Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No:
UI-2025-003201

First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/02367/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

MOHAMOUD ABDALLA AHMED
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Mohzam, Counsel, instructed by Sultan Lloyd Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Secretary of State has been granted permission to appeal the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge who allowed the appellant’s deportation appeal following a hearing which took place on 11 April 2025. However, for ease of reference hereafter the parties will be referred to as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
Anonymity
2. No anonymity direction was made previously, and there is no reason for one now.
Factual Background
3. The appellant is a national of Denmark now aged thirty. He entered the United Kingdom with his family during 2004 when he was aged around 9 years old. An application for indefinite leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme was granted on 13 April 2021.
4. On 19 August 2024, the appellant was convicted of conspiracy to supply Class B drugs, the possession of Class B drugs with intent to supply as well as possessing criminal property. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. The appellant raised a human rights claim in response to the respondent’s decision to make a deportation order, primarily based on his relationship with a partner, his two children and his integration in the United Kingdom. The appellant also stated that he would be targeted by criminal gangs in Denmark. That claim was refused in a decision dated 11 December 2024.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the issues for determination were whether the Exceptions to deportation applied and if not, whether there were very compelling circumstances which outweighed the public interest in the appellant’s deportation. The appellant confirmed that he had no children but relied upon his relationship with his partner with whom he had undergone a religious ceremony. The judge concluded that the appellant met the requirements of both Exception 1 and 2.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:

(i) Procedural unfairness in refusing to admit the respondent’s late evidence but admitting that of the appellant.
(ii) Inadequate reasoning in the assessment of the appellant’s ability to reintegrate in Denmark
(iii) The assessment of undue harshness was materially flawed for several reasons.
7. Permission to appeal was granted on limited grounds, with the judge granting permission refusing permission on ground 1 and in granting permission on the remaining grounds, making the following comments:

It is arguable that the Judge has given inadequate reasons for finding that the Appellant’s deportation would result in unduly harsh consequences for the Appellant’s wife. At [76] the Judge sets out at some length the issues that the wife would face in the “stay” scenario, and concludes at [78] that this would result in bleak and/or severe consequences. This choice of language suggests that the Judge concluded that removal would be harsh in line with HA (Iraq), but it is arguably unclear as to why it is they have then gone on to conclude that the elevated threshold of being unduly so was met.

Ground two is arguable insomuch as the approach may be inconsistent with Ackom. Had this ground appeared in isolation, however, I may have questioned 37 2 the materiality of any error, given that the Judge did not rely solely on this exception in reaching their conclusion. As permission is granted on ground three, however, I am satisfied that the grant of permission should not be restricted in respect of this additional arguable error.
8. A Rule 24 response/ skeleton argument was filed on the appellant’s behalf dated 1 August 2025, in which the appeal was opposed.
The error of law hearing
9. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the Secretary of State containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
10. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
Discussion
11. The judge allowed the appeal under both Exceptions 1 and 2. In relation to Exception 1, the judge failed to provide adequate reasons as to how the obstacles he identified would prevent or seriously inhibit the appellant from integrating in Denmark. Those obstacles were the fact that the appellant last lived in Denmark aged ten, that he no longer spoke Danish and had no family or friends there. While the judgment in Ackom [2025] EWCA Civ 537 postdated the First-tier Tribunal decision, that case did not alter the elevated test established in Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813. What was said at {48} of Ackom equally applies to the instant case;
What does not emerge clearly from the decision is why the FtT judge reached the conclusion that a fit, reasonably intelligent young man in his twenties, who had good educational qualifications and had been employed, and who was willing to undergo courses in prison to equip him with new skills, even if he were forced to live on benefits for a time, would be precluded from integration, in the sense explained in Kamara, by the current lack of any friends or family in Germany, the fact that he had not been back to Germany since he left at the age of 7, and the fact that he did not yet speak German. I do not accept that it is to be inferred that the judge considered the respondent's ability to learn German, let alone that she must have concluded that he would have been unable to do so within a reasonable time. Yet if she was going to place as much weight as she did on the impact of his inability to speak the language, that was plainly a material consideration in terms of mitigating the immediate disadvantage.
12. The judge records that the appellant in this case ‘was educated to a high level’, a graduate who was able to secure a good job with a well-known company. There are no health concerns or other conditions identified. The only obstacle identified was linguistic in that the judge considered the appellant’s lack of Danish would hamper the appellant in obtaining work and housing. It follows that I conclude that the judge’s findings on reintegration are inadequately reasoned.
13. In the third complaint in the grounds, it is rightly argued that the judge found that Exception 2 was made out based on the unsupported assertions of a witness. The judge heard that if the appellant was deported, his wife’s father would discover his offending and would take steps to end the marriage. Such an outcome, in addition to being implausible and speculative, was not supported by any evidence to that effect.
14. The judge also heard that the appellant’s wife assists in caring for siblings who have autism. Again there was no documentary evidence of the diagnoses or even evidence from other family members to the same effect. Furthermore, the judge refers to no evidence to suggest that the wife would be unable to adapt to life in Denmark with the appellant within a reasonable period of time.
15. Mr Nappey further drew my attention to the fact that at [75] and [78] of the decision, the judge refers to the wrong test in finding that both the stay and go scenarios would be unduly harsh, in that he describes the consequences of the appellant’s deportation on his wife would be ‘bleak and/or severe.’ In KO (Nigeria) [2018] UKSC 53, at {33} the Court approved the threshold identified in earlier cases of the Upper Tribunal, that harsh meant bleak or severe and that unduly harsh meant ‘inordinately’ or ‘excessively’ harsh taking into account all of the circumstances of the individual.’ I therefore conclude that the judge failed to apply the correct test, notwithstanding his earlier, correct, self-direction at [72].
16. I canvassed the views of the parties as to the venue of any remaking. Mr Nappey was of the view that the matter could be retained in the Upper Tribunal. Mr Mohzam was unable to express a view, stating that he had not taken instructions on the point. As the appellant is in prison, I permitted Mr Mohzam additional time after the hearing to ascertain his instructions. As of 19 September, there has been on communication on behalf of the appellant.. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. I took into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as the fact that the nature of the errors of law in this case meant that the respondent was deprived of fair consideration of this deportation appeal. I further consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different First-tier Tribunal Judge.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 September 2025