Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003232

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64685/2024
LP/00549/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29 November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KUDHAIL

Between

AD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Georget, Counsel instructed by Sterling Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Russia who entered the UK lawfully with a Teir 5 seasonal worker visa. He sought asylum on the basis of his political activities including past candidacy for election in Russia, participation in anti-government protests, and sur place activism in the UK opposing the war in Ukraine. The asylum claim was refused by the respondent on 08 May 2024. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FTT), which dismissed his appeal on 31 March 2025. Permission to appeal was initially refused by an FTT Judge, but later granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Landes on 12 September 2025.
The appeal
2. In the grant of permission to appeal, UTJ Landes referred to the grounds as being drafted in a unhelpful way. She identified the following ground’s which were arguable:

a) whether the Judge gave adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s risk arising from sur place activities (ground 3 of both sets of grounds);
b) whether the Judge gave adequate for rejecting the appellant’s case to be at risk at least partly because of his opposition to the war in Ukraine (ground 4 of both sets of grounds and ground 8 of renewed grounds)
c) whether the Judge properly analysed the appellant’s case along HJ (Iran) principles (ground 5 renewed grounds and ground 3 original grounds).
3. She also directed the appellant to consolidated the grounds.
The Hearing
4. At the outset I enquired whether consolidated grounds had been filed by the appellant. Mr Georget confirmed they had and sent a copy to me via email. I also raised with the parties that there was a Robinson obvious point, not raised by the parties that the Judge had not considered the appellant’s claim within the statutory framework which applied to asylum claims made after 28 June 2022, namely ss. 30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’). I indicated that I accepted this would make little material difference to the appellant given it was his challenge to the decision, which had effectively been determined on the lower standard. Both parties agreed that the Judge did not appear to have considered the claim as set out in the statutory framework or as per the guidance in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100.
5. Mr Georget on behalf of the appellant indicated his submissions would focus on one ground, namely the Judges error of law in not applying the principles as per HJ Iran, given the respondent’s concession that the appellant was politically opposed to the Russian Government. He argued the Judge had erroneously embarked upon an assessment of credibility, when the refusal decision did not raise such issues. He referred to each paragraph within the refusal decision, which he argued amounted to dispute about risk on return. He submitted that the first limb of HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 had been satisfied as a consequence of the respondents concession. He stated the Judge focused on whether the appellant had come to the adverse attention of the state, rather than whether he would come to the adverse attention as a consequence of this political beliefs. He submitted the appellant’s case has never been that he has previously come to the adverse attention. The issue he submitted was solely whether as a consequence of his genuinely held beliefs (as accepted) and his sur place activity in the UK, he would now come to the adverse attention of the state.
6. Ms Clewley accepted she could add little to the point raised. She submitted that whilst the respondent accepted the appellant was politically opposed to the current ruling Russian Government, the decision did refer to inconsistencies about the appellant’s political profile.
7. Mr Georget in response submitted, the appellant’s evidence was that he was not at risk as a consequence of being a member of a political party, the risk he argued emanated from his political belief and ideology, namely that he was against the war, government and pro democracy.
Findings and reasons
8. The respondent ‘s decision accepts the appellant was politically opposed to the current Russian Government. The decision does not accept that the appellant would be of adverse interest to the Russian Government, despite his political opposition. The latter was the principle controversial issue to be determined by the Judge. Whilst the respondent sets out a series of issues under the heading credibly within her decision, upon closer inspection it is evident that these issues relate to risk upon return. Therefore , the Judges starting point should have been that it was accepted the appellant held genuine anti-government political opinions. At paragraph 24 the Judge finds “at best the appellant was a general supporter of an opposition party and as such would not be of adverse interest to the government.” The Judge did not give reasons for the finding the appellant would not be of adverse interest and does not consider background country evidence. In view of the concession and the Judges own findings of general support for an opposition party, it was incumbent upon the Judge to ask the HJ (Iran) question of whether the appellant would be expected to conceal genuinely held political beliefs – even where the beliefs are not strong, in order to avoid persecution. See HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 and RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38. This is often referred to as the HJ (Iran) principle.
9. I conclude that the appellant’s grounds correctly identify that not only is there no reference to HJ (Iran) within the Judge’s decision, there is no application of the principles derived from this important case either. As the Judge has not considered this, I am satisfied that the Judge’s error is material to the outcome. Thus, the decision of the FTT involved a material error of law requiring it to be set aside.
10. I have taken into account the guidance set out in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, and the general principle that the case will be retained within the Upper Tribunal for the remaking of the decision. I consider that neither of the exceptions to this general principle set out in paragraph 7(2)(a) and (b) of the relevant Practice Statement apply in this case. There is no challenge to the fairness of the proceedings below, and the need for further fact-finding is limited. It is therefore appropriate for the appeal to be retained in the Upper Tribunal.
11. I make the following directions ahead of the resumed hearing:

• By no later than 4pm on 08 January 2026 the appellant is to serve a bundle containing all the documentary evidence on which he wishes to rely at the resumed hearing, including a skeleton argument.
• No less than one week before the hearing the respondent is to serve a skeleton argument.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision.
The decision to allow the appeal is therefore confirmed. I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

S K Kudhail

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 November 2025