Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003193

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62809/2023
LP/01234/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

PM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Mair, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnwyz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 22 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and any member of his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to India and several members of the family have serious mental health conditions. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of their identity.
2. The appellant, a citizen of India, appeals against the decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) promulgated on 18 March 2025 dismissing his appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds. The appellant’s claim arises from his accepted status as a victim of modern slavery in the United Kingdom, his asserted fear of harm from his former trafficker and risk of re-trafficking on return to India, and his reliance on Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in light of significant mental health issues affecting both himself and his wife, together with the best interests of their children. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds, and the matter now comes before the Upper Tribunal for consideration of whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law.
Background
3. The appellant, an Indian national, entered the UK in November 2019 with his wife and two children on visit visas arranged by Mr S. He paid £36,000 for this service on the promise of lawful long-term residence. Upon arrival in the UK, the family lived with Mr S and have been found, on conclusive grounds, by the Single Competent Authority to have been victims of modern slavery. The appellant worked in Mr S’s restaurant while his wife undertook domestic labour in Mr S’ home and claimed to have been sexually abused. They escaped in 2020 and were later granted a period of discretionary leave on the strength of the trafficking they had endured. Both parents suffer from significant mental health conditions—diagnosed PTSD and depressive disorders—with extensive involvement from psychiatric and community services.
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the judge’s decision to dismiss the appeal on all grounds:
a. The judge recorded the broad background and procedural events which led to his decision. He noted that a 2-year grant of discretionary leave was issued in January 2023 and that a further application, made in February 2025, remained under consideration by the respondent. [3]-[5]
b. At paragraph [9], the judge referred to the assistance he derived from counsel’s detailed skeleton argument. The following issues were agreed following discussions at the outset of the hearing:
i. Does the appellant’s claim fall to be considered as a member of a particular social group (PSG)?
ii. Has the appellant established to the lower standard that he would be at risk on return to India and that there would be no sufficiency of protection and reasonable internal relocation alternative?
iii. Would there be a breach of the appellant’s Article 3 ECHR rights due to his poor mental health and risk of destitution?
iv. Would there be very significant obstacles to integration in India and a breach of the appellant’s Article 8 ECHR rights including the best interests of his children.
c. Between [11] and [13], issues of vulnerability were addressed:
Appellant’s Counsel requested that the appellant, his wife and the two older children be treated as vulnerable witnesses given the history above. The Presenting Officer agreed. Upon considering the principles from the “Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance” the appellant, his wife and his children were so treated as vulnerable. Finally, I acknowledge the well-known principle that trauma can affect memory and recall.
The appellant was offered breaks when he wished and breaks were taken. I informed the Presenting Officer that certain topics (such as possible sexual abuse of his wife) were not relevant and were to be avoided. Appellant’s Counsel did not request any other measures. The appellant adopted his three witness statements, was cross-examined and answered brief clarifying questions from myself. The children only gave very brief oral evidence.
The appellant’s wife K had given a brief statement but there was a psychiatric report of Dr Katona where it was stated that she “lacks capacity” (report para 8.5). I pointed out to the Presenting Officer that her witness statement evidence was very limited upon risk in India and that any answers she gave could not be given any real weight given the Dr’s opinion. It was agreed by both parties that there was no need to call K given the relatively limited reliable information she could give as compared to the risk of re-traumatising her.
d. At [14], the judge referred to the extensive range of served medical and expert evidence including the key psychiatric and country reports. He said that it would be a “herculean task” to attempt to list all of this evidence.
e. The judge began his assessment of the evidence by noting, at [20], that he had considered all of the evidence, but would only refer to particular strands, if necessary, in the context of his findings. At [21], it was observed that the complex and interwoven issues presented a complex analytical task, but that the serious mental health issues was a thread running through all of the grounds to be decided.
f. The first principal controversial issue was resolved in the appellant’s favour, and he was found to be a member of a particular social group in India [24]-[28].
g. Turning his mind to the second principal controversial issue, the judge summarised, between [29] and [32], the mental health evidence he had considered:
For reasons that will become clear below, there are mental health concerns around this appellant and his wife. There are psychiatric reports and numerous letters from agencies involved including from Consultant Psychiatrists. The appellant has PTSD and a Major Depressive Disorder with psychotic symptoms (per the Dr Katona report and GP records). He has “hallucinatory experiences” (report para 7.5) in terms of hearing voices and sounds. A recent “Early Intervention Team” letter was provided (dated 6 February 2025) which notes that his care co-ordinator has contact approximately every 2 months and that the appellant has 6 monthly reviews with a consultant psychiatrist. His care co-ordinator attended the hearing and was helpful in assisting him when distracted or agitated, a support worker also attended. However, there was no record of any involuntary sectioning under the Mental Health Act, although voluntary admission was considered at one point per a letter in his GP records dated 25 April 2022.
His wife K has complex PTSD, a Major Depressive Disorder (including depression and anxiety) and lacks capacity per the Dr Katona report (para 6.2) and her medical letters/records.
Suicide is a potential risk factor for both and both take medication. However, the medication appeared to be standard type medication for depression and psychosis such as olanzapine and mirtazapine. There was no argument that such medication was specialist nor could never be obtained in India.
As discussed above, K did not give evidence and did not stay in the hearing room. The appellant did give evidence, was cross-examined and answered a few clarifying questions from myself. In the hearing the appellant was agitated at times so was given breaks. At other times he was calm and coherent. He did refer to hearing noises that were not there and that he thought Mr S was elsewhere in the building. Whilst I am not qualified to give an opinion, his presentation was largely consistent with the medical evidence. I consider his evidence through the lens of his mental health issues.
h. The following observations were made about the appellant’s narrative evidence, at [34] and [37]:
Given the appellant’s psychosis, I cannot simply accept all his evidence on face value. To put matters rather bluntly, he hears voices but also thinks that Mr S is powerful with reach in the home area and throughout India. The appellant’s fears about Mr S are not credible or realistic in my view. He appeared to think that Mr S had links within the India state locally and nationally (he referred to railways, airports and police) simply because Mr S had been a youth cricketeer and knew a lot of people. Appellant’s Counsel correctly accepted that national links were perhaps unrealistic in a country as large as India. The appellant seemed to base his ideas on what Mr S told him and that Mr S was able to help the appellant’s sister in India when asked to helped to obtain a divorce.
[…]
Overall, the appellant presents as having some irrational ideas along with moments of paranoia. This is in line with his medical records.
i. The judge noted tension in the evidence (at [35]-[36]) about the description of the appellant’s father as an exploitative and controlling figure. This proposition was rejected as implausible with reference to the funds which his father had made available to the appellant.
j. The judge relied on the absence of any evidence that Mr S had caused the family harm in India. He recognised that the couple subjectively feared him but noted that “they both have mental health issues that affect how they perceive matters”. The notion that Mr S continued to pose a threat having been paid for arranging the family’s transport to the UK was characterised as “speculative”. He further relied on the fact that the appellant had come to no harm when he returned, against Mr S’ wishes, to the UK after a previous trip to the UK. In addition, Mr S did not act against the family in the UK once they extricated themselves from him here. The overall conclusion was reached that Mr S did not pose an objectively well-founded threat of re-trafficking the family on return to their home area thereby rendering the issues of internal relocation and sufficiency of protection academic. [38]
k. A more generalised risk of re-trafficking was rejected between [39] and [46], with the country expert report of Ms Holden referred to at [41]. The judge drew upon the factors identified in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC) [decided in the context of women in Albania] and said this, at [42]:
[…] Some factors are not present, i.e. they can go to the home area, there are no illegitimate children, age is not an issue etc. For reasons that will be discussed below I find there is a support network of family that can be contacted in India. Per below I will also discuss destitution and conclude that work is possible for the oldest child now even if the appellant and his wife continue to be unable to work. Legitimate income and a support network will be a protective factor against general re-trafficking. Furthermore, given the mental health issues around the appellant and his wife (both of whom are mostly voluntarily confined to the home in any event) they are not likely to be of prime interest to traffickers for work nor even visible to and contactable by traffickers in general. Finally, they also have no money now, and that was how they were targeted before so that risk factor has gone.
l. Moving on to the third issue, the judge recorded that the respondent took no issue with the diagnoses, but that this was not equivalent to the test under Article 3 of being a “seriously ill person”, nor that the prospects for the future were dire. The Article 3 claim was said to centre on the risk of suicide, not an absence of appropriate mental health treatment. [48]-[50]
m. The expert evidence of Dr Katona was referred to while noting that there was little commentary from the appellant and his wife’s treating physicians, albeit the medical records and correspondence revealed something of their developing concerns over time. The judge summarised key events in this background material at [54].
n. Between [55] and [58], the judge concluded that neither the appellant nor his wife were “seriously ill” for the purposes of Article 3:
Pulling together the multiple face to face attendances with treating physicians (some who saw the appellant on multiple occasions); I take the view that the appellant suffered acute mental health issues around April 2021 and there was very regular contact for a period but that is now infrequent in terms of psychiatrist input (i.e. every 6 months). The appellant takes common anti-depressant and anti-psychotic medications. He lives at home with his family and sees a care co-ordinator every 2 months. There was no evidence that he had ever been sectioned. The notes state that he ended CBT treatment and would not travel for hospital admission/treatment.
Considering the records and letters from treating physicians and setting those against the report of Dr Katona (who only saw him one time across 3 hours via videocall); I take the view that the records do not show a man who is seriously ill now. He lives at home with his family, he takes standard medication, he has attended college by bus, he has no recent record of suicide attempts (let alone serious attempts needing any treatment or intervention), he declined voluntary admittance. PTSD and depression are not sufficient alone to be deemed a “seriously ill person”. In this case the psychosis around hearing voices and suicidal thoughts are managed and the appellant copes now with limited input on his mental health. He is clearly unwell in terms of his mental health, but he is not a “seriously ill person.”
For fear of being seen to be reductive on the mental health issues, the issues are not so severe as to mean that he cannot co-parent the three children, one of whom is still only four years old and who would need the kind of care and supervision not needed by the older two. Albeit I do accept the external help they receive from varied agencies such as the Bradford Childre and Families Trust. There had been some concern as to how they care for the children as there is mention of a care plan at some point but the family live together. If the mental health issues were so serious, and given the multiple agencies involved, then social care would likely have been alerted with a view to the children being removed due to an inability of the parents to care for the children.
His wife’s (K) issues appeared to be less serious than the appellant’s, her issues were not really part of the ASA or submissions on ill-health/suicide. She is prescribed common anti-depressant medications. There is no mention of any recent suicidal thoughts or attempts. For example, a 15 March 2022 letter to her GP records anxiety and PTSD with “thoughts of self-harming or suicide, but wants to stay around for her child. She has no active plans to self-harm or take her life”. K had some input from the Specialist Mother and Baby Services (SMABS) and Dr Katona concludes (report para 10.5) that K is unable to provide comprehensive care for the daughter H now aged 4. However, H remains in the care of the parents and there was no mention that police / social care protection intervention is needed here for H.
o. At [59]-[60] & [62], the judge distinguished the facts of MY (Suicide risk after Paposhvili) [2021] UKUT 232 (IAC) partly based on the absence of daily suicidal ideation and no record of recent attempts. He then found that the appellant and his wife could not get beyond the first hurdle of establishing that they were seriously ill for the purposes of Article 3.
p. The prospects for the future upon return to India were considered at [61]-[64] in the following terms:
I note the obvious point that return would be a stress factor that could exacerbate mental health issues and increase risk of suicide. That is the view of Dr Katona in both reports. However, I cannot simply accept what the expert says about possible suicide risk going forward on the basis of one remote assessment. Considering the medical notes and the recent medical history, I do not accept the future risk of suicide to be a real one given the lack of such a realistic risk now and lack of such attempts. The children are a strong protective factor against suicide as noted repeatedly by the treating physicians. The appellant has shown that he is able to control suicidal impulses by the distraction of his family. Also, upon return the uncertainty around the immigration status will be gone and that is a factor that has impacted on the mental health issues.
In conclusion, the Article 3 health claim fails as I do not accept the appellant (or his wife) have discharged the burden of establishing that they are “a seriously ill person”.
Even if I am wrong and the appellant is a seriously ill-person. I am not satisfied that the appellant will suffer a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his mental health which will lead to a reduction in life expectancy or intense suffering. I do not accept the future risk of suicide is anything more than a speculative and theoretical one given the lack of recent attempts, the limited input deemed necessary by a consultant psychiatrist now and the protective factor of the children (especially the 4 year old) to care for. As I stated above, this was never put on the basis that the lack of standard medication would immediately cause a suicide risk by a dramatic downturn in mental health.
I do not accept the final argument from appellant’s Counsel that Article 3 can succeed because there is a need of future intensive therapy in the UK; i.e. as suggested by Dr Katona at para 10.1 of appellant’s report for “particularly eye movement desensitization and reprocessing [EMDR] and trauma-focused cognitive behavioural therapy”. There is no such treatment noted now and no right to stay to have that at some theoretical future date.
q. The proposition that the family would live in destitution on return was rejected primarily because the eldest child, who had just turned 18, could work to support them all. At [66], the judge accepted that the appellant and his wife would be unlikely to be capable of working in India. The following was said about the role which could be played by the eldest child at [67]:
In reality, the burden of working and providing would fall on the oldest child P, he turned 18 on the day of the hearing. The reports of Dr Katona and Dr Holden do not deal with the point, unsurprisingly as P was not 18 when the reports were commissioned. P speaks English and is currently completing a T-Level course at college in “digital support services with network engineering and cyber security”. He spent many years in India and it was not suggested that he cannot speak a local language. The respondent was correct to submit that English speakers in India, especially with a knowledge of computing matters, are known to be sought after for work. I do acknowledge what the appellant’s Counsel stated, that P only turned 18 the day of the hearing and there is not bright line to adulthood. It would clearly be contrary to his wishes to have to work to support the family in India, it would be a hard life experience for one so young. However, he could obtain work and earn money to support the family. I do not accept that the scenario is unheard of in many countries, including India. There is also the option of Voluntary Returns money to enable the family to pay for accommodation and initially settle. I will further discuss the possibility of family support in India below. However, even if there was none as claimed then this argument would fail. I do not find any suffering would be of the level required. Therefore, I do not accept the destitution argument as I do not find that there would intense suffering, let alone temporal proximity between the removal decision and any intense suffering of the family.
r. Turning his attention to the Article 8 ground of appeal, the judge pointed out that the central questions involved obstacles to integration, the best interests of the children and the overall balance [69]. It was acknowledged that the prospects on return for the family would be harsh but he was required to consider whether the elevated thresholds of very significant obstacles or unduly harsh consequences were made out [70].
s. The judge drew upon the conclusions he had reached in relation to the preceding issues and reiterated that the eldest son would need to become the family breadwinner. It was expressly stated that this would be “hard on the son as he is only just 18”. He concluded that the two oldest children could communicate in a local language on return and the youngest would be likely to adapt as a young child. They were found to be able to access education if the funds were available. [71]
t. In his assessment of the extent to which the family could look to the appellant’s family for support, the judge referred to the doubts he expressed previously about the extent to which the appellant’s father was a controlling and exploitative force in their lives. [72]
u. The following was said about the evidence of the two oldest children on this topic, at [73]:
The son P was evasive in evidence and asserted that he had no memory of how he lived in India up to departure in 2019 (so when he was about 12). I do not accept that from P, there is no evidence of memory issues. I consider that was a lie and one that he can only have told because he thought it would help this claim; i.e. there is no reason a 18 year old would not remember how he lived when he was around 12. The daughter L gave clear and compelling oral evidence that they all lived with the appellant’s parents in India up to 2019 departure. L was clear that she was not aware of any more recent contact with any grandparents and that supports what the appellant said. Hence, I accept what the appellant says about a lack of current contact with his family in India (parents and siblings, being a brother and a sister).
v. The judge rejected the appellant’s inconsistent narrative about why he had ceased contact with his family ([74]-[76]). At [77], the following findings were reached:
It is trite to comment that on his own evidence the appellant has had no contact for around 4 years so has no idea if his father is even alive or has mellowed. His family in India are not aware of the issues this family faces now and have not explicitly refused to help in that knowledge. It is the appellant’s speculation that the relationships are broken and the family will not help. I do not accept that simply on the basis of the conjecture of a man with mental health issues affecting his perception of reality. I also set his views against the objective fact that they all lived together for many years (right up to departure) after the family took him back following the previous failed attempt to succeed in the UK in 2011/2012. Also that he helped his sister previously in India (with Mr S’s help) so there should be a residual well of mutual care there. As discussed above, I do not accept as plausible the narrative of the exploitative father who then simply paid out an inheritance.
w. The judge did not accept the suggestion that relations with the family in India could not be rekindled ([78]) before the ultimate conclusion was reached (at [79]) that it had not been shown that there was a not a family support network available to the family on return. Dr Holden’s report was said to attract minimal weight because she assessed the prospects for integration through the prism of a lack of family support and without considering the prospects for the eldest son providing for his family through work ([80]).
x. When seen against the circumstances to which they would be likely to return, the appellant and his wife’s mental health condition were not found to amount to very significant obstacles to integration. [81]
y. The best interests of all three children were considered at [82] and the conclusion reached that it was in their best interests to remain in the UK to pursue their education, but the judge considered there were benefits to be drawn from reconnecting with their Indian heritage.
z. In his assessment of the overall balance, the judge attached significant weight to the interests of the youngest child, H. The judge considered the statutory factors under s.117B of the 2002 Act. [88]
aa. The competing factors in the balancing exercise were resolved in favour of the public interest between [88] and [90]:
I do not rehearse the issues for the family as discussed at some length above (i.e. around destitution and suicide risk) but I have found that family support will be available in India. I do weigh the following family and private life factors in the favour of the appellant, his wife and children:
the two oldest children are in full time education including in an important period of exams (L will take her GCSEs shortly);
the two oldest children have lived in the UK for over 5 years and claim very little or no memory of India;
the youngest child H is aged 4 and has never lived outside the UK;
the family will have better life chances and much better state support in the UK than India; i.e. for the mental health issues and around caring for H;
the son aged 18 would experience a hard life lesson in becoming a breadwinner in India rather than pursuing education and a private life in the UK outside the family;
the appellant would be returning to India with a feeling of failure and be judged as so by his family and wider society, that could impact his mental health and so his ability to parent H;
the appellant and his wife will face stigma attached to their mental health issues and the care in India will be worse than the UK;
mental health care and medication will be harder to come by and is likely to come at a financial cost which they may find difficult to pay.
Striking a fair balance between the competing public and individual interests involved, I find that the factors raised by the appellant do not outweigh the public interest. The consequences of return would be distressing and difficult, I accept that. Hence why this is a difficult appeal upon which to make a determination. However, any welfare concerns for H are mitigated by the presence of her two older siblings and other relatives in India. I do not find that the consequences for this appellant/family get to the level of being unjustifiably harsh.
I find the scales fall on the side of the public interest and the decision is proportionate. The decision does not lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant, his wife or three children and is not a disproportionate breach of Article 8 ECHR.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds:
I. The judge failed to meaningfully and properly assess the vulnerability of the witnesses.
II. The judge adopted a flawed and unlawful assessment of credibility.
III. The judge mishandled the evidence going to the Article 3 health claim.
IV. The judge’s analysis of the Article 8 ground of appeal did not consider whether it was lawful to remove the family while an application for leave to remain was undecided. Furthermore, the judge indulged in unsupported speculation in his assessment of very significant obstacles to integration and did not take into account all of the matters which touched on the youngest child’s best interests.
6. In a decision dated 14 July 2025, a judge of the First-tier Tribunal granted permission for all grounds to be argued.
7. The respondent set out her written arguments opposing the appeal in a rule 24 notice dated 29 August 2025.
8. At the error of law hearing, I was asked to admit further evidence to show the extreme deterioration the appellant experienced upon learning of the judge’s decision. I decided that this evidence could not go to the articulated grounds of appeal as to the judge’s lawful assessment of the evidence which was before him. I declined to receive this evidence as it could only underpin an ex post facto contention that the judge ought to be found to have reached the wrong factual conclusions when subsequent developments were taken into account. This would be a fundamentally flawed approach to the assessment of the lawfulness of the judge’s consideration of the evidence which was before him when he reached his decision. I heard oral submissions from both parties and address any points of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
9. It was acknowledged during the error of law hearing that the four grounds of appeal involved a considerable degree of overlap. Each ground also involved various sub-strands of argument. To the extent that any of the grounds touch on the adequacy of judicial reasoning as an error of law, it is important to keep in mind the restraint required of an appellate judge before it can be properly found that this type of challenge rises to the level of an error of law.
10. The touchstone for considering inadequacy of reasoning as an error of law remains R (Iran) & Others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982. At [13]-[14] of the judgment of Brook LJ, it was emphasised that reasons must be sufficiently detailed to show the principles on which a decision was made and why the ultimate decision was reached. Reasons need not be elaborate nor is it necessary to address each and every matter which might have had a bearing on the overall decision if those which were material to the reasoning are articulated. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, the Court of Appeal, in the context of employment proceedings, considered adequacy of reasoning as an error of law. Popplewell LJ, stressed, at [57] the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as whole without being hypercritical. Appellate restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. “Simple, clear and concise” reasoning was to be encouraged to enable to parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was left out of account. While these observations were made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance in the immigration and asylum sphere because this is also a jurisdiction in which decisions are made by expert tribunals attenuated by the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny.
11. With those introductory observations in mind, I now turn to the articulated grounds of appeal.
Ground 1
12. Under this ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the judge did not adequately consider the vulnerability of the witnesses whose evidence he was assessing. This ground involved various sub-strands in that: vulnerability factors did not inform the judicial analysis of the cogency of the appellant’s account; the appellant's vulnerability was wrongly used as both a “sword and a shield” in the evaluation of his credibility; that the judge was procedurally required to consider further procedural adjustments once the conclusion started to form in his mind that his evidence could not be relied upon in certain respects; that the appellant’s eldest son’s vulnerability should have been expressly considered before part of his evidence was rejected. I will deal with each point in turn.
13. I am not persuaded that the judge fell into legal error in how he analysed the appellant’s evidence when seen against his uncontroversial vulnerability as a man with serious mental health conditions. Firstly, I must exercise caution not to focus in on discrete findings of fact at the expense of overlooking the wider context in which those decisions were reached. I have summarised the decision at some length above because it is important to see the particular findings in their proper context. The judge expressly noted the agreed position of the parties that the appellant, his wife and their two older children were to be treated as vulnerable and that trauma can operate to have a bearing on the ability to recall events fully and accurately. A similar point was made at the conclusion of paragraph [32] where the judge referred to considering the appellant’s evidence through the prism of his mental health. Equally, while the judge did not use the word “vulnerability” when discussing the evidence of the eldest child, it could scarcely be clearer that he was mindful that he had only just turned 18 years old and there was not a bright line marking adulthood. Short of the judge stating expressly, and for the avoidance of any doubt whatsoever, it is tolerably clear that the eldest child’s evidence was considered fairly by acknowledging that he was, until very recently, a child.
14. Reading the judge’s extensive analysis of the evidence fairly, I am unable to conclude that he did not have the vulnerability issues well in mind when assessing the credibility and reliability of what he heard. I must look to the substance, rather than the mere form, of what underpinned the judge’s factual conclusions. It is not a procedural or substantive requirement for the judge to repeatedly state in a mechanical fashion that he had vulnerability in mind when addressing each and every facet of this complex and challenging appeal. Reading the decision benevolently, the judge is to be regarded as remaining mindful of the points he alluded to at the outset of his decision when he descended into the details of the particular factual matters he was required to resolve. I reject the proposition that the judge did not assess vulnerability when reaching his particular factual findings.
15. The second sub-strand, which was developed during oral submissions, was that the judge was wrong to have looked to the impression he formed of the appellant during his oral evidence as undermining the weight which could be attached to his account. To this extent, it was said that the judge was wrong to use these mental health considerations as both a sword and a shield in the assessment of credibility. I regarded this as an overly blunt characterisation of a more nuanced dimension of the credibility and reliability assessment of the appellant as a witness. The judge was bound to assess whether the appellant’s subjective fears were objectively well-founded in the lawful evaluation of whether the appellant and his family were at risk on return. To do this, he could not ignore evidence touching on the reliability of the appellant’s concerns. These findings did not exclusively hinge on the appellant’s presentation during the hearing. There was ample evidence on the face of the medical records and expert evidence to support the notion that some of the appellant’s fears may not have had the required foundation in reality. An important dimension of the appellant’s Article 3 claim was that his subjective fears may increase the risk of him taking his own life on return even if those fears were not fully anchored to the real world to which he would return. The judge could not, properly, overlook the evidence he heard, and the way it was given, particularly in circumstances where it cohered with other independent evidence to much the same effect.
16. It was suggested in the grounds of appeal (at [12]) that the highest standards of procedural fairness which apply to matters involving vulnerable witnesses means that the judge ought to have considered further reasonable adjustments to hearing procedure. The difficulty with this argument is that it appears to turn on the nature of the findings which the judge reached. The suggestion that a judge is required to canvas alternative means of taking the appellant’s evidence if adverse credibility or reliability findings start to form finds no express support in the authorities and runs the risk of a starting point that a vulnerable witness cannot be disbelieved or found to be unreliable unless additional procedural measures are taken.
17. Looking at the decision holistically, fairly and benevolently, I do not accept that the vulnerability issues which were front and centre of this appeal were in any way left out of the essential fact-finding analysis. I am satisfied that the judge had these matters fully in mind even if he did not mechanically, or by rote, repeat this factor each and every time he dealt with a discrete factual aspect of the appeal.
Ground 2
18. I am not satisfied that the judge adopted a flawed approach to his assessment of credibility. It was argued that the appellant’s evidence fell to be considered in tandem with the corroboration provided by his eldest children. A fair reading of paragraph [73] of the decision reveals that the judge considered the evidence provided by the eldest daughter and noted that it tended to support parts of what the appellant had to say. This was the basis on which it was accepted that he was not in contact with his family at the time of the hearing. I accept that more might have been said about her evidence and that parts of her narrative did not fit easily with the judge’s overall findings about the prospect of there being some form of reconnection with the wider family in India. However, it goes too far to suggest that the judge was bound to treat the evidence of the accounts of the two children as powerful corroboration. To insist that the judge attach greater weight would be to trespass on the judge’s independent fact-finding role. The important point is that it is abundantly clear why the judge reached the conclusion he did on this topic. The appellant can be in no doubt about why the judge found that family support would ultimately be available.
19. The suggestion that the judge over-relied on matters of uninformed and unsupported plausibility findings is difficult to reconcile with the holistic and multi-faceted analysis of the evidence in the round. The judge included some findings which involved plausibility concerns such as the observations made at [36]. Matters of plausibility are not forbidden territory for a judge to explore. That much is clear from recent high authority on how credibility should be assessed in the context of appeals which demand anxious scrutiny. In his summary and synthesis of the leading authorities in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216; [2023] Imm. A.R. 713, Singh LJ explained how fact-finders should approach their task in the assessment of a protection claim. Between [58] and [63], the following observations were made:
In SB (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 160, at para. 44 , Green LJ said that appellate courts will accord due deference to the fact-finder who has assessed an applicant's credibility. But the appellate court needs to be able to satisfy itself that the fact finder has at least identified the most relevant pieces of evidence and given sufficient reasons (which might be quite concise) for accepting or rejecting it.
At para. 46, Green LJ said:
"In cases (such as the present) where the credibility of the appellant is in issue courts adopt a variety of different evaluative techniques to assess the evidence. The court will for instance consider: (i) the consistency (or otherwise) of accounts given to investigators at different points in time; (ii) the consistency (or otherwise) of an appellant's narrative case for asylum with his actual conduct at earlier stages and periods in time; (iii) whether, on the facts found or agreed which are incontrovertible, the appellant is a person who can be categorised as a risk if returned, and, if so, as to the nature and extent of that risk (taking account of applicable Country Guidance); (iv) the adequacy (or by contrast paucity) of evidence on relevant issues that, logically, the appellant should be able to adduce in order to support his or her case ; and (v), the overall plausibility of an appellant's account." (Emphasis added)
At para. 47, Green LJ made it clear that this list was not intended to be exhaustive. Nor, I would add, is it a "checklist", every part of which has to be satisfied in every case. Everything depends on all the circumstances of each individual case. […]
At para. 59 of its judgment, the UT referred to the decision of this Court in Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223, at paras. 25-27. As Keene LJ said at para. 25, the tribunal of fact should be cautious before finding an account to be inherently incredible, because there is a considerable risk that it will be over influenced by its own views of what is or is not plausible, and those views will have inevitably been influenced by its own background in this country and by the customs and ways of our own society. It is therefore important that it should seek to view an appellant's account of events in the context of conditions in the country from which the appellant comes.
However, as Keene LJ continued at para. 26, none of this means that the tribunal is required to take at face value an account of facts proffered by an appellant no matter how contrary to common sense and experience of human behaviour that account may be. The decision-maker is not expected to suspend its own judgment. In appropriate cases, it is entitled to find that an account of events is so far-fetched and contrary to reason as to be incapable of belief. Keene LJ supported that proposition by reference to the decision of Lord Brodie, sitting in the Outer House of the Court of Session, in Awala [2005] CSOH 73, at para. 24.
In that passage, Lord Brodie said that a tribunal of fact making an adverse finding on credibility must only do so on reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation. Inferences concerning the plausibility of evidence must have a basis in that evidence. An applicant's testimony should not be lightly or readily dismissed and when it is reasons must be given. Nevertheless, the tribunal of fact need not necessarily accept an applicant's account simply because it is not contradicted at the relevant hearing. The tribunal is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality, and may reject evidence if it is not consistent "with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole." Because the reference to the word "probabilities" may be misunderstood in the present context, where the lower standard of proof applies, it is important to read that passage in context.
20. Plausibility remains one of the tools in the judicial toolbox even if it is a tool which should be deployed with due care. I see nothing in this decision to arouse concern that the judge has improperly and excessively examined the facts through a plausibility lens. Instead, plausibility factors have merely informed a holistic assessment which drew upon other matters such as the undisputed narrative evidence that the appellant’s father gave him £36,000 as an early inheritance which was in considerable tension with the notion that the father was a malign, coercive and exploitative force. This was a finding which was open to the judge even if the appellant may disagree with this conclusion.
21. Finally, I am not persuaded that there was any procedural unfairness in how the judge examined this particular issue during the hearing. It cannot be said that the prospect of family support on return was not explored. Both of the elder children were plainly questioned on the broad topic of their experience of living within the wider family setting in India before they departed for the UK and the appellant’s oral evidence appears (from [76] of the decision) to have touched on the strength of current ties to his family in India. Given the themes explored during the hearing, it cannot have come as a surprise that the judge reached findings about the extent to which the appellant’s family in India might support them on their return.
Ground 3
22. The contention that the judge did not properly and fully assess whether the appellant and his wife were seriously ill in accordance with the legal test to be applied under Article 3 is exceptionally difficult to reconcile with the nuanced analysis of the overall evidential picture. It cannot be said that the judge did not address his mind to the expert evidence. He explained why this evidence had to be seen together with the medical records which he evaluated with conspicuous care. On no sensible interpretation can it be said that the judge impermissibly substituted his own unqualified medical opinions for those of suitably competent experts. Instead, he relied on the findings of fact which were open to him about the conditions the appellant and his family would face on return such as the realistic prospect of family support. It cannot be said that the judge disregarded the expert evidence which he broadly summarised between paragraphs [29] and [32]. The judge was not required to engage in a line-by-line analysis of these lengthy reports, but to reach conclusions on the evidence. This he did, and the appellant cannot be in any state of uncertainty as to why the judge ultimately found that he had not overcome the demanding threshold to establish that he and his wife were seriously ill people to engage Article 3. At paragraphs [32]-[33], the Supreme Court, in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department v AIRE Centre [2021] A.C. 633 held that it is for an appellant to adduce evidence “capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing” that it is a very exceptional case because of a real risk of being subject to inhuman treatment. If that demanding threshold is met, it will be for the Secretary of State to dispel any serious doubts about the availability of appropriate treatment.  The judge plainly considered the evidence which went to this issue and explained why he found against the appellant. Whether viewed individually or cumulatively, the factors relied upon – the expert evidence, the impressions formed by the judge of the appellant’s presentation when giving evidence and the agreement between the parties that his wife need not give evidence on account of her mental health issues - did not compel the judge to conclude that the first part of the applicable test was satisfied. The appellant may take the view that the evidence called for a different answer, and other judges may have reached a different conclusion on this evidence, but that form of factual disagreement falls a considerable distance short of amounting to an error of law.
Ground 4
23. It appears to me that there is little merit to the argument that the Article 8 appeal ought to have been allowed solely on the principled basis that the family were awaiting a decision on a further period of discretionary leave as victims of modern slavery. At [69], the judge noted that the outstanding application went to whether there remained a practical barrier to removal and that it was difficult to imagine removal occurring while this application remained under consideration. The judge was entitled to assess the human right appeal based on the circumstances which applied at the time of the hearing. He was clearly mindful that an application was still to be decided, but he was equally entitled to assess the Article 8 appeal which was before him on the basis that the appellant and his family were not then the beneficiaries of leave to remain. Beyond acknowledging that an application remained under consideration, it is difficult to see what meaningful role or weight this factor could attract in the balancing exercise when seen against the far weightier matters which were fully assessed.
24. For the reasons I have explained above, I do not accept that the judge descended into mere speculation in finding that family support might well be available on return. At [25] of the grounds, parts of the evidence were emphasised which might have brought about a different conclusion. This is the language of factual disagreement, not error of law. The judge explained why he reached the conclusions he did – he was not required in law to say more than he did or to defensively explain why other aspects of the evidence did not weigh on him to arrive at a different answer to the agreed issues. None of this is to say that the judge ignored these features of the appeal. The factor relied upon at [25c] was manifestly considered by the judge when he discussed how the prospect of the eldest son becoming the family breadwinner would be a difficult one for him to come to terms with. The judge did not ignore the evidence of Dr Holden in coming to this conclusion, he explicitly indicated that the expert had not addressed her mind to the notion that the eldest son might need to work in India to support the family. I have read the expert’s report for myself, and the judge was entitled to point to this gap in the expert evidence.
25. I reject the submission that the judge did not adequately reflect the best interests of the youngest child in his assessment of proportionality. It is to be recalled that the judge found that it would be in her best interests to remain in the UK in any event. The judge might have attached greater weight to the mental health difficulties her parents would experience on return to India, but this was a matter for his judgement and the factors to which he did attach weight cannot be said to involve legal error.
Conclusion
26. The grounds of appeal do not reveal errors of law in the judge’s decision, and I dismiss the appeal. The decision will stand undisturbed.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the judge did not involve an error of law. I dismiss the appeal.

Paul Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 October 2025