Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003223

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/55854/2024
LH/01156/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 31st December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE IQBAL

Between

MD Hamidur Rahman
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Khaled of Counsel, KPP Barristers
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh born in 1986. He made an application on 8 November 2022, for leave to remain under Appendix PL and outside the Immigration Rules based on Article 8 of the ECHR and compassionate factors. This was refused on 16 May 2024 and he subsequently appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. It was heard on 16 April 2024 however, dismissed by a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 5 May 2025. Permission was sought to the Upper Tribunal; however this was refused by a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 1 July 2025. The appellant renewed his application for permission to the Upper Tribunal and this was granted on 21 August 2025.

Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
2. The appellant was represented at the hearing however no-one appeared on behalf of the respondent. At [4] – [6] the judge summarised the appellant’s case with reference to his private life and the respondent’s case in turn at [7].
3. At [14] the judge concluded that she did not accept that there were “very significant obstacles” to the appellant’s return to Bangladesh, as he could not meet the high threshold under Appendix PL or Article 8 outside the Immigration Rules. At [15] she noted the appellant had not been in the United Kingdom for twenty years and that he was 39 years old, single and in good health. At [16] the judge accepted he had difficulties with his family because of his studies and the death of his father in January 2016. However, that he had a number of certificates demonstrating he had gained qualifications in the United Kingdom and with this level of education and that he was proficient in English. He spoke English to a proficient level which would assist him if he was returned to Bangladesh.
4. At [17] the judge found, contrary to the appellant’s assertion, that he would be unable to find employment and that he was in better position than most Bangladeshis as he was educated in Business Management in the United Kingdom and spoke good English. At [18] it was not accepted the appellant had lost contact with Bangladeshi culture and he would be treated as an outsider on return when considering the case of Kamara. It was noted he was close to his cousin and aunt, also from Bangladesh. Whilst the judge noted he helped care for his aunt; it was found there was no medical evidence or other evidence stating that she would face difficulties if he were not to be able to care for her. At [19] the judge had accepted the appellant had made close connections in the United Kingdom and that it would be difficult for him to return after spending so many years in the United Kingdom, however at [20] that this did not meet the threshold for very significant obstacles.
5. At [21] - [27], the judge went on to consider the appellant’s case outside of the Rules and found at [22] that the appellant had had a private life but that it was not of such gravity to prevent him from forming a private life in Bangladesh. At [22] and [24] in relation to proportionality Section 117B was applied and it was noted the appellant entered with lawful leave which expired in 2014 and there was no evidence he had access to public funds, he spoke English, however, all these were neutral issues.
6. At [25] the judge found that under s117B, on balance little weight was to be accorded to the appellant’s private life rights when balanced against the public interest. T [26] the judge summarised the nature of the appellant’s private life which consisted of relationships with his aunt and cousin, his volunteering and work in the community during COVID, however, as little weight was to be placed on his private life then the judge concluded the public interest outweighed his private life under s117B.
Grounds of Appeal
7. The grounds essentially make two points first. First, that the judge failed to apply the test of very significant obstacles to reintegration in line with Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 and the broad evaluative judgment required. The second is that the judge had failed properly to assess proportionality under Article 8 of the ECHR given the error in the application of Section 117B NIAA 2002.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The Upper Tribunal granted permission on 21 August 2025 highlighting that it was arguable “the judge considered themselves bound to give little weight to the appellant’s private life in the UK and so failed to consider whether there existed circumstances such as to give the appellant’s private life more than little weight.” Whilst there were doubts as to the arguability of the challenge to the assessment of very significant obstacles, permission was granted on both grounds.
9. At the error of law hearing, I received submissions from Mr Khaled and Mr Parvar, all of which are a matter of record. In the light of the grounds Mr Khaled further stated that the judge had not properly carried out a broad evaluative judgment required by Kamara. He reiterated the relevant factors that were outlined at [16], [18] – [19] of the judge’s decision. The judge had accepted the appellant had resided here since the age of 21 and was now 39 years old and this showed most of his adult life had been spent in the UK. Further that he had lost contact with those in Bangladesh, he had no future opportunities there and had an inability to provide for himself with no meaningful ties in Bangladesh. He accordingly submitted that these formed part of the appellant’s case and the judge had failed to consider these as part of the evaluative assessment.
10. In considering the judge’s finding at[18] he submitted that the appellant need not provide medical evidence to support that he cared for his aunt as it was accepted he had a close relationships with his aunt and the relationship and he further submitted that this established the relationship was real effective and with commitments. The judge had therefore failed to engage with all matters and his consideration of the facts was too narrow.
11. Insofar as ground 2 was concerned, it was submitted that given the appellant’s strong private life and the public interests considerations, the judge’s findings that little weight was to be accorded demonstrated an error when considered against the guidance of Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58, which should be applied flexibly especially on the facts of the appellant’s case where he had close relationships in the country and that most of his stay had been lawful.
12. On behalf of the respondent Mr Parvar relied on the Rule 24 and stated that the appellant simply sought to disagree with the findings of the judge in favour of it in order for a more favourable decision. The judge’s decision was compatible with Kamara. Particularly, he submitted that the judges’ consideration of relevant matters at [16] - [18] could not be said to demonstrate very significant obstacles. The judge was clear that there was no medical evidence in relation to his aunt and at [18] the judge was clear why the appellant could not succeed on Article 8 outside the rules.
13. It relation to Article 8 it was clear that ground 2 that there were no exceptional circumstances save from those considered by the Judge and his private life claim was tenuous. He further referred to the Rules 24 and submitted that there was nothing to depart from the position of little weight being accorded to his private life. He submitted that there was no error of law and for these reasons the appeal ought to be dismissed. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.
Analysis and Conclusions
14. I remind myself at the outset of the need to exercise appropriate judicial restraint before concluding there has been a material error in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal particularly where the judge has considered evidence from a variety of sources and has undertaken an evaluation of it, set out against the applicable legal framework. I remind myself that no decision will be perfect and that such a decision must be read holistically and sensitively and that there is no requirement to give meaningful reasons. With all that in mind I find that the judge has not materially erred in law and that conclusion is for the following reasons.
15. The applicable test under paragraph PL 5.1 and Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 requires a broad evaluative judgment considering whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to reintegration in Bangladesh. This involves more than a narrow assessment of employment prospects or cultural familiarity; it requires consideration of cumulative factors.
16. The judge identified relevant matters: the appellant’s age (39), good health, single status, education in the UK, proficiency in English, and family difficulties following his father’s death. Further that was unable to demonstrate 20 years of residence in accordance with the rules and that it was not accepted he had lost contact with Bangladeshi culture particularly given his links to his aunt and cousin in the UK, who were from Bangladesh and that the letters of support provided were from friends in the UK of Bangladeshi origins.
17. In accepting at [19] that he had close connections to the UK, the judge concluded that none of this is demonstrated that there were very significant obstacles. It cannot be said that the judge’s findings did not properly engage with the broad evaluative judgement required. To the contrary the judge’s approach demonstrates a broad balanced assessment and on the facts presented a rational decision which does not demonstrate any failure by the judge to apply the correct law.
18. In relation to ground 2, the proportionality assessment under Article 8 requires balancing the appellant’s private life against the public interest, applying Section 117B of the 2002 Act and the guidance in Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58. While little weight is generally given to private life established during unlawful residence, the Supreme Court recognised flexibility where particularly strong features exist.
19. At paragraphs [22] to [26], the judge considered the factors advanced on behalf of the appellant and assessed their relevance to the proportionality exercise. At paragraph [27], the judge concluded that those matters did not amount to exceptional circumstances. That conclusion accords with the statutory guidance that little weight should ordinarily be attached to private life established in the specified circumstances and reflects the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Rhuppiah, which recognises that flexibility may be applied where particularly strong features are present. The judge was entitled to find that such features were absent on the evidence before the tribunal. It cannot therefore be said that the decision discloses an error of law in the assessment of proportionality under Article 8 of the ECHR.
20. The judge identified and considered the relevant factors, applied the correct legal framework, and gave reasons that were adequate and legally sound. The conclusions reached were rational and fell within the range of responses open to the tribunal. It follows that the appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

S Iqbal

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber