Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003221

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/52589/2024
LP/10268/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

SD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr V Jagadesham, counsel instructed by Fisher Stone Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 8 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties are entitled to apply on notice to vary this direction.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is my decision which I have delivered on an ex tempore basis after hearing from Mr Jagadesham of counsel instructed by Fisher Stone Solicitors and Mr Diwnycz, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer on behalf of the Respondent. I have been provided with a large bundle of 864 pages and in addition, albeit late, there was also a Rule 24 response from the Respondent.
Background and Permission to Appeal
2. The Appellant, a national of Albania, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Saffer, who by way of a decision dated 7 May 2025, dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.
3. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. On a renewed application, permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi by way of a decision dated 23 September 2025.
4. The learned Upper Tribunal Judge noted that the application was out of time by 7 days but because the delay was not the fault of the Appellant himself, time was extended to admit the application in the interests of justice.
5. The grant of permission stated as follows:
“Whilst there appears to be little merit to Ground 1 given the judge accepted the appellant’s credibility and in Ground 3 in relation to which sufficient reasons seem to have been given for finding that there is sufficient protection in Albania, it is arguable that the judge erred in his assessment of the reasonableness of relocation to the appellant’s uncles and in his arguable failure to have regard to relevant expert evidence.”
Grounds of Appeal
6. There are detailed grounds of appeal which have been drafted in this case by Ms Mair of Counsel. She had appeared in front of the Judge and Mr Jagadesham today has taken me through those grounds of appeal. In summary the grounds contend as follows:
(1) Ground 1: That there was a failure to apply the vulnerable witness guidance and it is said that although the Judge had said he was treating the Appellant as a vulnerable witness, he had in fact failed in practice to follow the guidance in AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 and that this error of law was significantly compounded by the Appellant’s young age.
(2) Ground 2 contends that there was an error of law in relation to the assessment of internal relocation when the Judge had said that the Appellant could stay at his uncle’s home when that was not actually the position. In summary, it being contended, that rather than a holistic approach to the Appellant’s own individual personal circumstances and accepted vulnerability, the Judge simply went on to make the decision without taking into the account the other extensive evidence.
(3) Ground 3 contends that there was an error of law by the Judge in the assessment of sufficiency of protection. Here the grounds state that it was accepted that the Appellant’s father would know that the Appellant was in Klos and that thereby sufficiency of protection was not something which was open for the Judge to find in this particular case.
7. Mr Jagadesham took me through the grounds of appeal. He referred me to various parts of the Judge’s decision and he took me to the country expert report and also to a psychiatric report. He referred to some of the background material and he referred to, amongst other things, to case law including AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 31(IAC) which requires me to consider the individual circumstances of the Applicant. I also listened with care to Mr Jagadesham’s submissions in relation to other evidence which had been provided to me in the large bundle. Much, if not all of which, was also before the Judge as well.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
8. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:

‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
9. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
Analysis and Consideration
10. I deal with the vulnerability ground first and it is important that the context of vulnerability is considered first. Mr Jagadesham reminded me that I had dealt at length with vulnerability in a different unrelated (currently unreported) case setting out the importance of IAC Judges assessing the evidence of vulnerable witnesses in a careful way and that they must take into account the Joint Presidential Guidance Note 2 of 2010. In particular, when assessing why, for example, a witness may be seen to be unreliable or failing in their memory or simply not venturing reasons for certain aspects.
11. In my judgment, in this case however, the Judge very clearly concluded he was able to accept the Appellant’s account. I refer by way of example to the Judge’s decision the following paragraphs in which he did so. I refer to the Judge’s decision and his findings of fact.
12. The Judge said at paragraph 28,
“28. …I accept it is likely the Appellant intervened on one occasion at least when his father was violent to his mother and was stabbed. I accept this amounts to domestic violence. It is also amounts to child abuse. …
29. I accept it is likely that the police were called by the Appellant on various occasions when his father was abusive, and his father was kept overnight in the police station. I accept he was released and returned home contrite but unreformed as I have no reason to doubt it. I accept it is likely the Appellant and his mother and siblings went to stay with his uncle in Klos between 30 and 60 minutes’ drive away for a few months as I have no reason to doubt it. I accept his father expressed contrition and the family returned home as I have no reason to doubt it. I accept it is likely the Appellant went to Germany for a few months to work and returned as I have no reason to doubt it. I accept it is likely his uncle facilitated him coming here as I have no reason to doubt it.”
13. The Judge also noted at the start of his decision in paragraph 1 that he accepted that the Appellant has PTSD. The Judge noted that it was accepted that his father was abusive to him and the Judge noted in that same paragraph 1, “I have treated him as a vulnerable witness”.
14. In my judgment there is no reason to doubt whatsoever that the Judge did not do what he said he was doing in line 3, paragraph 1 of his decision, namely that he said he was treating the Appellant as vulnerable, thereby taking into account the evidence of the Appellant in the round with very much those considerations. Additionally, this case was different from most other cases because the Judge found the Appellant to be telling the truth in relation to those aspects. It is not a case in which the Appellant has seen to be doubted in relation to the core aspects of his case which thereby required the Judge to factor in further reasoning as to whether it is possible that it was the Appellant’s vulnerability which caused the Judge to doubt what the Appellant was saying. The Judge also stressed throughout his decision, the Appellant’s young age. For example, at paragraph 27 when the Judge said that he was bearing in mind that the Appellant was aged 17 when he left Albania and was aged almost 20 at the date of the hearing.
15. In my judgment just as Judge Rastogi noted, this really was a weak ground of appeal and although Judge Rastogi granted permission to appeal that it was arguable, in my judgment having fully evaluated and considered it fully and appropriately, it has no merit and I dismiss it.
16. The other two grounds of appeal relate to sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. I turn first to the skeleton argument which had been provided in readiness for the hearing before the Judge. That appears at page 720 of the 864 page bundle onwards. It is said at paragraph 722 that the issues are as follows:
(1) Is there sufficiency of protection or an internal relocation alternative for the Appellant to protect him against future persecution from his father?
(2) Would the Appellant’s removal breach his Article 8 ECHR rights?
17. The Respondent’s review, which appears at page 728 onwards, mirrors that schedule of issues at paragraph 3 and provides a counter schedule and sets out the matters.
18. It is worth stating that Mr Jagadesham in this case has said and done all that he possibly can on behalf of the Appellant. He did not draft the grounds of appeal which appear before me and indeed he was not counsel who had appeared before Judge Saffer, but nonetheless he sought to assist me to the best of his ability and he took me to various documents within the (unnecessarily) very large bundle.

Lindsay Riley
19. One of the documents that Mr Jagadesham took me to states it is a statement. It is at pages 718 and 719 of the bundle and is from Lindsay Riley at Bradford Children and Families Trust dated 29 May 2025. It states at near the end:
“In my view it is essential that [SD] continues to receive support and protection in the United Kingdom to enable him to maintain his safety, build his independence, and realise his potential for a secure future”.
20. The difficulty is that the issues which the Judge was asked to identify (relating to the Appellant’s father) are not accurately reflected by what is recorded by this witness or this person who provided this witness statement because it says:
“Given his past experience of abuse, the credible threats he has received from organised groups the complete absence of familial support and the progress he has made in establishing a safe and stable life in the United Kingdom is my professional opinion that [SD] remains at considerable risk should he be returned to Albania.”
21. Mr Jagadesham was good enough to take some instructions in relation to this and he was able to get in touch with Ms Lindsay Riley by telephone. Ms Riley said that here she was referring to the Appellant’s expressed fear for being made to work for criminal groups in the future. The problem which arises is that earlier in her same witness statement Ms Riley said:
“In addition to the abuse he suffered within his family, [SD] reported that he was threatened by individuals. He expressed genuine and ongoing fears for his safety, stating that these threats posed a significant risk to his life and well-being. [SD] made it clear that returning to Albania would expose him to immediate danger, with no available protective support from any family or other trusted individuals.”
22. This is very different to the issues which the Judge was asked to deal. The Judge had not been asked to deal with reports of threats from individuals or indeed in respect of “credible threats he has received from organised crime groups”.
23. It is essential that those providing witness statements, whether Lindsay Riley at Bradford Children and Families Trust or anyone else. If they are not accurate then at the very least, they can mislead the court or Tribunal to whom the letter or statement is sent. It can impede justice. The Upper Tribunal has very wide powers in respect of contempt of court if false statements are provided and will not hesitate to deal with those matters.
24. I expect to see from Ms Lindsay Riley a witness statement with a statement of truth provided by the Appellant’s solicitors setting out why it is that she said what she did and I will then consider what further action I should take thereafter.
25. Mr Jagadesham said to me that whatever I was to decide in relation to Ms Lindsay Riley’s statement, that that should not be held against the Appellant. In my judgment, Mr Jagadesham is correct that I should not hold against the Appellant these matters which appear to have been set out by Ms Riley and I am not going to assume that it was the Appellant who said these things to Ms Riley who has then provided them to me, I just do not know, but I certainly do not hold it against the Appellant and it is not a factor I take against him in relation to the assessment of the case at this Error of Law hearing. But it is something which dilutes what Mr Jagadesham had said to me. Mr Jagadesham had submitted that the Judge should have, in effect, been persuaded by Ms Riley’s statement where she said that it is essential that the background in relation to SD can be taken into account and that he be permitted to remain here in the United Kingdom. It is not clear to me how the Judge erred if what Ms Riley was referring to in respect of risk from others has little to do with the Appellant’s actual claim of fear from his father and the domestic abuse that his mother suffered.
26. Mr Jagadesham also referred to a country expert report. It is a detailed report at pages 26 to 79 dated 2 August 2024 and has been prepared with a statement of truth by Vebi Kosumi, who references independent expertise in relation to Western Balkans focusing on Albania, Kosova and North Macedonia.
27. In essence here the complaint in the grounds of appeal is that the Judge was wrong to prefer the February 2025 CPIN over this specific expert report. This is said to be for 2 reasons, firstly because of the very nature of this specific report which related directly to the Appellant but also because in any event, the sources used by the expert were identical in date to those references within the CPIN in any event. The CPIN report is dated February 2025 and the expert report is dated August 2024. It was submitted that the reason the Judge was wrong was because the bibliography suggested that the sources were of a previous date.
28. The CPIN was not before the Judge and it is not in the bundle before me either but for today’s purposes, we have all been able to access it digitally. It is the CPIN version 3.0 February 2025 and the bibliography appears at the end. If one looks at that it shows, for example, the following. An Albania report 2024 30 October 2024, the government of Albania Constitution 20 April 2008, Criminal Procedure Code August 1995, USSD report 20 April 2024.
29. The specific parts of the country report which were referred to before me, include the following:
“22. The police and prosecution need proper funding and professionalism. There is corruption in all state departments. Currently, the country is undergoing a vetting process in all departments …
23. [SD] claimed that he has called the police several times seeking protection from his father, but the police have not provided adequate protection.
…
The responses to [SD] are in line with how Albanian police behave, considering that domestic abuse is the right of the man of the house. The Albanian police are more reactive than proactive in preventing a crime. The Police will be reactive to severe crimes such as murder, although there may have been several reports to the police for the risks an individual would face and no prevention actions taken.”
“28. The reports of domestic violence against women and children show that Albanian society and authorities do not provide robust protection to abused women and children compared to European standards. Women and children do not seek protection from the police, being aware that there would not be robust protection and the offender would continue the abuse. ...
29. The World Vision International report found in their survey that just under two-thirds of children have been exposed to abuse. This shows that the authorities do not act when parents commit violence against children, as they are of the view that parents are within their rights to beat their children. Many Albanians believe that parents have power over their children, and the abuse is considered a form of disciplining children. Children feel powerless when abused. In Albania, there are almost no cases when children with parents are placed with foster families.”
30. I was taken to paragraph 36 of the expert’s report which states, “If returned to Albania, [SD] may approach the Policia e Shtetit (State Police) and seek protection. His father will be called to the police station, and likely no action will be taken. [SD] would increase the risk of harm from his father”. Here Mr Jagadesham said that this would be a risk in any event and not merely if the Appellant was now to seek to take action against his father for past conduct that his father had committed against him.
31. In relation to internal relocation the expert dealt with the instructions in relation to paragraphs 25 to 31 of the Reasons for Refusal Letter which dealt with internal relocation. At paragraph 42 the expert said:
“The relocation of an 18-year-old, [SD], is unlikely to be a viable option due to the size of the country and because individuals in the community are looking to find information about the newcomer. Albanian society cannot be compared to British society, where it is far less common for individuals to be asked personal questions. Within a few minutes, an Albanian starting a conversation would be questioned if he had a girlfriend. Does he want to be matched with a girl? What job do his parents have, where does he come from, where does he work, etc.”
There is also reference to the Albanian police being corrupt.
32. At paragraph 46 the expert concludes that SD, in relation to whether he could lead a relative every day life, the answer is that he would face challenges due to complications and would face in attempting to relocate to a different part of the country.
33. In relation to law in respect of internal relocation, I was referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in SC (Jamaica) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15. Lord Stephens, with whom Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Arden and Lord Hamlen agreed gave the only reasoned judgment and said at paragraph 95 in part as follows:
“95. The correct approach to the question of internal relocation under the Refugee Convention is that set out in Januzi at para 21 and in AH (Sudan) at para 13. It involves a holistic approach involving specific reference to the individual’s personal circumstances including past persecution or fear thereof, psychological and health condition, family and social situation, and survival capacities in order to determine the impact on that individual of settling in the proposed place of relocation and whether the individual ‘can reasonably be expected to stay’ in that place. It does not take into account the standard of rights of protection which a person would enjoy in the country where refuge is sought. Also, as correctly conceded by the SSHD, it does not take into account what is ‘due’ to the person as a criminal. There is no support for such an approach in domestic authority or in authority in any other jurisdiction. …”
34. Here the Supreme Court were dealing with a criminal case and I am very familiar with Januzi and AH (Sudan) but there is no change to the requirement to consider the reasonableness of internal relocation and its viability with the specifics of the individual person. In my judgment the Judge did as was required by the caselaw.
35. It is therefore necessary to look to consider what the Judge actually said in this case Firstly, as I have already explained, the Judge had accepted that the Appellant had been the victim of awful behaviour from his father. To call it ‘domestic’ abuse or ‘domestic’ violence can have the effect of diminishing the seriousness of such matters. In my judgment, the fact that the perpetrator is a parent does not make the impact of the that abuse or violence any less. Indeed, the effect can be more serious, particularly psychologically. It can hurt more than if it was a stranger inflicting that violence. Here, this Appellant, whilst trying to defend his mother, was stabbed by his father. The Appellant faced serious violence at the hands of his father.
36. I do not have to assess whether or not these events took place. I have to assess whether or not the Judge made a material error of law when he considered the case.
37. Because the Appellant is here sitting in front of me today, I shall again state that judgments of the senior courts including of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal set out the limits within which I must consider my role. I am not rehearing the case which the Judge heard. I am considering whether the Judge had made a material error of law. I cannot find that there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision just because I disagree with it or because I have sympathy for the Appellant.
38. Even when using the evidence of Dr Rukyya Hassan, the consultant psychiatrist, which goes back to May 2023 whereas this appeal was heard in February 2025, I discern no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. When I scrutinise the country expert report and assess it, I take into account paragraph 30 of the Judge’s decision which states, “I am satisfied that when he initially said he was coming here for schooling and a better life and to feed his family that he was telling the truth.”
39. The Judge said at paragraph 31, “I do not accept it is reasonably likely that the Appellant would be a victim of domestic violence on return from his father for these interrelated reasons”.
40. The Judge set out his reasons at paragraph 32:
“32. He is an adult in good physical health who can fend for himself.
33. He can stay at his uncle’s as it has not established it is not reasonably likely he cannot, as this time he would be alone as it has not been established his mother and siblings would be reasonably likely to leave his father.
34. It has not been established it is likely there was any violence at his uncle’s or that it is reasonably likely there would be in the future for these reasons. Despite the challenges with the police and justice system, I am satisfied that the picture presented in the 2025 CPIN more accurately reflects the improvements in protection and support available that the older reports of Mr Kosumi and generic reports of [others] who attended to have their evidence tested and none of whom have considered the more recent CPIN. The same applies to the Asylos Reports from 2019 and 2024. That evidence submitted on behalf of the Appellant therefore carries very little weight. As the Appellant would be at his uncle’s it is reasonably likely that his father would know the Appellant was there. He would not have to live anonymously. His father is from a very low economic background and therefore not reasonably likely to be able to bribe the police not to intervene. They did so on the past even before the improvements in the service they give, and they did not require the Appellant to pay a bribe. The police can therefore be called if his father turns up and would be likely to assist.
35. He would not therefore be required to move to Tirana or live independently.”
“39. He has PTSD. He is not receiving treatment here. His uncle was able to afford for him to come here. It has not been established he would not be able to pay for any therapy the Appellant required. It is plainly available for PTSD. It would be conducted in his first language. The Appellant can work and as he would be living with family in the North would not be reasonably likely to be preyed on by criminals or traffickers due to impecuniosity or his accent.”
41. As I explored during the discussion part of the case, during pre- 2023 and indeed even earlier, the situation for the Appellant was very different. There is a, in my judgment a qualitative difference between a 16 year old and the almost 20 year old that was before the Judge. The Judge was perfectly entitled to take that it into account.
42. The Judge was unarguably entitled to take into account that the Appellant now would find himself in a very different situation compared with the vulnerable state he was in terms of his age and the predicament he found himself in previously.
43. The Judge was perfectly entitled to conclude that there would be a sufficiency of protection because both the expert report and the CPIN said that that would be the position insofar as the general nature of the police was concerned. Although I accept that the system is not perfect in Albania, no country has a system which is perfect. Sadly, domestic abuse is a real problem even in the UK. I accept that there is corruption in Albania, including amongst the police, but for this case the Judge was entitled to reach the decision that he did in respect of the non-state actors.
44. The Judge also referred to the corruption in Albania and that there is a lacklustre approach to some offences, domestic abuse being one of them. But this Appellant is not now in that category of being a minor. He is an adult and he was an adult when he was before the Judge in February 2025. The Appellant has his uncle and the assistance that his uncle would be able to provide him as well. Whilst the Appellant has the vulnerabilities in terms of the PTSD and the natural anxiety he will feel, having been returned from the UK, these are all matters which clearly can be dealt with by the medical facilities which are available to the Appellant in Albania and which the Judge was entitled to find will likely be paid for by the Appellant’s uncle.
45. In the strict sense, internal relocation is not entirely relevant here because the Appellant will not be fending for himself on his own. He will be moving to his maternal uncle’s home. In any event, the Judge was able to see that the home which is some 30 to 60 minutes drive from the father’s home. Indeed, the Judge went further to conclude that the Appellant’s father may well seek to turn up at the uncle’s home, but that there will be a sufficiency of protection in any event.
46. I note that the Judge was aware of the very large bundle but that he was not taken to specific parts of that bundle. The days of the past when Appellants provided far too many documents in their appeals must be consigned to history because it is not reasonable to contend when the appeal fails that the Judge did not consider a document buried amongst an unnecessarily large bundle. The Judge said at paragraph 23,
“As nothing else was referred to by Ms Mair despite my request to her to point me to anything relevant, and there was no key passage index attached to the excessively voluminous bundle which was of age and superseded by more recent CPINs I will not refer to anything else from those documents which are of no help.”
47. In my judgment, the Judge was perfectly entitled in those circumstances to come to his own assessment of the background material and to prefer what was set out in the more recent CPIN compared to other documents. In respect of the expert reports, he noted at paragraphs 21 and 22 the anonymously sourced references and the fact that the authors of the reports had not attended the hearing for their evidence to be tested. The Judge was perfectly entitled to come to those conclusions.
48. With due respect to Mr Jagadesham’s submission in relation to paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules namely that because there was past persecution then therefore that is something that the Judge should have taken into account is a misconceived submission. It is misconceived because the Judge did note that the Appellant’s father had been domestically abusive. Here though the Appellant was now older and indeed an adult and that the Appellant’s uncle, along with the sufficiency of protection and internal relocation matters dealt with why what occurred before would not reasonably likely occur again.
49. In my judgment the Judge addressed the factors from the caselaw and applied to them to the Appellant’s specific circumstances.

50. Paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules establishes an alleviating evidentiary rule for cases where an Appellant has established to the requisite standard that they have already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm. Such fact will be regarded as indicative of future risk, unless there are ‘good reasons’ to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. The Judge provided adequate reasons why there were good reasons why such harm would not occur in the future.

51. Looking at the decision as a whole, the Judge provided lawful, adequate and clear reasons why the Appellant’s appeal was dismissed.
52. In my judgment, despite Mr Jagadesham being as helpful as he could possibly be on behalf of the Appellant, the Judge’s decision does not contain a material error of law. In the circumstances, I conclude that the Judge’s decision stands.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law.
The decision which had dismissed the appeal stands and thereby the Appellant’s appeal remains dismissed on all grounds.

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 December 2025