Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003186

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62823/2024
LP/02185/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

L G
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: None.
For the Respondent: Ms M Gilmour, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 12 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Morgan (‘the Judge’) dated 9th June 2025. In this decision, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal, which she had lodged against the Respondent’s decision dated 24th April 2024 refusing her claims.
2. Anonymity was ordered below and I continue to make such an order myself given that the appeal involves a claim to international protection.
Factual and procedural background
3. The Appellant is a 39 year old citizen of Nepal and she arrived in the United Kingdom in June 2022 on a temporary worker visa. She applied for asylum in December 2022 in essence because of her actual or imputed political opinion. The Appellant had been ill treated by her husband prior to their divorce in March 2021 and she attended a demonstration in support of the Nepal Communist Party in 2022. Following this demonstration, she was arrested, detained, beaten and seriously ill-treated. She fears ill-treatment on return because of her support for this political party.
4. The Judge heard the Appellant’s appeal on 5th June 2025 and recorded at [10] that the Appellant did not attend the hearing, nor was she legally represented. The Judge went onto to consider that the Appellant had been informed of the upcoming appeal hearing and had specifically requested that the case be considered on the papers. The Appellant had stated that she did not have the resources to participate in an online appeal and could not afford to attend the appeal hearing in person.
5. In light of this, the Judge determined that the Appellant had been notified of the hearing and considered that it was in the interest of justice for the hearing to proceed in her absence, pursuant to Rule 28 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014.
6. The Judge also confirmed at [10] that he drew no adverse inferences from the Appellant’s non-attendance, nor had he been requested to do so by the Presenting Officer. The Judge confirmed that, in light of the Appellant’s express position, there was no prejudice or unfairness to either party resulting from the Appellant’s non-attendance.
7. The Judge confirmed at [11] that he took into account all of the relevant materials before him.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
8. In so far as is relevant to this appeal, the Judge made the following findings of fact:
(a) Following consideration of the credibility concerns raised by the Respondent and summarised by the Judge at [18]-[22], the Judge found at [23] that the Appellant’s account had changed significantly over time and he was unable to find, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant had made out her claim to have been detained and ill-treated as alleged because of her involvement with the party;
(b) The Judge concluded as follows at [24]:
“In summary I have considered the respondent's concerns, outlined in the refusal letter and the review, individually and cumulatively. I am not persuaded that the appellant has adequately addressed the respondent’s concerns and find that the appellant has not made out her subjective fear on a balance of probabilities. In summary I find that the appellant has not made out that she is a refugee and dismiss the appeal on asylum grounds.”
9. The Judge went on to consider the Appellant’s human rights claim at [25]-[27] also dismissing this.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal
10. The Appellant, whilst representing herself, applied for permission to appeal raising six grounds of appeal. These grounds can be summarised as follows:
(i) Ground 1 – that the Judge failed to apply JL (medical reports – credibility) China [2013] UKUT 00145 when dismissing her claim based on perceived inconsistencies in her account without engaging with the Appellant’s medical evidence confirming a diagnosis of PTSD and depression;
(ii) Ground 2 – the Judge wrongly found that the Appellant’s conversion to Christianity and the risk that this posed her on return was a new matter;
(iii) Ground 3 – the Judge failed to assess the Appellant’s evidence that her husband is a politically influential figure and had colluded with the local police to facilitate her wrongful arrest;
(iv) Ground 4 – the Judge failed to engage with the background evidence cited and relied upon by the Appellant in her skeleton argument, which supported her claim to face risk on return as a woman, political dissenter and religious convert in Nepal;
(v) Ground 5 – the Judge’s proportionality assessment under Article 8 was legally deficient with the Judge not engaging with her health diagnosis and other vulnerabilities;
(vi) Ground 6 – the Judge contradicted himself by making an anonymity order in order to protect the Appellant from a real risk of harm yet finding at [24] that the Appellant was not at risk on return.
11. A different judge of the FtT granted permission to appeal to the Appellant on Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5.
12. In response, the Respondent filed and served a reply under Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules, defending the Judge’s decision.
13. Leading up to the hearing on 12th September 2025, I considered on 26th August 2025 the Appellant’s request to have her appeal against the Judge’s decision considered on the papers, without an oral hearing. This request was communicated to the Tribunal by the Appellant by e-mail on 21st August 2025. In this e-mail, the Appellant confirmed that she would not be attending the appeal hearing listed on 12th September 2025 due to the difficulties that she has previously referred to. She asked that the Tribunal determine her appeal on the papers and she confirmed wishing to rely on her witness statement and evidence already filed, together with her grounds of appeal for which she secured permission to appeal. She also confirmed that she did not seek to file any new evidence.
14. In light of the Appellant’s position, I decided on 26th August 2025 that the appeal hearing will remain listed to enable the Respondent to make any oral submissions in response, if she so wished. I also indicated that the Appellant’s evidence and legal argument would be considered as it stood in written and documentary form. This decision was communicated to both parties on the same day.
15. As was foreshadowed by the Appellant, the Appellant did not attend the appeal hearing. For completeness, I reiterated at the hearing that I was satisfied that it was appropriate to proceed with the hearing in the Appellant’s absence, pursuant to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. This was in light of the Appellant’s correspondence of 21st August 205, my decision of 26th August 2025 which had been served on both parties and the Appellant’s position in the Upper Tribunal regarding her non-attendance reflecting that taken by her at first instance.
16. I then heard brief further oral submissions from Ms Gilmour on behalf of the Respondent, who wished to rely on the Respondent’s Rule 24 reply defending the Judge’s decision. I have addressed the parties’ respective written pleadings in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
17. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision and now provide this below with my reasons.
Analysis and conclusions
The Appellant’s Ground 1
18. As noted by the judge granting permission to appeal, the Judge confirmed at [11] that he had taken into account the Appellant’s documents, which included “in particular (her) witness statement” and “in particular the medical report”. Whilst it is correct that there is no further reference to this and no express reference to this medical evidence when the Judge reached his findings concerning the Appellant’s credibility at [23]-[24], the burden of proof rested with the Appellant and this included her being able to demonstrate how the medical evidence impacted on her ability to recount the events that she wished to rely upon as part of her protection claim.
19. The Upper Tribunal held in SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 398 (IAC) that the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 on ‘Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance’ makes it plain that it is for the judicial fact-finder to determine the relationship between the vulnerability and the evidence that is adduced.
20. At [24], the Judge stated that he was not persuaded that the Appellant had adequately addressed the Respondent’s concerns and found that the Appellant had not made out her subjective fear on a balance of probabilities. Whilst this is brief, this also needs to be considered within the context before the Judge. This included the medical evidence relied upon by the Appellant: a medical report from Gandaki Medical College, Nepal, dated 13th October 2024, which gave details of a diagnosis and treatment during the period October 2021 to March 2022. No further medical evidence was provided by the Appellant to demonstrate her mental health at the date of hearing or at relevant times during her asylum application and its consideration by the Respondent.
21. The fact remains that adverse credibility findings can be made against vulnerable adults and it is not necessary for the Tribunal judge to refer to the vulnerability when making each finding. It is clear from the Judge’s decision that he considered the parties’ competing positions and evidence before him holistically and that whilst the Judge did not draw any adverse inferences from the Appellant’s absence at the appeal hearing at first instance, the burden of proof remains on the Appellant and the Appellant’s task was not assisted by her absence. For these reasons, I do not agree with the Appellant and conclude that the Judge has not materially erred for the reasons pleaded under this ground.
The Appellant’s Grounds 3 and 4
22. Under these two grounds, the Appellant argues that the Judge failed to assess the serious risk that she faced from both non-state actors and state complicity in her persecution. The Appellant relied on her witness statement, which explained that her former husband — a politically influential figure — colluded with the local police to facilitate her wrongful arrest and her ill-treatment whilst in detention. Further, that the Judge failed to take background evidence into consideration, which addressed the country conditions on return for a woman, political dissenter and religious convert in Nepal.
23. For the reasons that I have stated above, the Judge did not accept the subjective aspects of the Appellant’s claim, namely that she had been politically active in support of the Nepalese Communist Party and that she had been ill-treated by her husband. The aspect of the Appellant’s claim relating to her conversion to Christianity was deemed to amount to a new matter and the Appellant has not secured permission to appeal on this aspect of the Judge’s decision.
24. It is clear from the Judge’s decision that he preferred the Respondent’s assessment of the Appellant’s claims, as raised within her refusal decision, over the Appellant’s evidence. In the refusal decision, the Respondent had raised concerns over the Appellant’s knowledge of the party, her reasons for attending the claimed demonstration, and over her account of her relationship with her husband. The Respondent had also raised in the alternative that the Appellant could return to Kathmandu.
25. The Appellant’s submissions under these two grounds go to whether she would face a risk of persecution on the basis of her claimed fears being accepted, and whether in turn there would be sufficiency of protection. However, those fears were not accepted by the Respondent, who disputed the Appellant’s political opinion and activities and the claimed ill-treatment from her husband. That was a decision that was clearly upheld by the Judge for the reasons that he gave and which I have already addressed.
26. The Respondent is correct to note at para 7 of her Rule 24 reply that she had accepted in the refusal decision that “if the key material facts of the appellant’s claim were accepted then there would not be sufficiency of protection”. The Appellant’s submissions - that the documented failure of Nepalese authorities to investigate or protect victims of gender-based and religiously motivated violence, demonstrate risk and a lack of state protection - do not disclose a material error of law on the Judge’s part when he rejected the Appellant’s account to have a well-founded fear in the first place. In other words, it was not necessary for the Appellant to assess the background evidence documenting risk for political dissenters and those subjected to gender-based violence because he did not accept that the Appellant was such a person at risk.
The Appellant’s Ground 5
27. I address this remaining ground fairly swiftly. In light of my conclusions above on the Appellant’s grounds of appeal as these relate to her protection claim, there was little else for the Judge to consider under Article 8 ECHR.
28. Furthermore, the Judge did also address the threshold of ‘very significant obstacles’ to reintegration and exceptional circumstances at [26]. The Judge made findings which were reasonably open to him on the evidence available to him and the Judge confirmed at [26] that he had considered all of the Appellant’s evidence cumulatively.
29. The Appellant’s case under Article 8 was very briefly set out in her skeleton argument at para 10, where she relied on developing her Christian faith, her engagement with local churches for emotional support, and her ongoing mental health treatment in the UK as aspects of her private life established in the UK.
30. The Respondent is otherwise correct to argue that there were no witness statements from any friends of the Appellant before the Judge nor any medical reports or other evidence of the Appellant’s mental health treatment received in the UK. On this basis, it cannot be argued that the Judge materially erred in law when assessing the Appellant’s Article 8 claim in the way that he did.
31. Lastly, I remind myself that pursuant to Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48, at [65], I am satisfied that the Judge, as the trial Judge, has determined what the facts are and how they are relevant to the legal issues to be decided in this appeal. From a careful and complete reading of his determination, it is clear that the Judge has had regard to the whole of the evidence before him, with anxious scrutiny, and his findings were duly open to him. As I have already noted above, this was the case in difficult circumstances in light of the Appellant’s absence at the hearing.
Notice of Decision
32. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 9th June 2025 did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decision shall stand. The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10.11.2025