Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003218
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58484/2024
LP/03487/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 30th of April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEN KEITH

Between

WM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mandarhi, instructed by CB Solicitors
For the Respondent: Miss Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hoshi (“the Judge”), promulgated on 13 June 2025, in which the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 15 March 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim. The Appellant had claimed asylum on 17 December 2021.
2. The Appellant is a national of Iraq. An anonymity order was made by the First-tier Tribunal. I continue that order.
Factual Background
3. The Appellant’s claimed account was summarised by the Judge at paragraph 2 of the determination as follows:
“(1) The Appellant is a national of Iraq aged 24. He is a Kurd from Halabja in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (‘KRI’). He is a member of the Roghzayy tribe.
(2) The Appellant’s father was involved in a land dispute with a neighbour named Osman Mohammed. Mr Mohammed had encroached on his father’s land and was claiming it as his own, and the Appellant’s father was disputing this.
(3) Mr Mohammed is a powerful individual. He is employed by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (a political party in the KRI), he has contacts within the Kurdistan Democratic Party (a political party in the KRI), and he is a member of the Peshmerga (a paramilitary group in the KRI). He is a member of the Tarkhani tribe, which is in conflict with the Roghzayy tribe.
(4) One day in 2021, the Appellant’s older brother came to the Appellant’s school and told the Appellant that Mr Mohammed had shot their father in the leg. Together, the Appellant and his brother went to Mr Mohammed’s house and, when they got there, the Appellant’s brother shot Mr Mohammed’s son. Later, they learned that Mr Mohammed’s son had died as a result.
(5) Shortly afterwards, the Appellant and his brother fled to Sulaymaniyah in the KRI. However, after around 3 days, Mr Mohammed tracked them down there. They escaped him and fled to Erbil in the KRI. However, after around 4-5 days, Mr Mohammed tracked them down there. They escaped him and fled to Turkey, where they were separated and lost contact with one another. Thereafter, the Appellant made his way to the UK and claimed asylum.
(6) Once in the UK, the Appellant initially remained in contact with his parents. They informed him that Mr Mohammed had visited them and told them that, as their sons had killed his son, he intended to kill one of their sons (i.e. the Appellant or his brother). The land dispute had thus developed into a blood feud. More recently, the Appellant has lost contact with his parents.
(7) The Appellant fears that, if he returns to any part of the KRI, Mr Mohammed will find him and kill him.”
4. The Respondent did not accept the credibility of the material core of the Appellant’s account and refused his claim on all grounds.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. At the hearing before the Judge, the Respondent’s presenting officer, Mrs Awe, confirmed that she was satisfied that the Refugee Convention was engaged on blood feud grounds, being membership of a particular social group (specifically, the Appellant’s membership of his own family). She further accepted that, if the Tribunal were to find the material core of the Appellant’s account to be credible, the Appellant would be at risk on return to his home area, there would be no sufficiency of protection for him, and there would be no safe and reasonable internal relocation alternative available to him. Credibility remained firmly in dispute.
6. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Madanhi confirmed that the Appellant was advancing an Article 3 ECHR claim on the same basis as his Refugee Convention claim and that they would stand or fall together. He confirmed that the Appellant was making no further Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection, Article 3 ECHR, or Article 8 ECHR claims.
7. The representatives agreed that this was a single-issue appeal. The Judge recorded at paragraph 16:
“Therefore, the representatives agreed that this was a single-issue appeal, namely whether the material core of the Appellant’s account was credible, assessed to the lower standard of proof. If it was, his appeal would fall to be allowed on Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR grounds. If it was not, his appeal would fall to be dismissed.”
8. The Judge identified factors weighing in the Appellant’s favour at paragraph 23, including that the Respondent had accepted the Appellant’s identity and nationality and had not challenged that he is a Kurd from Halabja and a member of the Roghzayy tribe; that at its most basic, the Appellant’s account had been consistent; and that the account was broadly consistent with the country evidence, in particular the Respondent’s ‘Country Policy and Information Note, Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and Tribal violence’ (v.1.0, July 2024).
9. At paragraph 24, the Judge identified eight factors weighing against the Appellant’s credibility. I set out the first two findings in full, as they are central to the disposal of this appeal.
10. At paragraph 24(1), the Judge found:
“The Appellant has been inconsistent about the name of the man with whom his father was in a land dispute. The first occasion on which he provided a name was in his first questionnaire, which was submitted subsequently to his screening interview, in which he said that the man was named ‘Abdullah’. Subsequently to the submission of his first questionnaire, his then solicitors submitted a letter making certain corrections to the screening interview record – the letter did not make any corrections to the first questionnaire, or address the issue of the man’s name. Thereafter, the Appellant submitted his second questionnaire, in which he again said that the man was named ‘Abdullah’. Thereafter, he attended his substantive asylum interview. At the outset, he was asked whether he was happy with the contents of his screening interview and his first questionnaire (though not his second questionnaire), and he said that he was. Later in the interview, for the first time, he said that the man was named ‘Osman Mohammed’.”
11. The Judge continued:
“In his oral evidence before me, the Appellant said that there was a mistake in the questionnaires – he had never said the man was named Abdullah. He said that his usual solicitor and interpreter had been unavailable. He had completed the questionnaire with a different solicitor and a telephone interpreter, and an interpretation error must have arisen as a result. It was pointed out to him that the questionnaires were submitted more than a year apart and he was asked whether the same explanation applied to both questionnaires – he then said that he could only remember completing one questionnaire. In his submissions, Mr Madanhi confirmed that the Appellant had never sought to correct this mistake or to put any complaint about it to his former solicitors. I consider this to be a fundamental inconsistency that goes to the heart of the Appellant’s account. I do not accept the Appellant’s explanation, even applying the lower standard of proof.”
12. The Judge gave the following further reasons for rejecting the explanation:
“To the extent that he is contending that it was a mistake, he did not seek to correct it prior to the day of his appeal hearing, as one would expect him to do (notable opportunities to do so would have been in either the corrections letter or the corrections email, or in his witness statement). I also accept Mrs Awe’s submissions that (a) interpretation errors are unlikely to arise with proper nouns, because they are typically (though not always) the same in all languages and (b) these two names do not sound at all similar in any event. Yet further, I assess the Appellant’s explanation in the round, in the context of the multiple, significant inconsistencies in his account. I give this factor very significant weight against the Appellant in the overall assessment of the credibility of his account.”
13. At paragraph 24(2), the Judge found:
“The Appellant has been inconsistent about the tribe of the man with whom his father was in a land dispute. In his first questionnaire, he said that the man was from the ‘Gillally’ tribe. In his witness statement, he said that the man was from the ‘Tarkhani’ tribe and the significance of this was emphasised in his appeal skeleton argument. The statement did not address the clear inconsistency in this element of his account, and nor was it addressed in either the corrections letter or the corrections email.”
14. The Judge continued:
“In his oral evidence before me, the Appellant said that there was a mistake in the first questionnaire – he had never said the man was from the Gillally tribe. He provided the same explanation for why the mistake had arisen as that set out in sub-paragraph (1), above. Again, in his submissions, Mr Madanhi confirmed that the Appellant had never sought to correct this mistake or to put any complaint about it to his former solicitors. Again, I consider this to be a fundamental inconsistency that goes to the heart of the Appellant’s account. For all of the same reasons as given in sub-paragraph (1), above, I do not accept the Appellant’s explanation, even applying the lower standard of proof. I give this factor very significant weight against the Appellant in the overall assessment of the credibility of his account.”
15. The Judge also identified inconsistencies regarding when the Appellant learned of the death of the man’s son (paragraph 24(3)), to which the Judge gave very significant weight, and regarding five aspects of the Appellant’s journey from Iraq to the United Kingdom (paragraphs 24(4) to 24(8)), to which the Judge attached varying degrees of weight ranging from significant to moderate.
16. At paragraph 26, the Judge concluded:
“Having done so, I have come to the conclusion that the factors weighing in favour of the Appellant are significantly outweighed by the factors weighing against him. There have been multiple, significant inconsistencies in the detail of the Appellant’s account, which I am entitled to take into account (see e.g. SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160, per Green LJ at §46). Cumulatively, I consider them to do irreparable damage to the credibility of the Appellant’s account. Therefore, I find that the Appellant has failed to establish that the material core of his account is credible – that is, he has failed to establish that he is the target of a blood feud in the KRI.”
17. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
The Grounds of Appeal
18. The grounds of appeal, advance two grounds.
19. Ground 1 is headed “Irrationality/Giving weight to immaterial considerations: The consistency of the Appellant’s account.” It challenges the Judge’s finding at paragraph 24(3) that the Appellant gave inconsistent accounts regarding when he discovered that the person he and his brother had shot had died. The grounds contend that the Tribunal “arguably misunderstands the evidence before it” and that “[o]n a broad and sympathetic reading of the Appellant’s evidence, there is in fact no inconsistency at all.
20. In particular, the grounds argue that there is nothing inconsistent between the Appellant’s claim that the man’s son was still alive when the Appellant was in Iraq and his claim that the son died before the Appellant left Iraq. The grounds further argue that the Appellant’s statement that “We fled to Sulaymaniyah from Halabja and went into hiding because Osman’s son had died from the shot” is “entirely consistent with his claim that he learned of the man’s death after fleeing to Halabja, and while in Halabja.”
21. Ground 2 is headed “Giving undue weight to immaterial considerations: The Appellant’s journey to the United Kingdom.” It contends that credibility “is not a seamless robe and the assessment of credibility is not necessarily an ‘all or nothing’ exercise,” citing MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at [26] and WAS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 894 at [87].
22. The grounds argue that at paragraphs 24(4) to 24(8), the Tribunal “focuses extensively on the Appellant’s journey from the United Kingdom” and that whilst the Tribunal acknowledges the Appellant’s advocate’s submission on the point, “the Tribunal appears to attach significant weight to the Appellant’s evidence about his journey to the United Kingdom as undermining the Appellant’s evidence in respect of what happened in Iraq. To do so arguably treats the Appellant’s credibility as a ‘seamless robe’ and is a material legal error.”
The Grant of Permission
23. Permission to appeal was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready on 14 July 2025. Judge Mulready concluded:
“The Judge accepted that at its most basic, the Appellant’s account had been consistent, however they identified a number of inconsistencies in the detail of the account, which they considered significant. These findings were open to the Judge on the evidence, and cogently reasoned in the Decision. The Judge was obliged to consider the behaviour which engaged section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 and entitled to treat them as undermining of the Appellant’s credibility in the way described in the Decision. The grounds therefore identify no arguable error of law material to the outcome of the appeal.”
24. Upon renewal to the Upper Tribunal, permission was granted on the basis that the grounds disclosed an arguable error of law.
The Appellant’s Skeleton Argument
25. A skeleton argument was prepared by CB Solicitors on behalf of the Appellant for use before the First-tier Tribunal. It set out the factual background, identifying that the Appellant is an Iraqi national who fled his country of origin out of fear of being persecuted by Osman Mohammed and his family members. It identified that Osman Mohammed was “a member of the PUK who had access to weapons and guards” and belonged to the Tarkhani tribe, described as “one of the biggest tribes in Iraq,” whilst the Appellant belongs to the Roghzayy tribe, and that “[t]he two tribes are known for their disputes.”
26. The skeleton argument addressed three issues: (a) whether the Appellant is a potential victim of a land dispute or blood feud constituting a particular social group; (b) whether the Appellant could obtain state protection in Iraq; and (c) whether the Appellant could internally relocate within Iraq.
27. On the first issue, the skeleton argument relied upon the Respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note, ‘Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and Tribal violence’ (v.1.0, July 2024), submitting that “blood feuds occur as a result of tribal custom that dictates that a tribal unit are obligated to avenge the death or injury of a family member, punishing the perpetrator with the same act in retaliation” and that “[b]lood feuds can lead to prolonged cycles of retaliatory violence and revenge with violence such as armed confrontations, the shooting at or burning of homes, abductions and killings.” It further relied upon the EUAA Common Analysis (November 2024), which identifies that persons involved in blood feuds are at risk of revenge killing and that in cases of “grave nature” such as murder, settlement becomes more complicated. The skeleton argument submitted that the credibility issues raised by the Respondent “are minor at best and do not go to the core of the claim” and that “the credibility issues centred around the exit itself rather than the causation – the reason for fleeing which is why the Appellant is claiming asylum.”
28. On the second issue, the skeleton argument submitted that there is no state protection available to the Appellant, relying on the CPIN which states that “local police and security agents are unwilling to get involved with what they see as a family matter” and that “protection from the state or from a tribe is unlikely to be available for victims or potential victims of blood feuds and those fearing honour crimes or revenge for honour-related transgressions, as the federal security system is weak, particularly with regards to tribal matters.” It further relied upon paragraph 4.1.2 of the CPIN, which states that “[t]here are reports of law enforcement personnel being reluctant to get involved in tribal conflicts as they fear that they will exacerbate the situation or experience reprisals” and that “[l]aw enforcement have also been known to ‘take sides’ in line with their own tribal affiliations.”
29. On the third issue, the skeleton argument relied on paragraph 5.1.5 of the CPIN, submitting that “available evidence indicates that tribes have the capacity to locate people after they have relocated through tribal or familial links” and that “tribal disputes span across the entirety of the country.”
Discussion and Conclusions
30. I have carefully considered the grounds of appeal, the skeleton argument, the submissions on behalf of the Appellant and those on behalf of the Respondent, and all of the materials in the bundle.
31. It is well established that an appeal to the Upper Tribunal is not an opportunity to re-argue the merits of the case that was before the First-tier Tribunal. The question for this Tribunal is whether the Judge made a material error of law.
32. I turn first to the findings that are not the subject of challenge in the grounds of appeal. Paragraph 24(1) concerns the inconsistency between the Appellant naming the man with whom his father was in a land dispute as “Abdullah” in both his first and second questionnaires, and then for the first time naming him “Osman Mohammed” in his substantive asylum interview. The Judge considered this carefully, examined the Appellant’s explanation that it was an interpretation error, and rejected that explanation for cogent reasons. The Judge noted in particular that proper nouns are typically the same across languages, that the two names “do not sound at all similar in any event,” that the Appellant had confirmed at the outset of his asylum interview that he was happy with the contents of his screening interview and first questionnaire, and that the Appellant had never sought to correct the error despite multiple opportunities to do so, including in the corrections letter, the corrections email, and his witness statement. The Judge further noted, by reference to SV (Alleging misconduct and suppressing evidence) Iran [2005] UKAIT 160, that to the extent the Appellant was alleging misconduct by his solicitors, he had not put it to them as one would expect. The Judge was entitled to characterise this as “a fundamental inconsistency that goes to the heart of the Appellant’s account” and to give it “very significant weight.”
33. Paragraph 24(2) concerns the inconsistency between the Appellant stating in his first questionnaire that the man was from the “Gillally” tribe, and subsequently stating in his witness statement that the man was from the “Tarkhani” tribe. The significance of the tribal name was, notably, emphasised in the Appellant’s own appeal skeleton argument. The Judge noted that this inconsistency was not addressed in the witness statement, the corrections letter, or the corrections email. The Appellant offered the same explanation of interpreter error, which the Judge rejected for the same cogent reasons as in paragraph 24(1). Again, the Judge was entitled to find this to be “a fundamental inconsistency that goes to the heart of the Appellant’s account” and to give it “very significant weight.”
34. These are findings of fact which were plainly open to the Judge on the evidence. The Judge identified the inconsistencies with precision, examined the explanations offered, and gave clear and cogent reasons for rejecting them. There is no irrationality, no failure to apply the lower standard of proof, and no misdirection of law. The inconsistencies at paragraphs 24(1) and 24(2) relate to the very identity of the Appellant’s claimed persecutor — both his name and his tribal affiliation. These are not peripheral details. If the Appellant cannot consistently identify the name or tribe of the person he says shot his father and who he says now seeks to kill him in a blood feud, those are matters that go directly to the core of his account. The Judge was entitled to give them very significant weight, and did so.
35. Even if I were to accept Ground 1 in its entirety, that the Judge’s analysis at paragraph 24(3) disclosed an error in respect of the timing of the Appellant’s knowledge of the death of the man’s son and even if I were to accept Ground 2 in its entirety that the Judge gave undue weight to the journey inconsistencies at paragraphs 24(4) to 24(8) I am satisfied that the Judge’s findings at paragraphs 24(1) and 24(2) alone were sufficient to sustain the adverse credibility finding. These were the findings to which the Judge attached the greatest weight, describing each as “a fundamental inconsistency that goes to the heart of the Appellant’s account.” In the light of those unchallenged and properly reasoned findings, the Judge would inevitably have reached the same conclusion. Any error in respect of paragraph 24(3) or paragraphs 24(4) to 24(8) was not, therefore, material to the outcome of the appeal.
36. For completeness, I note that the Judge correctly directed himself as to the applicable legal framework, including the lower standard of proof, and applied the guidance in Ravichandran v SSHD [1995] EWCA Civ 16, [1996] Imm AR 97 and Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11, [2000] Imm AR 271. The Judge also had proper regard to the approach endorsed in SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160, per Green LJ at §46, that the cumulative effect of multiple inconsistencies in the detail of an account may be taken into account in the overall assessment of credibility. The Judge assessed the evidence in the round, as he was required to do.
Notice of Decision
1. There is no error of law
2. The appeal is dismissed

Ben Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 April 2026