Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-003204 & UI-2025-003205

First-tier Tribunal Nos:
PA/54212/2024 LP/07321/2024
PA/68863/2023 LP/07320/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26 February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

TU
&
IB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Harris-Hercules, Legal Representative, instructed by Wortley Legal Consultants
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
(extempore)
1. This is an appeal by citizens of Georgia against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their appeals against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse her international protection.
2. The appellants are partners.
3. Put very simply, it is the first appellant’s case that she is the victim of domestic violence and she remains a potential victim of her former partner and she needs to be protected.
4. It is the second appellant’s case that he too risks violence by the first appellant’s former partner and that effective protection is not available to him.
5. The main contention in the grounds of appeal is that the first appellant did not have a fair hearing, that points were taken against her that could not have been anticipated and were not put and, as a consequence, her case was not considered properly and the judge came to wrong conclusions.
6. We have looked carefully at the grant of permission by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick who gave very clear reasons for finding that the grounds were arguable. We have considered the reasons for the grant but we had the benefit today of information that Judge Ruddick did not have in the form of the Presenting Officer’s notes that were produced without objection at the last minute shortly before the hearing. They do not confirm that everything that, ideally, should have been put to the appellant were put to her. However, it is quite plain that it was raised in the respondent’s review that the report showing photographs of alleged injuries on the appellant was deficient because there was nothing that linked the injuries in the photographs to the appellant. The photographs clearly showed a damaged arm but they do not identify the person being photographed. Omitting such information would be a surprising error to be made by somebody used to preparing papers for court but surprising errors happen. The point was raised in the review and this created an obvious opportunity for the appellant to correct the deficiency by explaining how the photographs were taken but the opportunity was not taken either before the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal or indeed since. This omission is something which the judge was plainly entitled to consider and take into account.
7. Further, the judge was entitled to give considerable weight to the first appellant saying when interviewed on her arrival in the United Kingdom that the purpose of her visit to the United Kingdom was to be with her partner and to work, not to seek protection. We remind ourselves that these explanations are not strictly incompatible. However, the first appellant’s failure to mention when asked what she now says is her main reason for coming to the United Kingdom is a point the judge was entitled to take.
8. We are not at all satisfied that there was anything unfair about the conduct of the hearing. We are satisfied that the appellant knew from the refusal letter that it was not accepted that she had been injured as claimed and the judge was entitled to find that it had not been proved.
9. However, there is an important additional element to the Decision and Reasons here. At paragraph 36 of the Decision and Reasons the judge made plain that “if I am wrong on the issues of Convention reason and credibility, I go on to consider whether there is sufficient state protection against” the appellant’s former partner. The partner was described as a factory worker who was alleged to have had influence throughout the country and would have been inclined to use that influence to continue to ill-treat his former partner. Sadly, given the obsessive and vindictive behaviour that often characterises cases of domestic violence such a claim not incompletely incredible but it is surprising and the judge was entitled to take the contention warily.
10. Much more importantly the judge looked at the question of there being effective protection in the state of Georgia. The judge looked carefully at background material, quoted at length an indication from the US State Department Report that the government was making real efforts to criminalise domestic violence and to punish those who offend and no impact was made whatsoever on the judge’s finding that even if the appellant was credible effective protection was available and that is the point which we find is determinative of the appeal.
11. We have reminded ourselves how very difficult it is sometimes for victims of domestic violence to tell their stories and a lot of allowances have to be made but that has happened here and the judge has concluded that, even if wrong in making adverse credibility findings, it was not been shown that effective protection is not available. This finding is not casual. It is a reasoned and considered decision that was not undermined by anything we have heard today.
12. We have our decision in the case of the first appellant by an extempore judgement at the hearing. This written judgement is based very closely on what was then said but it has been brought to our attention that we did not mention the second appellant in the extempore judgment. Neither party drew that to our attention at the time. This is not really surprising. The parties to the appeal made separate protection claims but the appeals were heard together and practically, if not as a matter of strict law, the second appellant’s case depended on the first appellant’s case to have any merit at all. It did not.
13. We therefore find that it has not been shown that there is any material error of law on the part of the First-tier Tribunal and we dismiss this appeal.

Jonathan Perkins

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 February 2025