Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003164

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52884/2024
LP/00305/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURNS

Between

MA
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: In Person
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 7 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals a decision by a First-tier Tribunal (“FtT) Judge (“the Judge”) dated 8 May 2025 dismissing his protection claim.
The Background
2. The Appellant, a national of Bangladesh had applied for protection on his own behalf and on behalf of his wife and 2 children on 22 December 2022. He said that he was a member of the BNP and had held positions in the party including the student wing from 2016. He said that he had attended public demonstrations and private events for the BNP. He claimed that because of his political activities both in Bangladesh and his sur place activity in the UK he would be at risk on return to anywhere in Bangladesh. If his protection claim was not successful, he argued that his family had established a private life in the UK such that dismissal of his claim would breach his Article 8 private life rights.
3. The claim was refused by the Respondent for reasons set out in a decision dated 29 January 2024.
4. The Appellant's appeal was refused on 8 May 2025. In summary the Judge found that the Appellant’s claimed activities for the BNP whilst he was in Bangladesh was not credible and that the documents he had supplied in support of his appeal were not reliable, particularly given that they had not been translated in the UK [18] and were not entirely consistent with his oral evidence [20]. The Judge found that the Appellant had not held political positions within the BNP whilst in Bangladesh [36]. The Judge found that the Appellant’s limited sur place activity whilst in the UK was insufficient to make him a person of interest to the authorities in Bangladesh [39]. The Judge concluded that even if she was wrong about the Appellant’s credibility and political profile then there would be no risk to him on return [42] relying on the CPIN: Bangladesh Political Situation December 2024. The Judge rejected the Article 8 claim, finding that there would not be very significant obstacles to the family’s reintegration in Bangladesh and that there would not be unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant and his family [46].
5. The Appellant was refused permission to appeal by the FtT on 27 June 2025. Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman granted permission to appeal on 8 August 2025.

The Grounds of Appeal
6. In summary the grounds of appeal assert that
(i)The Judge did not follow a structured approach to assess credibility and KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC) was cited,
(ii) The Judge should not have given less weight to the documents which had been translated in Bangladesh because this was necessary due to cost. Further the Judge made inadequate findings about why she placed limited weight on the photographs and medical evidence,
(iii)The Judge failed to give weight to paragraph 3.1.5 of the Home Office Fact-Finding Mission Report : Bangladesh 2017 and this undermines the Judge’s inference that the Appellant’s ability to leave the country safely contradicts his claim,
(iv)The Judge did not make sufficient findings on the sur place activity specifically whether it had come to the attention of the Authorities in Bangladesh,
(v)The Judge did little more than superficially consider the Article 8 claim and did not make an assessment of the best interests of the children.
PERMISSION TO APPEAL
7. Permission to Appeal was granted on 8 August 2025 by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman on all grounds. He found that it was arguable that the Judge’s assumption that it may have been easier to leave Bangladesh in 2017 (at the time of the Home Office fact-finding mission) than in 2022 was irrational and insufficiently reasoned and was arguably material to the Judge’s treatment of the Appellant’s credibility which then informed the findings on risk on return. Furthermore, he found it arguable that the Judge’s findings on the evidence from the Appellant’s Bangladeshi lawyer was influenced by her own cultural perspective.
THE ISSUE IN THE APPEAL
8. The issue before us is whether the Judge erred in law when assessing the Appellant’s credibility and if so whether any error was material to the outcome.
The Hearing of the Appeal
9. Ms Simbi referred to a Rule 24 response dated 20 August 2025. It was not in the bundle and had not been filed. It was only 4 paragraphs long and rather than seek permission to file it out of time Ms Simbi referred to its contents in her submissions.
10. The Appellant was assisted by the court appointed interpreter. The Appellant relied on his written Grounds of Appeal, and he briefly summarised his asylum claim. He then said that the refusal breached his family’s Article 8 (private life) rights for two children, one born in the UK and one settled at nursery school.
11. Ms Simbi referred to the adverse credibility findings which she submitted were open to the Judge to make. She referred to the discrepancies in the titles of the position the Appellant said he held in the BNP. She said that there was no identity information on the Appellant’s ID card. She submitted that it was open to the Judge to doubt the provenance of the documents because of how they had been translated. Furthermore, the Appellant had not explained in his skeleton argument or in evidence about what the documents are supposed to show and therefore he failed to show why they should be relied upon.
12. Ms Simbi explained that the Appellant has referred to the 2020 CPIN in his skeleton argument but the Judge had the 2024 CPIN and made properly reasoned findings about the Appellant’s risk on return [40] having considered the 2024 CPIN.
13. Ms Simbi referred to the 2017 Fact Finding Report and confirmed that it could be found in the background material (from page 323 in the stitched bundle). She submitted it was probably now an archived document because it no longer appeared as a document available on the gov.uk website. She submitted it was open to the judge to find that it was not a reliable document.
14. Ms Simbi submitted that there was no material error of law in the Judge’s treatment of the Article 8 claim.
15. In response the Appellant said that he thought he would have a further opportunity to provide further documents in support of his appeal. He said again that he had been unable to arrange for translations in the UK because of his financial difficulties.
Our Analysis
16. We consider each of the numbered Grounds of Appeal namely, 4, 5 (i) – (v) in the order in which they were set out by the Appellant.
17. We find that there was no arguable error of law Arising from Ground 4 and 5 (i) in relation to how the Judge had carried out her credibility assessment. The Appellant did not develop this point in the hearing before us. The Appellant referred to KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) in his grounds of appeal. The Upper Tribunal held that a framework comprising sufficiency of detail; internal consistency; external consistency; and plausibility provides a helpful framework within which to conduct a credibility assessment, although this is not an exhaustive list. We find that the Judge dis not err in law in her assessment.
18. Ground 4 was a disagreement with how the Judge had dealt with the evidence in [17] and the Appellant’s disagreement with the Judge’s assessment does not amount to an error of law
19. We find that the Judge did not err in law in her treatment of the documentation (Ground 5 (ii)) and the weight to be attached to it for which she gave adequate reasoning at [18] and [24].
20. We find that the Judge did err in law in her findings in relation to the ease with which the Appellant could leave Bangladesh when she weighed the 2017 Fact Finding Report (Ground 5 (iii)). The Judge found that the report was “not wholly reliable as evidence of the state of affairs in 2022” [22] which we find was open to the Judge to determine. However, a finding that the report was “not wholly reliable” [22] must mean that it was reliable to some extent. This therefore meant that the report to some extent corroborated the Appellant’s account, although the extent to which it was found to corroborate the account is not clear from the decision. What is clear is that when the Judge assessed the evidence in the round [37], she found that the Appellant was not a person of interest to the Authorities in Bangladesh. There is an error in her reasoning because she does not factor into her credibility assessment that the 2017 Report partially corroborates the Appellant’s account in accordance with the finding she made at [22].
21. We find that the Judge did not err in law in her consideration of the sur place activity. Although the Appellant said that the Judge misapplied XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC) we do not find that she did. The Judge was entitled to find that the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations was not enough to make him become a person of interest to the Authorities in Bangladesh [39] and that his sole Facebook post was similarly unlikely to have attracted adverse attention [41].
22. We do not find Ground 5 (v) is made out. The Judge made sufficiently reasoned findings as to why the decision did not breach the family’s Article 8 rights. Whilst there was no explicit reference to the children’s best interests, had she done so it could not have given rise to a different outcome because their best interests would be served by them remaining with their parents as a family unit and on the evidence, this could be in Bangladesh.
23. Permission to appeal was also granted on the basis that the findings at [23] and [36] that the Bangladeshi lawyer’s correspondence contained “emotive” and “political statements” was an impermissible finding given the evidence. The Judge found the evidence to be “an unusual style of writing for a letter from a lawyer to a client” [23] and “inconsistent” with what is usually expected. There was no objective evidence of what would “usually be expected”. The Judge erred in law in making findings which were not supported by the evidence before her. We find that it is likely that this influenced the Judge’s assessment of that evidence. This is because it appears to be listed as a factor in her assessment when she made findings about the documents’ “unreliability” [36]. There was no objective evidence as to the style of lawyer to client correspondence in Bangladesh. So, we find that the Judge was impermissibly influenced by her own cultural perspective. This impacted her assessment of the lawyer’s letter which fed into her overall credibility assessment. For reasons which we set out below this was not material to the outcome of the appeal.
24. In conclusion we find that the Judge’s credibility assessment was flawed. She erred in law in making two findings which were not open to her on the evidence before her.
The Reasons why the two errors of law were not material
25. The Judge made the following finding at [42]. “Even if I were wrong about my assessment of his credibility and his political profile I find there is no evidence that he would be at risk on return and rely on the CPIN: Bangladesh political situation dated December 2024 in support of my findings”.
26. Permission to appeal was neither sought nor granted in relation to [42]. This finding was therefore not open to challenge before us.
27. The decision contains some subheadings, some of which are underlined, some of which are in bold and capitalised, and some are neither. [42] falls under the heading “Findings” and the sub-heading “Appeal on Asylum Grounds”. There are three paragraphs above it which relate to sur place activity which follow a subheading “Sur Place Activity”. At first glance it could appear that [42] relates to sur place activity only, but we find that this is not the case when the decision is read as a whole.
28. Our reasons for that finding are as follows. Firstly, [42] refers to the assessment of the Appellant’s credibility and the Judge did not make credibility findings in relation to the sur place claim. Secondly, given that the Judge set out at [9(b)] that risk on return was an issue in dispute [9 (b)] and one she would need to determine [13(d)-(e)], and given that the Judge expressly mentions the 2024 CPIN [7], it is clear that she needed to make findings about risk on return. There is no other section in the decision other than [42] where such findings are made. We find therefore that the unchallenged finding of the Judge at [42] was that the Appellant was not at risk on return “even if I were wrong about my assessment of his credibility” and that this related to his risk on any basis, not just in relation to his sur place activity. Thus, the two errors of law which made the Judge’s adverse credibility finding unsafe did not undermine the finding that the Appellant was not at risk on return. Or to put it another way, had the Judge found the Appellant’s account to be made out in its entirety she would still have found him not to be at risk on return.
29. In reaching this conclusion the Judge relied on the CPIN Political Situation Bangladesh December 2024. This was not referred to in the refusal letter (29 January 2024) because the current CPIN at that time was CPIN Bangladesh: Political parties and affiliation version 3.0 September 2020.
30. We are satisfied that the correct CPIN at the time of the hearing and promulgation of the decision was the 2024 CPIN which was referenced by the Judge at [7] and would have been available to the Appellant at the time of the FtT hearing. The purpose of this CPIN was to provide an update following the resignation of the Awami League prime minister on 5 August 2024 and the establishment of an interim government on 8 August 2024 which includes representatives of the BNP (CPIN 2024 3.1.10).
31. The Judge found that the Appellant was not at risk on return [42]. Having considered the 2024 CPIN we are satisfied that her findings are consistent with the 2024 CPIN. The CPIN 2024 3.1.1 sets out that “Leaders, members, and supporters of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) … and their auxiliary (student and youth) organisations are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from the state”. BNP supporters have been able to engage in peaceful protest, tens of thousands attended a rally on 8 November 2024 in Bangladesh (CPIN 12.4.4). Whilst some factions have been involved in violent clashes with members of the ousted Awami League this would appear to be in relation to control of businesses (CPIN 12.4.2). BNP members who are involved in extortion and other criminal activities are still at risk of violence (CPIN 12.4.3). However, BNP leaders are supportive of the current regime and have taken “commendable steps to limit retributive violence by the party rank and file “(CPIN 12.4.6).
32. In MU v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 812 the Court of Appeal considered the risk on return to Bangladesh of a Bangladeshi national (the Respondent in that appeal) who had been actively involved in the student wing of the BNP. The Respondent had been attacked by members of the Awami League when he had returned to Bangladesh for his mother’s funeral. The Court held that the risk was from non-state actors in the Respondent’s home area, and it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to consider state protection and internal relocation and accordingly the Tribunal had erred in law. In deciding to remake the decision the Court considered the 2024 CPIN and found there was “no real risk” [16] to the Respondent following the regime change.
33. It held [17] “The truth is that the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the respondent will be at risk of serious harm if returned”. The decision was remade, and the Respondent’s appeal was dismissed.
34. Whilst recognising that MU is not a country guidance case and that risk on return has to be conducted on a case by case basis, we find that this is entirely analogous with the Appellant in the appeal before us.
35. In the circumstances, we find that the two errors into which the Judge fell were immaterial to the outcome of the appeal, because the Appellant would not be at risk on return and the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
1. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
2. The decision of the FtT dismissing his appeal stands.

C Burns
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Burns

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 November 2025