Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003210

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54209/2024
LP/12487/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 30th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH

Between

DF
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Eaton, Counsel instructed by Shawstone Associates
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 22nd May 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 5th February 2024, refusing his protection and human rights application.
Background to the appeal
2. The appellant is a national of Iraq who arrived in the UK on 17th August 2022 and claimed asylum on 25th August 2022.
3. The appellant states that he entered a pre-marital relationship with a girl which was discovered by the girl’s father. He states that the girl’s father threatened to kill him and that his girlfriend’s father is a powerful person in Iraq. The appellant states that his uncle made arrangements for the appellant to leave Iraq. The appellant states that his passport was taken from him by the people who arranged his journey to the UK and that he cannot contact his family to obtain his ID card because of the problems with his girlfriend’s family.
4. The respondent accepted that the appellant was an Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity. The respondent did not accept that the appellant had given a credible account of events in Iraq. The respondent also did not accept that the appellant could not contact his family to obtain his ID card. The respondent also stated that there was an internal flight alternative available to the appellant within the IKR.
5. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The judge refused an adjournment application for the appellant to obtain an expert report. The judge did not find the appellant’s account to be a plausible or credible account and found that there were material inconsistencies within the account. The judge found that the appellant’s account was inconsistent with the background evidence regarding Iraq. The judge found that the appellant’s explanation for some of the inconsistencies were not credible. He found that there was a lack of evidence to show that the father of the appellant’s girlfriend was a powerful figure within the IKR. The judge further found that the appellant had given inconsistent and conflicting evidence with regard to his identity documents and found that the appellant either had his ID documents in the UK or would be able to obtain his identity documents prior to leaving the UK.
6. The judge also considered Article 8 and found that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles in reintegrating into Iraq and that there would be no unjustifiably harsh consequences if the appellant were refused leave to remain.
7. The appellant sought permission to appeal. Permission to appeal was granted by Judge Bowen of the First-tier Tribunal on 15th July 2025.
8. On 22nd July 2025, the respondent lodged a Rule 24 response.
9. The appeal came before me at an error of law hearing on 15th January 2026. There were six issues:
a. Whether the judge erred in failing to adjourn the appeal to allow the appellant to obtain an expert report
b. Whether the judge erred in his approach to the relevance of the appellant being a minor when assessing the appellant’s evidence
c. Whether the judge failed to give anxious scrutiny to the evidence
d. Whether the judge failed to make findings on material issues
e. Whether the judge applied the incorrect standard of proof to the human rights claim
f. Whether the judge erred in his application of SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC)
The error of law hearing
10. At the hearing before me, the appellant was represented by Mr Eaton, Counsel instructed by Shawstone Associates. The respondent was represented by Ms Clewley, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.
11. In his submissions, Mr Eaton relied on the grounds of appeal. He said that, with regard to the adjournment request, the judge rightly identified that the application was late but he submitted that the key test when deciding whether to grant a hearing was whether the appellant would be deprived of a fair hearing if an adjournment were not granted. He said that part of the judge’s refusal was based on the fact that the judge did not accept that an expert report would assist with assessing the credibility of the appellant’s account. Mr Eaton submitted that an expert could assist with the plausibility of the account including the identity of the alleged perpetrator of persecution. He submitted that the judge then went on to make a specific finding that the appellant had not provided external evidence regarding the girlfriend’s father and made a significant number of findings based on plausibility. Mr Eaton submitted that the judge failed to cite any country evidence when assessing whether parts of the appellant’s account were plausible.
12. Mr Eaton further submitted that there was a perverse finding by the judge in assessing the appellant’s ability to give evidence directly as a result of being mature enough to be involved in sexual activity yet then finding that the appellant’s account of his relationship was incredible. He submitted that the judge failed to take proper account of the fact that there was no bright line with respect to age.
13. Mr Eaton submitted that the judge relied on certain factors in finding the appellant was not credible without looking at the country evidence. He said that the judge assessed that it was unlikely that the appellant was telling the truth given the conservative nature of Iraqi society but did not consider that same evidence when considering the likelihood of the reaction of the persecutors if the appellant’s account were true. With regard to the social media messages, Mr Eaton submitted that the appellant had provided an explanation but the judge had failed to give reasons for finding that the explanation was not a credible explanation.
14. In her submissions, Ms Clewley relied on the Rule 24 response. She submitted that the judge had properly considered the adjournment application in line with the relevant case law. She submitted that where a judge has given a correct self-direction, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to find that the judge had not properly applied the law. Ms Clewley submitted that the judge had specifically considered whether it would be unfair to proceed in the absence of an expert report and had been satisfied that the appeal could be justly determined in the absence of an expert report. She submitted that many of the points turned on internal inconsistencies and not on plausibility issues. She further submitted that these matters were clearly material to the assessment of credibility and did not turn on background evidence and plausibility.
15. With regard to the age of the appellant, Ms Clewley submitted that the judge clearly had an understanding that there was no bright line between childhood and adulthood and referred to a spectrum. She submitted that the judge’s point that the appellant had been directly involved and the events were key personal events affecting the appellant was a valid point. She said that it was not a claim where a younger child was relating events that had happened to a third party. Ms Clewley submitted that the judge took proper account of the guidance regarding giving evidence as a minor and was aware of the weight to be attached to external objective indications in such cases.
16. Ms Clewley submitted that messages and voice notes were different things with different names and the judge was clear that the appellant had previously referred to messages and had then changed this to voice notes. She submitted that the judge had given clear reasons for rejecting the appellant’s explanation.
17. Mr Eaton had no further submissions in response.
Error of law decision
18. I bear in mind that an appellate Tribunal should be wary of setting aside a decision by a lower Tribunal. In doing so I apply what was held in in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. I further bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72].
19. I have considered each ground of appeal separately.
Ground 1 – Failure to adjourn
20. The judge makes reference to the application for an adjournment relying on a written application [10]. The appellant’s supplementary skeleton argument [3] makes reference to a written application for an adjournment being made on the Friday before the hearing on the basis of obtaining expert evidence. The composite bundle before the Upper Tribunal does not contain a copy of the written application to adjourn.
21. The judge considered the application to adjourn noting that it was in order to obtain a country expert report. He further noted that the principle issue in the appeal was credibility which was not something with which an expert could assist. The judge made specific reference to the decision in Nwaigwe (adjournment; fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418 (IAC) and was clearly aware of the necessary principles to be applied. He took account of the lateness of the application but balanced this against the fairness of proceeding in the absence of an expert report. The judge also decided that it was highly unlikely that the expert would be able to verify the identity of the alleged perpetrator of persecution.
22. The key issue with regard to the adjournment application is whether it was unjust to refuse the application and to proceed with the appeal. That was an issue which the judge clearly had in mind as he gave consideration not only to the lateness of the application and the delay an adjournment would cause but also to whether an expert report would assist the Tribunal in reaching a decision and the impact such a report may have on the assessment of the appellant’s account.
23. On the face of it, there is some force in the grounds of appeal submitting that much of the judge’s findings are based on plausibility and that commenting on the plausibility of an account as opposed to the credibility of an account, is within the remit of an expert. However, on closer inspection, a large number of the credibility findings of the judge were based on internal inconsistencies and not on implausiblities. I accept that there are also references to whether the appellant’s account is a plausible account but many of those findings would not have been within the remit of an expert.
24. The reasons for refusal letter alleged a number of inconsistencies as well as elements of the account being implausible and inconsistent with external evidence. The judge therefore had to assess the credibility of the account taking account of alleged inconsistencies and implausibilities as well as taking account of the appellant’s evidence and explanations and any background evidence before him. The judge has given very careful consideration to the appellant’s account in a detailed decision.
25. The judge notes inconsistencies in the appellant’s account of the history of his claimed relationship [22] and in how they decided to meet alone [23] as well as an inconsistency regarding whether the appellant was messaging his girlfriend [25]. The judge made a clear finding regarding this inconsistency and regarding the appellant’s explanation which he did not find credible. He gave cogent reasons for finding that it was not a credible explanation. The judge also found that the appellant’s credibility was undermined by a failure to provide the messages [26]. A further inconsistency was noted in the appellant’s account of who was home when he visited his girlfriend [27]. At [29], the judge finds it implausible that the appellant and his girlfriend would have sex somewhere where they risked being seen through a window. Whilst that it described as an implausibility, it is, in effect, a credibility finding on the basis of the appellant’s evidence and background information and it is unlikely that an expert report would have assisted further in that assessment. At [30], there is a further assessment of the appellant’s evidence and finding that the evidence is incredible. At [31] there is a finding that the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent. At [33] there is a further assessment of credibility rather than implausibility and clear findings rejecting the appellant’s explanations of inconsistencies. Whilst [34] makes a reference to implausibility this is again, in effect, a credibility finding and not one about which an expert would have been likely to provide assistance. Further inconsistencies are noted at [35] and [36].
26. There are also references to implausibilities in the account. At [24], the judge finds it implausible that the appellant and his girlfriend would meet alone. At [28] the judge finds it to be implausible that the girlfriend and her mother would be at home with no bodyguard or that the girlfriend would not check the bodyguard had left or risk her mother awakening [28]. Whilst there is a reference within that paragraph to the culture and country circumstances, the finding of implausibility was based on an assessment of the evidence overall including the appellant’s account that the father and bodyguard would accompany his girlfriend to school and back. An expert report is unlikely to have assisted with that assessment. At [37] there is reference to there being no external evidence to corroborate the claim that the girlfriend’s father was a powerful figure. An expert may have been able to assist with that but the fact that a person named by the appellant is a powerful figure in the IKR does not, on its own, mean that his account of a relationship is credible. That is particularly so where there are so many inconsistencies identified in the appellant’s account which would not have been within the expert’s remit to comment upon. Indeed, at [39] the judge finds that the appellant’s account had changed over time and there was an inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence about whether his girlfriend’s father was a PUK member.
27. An analysis of the decision as a whole therefore shows that the judge’s findings were based primarily on inconsistencies in the account and were credibility points rather than plausibility points. It is correct to state that there are references to plausibility but many of those references are, when considered in depth, more akin to credibility points than plausibility points. The expert report may have been able to comment on, for example, whether the appellant and his girlfriend were likely to meet alone given the background circumstances of the IKR or on whether the girlfriend’s father was a member of the PUK but these were minor points compared to the overall findings of credibility made by the judge on the basis of the appellant’s own evidence. There were numerous inconsistencies and incredible events identified by the judge in the evidence and that is the primary basis of his refusal of the appeal. When considered as a whole, I find that the refusal to adjourn did not lead to it being unjust to proceed without adjourning to obtain an expert report.
Ground 2
28. The grounds of appeal submit that the judge erred in his application of the guidance relating to the assessment of evidence of minors. The judge has specifically stated that he was alive to the fact that the appellant was under the age of 18 when the claimed events took place and that his earlier sources of evidence were given when he was under the age of 18 [18]. The judge makes specific reference to the Home Office guidance in such cases [19]. The judge considers the extent to which the appellant should be considered to be able to recall events. He finds that the events directly related to the appellant and he was directly affected by them. There is a reference to the appellant being mature enough to be involved in sexual relations but that is a reference to the appellant’s claim and not to a finding. That was the appellant’s claim and the judge was entitled to take account of that when assessing the extent to which the appellant should be expected to give his account albeit that he was a minor at the time of the claimed events. The judge has clearly taken account of the fact that it is a spectrum and that the appellant was ‘on the cusp of adulthood and maturity’ [20]. That was an acknowledgement that the appellant was still young and did not suggest that he treated his assessment of the appellant’s evidence in the same way as he would have treated an adult witness’ evidence. The judge was clearly aware of the need to exercise caution in assessing the appellant’s evidence and has given careful consideration to it. The decision is an extremely detailed and careful decision taking account of evidence from the appellant as well as case law and an understanding of the background situation in Iraq. The judge has made reference to the background circumstances when making his assessment of credibility.
Ground 3
29. The grounds submit that the judge has only taken account of background evidence where it tells against the appellant and not where it is in his favour. The appellant argues, for example, that the judge only considered the background evidence when considering whether the appellant’s account of having sex with his girlfriend where the appellant and his girlfriend could have been seen but not factoring in that background evidence to an assessment of risk having been discovered. The difficulty with that argument is that if the background evidence shows that the account is not credible, then it is not necessary to go on to consider the risk to the appellant because the account has not been found to be credible. In any event, the judge clearly had in mind that the country’s culture was a conservative culture and he references this within his decision when making his assessment of the appellant’s account. The real issue with the appellant’s account was the number of inconsistencies contained within it as detailed by the judge in his decision. The refusal of the claim was primarily based on a finding that the appellant was simply not a credible witness.
30. Furthermore, at no stage does the judge suggest that the reaction of the girlfriend’s family would be considered to be implausible; his findings relate to inconsistencies or implausibilities in the account of what the appellant states happened, for example, finding that it was not credible that the appellant would have been able to escape an armed bodyguard [34]. The judge does not find that it would not be credible for the family to react if the relationship were discovered; he finds that the account of the relationship being discovered was incredible.
31. The judge has also considered the appellant’s contention that he was illiterate [25] and finds that there was an inconsistency in the appellant’s account that he was illiterate. The judge does not make a finding that the appellant was illiterate; he makes a finding that the appellant is inconsistent in his evidence about that It was not therefore incumbent on the judge to assess the appellant’s evidence on the basis that he was illiterate.
Ground 4
32. The grounds submit that the judge failed to make a finding about the appellant’s explanation with regard to messages and voice notes, that he fails to clearly state why he finds the appellant to be an economic migrant and that he fails to take account of the appellant’s evidence that his uncle had had problems in the past year as a result of the events claimed by the appellant.
33. The judge does make a finding with regard to whether he accepts the explanation of the appellant regarding messages and voice notes [25] and finds that explanation to be incredible. It is not a material error of law for the judge not to state why he finds the appellant to be an economic migrant. He has found that the appellant does not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Convention or Humanitarian Protection or Article 3 and has based that finding on his assessment of credibility. The grounds make a brief reference to the appellant stating, in re-examination, that his uncle had had problems over the last year as a result of the appellant’s basis of claim but do not set out the appellant’s evidence regarding this issue in any further detail. The decision states that there was no evidence from the appellant that his mother or uncle had had any problems in Iraq since he left [45].
Ground 5
34. The grounds submit that the judge applied the incorrect standard of proof by rejecting the Article 3 claim on the same basis as the asylum claim. However, the judge is making reference to rejecting the Article 3 claim on the basis of the same factual matrix and findings as with the asylum claim. The credibility findings regarding the appellant’s asylum claim would necessarily be of significance when assessing Humanitarian Protection and human rights. The judge has also given careful consideration to the feasibility of return of the appellant and has given cogent reasons for finding that the appellant can return. I consider this in more detail below. The grounds do not identify how the judge has applied a higher standard of proof than that required when assessing the appellant’s Humanitarian Protection and human rights claim.
Ground 6
35. The grounds submit that the judge has failed to properly apply the principles in SMO. However, the judge’s finding was that the appellant either already held his INID card in the UK or that he could obtain it in the UK before leaving the UK for the IKR by having it sent to him by his family [45]. The appellant would therefore have identity documents with him on return to the IKR. The judge further finds that the appellant maintains contact with his family [44], [45]. He also finds that the appellant’s family could meet him on return to the airport with the family book details if required [46]. The judge finds that the appellant would be able to return with his identity documents and would not therefore be at risk on return [50]. He has given cogent and detailed reasons for those findings.
36. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law and therefore stands.

F Beach

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27th January 2026