Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003181

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/56852/2024
LH/00914/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21st of November 2025

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
JAGDEV SINGH GILL
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Azmi, Counsel, instructed by Garg Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant, a citizen of India born in 1944, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge L Jones (“the Judge”), who dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim. That claim had been predicated on the assertion that the Appellant would be unable to return to India without encountering very significant obstacles or unjustifiably harsh consequences by virtue of his various health conditions. In refusing the human rights claim by a decision dated 30 May 2024, the Respondent asserted amongst other matters that appropriate care could be provided for the Appellant in India, whether it came from family members or private care facilities. In respect of the latter, the reasons for refusal letter cited a variety of sources as to possibilities as regards the provision of treatment and residential care provision.

The Judge’s decision
2. The Judge set out the relevant background, recording that the Sponsor alone gave oral evidence (the Sponsor being the Appellant’s son). An aspect of the evidence was that the Sponsor’s sister (the Appellant’s daughter) who resided in India was not in a position to provide care for the Appellant by virtue of her own health conditions and her caring role for one of her children.

3. At [11] the Judge began by observing that the Appellant’s case was “not without some significant difficulties.” The Judge went on to record that there was no supporting statement from the Sponsor’s sister, that the Sponsor’s own evidence was lacking in detail with much of the information only emerging during the course of cross-examination, and the absence of any social media messages or an email from the Sponsor’s daughter in relation to her claimed inability to provide care for the Appellant.

4. At [12] the Judge again observed that the Sponsor’s own evidence was lacking in detail, in particular to what he did for the Appellant on a daily basis. The Judge raised a concern as to how the Appellant’s running of a construction business was compatible with him apparently providing very significant practical care to the Appellant on a daily basis. In the same paragraph the Judge observed that there was “very little evidence” before him as to the Appellant’s needs.

5. At [13] the Judge confirmed that he had considered the report of a psychiatrist, Dr Gupta, “with care”. The Judge attributed some weight to the report and essentially accepted the assessment of very significant mobility issues, a diagnosis of moderate to severe anxiety and depression, and that the Appellant would require very high levels of physical and psychological assistance if he were to travel for any amount of distance. Dr Gupta had been told by the Sponsor that the Appellant was not even able to make a cup of tea for himself.

6. At [14] the Judge went on to conclude that he had concerns with the scope of Dr Gupta’s assessment, in particular that the report had been written without any review of the care facilities which might be available in India, nor upon any consideration of what care the Sponsor’s sister may be able to have offered in that country. The Judge noted that the reasons for refusal letter had put forward evidence relating to the possibility of private care providers in India. With this in mind, the Judge went on to consider Article 8(1), finding that there was family life as between the Appellant and the Sponsor.

7. In relation to the very significant obstacles test under the relevant Immigration Rules, the Judge found, having correctly reminded himself of the need for a broad evaluative assessment, that the appropriate medication would be available in India or that the medication recorded in Dr Gupta’s report was not in fact necessary. The Judge found that the Appellant had not established that the Sponsor’s sister was unable to provide care, nor had the Appellant established the absence of alternative appropriate care provision in India. The Judge found that the Appellant would have family support in India even if he did not reside with the Sponsor’s sister. Overall, the Judge concluded that there were no very significant obstacles to integration in India.

8. The Judge then went on to consider Article 8 on a wider basis. He referred to mandatory considerations under section 117B of Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. At [19] the Judge concluded that the Appellant’s interests did not outweigh the competing public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. In essence, the Judge brought forward his previous findings into the balancing exercise, concluding that the Appellant had failed to establish that his needs could not be appropriately met in India. It was open to the Sponsor to visit the Appellant and/or maintain communication by other means. The Judge observed that it was open to the Appellant once in India to make an application for entry clearance under the Adult Dependent Relative provisions of the Rules. At [20] the Judge considered the best interests of the Sponsor’s children, albeit that only one of them was a minor. This consideration did not tip the balance in the Appellant’s favour.

9. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.

The grounds of appeal and grant of permission
10. Four grounds of appeal have been put forward. Ground 1 asserts that the Judge failed to properly engage with Dr Gupta’s report, in particular the expert’s view that the Appellant would not be in a position to access or meaningfully benefit from care in India. This, it is submitted, constituted a “wholesale dismissal of the expert evidence”. Ground 2 asserts that the Judge misunderstood evidence in relation to the Sponsor’s sister’s ability to care for the Appellant in India and the Sponsor’s work/care arrangements in this country. Ground 3 asserts that the Judge misapplied the very significant obstacles test, and ground 4 asserts that the Article 8 proportionality assessment is flawed.

11. Permission was granted on all grounds by the First-tier Tribunal.

Rule 24 response
12. The Respondent has not provided a rule 24 response in this appeal.

The hearing
13. At the outset, Mr Azmi acknowledged that grounds 3 and 4 were effectively dependent on the success of grounds 1 and/or 2. He directed me to the passage within Dr Gupta’s report where the author expresses the view that the Appellant would not be able to access or benefit from any care in India even if it were in theory available. It was submitted the Judge simply failed to address this particular aspect of the expert evidence and that of itself undermined his overall assessment.

14. In respect of ground 2, Mr Azmi submitted that the Judge had failed to engage with or provide reasons in respect of the Sponsor’s own evidence in relation to his sister’s ability to care for the Appellant and/or his working arrangements in this country. Mr Azmi suggested that it would not be right to infer from [11] and [12] of the Judge’s decision that the Sponsor’s evidence had in fact been rejected.

15. Mr Wain submitted that the Judge had adequately addressed Dr Gupta’s report and had been entitled to rely on the absence of assessment of possible care provision in India. In respect of ground 2, Mr Wain submitted that the Judge had, at least implicitly, rejected the Sponsor’s evidence on the two issues of the sister’s possible care and the Sponsor’s work arrangements.

16. In a brief reply Mr Azmi emphasised the lack of an express rejection of the Sponsor’s evidence.

17. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.

Conclusions
18. I first remind myself of the need to exercise appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The Judge at first-instance was best placed to evaluate the evidence from a variety of sources. I should be slow to assume that evidence was simply overlooked or that evidence which was expressly referred to has not been adequately addressed. I also remind myself that a Judge need not provide extensive reasons, or reasons for reasons, and that each and every item of evidence considered need not be set out on the face of a decision. I have read the Judge’s decision holistically and sensibly.

19. With the above in mind and for the reasons set out below, I conclude that the Judge did not materially err in law when dismissing the Appellant’s appeal.

20. At [13] the Judge stated in terms that he had considered the report of Dr Gupta “with care.” He set out several important aspects of the report and accepted that the Appellant suffered from a number of physical and mental health conditions and that there were significant care needs (notwithstanding the lack of detail provided by the Sponsor himself). The important passage is contained in [14]. It is an indisputable fact that Dr Gupta had not engaged with any evidence relating to possible care provision in India: indeed, he did not purport to be an expert on that particular issue. It is also an undisputable fact that the Appellant himself had not adduced any independent evidence relating to care provision in India, in particular that which might be available from private care facilities (including residential homes). Thus, the Judge was faced with a report which was based on an incomplete picture as regards the core issue in the appeal, namely the Appellant’s care needs. The Judge was entitled to find that Dr Gupta’s opinions had not been arrived at on the basis of a review of the care facilities that might be available in India, nor in consideration of what, if any, care the Appellant’s daughter may be able to offer. He was entitled to find that there had not been a proper review undertaken of what care might be available to the Appellant in India on a paid basis. That shortcoming in Dr Gupta’s report was, as found by the Judge, relevant to the consideration of the Appellant’s case within and without the relevant Immigration Rules.

21. Mr Azmi’s reliance on a particular passage in Dr Gupta’s report where the author speaks of the Appellant not being able to access or benefit from any treatment in India does not of itself demonstrate a material error on the Judge’s part. First, the Judge confirmed that he had considered the report “with care”. I am satisfied that that clearly indicates that the entirety of the report had been taken into account. Second, Dr Gupta’s view as expressed in this specific passage could only ever have been based on an incomplete evidential picture, as I have already mentioned. He had not considered any evidence about the nature of potential care facilities in India; he had not considered the availability of appropriate psychological treatment; he had not considered the availability of significant practical care provision; he had not considered the possibility of residential care with, for example, specialist psychological input. That is not a criticism of Dr Gupta, but simply the reality of the evidence being considered by the Judge.

22. In my judgment, the Judge was entitled to conclude, as he did on a sensible reading of [14], that Dr Gupta’s report did not address a core aspect of the relevant considerations to be assessed and that the passage relied on by Mr Azmi could only have been based on half the picture, as it were. The fact that the Judge did not expressly refer to the passage in question does not disclose an error of law on the basis of the overarching principles I have stated previously and the fact that the report was considered with care.

23. Ground 1 is not made out.

24. I am satisfied that the Judge did find that the Sponsor’s evidence on the two matters in question was unreliable. In respect of the Sponsor’s sister’s situation in India, the Judge had premised his concerns with the observation that the Appellant’s case “was not without some significant difficulties.” That represents the context for what followed in [11] and [12]. The Judge was entitled to conclude that some evidence from the Sponsor’s sister should have been forthcoming: it was an obvious matter which should have been addressed as part of the Appellant’s case. There was no explanation for the absence of any such evidence. This is not a protection claim in which the issue of corroborative evidence has to be approached with particular caution. In addition, the Judge has expressed general concerns with the lack of detail from the Sponsor himself. There is no error here. Even if there was, it would have been immaterial because the Judge’s conclusion on the provision of care in India was put in the alternative: the Appellant had failed to show that appropriate care would not be available from either private providers or the Sponsor’s sister.

25. In respect of the Sponsor’s evidence of his own work/caring responsibilities in this country, again the Judge expressed concerns about the absence of detail in that evidence, both in respect of what the Sponsor allegedly did for the Appellant and what the Appellant’s needs were. The Judge was entitled to find that it was “difficult to see” how the Sponsor had been maintaining the running of a business with the claimed significant practical caring of the Appellant. Overall, the Judge’s implicit rejection of this particular evidence was sustainable. There is no error here. Again, even if there was, it makes no difference because of the Judge’s alternative basis for concluding that the Appellant had not made out his case as regards the provision of care in India.

26. Ground 2 is therefore not made out.

27. I conclude that grounds 3 and 4 are not made out. In the main I rely on what I have already said in respect of grounds 1 and 2. In addition, the Judge’s assessment at [17] through to [20] is adequate in light of his primary conclusions on the evidential picture. It is incorrect to assert that the Judge primarily focused on the Appellant’s cultural familiarity with India. It is clear enough that the Judge relied not only on that consideration, but also, and importantly, on the provision of care point. In respect of the wider proportionality assessment, the Judge expressly referred to the upset which would be caused by the Appellant’s departure both to the Sponsor and the Sponsor’s children. The Judge was entitled to observe that the Appellant could return to India and make an Adult Dependent Relative application if he so wished. That was a proper route open to the Appellant.

28. In light of the above, the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

Anonymity
29. There is clearly no basis for making a direction in this case and I do not do so.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law.

The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

H Norton-Taylor

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 4 November 2025