Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003219, HU/56592/2024
UI-2025-003225, HU/56593/2024
UI-2025-003230, HU/56594/2024
UI-2025-003234, HU/56595/2024
UI-2025-003239, HU/56596/2024
UI-2025-003246, HU/56598/2024
UI-2025-003247, HU/56597/2024
UI-2025-003248, HU/56599/2024
UI-2025-003251, HU/56600/2024
UI-2025-003252, HU/56599/2024
UI-2025-003257, HU/56603/2024
UI-2025-003259, HU/56604/2024
UI-2025-003260, HU/56605/2024
UI-2025-003269, HU/56606/2024
UI-2025-003270, HU/56607/2024
UI-2025-003280, HU/56608/2024
UI-2025-003281, HU/56609/2024
UI-2025-003285, HU/56611/2024
LH/00065/2025; LH/00066/2025; LH/00068/2025
LH/00069/2025; LH/00070/2025; LH/00071/2025
LH/00072/2025; LH/00074/2025; LH/00076/2025
LH/00077/2025; LH/00080/2025; LH/00082/2025
LH/00083/2025; LH/00084/2025; LH/00085/2025
LH/00086/2025; LH/00087/2025; LH/00088/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 25th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
(ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER)
Appellant
and

A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, A9, A10, A12, A13, A14, A15, A16, A18 & A20
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondents

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Reid, Counsel instructed by the GLD.
For the Respondents: Ms M Knorr and Ms H Lynes, Counsel instructed by Wilson Solicitors LLP

Heard at Field House on 6 March 2026

This is an appeal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. To avoid confusion, I shall refer to the Secretary of State for the Home Department as the SSHD (rather than the Appellant) and the 18 Respondents as the Applicants.

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, all of the Applicants, the Sponsor and the Sponsor’s children are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Applicants, the Sponsor and the Sponsor’s children likely to lead members of the public to identify the Applicants, the Sponsor and the Sponsor’s children. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘SSHD’) appeals with permission against the decisions of First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”), promulgated on 4 April 2025, allowing the Applicants’ appeals against the SSHD’s refusal of their human rights claims.
2. The Applicants are all Palestinian nationals residing in Gaza. On 30th November 2023 the Applicants applied for entry clearance to join the Sponsor in the United Kingdom (“UK”) under Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) of the Immigration Rules.
3. The Sponsor was born in Gaza. She has three children (17 years old, 15 years old and 13 years old). The Sponsor and her children are British Citizens.
4. A1 and A2 are the Sponsor’s parents. A3 is the Sponsor’s brother. A9 and A15 are the Sponsor’s sisters. A3 is married to A4 and they have 4 children (A5, A6, A7 and A8). A9 has 5 children (A10 (an adult), A12, A13 and A14). Her fifth child is A11 whose appeal was dismissed by the judge and is no longer party to these proceedings. A15 is married to A20 and they have 4 children (A16 (an adult), A17 and A18). Her fourth child is A19 whose appeal was dismissed by the judge and is no longer a party to these proceedings.
5. The Applicants’ appeals were heard in the First-tier Tribunal on 20 and 21 March 2025. The judge promulgated four separate decisions: the first concerning A1 and A2; the second concerning A3, A4, A5, A6, A7 and A8; the third concerning A9, A10, A11, A12, A13 and A14; and the fourth concerning A15, A16, A17, A18, A19 and A20. The decisions were accompanied by an annex detailing the judge’s findings common to all the Applicants. The annex formed part of the decisions and must be read with the separate decisions in which the considered the specific circumstances of each Applicant.
6. The judge allowed all the Applicants’ appeals. The judge dismissed A11 and A19’s appeals. They did not seek permission to appeal against those decisions.
7. This appeal was one of a number stayed by the Upper Tribunal pending judgment in IA and Others. Judgment was handed down on 26 November 2025: IA and Others v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516. By way of directions, the parties were given the opportunity to provide further submissions on its impact on the present appeal.
8. At the hearing before me both the parties described A17 as no longer being party to these proceedings. That is not correct. A17 made an application to withdraw his case on 3 February 2026, but it was refused on 4 February 2026. The appeal before the Upper Tribunal was brought by the SSHD, not A17. Accordingly, A17 is not entitled to withdraw it. After the hearing, on 30 March 2026, A17’s representatives wrote to the Upper Tribunal confirming that A17 remained a party to these proceedings.
9. I maintain the anonymity order made by the First tier Tribunal. Neither party asked for it to be discharged.
The Appeals to the First-tier Tribunal
10. The judge made extensive findings of fact in the individual decisions and the annex.
11. The judge found the Sponsor to be a credible witness and that the Sponsor suffers from severe depression and experiences trauma-related symptoms. The judge accepted that “a significant cause of the Sponsor’s trauma symptoms is her separation from her family members in Gaza and the knowledge of the circumstances they are facing” and that “if the Sponsor were to access medication and/or therapeutic treatment it would not be likely to improve her symptoms while her family remain in their current circumstances.” [Annex at 7 and 34]
12. In respect of the Sponsor’s children, the judge found as follows. The Sponsor’s daughter had been referred to Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) after her mental health deteriorated and she began self-harming. The Sponsor’s younger son had been significantly affected by the situation faced by the Applicants in Gaza; his behaviour changed markedly and he was ultimately permanently excluded from school. The Sponsor’s older son, who had previously been in the top set for all subjects, moved to a less demanding foundation course prior to sitting his GCSEs. As a result, he was no longer able to pursue A-levels as previously planned. The judge concluded that the (or a) cause of these difficulties was the Applicants’ situation in Gaza. [Annex at 35-46]
13. The judge found that the Sponsor and her family members contact each other or attempt to contact each other multiple times a day. The judge accepted that Sponsor calls all the telephone numbers of her family members and talks to any family members who are present. The judge noted that there are very few calls on the Sponsor’s call logs which are not either to or from a family member and considered that the number of calls demonstrates how the family is trying to keep in contact with each other. [Annex at 53-57]
14. The judge found that all the Applicants are financially dependent on the financial support arranged and provided by the Sponsor. [Annex at 58-71]
15. The judge accepted that the Sponsor travelled to Gaza three times and to third countries on a further three occasions in order to spend significant periods of time with the A1 and A2 between 2017 and 2023. The trips to Gaza were for the purpose of visiting the whole family and the Sponsor also saw other family members during the trips to third countries. The judge considered that the trips were significant considering the cost of travelling with 4 people, the Sponsor’s means and the fact that for some of the time the Sponsor was a single parent. [A1 and A2 at 17(viii)] The judge also accepted that the Sponsor travelled to Egypt in 2023 to support and care for A3 when he was undergoing treatment. A3 has hyperthyroidism and suffered from an episode of thyrotoxicosis, [A3 and Others at 15]
16. In each of the individual decisions, the judge identifies that there are three issues for determination in the appeals:

a. Whether the Appellants and the Sponsor enjoy family life.
b. If so, whether the SSHD’s decision causes an interference with their enjoyment of that family life.
c. If so, is the SSHD’s decision proportionate and therefore lawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?
17. The judge finds that all of the Applicants (and A11, but not A19) enjoy family life with the Sponsor and her children and that the SSHD’s decision causes an interference with their enjoyment of that family life. [A1 and A2 at 19-22; A3 and Others at 17; A9 and Others at 19-21; A15 and Others at 18-20]
18. In addressing proportionality, the judge directed herself to the statutory public interest considerations in section 117B of the 2002 Act. The judge noted that none of the Applicants satisfied the provisions of the immigration rules and considered that carried significant weight. The judge found that most of the adult Applicants could not speak English and considered that also carried weight against them in the balancing exercise. The judge found that A1 and A2 could be accommodated by the Sponsor, but none of the other Applicants could be. The judge concluded that the Applicants would require access to public funds. She attached weight to the lack of financial independence but did not consider that it carried the significant weight argued for the SSHD, on the basis that were all part of a group of 20 Applicants. The judge considered that many of the adult Applicants were likely to obtain employment in due course. [A1 and A2 at 27-41; A3 and Others at 22-38; A9 and Others at 26-43; A15 and Others at 27-45]
19. The judge attached significant weight to the best interests of the Sponsor’s children, the strength and nature of the family life between the Applicants, the Sponsor and her children and the Sponsor’s mental health issues. [A1 and A2 at 36 and 40; A3 and Others at 32 and 36; A9 and Others at 35 and 38; A15 and Others at 37 and 39]
20. The judge concluded that the Applicants refusal of entry clearance would give rise to consequences of such gravity for the Sponsor and her children as to be unjustifiably harsh such that the public interest was outweighed. Accordingly, the judge found that the decisions made in respect of the Applicants were disproportionate and unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and allowed their appeals. [A1 and A2 at 28-41; A3 and Others at 23-38; A9 and Others at 27-40; A15 and Others at 28-40]
21. In respect of A11, the judge accepted that family life existed between him and the Sponsor. However, she considered that the interference occasioned by the refusal of entry clearance was not of such gravity as to outweigh the public interest, and the decision was proportionate because A11, an adult residing safely in Egypt, was able to maintain contact with the Sponsor through modern means of communication and visits and was not facing the same level of risk or hardship as the Applicants remaining in Gaza. [A9 and Others at 41-43]
22. The judge did not find that family life existed between A19 and the Sponsor. The judge considered that even if she was wrong about that, the interference occasioned by refusal was not of such gravity as to outweigh the public interest, and the decision made in respect of A19 was proportionate. [A15 and Others at 42-45]
The Appeals to the Upper Tribunal
23. A11 and A19 did not appeal against the decisions dismissing their appeals.
24. On 2 May 2025, the SSHD applied for permission to appeal against the decisions allowing the Applicants’ appeals on the following grounds:

Ground 1: The judge failed to apply the correct principles when considering whether there was family life between the Applicants and the Sponsor and her children in the UK;

Ground 2: The judge failed to provide legally adequate reasons for her conclusion that refusing entry clearance to the Applicants engaged the Sponsor’s and her childrens’ right to family life and failed to carefully assess the nature and quality of the relevant family life;

Ground 3: The judge’s assessment of proportionality is unsustainable for the following reasons:
(i) The judge failed to identify and apply relevant principles identified by the ECtHR;
(ii) The judge failed to identify the (extreme precariousness) of the relevant family life held to exist in this case, this being an “important consideration”;
(iii) The judge failed to have regard to the Applicants’ very limited connection to the UK;
(iv) The judge did not properly weigh in the proportionality assessment the mandatory factor relevant to the public interest specified in section 117B(3) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA”);
(v) The judge erred in the application of section 117B(2) of the NIAA;
(vi) The judge failed to acknowledge that the public interest in this case is particularly weighty given that the UK has chosen not to implement a scheme for family reunion in this context.

Ground 4: The judge erred by considering irrelevant matters by considering the Applicants’ quality of life in Gaza.

Ground 5: The judge erred by considering the rights of the Applicants and in her understanding of the implications of there being a “unitary” family life for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR.
25. On 12 June 2025, the judge refused permission to appeal.
26. In a decision dated 5 September 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato stayed the renewed application for permission to appeal pending the hand-down of the Court of Appeal judgment in IA & Others v SSHD.
27. The Applicants applied to set aside the stay and the application was listed for an oral hearing on 2 October 2026. After the hearing, in a decision dated 3 October 2026, UTJ Lodato refused the application.
28. Judgment in IA and Others v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 was handed down on 26 November 2025. Both parties provided written submissions addressing the decision and on 31 December 2025, UTJ Lodato granted the SSHD permission to appeal.
IA and Others v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516
29. In IA and Others, a family of six, (mother, father and four children), living in Gaza, applied to join the father’s brother, a British Citizen living in the UK. The application was refused, the family appealed against the decision. The First-tier Tribunal accepted that family life existed between the family and the Sponsor, but dismissed the appeal. The Upper Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law, set the decision aside and remade it allowing the appeal.
30. The Court of Appeal summarised the grounds pursued by the SSHD in IA and Others in the judgment at [5]:
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (the SSHD) is appealing the UT's decisions as to the existence of family life and its conclusions on the proportionality balance under article 8(2). The SSHD contended that: (a) on a proper understanding of the law as to the meaning of "family life", the family and the sponsor did not enjoy family life under article 8(1), (b) even if such family life did exist, the UT was wrong at [166] to consider the free-standing article 8 rights of the family, rather than just those of the sponsor, in undertaking the proportionality balance required by article 8(2), and (c) the UT gave the wrong weight to the risks to the lives of the family and their dire situation in the Gaza warzone, and gave the wrong weight to the importance of UK immigration control and the short-lived family life that had existed in this case.
31. The Court of Appeal summarised their reasons for allowing the SSHD’s appeal on those grounds at [10]-[12]:
10. First, the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has been that "family life for the purpose of Article 8 … is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate "additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties"" (see Kumari v. The Netherlands 44051/20, 10 December 2024 (Kumari) at [35], and Beoku-Betts v. SSHD [2008] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 115 (Beoku-Betts) at [39]). The FTT did not apply that test, but instead asked itself whether the sponsor had provided "real, effective or committed support" to his brother and the family (see [18] and [25] of the FTT decision). The real, effective or committed support test is lower than the additional elements of dependence test. Applying the proper test, neither the brother nor his family had shown that they had family life with the sponsor for the purposes of article 8(1).
11. Secondly, if there had been family life between the sponsor and his family (as found by the FTT), it would have been appropriate to have regard to the unitary nature of that family life (see Beoku-Betts at [4], [20] and [41]-[43]). We accept, however, that, in undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2), the court is looking primarily at the article 8 rights of those persons within the jurisdiction of article 1 of the ECtHR (in this case, the sponsor).
12. Thirdly, we have concluded that the UT made several errors in undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2). Even if, contrary to what we have decided, family life had existed between the sponsor and the family, the balance should not have been determined in favour of granting the family entry clearance. Very exceptional or compelling circumstances had not been shown. The UT was wrong to pay so little regard to the immigration control policies of the SSHD and the UK Government, as reflected in the Rules, as expressing what was necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK and for the protection of the rights of the citizens of the UK. The UT wrongly over-stated the importance of the family's short-lived family life with the sponsor (had it existed at all), the best interests of the children of the family and the admittedly serious risks faced by the family in Gaza.
The Hearing
32. The parties produced detailed skeleton arguments for the error of law hearing and I heard detailed submissions from Ms Knorr and Ms Reid. Their submissions are a matter of record and I refer to them only as is necessary for me to determine whether the judge materially erred in law.
33. Ms Reid confirmed that the SSHD did not challenge any of the findings of fact made by the judge.
34. Ms Reid also confirmed that the SSHD no longer pursued ground 5. The SSHD accepted that the judge’s approach, as set out at paragraph 102 of the annex, was correct. The judge had correctly proceeded on the basis that family life is unitary in nature, such that interference with the family life of one member affects all members of the family and that it is the impact of the interference on the family members who are in the UK which will be determinative of whether a decision is lawful.
Analysis
Judicial Restraint
35. I have reminded myself that I must exercise caution when determining whether the First-tier Tribunal legally erred in its evaluation of the facts: AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 at [30]; Clin v Walter Lilly [2021] EWCA Civ at [83]; and also see the “review standard” described in Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] UKSC 30 at [142].
Ground 1: Failure to apply the correct principles when considering whether there was family life between the Applicants and the Sponsor
36. In IA and Others the Court of Appeal clarified the test for adult siblings to establish family life:
122. The real, committed or effective support test is, in our judgment, as we have already intimated at [68], on a proper analysis different from the additional elements of dependency test. Dependency may in one sense be the other side of the support coin. But “real support” may be provided without any serious dependency. Even “effective support” might be provided without there being meaningful dependency. As Sedley LJ himself acknowledged in Kugathas, the real, committed and effective support test was a reading down of the additional elements of dependency test. The FTT said the same at [25] where it acknowledged that the sponsor’s real, committed and effective support of family was short of the family being dependent on the sponsor.
123. In our judgment, it would be going too far to say that it is wrong to test whether there are additional elements of dependency by reference to the real, committed or effective support provided. But real, committed and effective support is not the test itself, because the level of real support, for example, may be minor or insignificant, whereas the word “dependency” denotes a significant relationship. This is not a semantic point. The ECtHR used the word “dependence” in S v. UK in the context of “cohabiting dependents”, which were its starting point (see [42] above).
37. The SSHD submits that the judge made the same error identified in IA and Others, by applying the test of “real, committed or effective support” to determine whether the Applicants enjoyed a family life with the Sponsor and her children in the UK and not the correct test of “additional elements of dependency.”
38. The judge heard the Applicants’ appeals on 20-21 March 2025 and therefore without the benefit of the guidance in IA and Others. The SSHD notes, however, that the judge was referred to Kumari v The Netherlands ECtHR App No 440151/20 (10 December 2024), which was approved in IA and Others. The judge does not refer to Kumari and cited Kugathas v SSHD as having set out the correct test under the heading ‘The Law’ in the annex.
39. In IA and Others at [132] the Court recognised that “the evaluation of whether family life exists is fact-sensitive exercise where many factors may be relevant including financial support, physical and psychological health and a combination of other factors”
40. In Kumari the Court found at [37] that a “finding of the existence of “family life” based on “additional elements of dependency other than normal, emotional ties” will often be the result of a combination of elements.”
41. Having read the annex and the four individual decisions together, I am satisfied that the judge’s conclusions as to whether family life existed between the Applicants and the Sponsor and her children demonstrates that she applied the correct ‘additional elements of dependency’ test.
42. I am also satisfied that the judge gave legally adequate reasons for finding that there was family life between the Applicants, the Sponsor and her children and that that finding was open to her on the evidence before her.
43. In each of the individual decisions under the heading ‘Is there family life between the appellants and the sponsor?’, the judge records that it is the respondent’s position that:
The respondent’s position is that there is no family life between the appellants and the sponsor because there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is dependency or more than normal emotional ties and that if there is dependency, the evidence does not show that any support provided is real, effective or committed.
44. In respect of A1 and A2, the judge concludes that that there are ties between the Sponsor and A1 and A2 “which go beyond normal emotional ties between parents and adult children” and that the “emotional dependence” by the Sponsor’s children on A1 and A2 “is over and above what would normally be expected between grandparents and grandchildren.” [A1 and A2 at 18-22]
45. In respect of A3’s family unit the judge concludes “there is a level of dependence between them (A3 and the Sponsor) which goes beyond simple emotional ties” and that the Sponsor’s daughter has a close relationship with A5 and A6. [A3 and Others at 15(v) and 15(vi)]
46. In respect of A9’s family unit the judge found that A9 and the Sponsor remained close and were in daily contact with each other prior to the current conflict. The judge also found that A9 viewed the Sponsor’s children as her own and the Sponsor viewed A9’s children as her own, the Sponsor’s eldest son had a close relationship with A13, seeing him as a brother, her younger son had a close relationship with A14 and her daughter had a close relationship with A12. [A9 and Others at 17(iii), 17(viii) and 17(ix))]
47. In relation to A15’s family unit, the judge found that A15 and the Sponsor share a close and continuing relationship and prior to the current conflict they were in daily contact. The judge accepted that A15 has taken on a parental role towards the Sponsor, regards her as a daughter, and treats the Sponsor’s children as her own and has been involved in caring for the Sponsor’s children. The Sponsor’s younger son is particularly close to A18 and A19. [A15 and Others at 17(i)-17(v) and 17(vii)]
48. It is notable that although the judge found that there was family life between the Sponsor and A16, A17, A18 and A20 , the judge did not find that there was family life between the Sponsor and A19. The judge found that “there was a close relationship between the Sponsor and A19” and that they remain close she did not accept on the evidence “that there is a level of support which goes beyond normal emotional ties.” [A15 and Others at 20]
49. I accept that the judge makes repeated references to real, effective and committed support. However, in IA and Others the Court of Appeal made it clear that “it would be going too far to say that it is wrong to test whether there are additional elements of dependency by reference to the real, committed or effective support provided.” I am satisfied that the judge considered that there were ‘additional elements of dependency’ by reference to the real, committed or effective support provided. Despite not having the benefit of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the judge’s application of the law is consistent with it.
50. In my judgment the judge applied the correct test in determining whether family life existed between the Applicants and the Sponsor and her children. I accept that conclusion was open to her on the (unchallenged) findings of fact that she made in respect of the Applicants’ relationships with the Sponsor and her children.
Ground 2: Failure to provide legally adequate reasons for the conclusion that refusing entry clearance to the Applicants engaged the Sponsor and her childrens’ right to family life and failed to carefully assess the nature and quality of the relevant family life
Refusal of Entry Clearance engaged Article 8(1)
51. The SSHD submits that the judge failed to provide legally adequate reasons for her conclusion that refusing entry clearance to the Applicants engaged the Sponsor’s and her children’s right to family life. In particular, the SSHD opines that having found that their family life was interfered with by the SSHD’s decisions the judge does not identify the consequences of the interference.
52. I am not persuaded by this submission. The judge gave detailed and clearly legally adequate reasons as to why the SSHD’s decision to refuse entry clearance engaged Article 8 ECHR. Those reasons identify the consequences of the interference.
53. In each of the individual decisions under the heading “Is there an interference with the enjoyment of family life?”, the judge found that “meaningful contact” between the Applicants and the Sponsor and the Sponsor’s children was “effectively impossible at present.” [A1 and A2 at 23-26; A3 and Others at 18-21; A9 and Others at 22-25 and A15 and Others at 23-26] The judge explained that was because:
The consistent evidence is that all forms of contact are very difficult, sporadic and unreliable. Visits to Gaza by the sponsor and the children are not possible and the appellants are unable to leave Gaza because the border is closed and the means by which A11 left Gaza are no longer available.
Sporadic calls of a few minutes duration are not sufficient to maintain the family life that exists between the appellants and the sponsor and her children.
54. In respect of A1 and A2, the judge also found that the Sponsor and her children were unable to access the level of support they previously received from A1 and A2. [A1 and A2 at 24]
55. The SSHD complains that “it is difficult to reconcile” the judge’s conclusion that the consequences of the interference are sufficiently serious to engage Article 8(1) with her finding that A3 and his immediate family unit only rekindled their family life with the Sponsor and her children in 2023 and that family life did not exist prior to the conflict. The judge found that after the Sponsor came to the UK the level of dependence reduced and that “had their circumstances remained the same” she “may have found that this was simply evidence of normal emotional bonds between siblings.” [A3 and Others at 15(iv)]. The judge considered that the conflict had the effect of increasing the level of dependence which went beyond simple emotional ties. The judge was entitled to come to that conclusion for the reasons outlined in addressing ground 1.
56. In any event, the judge found that “they remained very close and that they maintained regular contact with each other, both by telephone and through the Sponsor’s visits” and that they were no longer able to maintain that contact. Accordingly, it is clear why the judge considered the consequences of the interference are sufficiently serious to engage Article 8(1).
Assess the nature and quality of the relevant family life
57. The judge assessed the nature and quality of the Sponsor and her children’s family life with the Applicants in detail, as demonstrated by the detailed findings of facts in respect of it as outlined above at 11-20.
58. The SSHD’s argument that the judge erred in this assessment is simply not made out.
Ground 3: Erred in assessment of proportionality
Identify and Apply Relevant Principles Identified by the ECtHR
59. For the reasons given in respect of each issue I am not persuaded that they demonstrate that the judge failed to identify and apply relevant principles identified by the ECtHR.
Precariousness
60. The SSHD submits that the judge failed to identify the (extreme) precariousness of the family life in these appeals. She accepts that precariousness does not apply in the same way in entry clearance cases, but submits that it was necessary for the judge to consider that the family life in these appeals had been formed and developed from outside the UK with no expectation that the family members would be able to live together in the UK.
61. The SSHD relies on the following extract in Arshad v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 355 for her submission the precariousness of family life is relevant to the assessment of proportionality in these appeals:
122. … ’The first is that people who know that their relationship is formed and developed when one person has no right to be in the host country cannot expect to be able to stay there on the basis of that relationship. The second, which applies in the case of children, who may well not have that knowledge, is that it is not in the public interest for the parents of children to present the host state with a fait accompli in order to get permission to stay there. The ECtHR had made this point in paragraph 79 of its judgment in Butt v Norway (Application No 47017/09, 4 December 2012) although, in the event, it was not a decisive consideration on the facts of that case; and in paragraph 105 of its judgment in Jeunesse, the ECtHR said that it would follow the principles which it had stated in Butt. It is evident from the rest of the judgment that it did so.
62. I am not persuaded that these principles apply in these appeals. No-one in these appeals has unlawful immigration status in the UK. The Sponsor’s relationships with the Applicants were not formed and developed when any of them had unlawful status in the UK. Their relationships were first formed when they were all living in Gaza. The Sponsor then came to the UK to join her husband who had fled Gaza, sought and was granted asylum in the UK. The judge found that in the UK the Sponsor further developed her family life with the Applicants. The SSHD has not identified any authority to support the precariousness principle she argues for in this appeal.
Limited Connection to the UK
63. It is the SSHD’s submission that the judge had no regard to the Applicants’ “very limited connection to the UK.” The SSHD asserts that this is a factor that the ECtHR in MA v Denmark (Application number 6697/18, July 2021) has specifically highlighted as tending to suggest that an Article 8 positive duty will not arise to require family reunification. However, this is not an accurate reading of MA v Denmark. The ECtHR noted that the Courts had been reluctant to find a positive obligation in circumstances where the person requesting family reunification had limited ties to the host country. In this appeal the person requesting family reunification is the Sponsor not the Applicants and the Sponsor and both her children are British Citizens.
Public Interest Considerations
64. The SSHD claims that the judge erred in her consideration of the statutory public interest considerations at section 117B(3) NIAA 2002 because the judge considered that A1 and A2 could rely on the future employment of their other children being granted entry clearance and that their lack of financial independence would be short lived. The SSHD asserts that the judge attached reduced weight to that factor, which is a flawed approach because Article 8 ECHR must be assessed at the date of the hearing and at that date to allow the appeal would result in a significant burden on public funds. The SSHD argues that the judge speculated that some of the Applicants might gain employment in the future and that is incapable of demonstrating that they are currently financial independent.
65. I am not persuaded that the judge did attach “reduced weight to that factor” as claimed by the SSHD. It is notable that the judge does not record in any of the decisions or the annex that she did so.
66. The judge found that it was likely that the Applicants would require access to public funds for their support. [A1 and A2 at 32; A3 and Others at 26; A9 and Others at 30; A15 and Others at 31]
67. The judge recorded the SSHD’s submission that the Applicants’ likely lack of financial independence is a factor that significant weight should be attached because they are part of a wider group of 20 Applicants and the financial burden of allowing all 20 appeals would be significant. The judge accepted that in the particular circumstances of this case the likely burden to the public purse was something that carried more weight than it might otherwise. However, she noted that the adult Applicants who were of working age were likely to be able to find work that would reduce the burden to the public purse. In conclusion, the judge attached weight to the likely lack of financial independence, but did not agree that it carried the significant weight argued for by the SSHD. [A1 and A2 at 31-33; A3 and Others at 29; A9 and Others at 32; A15 and Others at 33-34]
68. I am satisfied that the judge did consider and attach weight to the fact that the Applicants are not financially independent. I am not persuaded that she gave it reduced weight because she found that the adult Applicants of working age would be able to find employment in the future. The judge simply noted that she did not consider that this factor carried the significant weight argued for by the SSHD. The judge was entitled to come to that conclusion.
69. The SSHD also submits that the judge erred in her consideration of the statutory public interest considerations at section 117B(2) of the NIAA because the judge considered that some of the Applicants would be able to learn English in the future and used that finding to diminish the weight of the Applicants’ lack of English ability when addressing proportionality.
70. The judge found that A1, A2, A3, A4 and A9 could not speak English and noted that carried weight against them in the balancing exercise. The judge accepted the Sponsor’s evidence that A10, A11, A12, A13 and A14 all spoke basic English and A10 and A11 spoke it well. The judge concluded that the minor children were all of school age and there was nothing to suggest that they would not be able to learn English to a standard that would allow them to integrate. [A1 and A2 at 19; A3 and Others at 24; A9 and Others at 29]
71. The judge noted that A15 was a teacher and therefore educated, so the judge found it was more likely than not that if she did not already speak English she had the capacity to learn. The judge considered that A16, A17, and A18 were all young adults and were also likely to have the capacity to learn English. In conclusion the judge attached negative weight to the lack of the English language ability of the adult Applicants. [A15 and Others at 29]
72. It is therefore clear that the judge did attach negative weight to the adult Applicants lack of language ability. The judge does consider that some of the Applicants may have the capacity to learn English. However, she does not find that it diminishes the weight she should attach to that factor.
73. The SSHD acknowledges that the judge recognises that the public interest in maintaining immigration control carries significant weight, but submits that it is plain that when reading the proportionality consideration in each decision the judge failed to do so. I consider that this argument is also unfounded.
74. The judge records in each of the individual decisions that “there is public interest in maintaining effective immigration control and this carries significant weight in the balancing exercise.” The judge also finds that the fact that the Applicants do not satisfy any of the provisions of the immigration rules carries significant weight. [A1 and A2 at 28; A3 and Others at 23; A9 and Others at 29; A15 and Others at 28]
75. The SSHD complains that the judge does not return to this factor or give any indication that she attached weight to this considerations. The judge was not required to return to it. It clearly formed part of the judge’s consideration. The judge records that she gave “significant weight” to the fact that the Applicants do not satisfy any of the provisions of the immigration rules. Having specified it as a factor carrying particular weight in her analysis, the judge was not required to give reasons for reasons by referring to repeatedly.
76. It is the SSHD’s case that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for her conclusion that the decisions were disproportionate and that the only factors that the judge found to weigh in the Applicants favour are “that is in the best interests of the Sponsor’s children that their family members are granted entry to the UK, and the anguish the conditions (the Applicants) are facing in Gaza is causing the Sponsor.”
77. I have carefully considered whether the judge committed the error, as identified in IA and others at [157], of promoting the children’s best interests to a paramount consideration. As outlined above, at 11-12, the judge made detailed findings about the extremely negative impact the separation was having on the Sponsor and her children. Having made those findings and given the best interests of the Sponsor’s children and the Sponsor’s mental health problems (and the fact that the Applicants’ circumstances were a significant cause of those problems) significant weight, the judge was entitled to conclude that the SSHD’s decisions created unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Sponsor and her children that the public interest was outweighed. There is no requirement that the judge identify additional factors.
78. I am satisfied that the judge gave legally adequate reasons. It is clear from reading the individual decisions and the annex (and indeed the SSHD’s pleadings, in which she is able to articulate a detailed challenge to those reasons) why the judge considered the decisions were disproportionate.
Failure to consider lack of policy
79. In IA and Others, the Court of Appeal considered that the relevance of the absence of a resettlement policy concerning Gaza was that the personal circumstances of the family had to be balanced against the SSHD’s policies as reflected in the immigration rules, which did not allow them entry on the basis of the risks they faced.
80. I note that the SSHD did not ask the judge to consider the lack of resettlement policy but, in any event, for the reasons I give above at 73-75, I am satisfied that the judge was clearly aware that the Applicants’ entry is contrary to SSHD’s settled policy and accorded that factor the significant weight it is due.
Ground 4: Erred by considering irrelevant matters by considering the Applicants’ quality of life in Gaza.
81. The SSHD accepts that the judge was entitled to consider the circumstances of the Applicants’ in Gaza in so far as it interfered with the Sponsor and her children, but argues that the judge “has gone further than that in considering the conditions of the children in Gaza and attaching significant weight to it.”
82. I am not persuaded by that submission. I am satisfied that the judge focuses her consideration of the Applicants’ circumstances on the impact it has on the Sponsor and her children. As outlined above at 12, the judge made clear and detailed findings regarding the impact the Applicants’ circumstances in Gaza was having on the Sponsor and her children.
83. I also note that in all the individual decisions, the judge finds that the circumstances in which the Applicants are living in are having a detrimental impact on the Sponsor. This includes when the judge is considering A1 and A2s precarious health and the fact that A3’s health has deteriorated as a result of being unable to access treatment. [A1 and A2 at 39; A3 and Others at 35; A9 and Others at 37; A15 and Others at 38]
84. I am satisfied that reading the individual decisions and annexes together that when the judge is attaching significant weight to the significant risk of harm to the Applicant children this is by reference to the impact that would in turn have on the Sponsor and her children.
Conclusion
85. For all these reasons I do not find the SSHD’s grounds to be made out and I conclude that the judge’s decision should stand. I accordingly uphold the judge’s decision.
Notice of Decision
The SSHD’s appeal is dismissed. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision allowing the Applicants’ appeals stands.

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
9 June 2026