Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003191

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56619/2024
LP/12604/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 25th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Ó CEALLAIGH KC

Between

MT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Gayle, instructed by Elder Rahimi Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Iraq. By these proceedings he appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal by which his protection appeal was dismissed.
2. On 19 December 2022 the appellant claimed asylum in the United Kingdom. The respondent refused that claim in a letter dated 28 February 2024, and the appellant brought an appeal. In a determination promulgated on 4 June 2025 the appellant’s appeal was dismissed, following an oral hearing, by First-tier Tribunal Judge Hayball.
3. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chinweze on 13 July 2025 on Ground 1 only.
4. The matter now comes before us to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
5. The appellant and respondent were ably represented by Mr Gayle and Mr Tufan respectively. We are grateful to them for their very helpful submissions.
6. The FTTJ made an anonymity direction and that direction is maintained.
Grounds
7. There was no renewal of the application for permission to appeal on Ground 2 and so the only issue before us was Ground 1.
8. By this Ground, the appellant submitted that the Tribunal had erred in law by failing to give adequate reasons for findings on material matters, in particular:
i. The Tribunal had erred in concluding that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the fact that he did not know the name of the head of the criminal organisation that threatened him and his family, or indeed the name of that organisation itself. It was submitted that the Judge erred in assuming that the organisation must have some name, and that the appellant must know it.
ii. The Tribunal had erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the television news interview that appears to show the appellant’s father discussing the arrest of an individual involved in a serious criminal enterprise.
9. Although both of these issues were addressed in the same ground, they are in substance distinct and so we refer to them as Ground 1(i) and Ground 1(ii).
10. Granting permission, First-tier Tribunal Judge Chinweze considered inter alia that it was arguable that “the judge… did not adequately explain why the appellant’s ignorance of the name of the group or its leader damaged his credibility so extensively”. We note that, as identified by FTTJ Chinweze, this finding was critical to the FTT’s reasoning.
Submissions
11. Mr Gayle for the appellant submitted that the findings at [36] in respect of the criminal group were inadequately reasoned. There was no evidence before the judge to show that every mafia or criminal organisation had a distinct name. There was no sufficient reasoning to explain how the appellant’s credibility could have been so extensively damaged by the fact that he did not know the name of the criminal boss.
12. Mr Gayle pointed out that the FTTJ had also relied on the fact that the appellant could not identify where the organisation operates, while in the very same paragraph [35] recording that the appellant had stated that it operated in every Kurdistan city.
13. Mr Tufan noted that the FTTJ had made a range of findings in respect of credibility, and that this was the only one challenged. The others were sufficient alone to determine the appeal. In any event, given the significance of this individual on the appellant’s account, the appellant could reasonably be expected to know his name. The FTTJ had plainly considered all of the evidence and given reasons. Those reasons were adequate. He did not suggest that it was inevitable that a criminal group should have a specific publicly known name, but did maintain that the FTTJ’s findings to that effect were open to him.
14. We put to Mr Tufan a matter that we had found concerning, which was that the parties had proceeded on the basis that it was unnecessary for the Tribunal to decide whether or not the appellant was telling the truth about his age [4-5]. We suggested to him that this question might be relevant to the approach the Tribunal adopted to the assessment of the matters that are the subject of challenge in Ground 1(i).
15. While acknowledging that this had not been raised in the grounds of appeal Mr Tufan very fairly accepted that in the interests of justice this was a factor that we should consider.
Findings and reasons
16. To deal firstly with Ground 1(ii), we do not consider that there is any criticism that can be made of the First-tier Tribunal Judge in his treatment of the evidence of the television news interview.
17. It does appear likely that watching the video would have been of assistance to the Tribunal, even if the FTTJ was clear [13] that he would not hold the fact that he had not seen it against the appellant. However the video was not uploaded to HMCTS on time, and the appellant does not suggest that in the circumstances the failure to view it was an error. Any such submission would have failed. Rather, it is said that the FTTJ erred in according the transcript of the discussion in the video only “little weight”.
18. The weight to be accorded to evidence is the quintessential matter for the tribunal. There is in our view no error in the FTTJ’s treatment of that evidence, which is not to say that another Judge might not have treated it differently (particularly had the video been made available on time).
19. More troubling is the appellant’s Ground 1(i). First, there is no doubt that on a fair reading of the determination the fact that the appellant struggled to give details about the identity of the criminal organisation he feared, and its leader, was a critical factor, if not the critical factor, in assessing his credibility.
20. Second, the FTT was, as noted above, invited by the parties to proceed without determining the appellant’s age [36] [4-5] and duly did so. This was because even on his own case the appellant was 19. However, while it might be right that the appellant did not require any reasonable adjustments or assistance, being an adult, that was not to say that his age was no longer relevant to the findings the FTT had to make.
21. On the respondent’s case, the appellant was 22 when the events that led to him leaving Iraq were said to have taken place. On his own case, he was 16. It is trite that whether a person is a child or not when they flee their country is relevant to the level of detail of the background to their claim they can reasonably be expected to know. Age may dictate whether that departure was the decision of the asylum seeker themselves or their parents; what they were told by their parents at the time and since; what they were told by the other adults around them; their maturity and their understanding of the situation.
22. For this reason, the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance provides as follows in respect of the evidence of children:

“10.3 Assessing evidence

Take account of potentially corroborative evidence

Be aware:

i. Children often do not provide as much detail as adults in recalling experiences and may often manifest their fears differently from adults;
...”

23. In AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] INLR 839 Sir Ernest Ryder, the Senior President of Tribunals said as follows [30]:

“To assist parties and tribunals a Practice Direction 'First-tier and Upper Tribunal Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Witnesses', was issued by the Senior President, Sir Robert Carnwath, with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor on 30 October 2008. In addition, joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 was issued by the then President of UTIAC, Blake J and the acting President of the FtT (IAC), Judge Arfon-Jones. The directions and guidance contained in them are to be followed and for the convenience of practitioners, they are annexed to this judgment. Failure to follow them will most likely be a material error of law.” [Emphasis supplied]
24. It is clear as set out above that the critical point taken against the appellant was his lack of knowledge about the general details of the criminal organisation and the man leading it. As is set out in the Presidential guidance, consideration must be given to the fact that children may well know less detail of their claims than adults, and may also be less likely to set out all the detail they need to (see also AA (unattended children) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 16 (IAC), the respondent’s guidance in Children’s asylum claims Version 5.0, and the UNHCR Guidelines 2019 at §§72-73). That reasoning applies as a matter of logic even where a person has become an adult since those events took place.
25. While we have considerable sympathy for the FTTJ who simply followed the path that the parties laid out for him by agreement, and for cogent reasons, we nevertheless conclude that Ground 1(i) is made out on this basis. In our view, although the FTT purported to consider the appellant’s “relative youth at the time” [36], in order to place the critical reliance he did on the details the appellant could be expected to be aware of regarding the circumstances of his asylum claim, the FTTJ was required to decide whether the appellant was 16 or 22 when those events were said to have taken place. In these circumstances, the reliance on that lack of knowledge or detail was a material error of law.
26. In any event, in the absence of evidence or a reason for believing that criminal organisations operating in Kurdistan must have particular names there is force in the suggestion that the fact that the appellant could not name the organisation was an immaterial factor on which particular reliance was placed. We accept that this too amounted to an error of law.
27. There is equally force in the appellant’s argument that he plainly did provide details of where the organisation operated, certainly as much as he could reasonably be expected to know, though we note that this was not actually raised in the grounds of appeal. There is no need for us to consider whether to grant permission to amend the grounds given our findings above. Equally there is no need for us to consider whether the fact that the appellant did not know the name of the leader of that organisation could, all things being equal, have rationally borne the weight it was afforded.
28. It follows that the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hayball contained a material error of law and must be set aside.
29. We canvassed the parties in respect of further steps in view of our finding of a material error of law. The parties agreed that in the circumstances the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing. That is our view also. Given the critical nature of the conclusions on credibility no part of the determination can be preserved.
Notice of decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hayball of 4 June 2025 did involve the making of an error of law and is set aside. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before a differently constituted tribunal with no findings of fact preserved.

Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18th September 2025