Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003203
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50497/2024
LP/06586/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

16th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

Between

SS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Gilbert, counsel instructed by Milestone Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and summary
1. The Appellant is an Indonesian national who appeals against the Respondent's decision dated 22 December 2023 refusing her protection claim on grounds of her sexuality.
2. The Appellant's appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 12 June 2025. On 19 September 2025 the Upper Tribunal set aside that decision and directed that the decision be remade. Following the remaking hearing on 15 December 2025, the promulgation of this decision was delayed by my prolonged absence on sick leave and I apologise to the parties for the significant delay.
3. For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that the Appellant's appeal should be allowed on asylum and human rights grounds.
Background
4. The Appellant is an Indonesian national and a lesbian. She entered the UK on 12 May 2009 and claimed asylum in the UK on 9 April 2022. Her claim was based on her fear of persecution due to her sexuality.
5. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim on 22 December 2023. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant was a lesbian but did not accept that she was at risk of persecution in Indonesia. The Respondent maintained that the Indonesian authorities were able to offer sufficient protection and/or that internal relocation was viable.
6. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 12 June 2025. On 19 September 2025 I decided that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law and set the decision aside, directing that the decision be re-made in the Upper Tribunal.
7. The remaking hearing took place on 15 December 2025. On 12 December 2025 the Appellant's solicitor made an application under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 for permission to adduce additional country evidence and an updated witness statement in a supplementary bundle. Although the additional evidence was served late, Mr Parvar indicated that he was prepared to address it in cross-examination and I admitted it.
8. The Appellant gave oral evidence via an interpreter and was cross-examined. Following submissions from the parties I reserved my decision. Unfortunately, I was then absent on sick leave for a prolonged period. In the interim, the new Indonesian Criminal Code came into force on 2 January 2026. I therefore directed that the parties provide submissions on the relevance of the new code to the appeal and that they indicate whether further oral submissions or evidence were necessary. Both parties provided written submissions and agreed that a further hearing was not necessary.
Issues in the appeal
9. The parties agreed that the issues for determination were as follows:
a. Is there a real risk of persecutory treatment for lesbians in Indonesia?
b. How would the Appellant conduct herself on return?
c. If the Appellant would on return conceal her sexuality, would she do so in order to avoid persecution?
d. Would the Indonesian authorities be able and willing to offer sufficient protection?
e. Is internal relocation viable and/or reasonable?
10. On behalf of the Appellant Mr Gilbert accepted that the Article 8 claim stood or fell with the Appellant's protection claim.
Evidence
11. The Appellant gave oral evidence at the hearing via an interpreter. She adopted her witness statements and was cross examined.
12. The Appellant came to the UK in 2009 as a visitor. In her screening and asylum interview she said that she had been aware she was a lesbian since the age of 16 or 17. She experienced an incident at around the same age where people in her local community threw stones at her. Although she came to the UK to seek treatment for a heart condition, once here she began to see that LGBT people could live openly and she did not want to lose that freedom. In oral evidence she said that after her visitor visa expired in 2009, she had looked for ways to regularise her status, but had not found anyone who knew how she could do so and did not have the financial means to seek legal advice. After her visa expired, she had lived with friends, caring for their elderly parents in return for pocket money. In or around 2011 her health had worsened, resulting in a heart operation in November 2012 from which it took a long time to recover.
13. The Appellant said that whilst in the UK she had met another Indonesian woman named Henny at Brighton Pride in 2017 and they had been in a relationship for five years. They had not lived together and the relationship had petered out in 2022. During the pandemic they had been unable to meet and had conducted the relationship by phone. Henny’s immigration status had also been precarious. The Appellant had formed a second relationship with a friend at the end of 2024 which was ongoing. When asked why she had not mentioned the second relationship in her updated witness statement she said that her solicitor had not included it; she had not realised or understood that her partner could give evidence in support of her appeal. She had attended Pride in 2025, and had also gone to LGBT clubs and bars in London and Brighton.
14. In her statement the Appellant said that she could not return to Indonesia because she could not live freely there. In the UK she had experienced a committed same-sex relationship where she was able to live openly and freely as a lesbian, and she would not be able to return to hiding her sexuality and feeling unsafe; she would be forced to live in secrecy and isolation. Her oral evidence was to the same effect.
15. The Appellant said that she had telephone contact with her mother and more limited contact with her two sisters in Indonesia. None of her family knew about her sexuality, which she had hidden from them because she did not want it to be the subject of gossip. She said that her mother would be saddened by learning of her sexuality, but also that it would isolate her family from their community. She was asked why, since she had arrived in the UK as a visitor in 2009, her mother had not questioned why she had remained in the UK without leave for so long. She said that her mother was not well educated and thought she was staying with friends. She was asked how Indonesian society would find out about her sexuality if her family did not disclose it, and she said that she thought that telling her mother would place a burden on her.
Submissions
16. For the Respondent, Mr Parvar relied on the reasons for refusal letter. Although the Appellant's sexuality was accepted, it did not follow that the Appellant's account of how she lived in the UK or her relationship history were credible. The Appellant had given different accounts of how she had met Henny, and there was also significant inconsistency as to when the Appellant had discovered that Henny’s immigration status was precarious. More importantly, there was no supporting evidence from any other individuals, including friends from the LGBT community confirming that the Appellant had been in a same-sex relationship or had displayed affection towards other women in public. The absence of supporting evidence was significant given the length of time the Appellant had been in the UK and claimed to have been attending LGBT events. The circumstances indicated overwhelmingly that the Appellant would not on return be perceived as lesbian, and she would therefore not be at risk. The objective evidence did not in any event indicate that there was a risk to lesbians in Indonesia; the evidence relied on by the Appellant referred primarily to gay men and transsexuals. Homosexuality was not prohibited; the articles provided by the Appellant were brief reports of specific incidents involving gatherings at sex parties or in bars or saunas. Even taken with the restrictions on publicising homosexuality in the media, the evidence did not even cumulatively establish a real risk of persecution. The Appellant was not someone who would attend large gatherings or parties and had not engaged with LGBT issues on social media; she had not any established participation or presence in the LGBT community. There was no indication that the Appellant's family would seek to force her into marriage; it was not plausible that her family were not aware of her sexuality given the length of time the Appellant had been in the UK. The Appellant would in any event be able to relocate internally to an area such as Bali if there were risk from a particular individual.
17. For the Appellant, Mr Gilbert submitted that the Indonesian authorities were unambiguously hostile to all kinds of same-sex relationships and the evidence showed that hostility extended towards those engaging in same-sex relationships in private. There had been a concerted drive from 2016 onwards to target LGBT individuals who gathered together in public and there had been further incidents as recently as 2025. LGBT individuals and public gatherings including NGOs and meetings were being targeted by police, resulting in a ‘chilling effect’ and self-censorship. Although only Aceh province criminalised LGBT sexual activity, five other localities outlawed it and anti-pornography laws were being used to target LGBT individuals. It was important to consider the Appellant's account of her time in the UK in the context of her serious medical issue and subsequent treatment and lengthy recovery period. She had enjoyed life with her partner in a way not open to her in Indonesia, including holding hands and kissing in public, having dinners with friends and going to Pride. If the Appellant were to act in the same way in Indonesia, she would clearly be at risk of enforcement activity including having her private residence raided and the loss of employment. There was no prospect of internal relocation and there was a real risk of persecution throughout Indonesia.
Discussion and decision
18. The Appellant's asylum claim was made in April 2022 and the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 therefore do not apply. To succeed in her appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must demonstrate that she has a well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of her sexuality. The burden of proof is on the Appellant and the standard of proof is the lower standard, i.e. a ‘real risk’ or reasonable degree of likelihood, which is lower than the balance of probabilities: MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] Imm AR 713, [2023] EWCA Civ 216. The Appellant must therefore show that on return to Indonesia there is a real risk or reasonable likelihood that she will be subject to persecution because of her sexuality.
19. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant is a lesbian. I address the issues for determination in turn below.
Is there a real risk of persecutory treatment for lesbians in Indonesia?
20. The Appellant's bundle contained a significant quantity of objective evidence, all of which I have read and considered. I have given more weight to the more recent articles and reports as reflecting the current situation in Indonesia, but overall there is a high degree of consistency over time.
21. The objective evidence demonstrates widespread and pervasive social and governmental hostility to LGBT people. Although same-sex sexual activity is specifically criminalised in only two provinces (Aceh and South Sumatra), the new national Criminal Code which came into force in January 2026 criminalises sexual activity outside marriage, which is now punishable by up to a year’s imprisonment. Since same-sex marriage is not permitted in Indonesia, the new Code de facto criminalises all same-sex sexual activity. Other regions and municipalities have local laws which restrict LGBT rights, including prohibiting LGBT organisations (Batam), defining homosexual acts as prostitution (Banjar) or otherwise prohibiting same-sex sexual activity (Tasikmalaya, Padang Panjang, Palembang, and Pariaram). There is significant evidence of a 2008 anti-pornography law being used to arrest and prosecute LGBT individuals across Indonesia.
22. Multiple more recent sources, including the February 2025 report by the Human Dignity Trust and the 2024 Human Rights Watch report, refer to ongoing actions by the Indonesian authorities against LGBT individuals, with police raids on LGBT bars, clubs and saunas as well as private homes, arrests and arbitrary detention. The US State Department 2023 report notes police corruption, bias and violence against LGBT individuals, and lack of protection by officials against homophobic abuse and failure to investigate complaints. The sources also refer to consistent reports of discrimination and violence against LGBT people, including harassment and denial of basic rights and services. LGBT advocacy groups are not permitted to register openly and face official pressure not to hold public events, and the Indonesian authorities have sought to shut down LGBT community websites. Government bodies censor domestic and imported films and television programmes with LGBT-positive content.
23. The objective evidence demonstrates a clear and consistent pattern of widespread and pervasive social and state-sanctioned hostility, harassment and discrimination against LGBT people across Indonesia together with active acts of persecution by the state authorities, including targeted raids on LGBT social gatherings, venues, and private houses, arrests and arbitrary detention. Although Mr Parvar sought to distinguish the position of lesbians from that of gay men, the evidence before me demonstrates that the Indonesian authorities themselves do not draw such a distinction. The evidence shows that whilst there have been fewer reported incidents involving lesbians, they have also been subject to police raids and arrests and are subject to local laws prohibiting same-sex sexual activity; the authorities’ hostile rhetoric and pervasive discrimination is directed against all LGBT individuals. The evidence before me is more than sufficient to demonstrate, to the lower standard, a real risk of persecutory treatment for lesbians in Indonesia.
How would the Appellant conduct herself on return? If the Appellant would on return conceal her sexuality, would she do so in order to avoid persecution?
24. I bear in mind and have applied the guidance in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596, [2010] UKSC 31 and in particular the judgment of Lord Rodger at §76-82 as to the approach to be followed. Of particular relevance in this appeal is the passage at §77-79:
“77. At the most basic level, if a male applicant were to live discreetly, he would in practice have to avoid any open expression of affection for another man which went beyond what would be acceptable behaviour on the part of a straight man. He would have to be cautious about the friendships he formed, the circle of friends in which he moved, the places where he socialised. He would have constantly to restrain himself in an area of life where powerful emotions and physical attraction are involved and a straight man could be spontaneous, impulsive even. Not only would he not be able to indulge openly in the mild flirtations which are an enjoyable part of heterosexual life, but he would have to think twice before revealing that he was attracted to another man. Similarly, the small tokens and gestures of affection which are taken for granted between men and women could well be dangerous. In short, his potential for finding happiness in some sexual relationship would be profoundly affected. It is objectionable to assume that any gay man can be supposed to find even these restrictions on his life and happiness reasonably tolerable.
78. It would be wrong, however, to limit the areas of behaviour that must be protected to the kinds of matters which I have just described – essentially, those which will enable the applicant to attract sexual partners and establish and maintain relationships with them in the same way as happens between persons who are straight….In short, what is protected is the applicant's right to live freely and openly as a gay man. That involves a wide spectrum of conduct, going well beyond conduct designed to attract sexual partners and maintain relationships with them. … In other words, gay men are to be as free as their straight equivalents in the society concerned to live their lives in the way that is natural to them as gay men, without the fear of persecution.
79. This is not to give any false or undue prominence to the applicant's sexuality or to say that an individual is defined by his sexuality. It is just to accept that "sexual identity is inherent to one's very identity as a person": Hernandez-Montiel v Immigration and Naturalisation Service, 225 F3d 1084 , 1093 (9th Cir 2000), per Tashima J. …an applicant for asylum does not need to show that his homosexuality plays a particularly prominent part in his life. All that matters is that he has a well-founded fear that he will be persecuted because of that particular characteristic which he either cannot change or cannot be required to change.”
25. The Appellant is accepted to be a lesbian, and I have found at paragraphs 20-23 above that there is a real risk of persecution for lesbians in Indonesia.
26. I have considered the Appellant’s evidence about how she would conduct herself if returned, and about how she has lived whilst in the UK. In her asylum interview, the Appellant stated that she had realised she might be a lesbian at around 16 or 17. The Appellant lived for a further 10 years in Indonesia without experiencing significant issues, with the exception of an isolated instance where a group of people threw stones at her because she was “completely different”. She stated in her interview that she had not had any same-sex relationships in Indonesia because it was forbidden. The Appellant's written and oral evidence was that having experienced a committed same-sex relationship in the UK where she was able to live openly and freely as a lesbian, she would not be able to return to hiding her sexuality if returned to Indonesia.
27. The Appellant has been in the UK since 2009 and I have considered carefully the evidence of how she has lived and conducted same-sex relationships during that time. The Appellant states that she was in a five year relationship with Henny and a two year relationship with another woman. Her evidence was that she and Henny met at a Pride event and that during their relationship they would go out together to restaurants and bars and would meet with Henny’s other LGBT friends. The Appellant's witness statement refers to enjoying being able to “do normal things that couples do” with Henny, including spending time with each other in public, and she explains that even simple things like holding hands with Henny in public felt surreal because it was something that had felt impossible in Indonesia. The Appellant also states that she visited LGBT-friendly venues in Chinatown with friends and from 2017 until the Covid pandemic was attending LGBT bars and clubs, and then afterwards when her health permitted. She has attended Pride events in London and Brighton. Her evidence was that if returned to Indonesia she would be unable to live freely or to form a relationship with another woman, and would have to hide her sexuality and live in secrecy, isolation and fear.
28. As Mr Parvar noted, there is no supporting evidence from either of the Appellant’s partners; nor is there any statement from any of the Appellant’s LGBT friends about her sexuality or relationship history. Given the length of time that the Appellant has been in the UK, the absence of such evidence is somewhat surprising. However, there is no requirement for corroborative evidence in an asylum appeal (MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] Imm AR 713, [2023] EWCA Civ 216), and having heard the Appellant give oral evidence and be cross-examined, I accept her evidence as credible. I find that the inconsistencies on which Mr Parvar relied, which included differences between the Appellant’s oral and witness evidence and her asylum interview about matters such as how she and Henny met, or when she became aware of Henny’s immigration status, are not inconsistencies or are minor matters which do not go to the core of the Appellant’s account. For example, I did not find that there was an inconsistency in the Appellant's account of where she met Henny, which she described variously as being “at Pride”, “at a Pride event” or “at a party during Pride” in 2017. Whilst there are no statements from friends, the Appellant’s account is supported by photographic evidence which I accept shows her attending Pride (wearing Pride face paint and carrying a Pride flag) and socialising with LGBT friends in bars and restaurants.
29. I accept that the Appellant has, whilst in the UK, formed romantic relationships with women, has gone to Pride events, and socialised with LGBT friends including at LGBT-friendly bars and clubs. I find that she has disclosed her sexuality to friends in the UK. I accept the Appellant's evidence and find that, having experienced the freedom to form a lesbian relationship and “do the normal things that couples do” in the UK, she would (if it were not for the fear of persecution) seek to live openly as a lesbian and form lesbian relationships on return to Indonesia; she would also seek to find LGBT friends and socialise with them in LGBT-friendly venues, and would attend LGBT community events. These are all aspects of the Appellant's protected Convention right to live freely and openly as a lesbian, as Lord Rodger made clear in the passage from HJ (Iran) cited above. I find that a material reason why the Appellant would in fact not live openly in that way on return would be her fear of persecution by the Indonesian authorities, which I find is both subjectively genuine and objectively well-founded.
Would the Indonesian authorities be able and willing to offer sufficient protection? Is internal relocation viable and/or reasonable?
30. I have found above that there is in Indonesia pervasive social and state-sanctioned hostility, harassment and discrimination against LGBT people across Indonesia together with active acts of persecution by the state authorities. The evidence demonstrates that the Indonesian authorities are not in general able or willing to provide protection to the Horvath standard.
31. The objective evidence shows that the situation for LGBT people is materially the same across Indonesia; there is no part of Indonesia to which the Appellant could relocate to avoid persecution. I find that internal relocation is neither viable nor reasonable.
Article 8
32. As Mr Gilbert accepted at the outset of the hearing, the Appellant’s Article 8 appeal stood or fell with the asylum appeal.
33. I find that the Appellant would if removed face very significant obstacles to her integration due to her sexuality given the pervasive social hostility and discrimination experienced by LGBT individuals in Indonesia. Her removal would be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of immigration control.

Notice of Decision
I allow the appeal on asylum grounds.
I allow the appeal on human rights grounds.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 June 2026