Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003215
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60675/2023
LP/12666/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 28th of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SEELHOFF

Between

DB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Chakmakjian, Counsel instructed by Kilby Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Albania who claimed asylum on the 31st of August 2019. The asylum claim was refused on the 3rd of November 2023.
Decision of the First-Tier
2. The appeal was heard by a judge in the First-tier and dismissed in a decision dated the 30th April 2025. The judge held that the Appellant’s account had not been credible in a number of respects not-withstanding the fact that the Respondent had issued a positive conclusive grounds decision in respect of the Appellant’s claim to be a victim of modern slavery implicitly accepting that some core aspects of the claim were true.
Application for Permission to Appeal
3. Permission to Appeal was granted by Judge Rhys-Davies on the 14th July 2025 on all grounds.
The Hearing
4. At the outset of the hearing Mr Nappey confirmed that he would not be relying on a Rule 24 notice which had said the decision was sustainable. Mr Nappey noted that in respect of Grounds 1 and 5 he had reviewed the notes of the evidence before the First-tier and was satisfied that matters raised by the judge in the challenged paragraphs had not been raised at the hearing. Mr Nappey conceded that the Appellant had not had an opportunity to address those issues and that as a consequence the decision was undermined by procedural unfairness.
5. I noted that I was in agreement and that I had primarily wished to clarify whether those matters had been addressed before the First-tier.
6. The parties both agreed that the matter ought to be remitted for de novo consideration in the First-tier tribunal. I indicated that my formal decision would follow.
Reasons
7. Ground 1 notes that as far as the Appellant had been concerned at the time of the hearing her account of trafficking had been accepted and it was not challenged by the Respondent before or during the hearing.
8. The Judge observed that whilst there was a positive conclusive grounds decision, the concession lacked detail and in the judge’s view did not amount to an acceptance that the account was correct. The Judge might have been entitled to reach this decision, had she put the parties on notice that she was considering doing this at the hearing, however it is accepted that she did not do so in respect of a number of matters central to her decision [46-50]. The grounds rely on H (Afghanistan) [2011] EWCA Civ 1284 para 8 noting that;
“It is fundamental that the parties should be allowed to answer adverse material by evidence as well as argument…”
9. I find that the Judge’s failure to raise this issue with the parties was procedurally unfair. Had the judge called further evidence on this issue it is possible that they would have reached a different decision on the issues in question and so I find that this error is material
10. Ground 2 was not expressly conceded and I did not hear submissions on it in light of the concessions. Ground 2 is essentially parasitic on ground 1 as it relies on an error as to the weight to be attached to concessions in NRM decisions further to DC (trafficking: protection/human rights appeals) Albania [2019] UKUT 351. I would not have found that this was a material error in isolation however as the Judge reached her decision on the basis that the credibility concessions were unclear. This was not an unreasonable finding.
11. Ground 3 argues that there was a failure to take account of the Appellant’s vulnerability in assessing credibility. The Skeleton Argument submitted on behalf of the Appellant makes repeated reference to her vulnerability noting her severe depression and CPTSD. There is no express reference to treating the Appellant as vulnerable in the decision. There is no mention of her mental health in the credibility assessment. The only reference to the medical evidence states;
“I have taken into account the appellant’s medical condition described in the U Matter Ltd dated 6 December 2022. In my view, the symptoms described in the report will not either by themselves, or together, reach the threshold for a finding in relation to Article 3 of the Human Rights Convention.”[65]
12. I do not consider that it can be extrapolated from that reference that regard was had to the Appellant’s vulnerability when assessing the quality of her evidence. I find that ground 3 is made out and discloses a material error of law.
13. Ground 4 asserts that it was unreasonable of the Judge to say that there was no evidence from which it could be inferred that the Appellant’s trafficker was in Albania. On this issue, the Judge was entitled to attach significant weight to the fact that the Appellant had no dealings with the trafficker in Albania. In isolation this did not constitute an error of law.
14. Ground 5 complains that the Judge has again based findings on matters which were not put to the Appellant namely the Appellant’s own family’s willingness to subject her to persecution. The Respondent has again conceded that issues raised in the decision [60-65] were not put to the Appellant and that it was procedurally unfair to attach weight to this matter when the Appellant had not been made aware it was in issue. It follows that this was an error of law for the same reasons as ground 1. I am satisfied that a reasonable judge would not have been bound to come to the same decision had this error not been made and it therefore follows that the error is also material.
Disposal
15. The entirety of the credibility findings are unsound in light of material errors in respect of grounds 1, 3 and 5. It follows that the decision will need to be remade. Extensive oral evidence may be needed including on those issues raised by the judge if the Respondent decides to adopt them. I am therefore of the view that this is one of the few cases that ought properly be remitted to the First-tier for a comprehensive rehearing.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained material errors of law and is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
The Appeal is remitted to the First-tier to be reheard by a Judge other than Judge Hussein.

A. Seelhoff
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
24th April 2026