for dismissing the appellant’s article 8 appeal, stating merely that “The respondent has adequately dealt with the appellant’s human rights claim.”
6. Ground Two appear to be a mere disagreement, but if the grounds relating to the treatment of the country evidence are made out, it could be found that this affected the credibility assessment as well.
7. Permission is granted on all grounds.
The Hearing
6. (a) For the Appellant, Mr Mazumder moved the grounds of appeal. He adopted the terms of the skeleton argument.
(b) Mr Mazumder said that the appellant relies on a report from a psychiatrist, and the Judge neither mentions that report nor gives any consideration to the evidence contained in the report. The respondent, in their rue 24 response, concedes that failure to consider the psychiatric evidence is an error. The respondent says it is not a material error. Mr Mazumder said that it is a material error because the evidence contained in the report goes directly to article 3 and 8 ECHR grounds of appeal.
(c) Mr Mazumder then moved the third and fourth grounds of appeal. He took me to [25] of the decision where the Judge appears to consider the country expert evidence. He said that, even though the Judge considers the country expert report to be well-written, the Judge does not explain why he does not attach weight to the country expert report. Mr Mazumder said that the Judge appears to say that the expert report is nothing but a rehearsal of the background materials, when in fact the expert provides an opinion after discussing the background materials.
(d) Mr Mazumder took me to [26] and [27] of the decision and said that, there, the Judge clearly carries out his own Internet research after the hearing, and places reliance on what he finds on Internet websites without giving parties a chance to comment on his independent research. Mr Mazumder told me that [25], [26], and [27] contain material errors of law.
(e) Returning to ground two, Mr Mazumder said that the Judge gave inadequate reasons for his credibility findings because the Judge gave inadequate consideration to the expert country report and no consideration to the psychiatric assessment.
(f) Finally, Mr Mazumder mentioned the fifth ground of appeal, and took me to [45] and [52] of the decision. He said that the Judge has simply dismissed the appellant’s article 8 appeal without carrying out any proportionality balancing exercise.
(g) Mr Mazumder asked me to set the Judge’s decision aside.
7. For the appellant, Mr Hulme resisted the appeal. He relied on the respondent’s rule 24 note and said that the decision does not contain an error of law, material or otherwise. He carefully went through the Judge’s decision. He conceded that failure to consider the psychiatric report was an error of law but told me it was not material to the outcome. He argued that the Judge adequately considered each strand of evidence. He agreed that the Judge’s findings of fact were not perfect, but he asked me to dismiss the appeal and allow the decision to stand.
Analysis
8. It is common ground that the Judge makes no mention of the psychiatric report dated 25 September 2024. That report offers a diagnosis of severe PTSD and links the symptoms of the diagnosed illness to an arson attack on the appellant’s family home in Bangladesh in 2019. The respondent’s position is that the decision contains an error of law because the psychiatric report is not mentioned, but that error is not material.
9. The error is material because the author of the report links the diagnosis of mental illness to the appellant’s claim of an arson attack on the family home in 2019. There is no analysis of that piece of evidence. The evidence contained in the psychiatric report is neither accepted nor rejected. The psychiatric report is a useful piece of evidence which, if it had been considered, could affect the outcome of the appeal. Failure to make any mention of the psychiatric report is a material error of law.
10. The Judge’s findings of fact lie between [24] and [45] of the decision. At [25] of the decision the Judge discusses the country expert report the appellant relied on. The Judge says that the report is well documented and well-articulated. Although the Judge discusses the contents of the report at [25], the Judge does not come to any conclusion. The Judge does not say that he either accepts or rejects the conclusion of the country expert. The objective reader is left wondering what conclusion the Judge reaches after considering the country expert report.
11. An expert report is a freestanding source of evidence which requires some Judicial analysis. An expert’s opinion does not need to be accepted, but the Judge must give reasons for either accepting or rejecting expert witness evidence. Those reasons are not in the Judge’s decision.
12. At [26], [27], and [39] of the decision the Judge records that he carried out his own Internet research after the hearing. It is common ground that neither party referred to either scroll.com or Wikipedia, but the Judge records what is found in each of those Internet websites and the Judge’s own independent post hearing research forms part of his findings in fact.
13. In EG (post-hearing internet research) Nigeria [2008] UKAIT 00015 the Tribunal said that it is most unwise for a Judge to conduct post-hearing research, on the internet or otherwise, into the factual issues which have to be decided in a case. To derive evidence from post-hearing research on the internet and to base conclusions on that evidence without giving the parties the opportunity to comment on it is wrong.
14. [25], [26], and [27] all contain material errors of law.
15. Throughout his consideration of the appellants evidence, the Judge tries to apply a mathematical equation. The Judge looks for a 10% risk of persecution, and then considers the number of Hindus in Bangladesh, the percentage of Hindus in the national population, and the distribution of a newspaper in various districts in Bangladesh. He takes those factors and considers whether a threshold is reached. That is the wrong approach to a protection claim and gives rise to another material error of law.
16. Article 8 ECHR grounds of appeal were an issue to be determined by the Judge, but there is no consideration article 8 grounds of appeal. At [45] of the decision the Judge says
The respondent has adequately dealt with the appellant’s human rights claim. In my view there is no prospect of success of his claim.
17. That is not a proportionality balancing exercise. The Judge has not considered the article 8 grounds of appeal. That is another material error of law.
18. The Judge’s findings at are incomplete and unexplained. That is an inadequacy of reasoning.
19. The decision contains material errors of law. Because the decision is tainted by material errors of law it must be set aside. None of the Judge’s findings in fact can stand.
20. Mindful of the guidance given in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, as well as the Practice Statement of 11 June 2018, I find that remittal is necessary given the extensive fact-finding required.
Remittal to First-Tier Tribunal
21. Under Part 3 paragraph 7.2(b) of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal of 11 June 2018 the case may be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal if the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.
22. This case is remitted because a new fact-finding exercise is required. None of the findings of fact are to stand and a complete re-hearing is necessary.
23. This case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Taylor House to be heard before any First-tier Judge other than Judge Hussain. A Bengali interpreter will be required.
Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal errs materially in law.
The Judge’s decision dated 21 April 2025 is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be determined of new.

Signed Paul Doyle Date 27 November 2025
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Doyle