Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003232
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64685/2024
LP/00549/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

Between

AD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Norman of counsel, instructed by Sterling Lawyers Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant is a Russian national. He appeals from the Secretary of State’s decision dated 8 May 2024 refusing his claim for refugee protection.
2. The Appellant entered the UK lawfully with a Tier 5 seasonal worker visa on 1 April 2022 and claimed asylum on 30 June 2023. The basis of his claim was his political activities, including his past candidacy for election as an opposition candidate and participation in anti-government protests in Russia and his sur place activities in the UK.
3. The Respondent refused the asylum claim on 8 May 2024. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant was politically opposed to the Russian government and that he had previously stood for election as an opposition candidate, but did not accept that the Appellant’s past activities or his sur place activities in the UK were such as to bring him to the adverse attention of the Russian authorities on return.
4. The Appellant appealed. His appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 31 March 2025. On 29 November 2025 the Upper Tribunal found that there had been a material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s determination and set aside the decision, directing that the appeal be reheard in the Upper Tribunal. The Appellant was directed to consolidate his grounds of appeal.
5. The rehearing took place before me on 30 June 2025. The Appellant gave evidence via a Russian interpreter and I heard submissions from both representatives.
Legal framework
6. To succeed in his appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion).  The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
7. As the Appellant’s asylum claim was made after 28 June 2022, the provisions of s32 Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply. In considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I apply a two-stage test, following the guidance in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
a. Does the Appellant have a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for one of the reasons set out in the Refugee Convention?
b. Does the Appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?
8. If so, I must go on to determine on the lower standard of proof (a real risk or reasonable likelihood) whether the Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason.
9. The Respondent in this case accepts that if the Appellant is reasonably likely to come to the adverse interest of the Russian authorities then there is not sufficiency of protection on return and internal relocation would not be viable.
Evidence
10. I had a consolidated appeal bundle running to 302 pages. The Appellant gave evidence via a Russian interpreter. He adopted his witness statement dated 2 September 2024 and was cross-examined.
11. The Appellant’s written evidence was that he started to be politically active in Russia in 2013, after meeting a member of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (‘LDPR’), and that he stood unsuccessfully as an LDPR candidate for the state Duma in 2013. After the elections the Appellant began to receive telephone calls from unknown persons, warning him not to participate in political activity or further elections. The Appellant decided not to stand for election again but remained a non-active LDPR member. In 2014, he became politically active again in opposition to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and took part in a protest demonstration against the annexation, organised by the mayor of Yekaterinburg. He grew increasingly opposed to the Russian government and became more active politically, posting on social media and handing out leaflets with pro-Ukrainian and anti-government messages. On 24 January 2021 the Appellant took part in another demonstration in support of Alexei Navalny and against Putin’s regime in Russia. Although the protest was peaceful, the police then surrounded and began to detain the protestors. The Appellant was frightened because he realised the dangers of an anti-government political stance. When asked at work whether he had attended the protest, he lied and said no to avoid persecution.
12. The Appellant acknowledged in cross-examination that he had participated in only two protests in Russia, both organised through an organisation called City Without Drugs. He said that he had not in Russia been part of any political group associated with Alexei Navalny, as at that time he had not been ready to be a member and could express his opinions without being a member of a political group.
13. Following the start of the war in Ukraine, the Appellant’s opposition to the government intensified further. He expressed his views on Facebook using a different profile and secure browsers to make sure that the posts could not be traced to him. He explained that he had bought different accounts on the internet to post political material and had then deleted the accounts. In re-examination he said that some of the accounts had been blocked rather than deleted by him.
14. The Appellant’s written evidence about his sur place political activity in the UK was that he has continued to be politically active in the UK and to express opposition to the Russian government. He stated that he had attended more than ten anti-Putin and pro-Ukraine protests in the UK in front of the Russian Embassy and at Downing Street. He also stated that he was an active member of the Russian Democratic Society (‘RDS’), an organisation which advocates against Putin’s regime, and volunteered there as a video editor creating pro-Ukraine and anti-government content which was posted on the society’s YouTube and Telegram channels.
15. In cross-examination the Appellant stated that in the UK he had continued to post political material online using temporary ‘burner’ internet accounts which he had then locked and deleted; he explained that he had deleted the accounts because he did not feel safe in the UK. The Appellant was taken to photographs in the bundle which showed him at protests near the Russian embassy and opposite Downing Street, as well as at a memorial to Alexei Navalny. He confirmed that he had attended the Navalny memorial twice, in spring 2024 and spring 2025.
16. When asked about his role as video editor, the Appellant said that he was providing audio materials and editing videos on his computer. Although his name did not appear on the videos, his computer could be traced via the metadata on the videos. He had not checked how many views the videos had had although he thought that on Tiktok they had had “quite a few” views. The Appellant also relied on evidence of a Bitcoin donation he had made to a Ukrainian support organisation. He was asked how the Russian authorities would be able to identify him as the donor, and said that they would be able to trace both the recipient and the donor.
17. I asked the Appellant some questions to clarify how many different demonstrations were shown in the photographs in the bundle. He confirmed that the photographs showed six different events: three demonstrations outside Downing Street, two outside the Russian embassy and a separate event in March 2024.
The parties’ submissions
18. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Clewley relied on the asylum refusal letter and the Respondent’s review together with a skeleton argument dated 26 June 2026. She confirmed that the Respondent accepted that the Appellant had been “somewhat political” in Russia, that he held anti-government views, and that he had stood for election in 2013. However, it was not accepted that the Appellant would be at risk on return. His profile whilst in Russia had been low, and his activity in the UK since the March 2025 First-tier Tribunal hearing had been very limited. There was no evidence of his social media activity and in particular no evidence which indicated that the Appellant would be identifiable from his social media posts, as he had been using accounts which could not be traced. Similarly, his donations were not publicly viewable and were not associated with his name; there was no evidence which indicated that the Russian authorities were able to trace individuals who had made donations. The Appellant was not linked by name or visibly associated with the videos made by RDS and there was nothing to suggest that the Russian authorities were tracing metadata in the manner suggested by the Appellant. In relation to his attendance at protests, the Appellant had simply attended, but was a “face in the crowd” rather than having any specific or prominent role. The author of the supporting letter from RDS had not attended to give evidence and it was unclear whether she knew the Appellant personally. The suggestion that the Appellant would be questioned at the airport on return was speculative.
19. On behalf of the Appellant, Ms Norman relied on her skeleton argument. The starting point was that the Appellant was accepted to be politically opposed to the Russian government and had expressed those views in political opposition long before leaving Russia; the environment for political opponents of the regime had only become more dangerous since then. The Appellant had given frank evidence and had not attempted to overstate his sur place activity. His use of fake accounts to make social media posts was consistent both with the Appellant’s strongly held political views and with his fear of persecution. The Respondent’s case was not that the Appellant had not been politically active, but rather than his activity did not create risk on return. It was not fair to suggest that the Appellant had undertaken activities to bolster his claim, and he had produced what evidence he could including supporting evidence of his attendance at demonstrations, the RDS letter and confirmation of his cryptocurrency donation. The question for the Tribunal was what would happen to the Appellant if he were to return and undertake similar activity; there was a reasonable degree of likelihood of risk. The evidence in the expert report and EUAA report referred to therein was that Russian intelligence was engaged in widespread surveillance of the civilian population and that individuals were questioned on crossing the border. The Appellant’s past history as an opposition candidate might create more extensive searches than would otherwise be the case, potentially also leading to criminal prosecution where financial transactions to Ukraine were discovered. It was not necessary for the Appellant to be an opposition leader or high profile activist to be at risk: ordinary citizens were also at risk of being targeted. If questioned about his activities in the UK the Appellant could not be expected to lie. His evidence, which was clear and not challenged in cross-examination, was that if he returned to Russia he would want to express anti-government views.
Discussion and decision
Is there a Convention reason?
20. The Appellant relies on his political opinion, as an opponent of the Russian government. He has been accepted by the Respondent as someone who holds anti-government views and previously stood for election as an opposition candidate. I find that on the balance of probabilities the Appellant’s anti-government political views are a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for a Convention reason.
Does the Appellant in fact fear persecution on the basis of his political opinion (the subjective element)?
21. The Respondent accepts that the treatment the Appellant fears would amount to persecution.
22. The Appellant has given a consistent account of moderating and limiting his political activity whilst in Russia on the basis of his fear of the authorities. His witness statement indicated that although he did not initially intend to claim asylum in the UK, he eventually realised that the situation in Russia had deteriorated to a point where it was no longer safe for him to return and he therefore claimed asylum. He stated that he was frightened of being detained at the border and of being convicted and imprisoned by the Russian state authorities. I accept the Appellant’s evidence, which was not overstated and is consistent with the objective and expert evidence (summarised below) of hardening attitudes of the Russian authorities towards political opposition since 2022. I find that on the balance of probabilities the Appellant has a subjective fear of persecution on the basis of his political opinion.
Would the Appellant be persecuted on return on the basis of his political views (the objective element)?
23. I found the Appellant to be a generally credible witness. He did not overstate his evidence nor attempt to exaggerate the extent of his political activities either in the UK or in Russia, and his evidence in cross-examination was internally consistent.
24. I remind myself that the lower standard of proof applies to the question of objective risk on return: the question is whether there is a real risk or reasonable likelihood that the Appellant would face persecution on return. That threshold is lower than the civil standard of proof, and may be satisfied where there is considerably less than a 50% chance of occurrence: MAH (Egypt) v SSHD at §52.
25. The issue of risk on return has two aspects. First, I consider the nature of the Appellant’s political views and the extent of his political activity in Russia and the UK. I then consider whether there is a real risk that the Appellant would come to the adverse attention of the Russian authorities as a result.
The Appellant’s views and political activity
26. The starting point in this case is that the Appellant has been accepted to hold political views opposed to the government and has been accepted to have stood for election as an opposition candidate in the 2013 Duma elections. I find that the Appellant holds genuine political views opposed to the Putin regime and the war in Ukraine, and that in particular his opposition to the war in Ukraine has grown over time. I find that in Russia he attended two protests in Yekaterinburg in March 2014 and January 2021; the first protest was against the annexation of Crimea and the second was in support of Alexei Navalny.
27. I accept the Appellant’s evidence about his attendance at demonstrations and vigils in the UK, which is evidenced by photographs. I find that the Appellant has since his arrival in the UK on 1 April 2022 regularly attended public demonstrations against the Russian government and/or against the Ukraine war. The photographs in the bundle show the Appellant at least six separate demonstrations which have taken place opposite and close to the Russian embassy and opposite the entrance to Downing Street. I accept the Appellant’s evidence that these demonstrations are held regularly and that he has attended more than ten such events. The Appellant is shown in some of the photographs holding placards with anti-government slogans (such as ‘Kick Russia out of the UN’ and ‘Free all political prisoners’) and in others holding a large Ukrainian flag. Although in some photographs the Appellant’s face is partially covered by a mask, in other photographs his face is visible. The numbers of other people present in the photographs vary, but in general there are between 15 and 30 people visible although one photograph, identified as a memorial event for Alexei Navalny, shows a larger number of people queuing without signs or placards.
28. In support of his claim to have done volunteer work for the Russian Democratic Society in the UK, the Appellant relied on a letter of support written by Ksenia Maksimova, the director of RDS. Ms Maksimova did not attend the hearing to give evidence and the letter described the Appellant as someone who maintains the memorial shrine to Alexei Navalny, when his own more limited evidence was that he had visited the memorial only on two occasions. As a result I did not give full weight to the RDS letter. However, the letter was consistent with the Appellant’s evidence that he was asked to edit videos as a volunteer, and he was able to describe the editing process; he was frank that his name did not appear on the videos. I accept that the Appellant has done some volunteer work for the Russian Democratic Society editing videos for the RDS YouTube channel. However, there was no evidence before me as to how many videos the Appellant had worked on or over what timeframe.
29. I also accept that the Appellant has made a single donation to a fundraiser for the Ukraine army via a Bitcoin account in a sum equivalent to just over £22, which is evidenced by records of the transaction. Although the Appellant referred to having made other donations to Ukrainian organisations he did not give any details in his witness statement or oral evidence and there was no supporting evidence of any other donations. I find that he made a single donation to a Ukraine army fundraiser at some point after December 2023.
30. The Appellant also gave an account of using fake or ‘burner’ accounts to post material critical of the Putin regime and the Ukraine war on social media both in Russia and the UK. His evidence was that he did not post using his own name or social media profile, but that he created pictures and leaflets opposing the Ukraine war and posted them online. There was no evidence in the bundle of the Appellant’s social media activities but given that his account was that he used fake profiles, such evidence would be of limited probative value in any event. Having heard the Appellant give oral evidence I accept that he did post critical anti-regime material on social media using fake accounts whilst in Russia. I do not accept that he continued to use fake accounts to post material whilst in the UK; his evidence in cross-examination that it was not safe to post in his own name because he did not have leave in the UK was not consistent with his activities demonstrating openly in front of the Russian embassy.
Would the Appellant be at risk on return as a result of his political beliefs/activities?
31. The Appellant relies on an expert report by Dr Turaeva-Hoehne, an academic at Ludwig Maximilian University in Germany who specialises in Russia and Central Asia. Dr Turaeva-Hoehne’s expertise was not challenged by the Respondent, and she has significant experience as a country expert on Russia. I am satisfied that she has appropriate expertise in this case and give her report full weight.
32. Dr Turaeva-Hoehne’s report outlines that since March 2022 Russian law has treated public criticism of the war and the armed forces as a matter of criminal and administrative liability, and that the Criminal Code provisions are broad enough to cover social media posts, protest slogans, statements about Russian military conduct in Ukraine and other actions which contradict the official narrative. The report details that hundreds of people to date have faced criminal prosecution for alleged discreditation of the army and at least 1,300 people had been prosecuted for opposing the war in Ukraine. The risk is not limited to high-profile activists or opposition leaders.
33. Dr Turaeva-Hoehne outlines that there is extensive use of surveillance and monitoring by CCTV and facial recognition within Russia, including the identification of protestors. A December 2025 report by the European Union Agency for Asylum (‘EUAA’) (‘The Russian Federation: Country Focus’) records that Russian nationals returning from abroad may be questioned at the border and officials may check mobile phones, banking applications and social media accounts. Her conclusion is that anti-war and pro-Ukraine activities abroad are realistically capable of coming to the attention of the Russian authorities through methods including open-source monitoring, digital compromise, social media, embassy-related observation or post-return device checks. Ukraine-related donations and support are particularly sensitive, as they are interpreted as support for a hostile power, and can attract very serious criminal treatment: she details reports of a programmer sentenced to 15 years in August 2025 for a small donation to Ukraine and the arrest of Ksenia Karelina over a small donation to a Ukrainian charity.
34. Dr Turaeva-Hoehne’s view is that the Appellant’s profile is “significantly above that of an ordinary returning Russian national” because of his past history as an opposition candidate, his repeated attendance at anti-war and pro-Ukraine demonstrations and activity in support of Alexei Navalny. Her view is that the Appellant is realistically likely to be questioned on return to Russia and have his devices, banking applications and social media checked.
35. The Appellant also relied on the EUAA report referred to by Dr Turaeva-Hoehne. The EUAA report is dated December 2025 and is very detailed; I give the report full weight. The report states that the Russian authorities have increasingly restricted reporting critical of the government or military and have tightened online censorship, including blocking websites and monitoring social media activity. The spread of surveillance technologies has significantly accelerated since the Covid-19 pandemic and there is widespread use of facial recognition technology. CCTV has been used to identify and detain individuals participating in anti-government protests. The report notes that individuals returning to Russia are questioned at the border, and that risk factors include having an activist background or having social media/financial transactions linked to Ukraine. The report states that in addition to state surveillance, private citizens also report neighbours, acquaintances or colleagues for expressing anti-war sentiments in private settings, which can lead to criminal prosecutions. War censorship laws are a key tool for suppressing criticism of the war in Ukraine and public dissemination of knowingly false information about the military is punishable by up to five years in prison. 931 discreditation cases were initiated between 1 January 2024 and 24 July 2025. Examples given include a paediatrician sentenced to five years after a patient’s mother accused her of making anti-war remarks during an appointment and a hairdresser sentenced to five years and two months after posting anti-war messages on social media, after a neighbour reported her. Individuals have also been prosecuted and detained for expressing support for Alexei Navalny, including for displaying a photograph of him.
36. The Appellant’s bundle included a number of other news reports from international news outlets reporting on individuals detained for protesting against the Ukraine war, the jailing of opposition activists and the use of treason charges to crack down on opposition, as well as reports from international NGOs. The objective material dates to 2022-2024 and I give it less weight due to its age; it is however entirely consistent with both the EUAA report and with Dr Turaeva-Hoehne’s report.
37. Considering the evidence as a whole and applying the guidance in BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) to the different context of this appeal, I find that there is a real risk that the Appellant will be of adverse interest to the Russian authorities on return. The objective evidence and the expert report demonstrate that the Russian authorities are increasingly hostile to criticism of the regime or the military, and that expressions of opposition to the Ukraine war in particular are increasingly criminalised. The evidence about the Russian authorities’ use of surveillance and facial recognition technology indicates that there is a realistic possibility that demonstrations outside the Russian Embassy will be monitored and efforts made to identify participants. The Appellant has genuine political beliefs opposed to the Russian government and he has been a regular participant at pro-Ukraine and anti-regime demonstrations. Whilst the Appellant has not acted as an organiser or leader of those demonstrations, the relatively small size of those demonstrations means that participants are not simply “a face in a crowd” but are easily photographed. I find that there is a real risk that the Appellant may have been identified by the authorities due to his participation in demonstrations. That in isolation raises a real risk of detention and questioning on return; the Appellant’s prior history as an opposition candidate (albeit back in 2013) is a further contributory risk factor.
38. Even if the Appellant has not been identified by the Russian authorities to date, I find there is a real risk (as indicated in the expert report and the EUAA report) that he will be subject to questioning at the border on return. The evidence from the expert report and the EUAA report in particular demonstrate that the adverse interest of the Russian authorities is directed not only to prominent or high-profile activists, but also to ordinary citizens expressing opinions in private or in relatively low-profile ways. It is therefore not necessary that the Appellant have a prominent profile as an activist.
39. The Appellant cannot be expected to lie either about his genuine political beliefs or his activities and the basis of his asylum claim in the UK, and I find that there is a real risk that he will be detained and prosecuted due to his views and his activities, particularly his attendance at demonstrations opposed to the government and critical of the war in Ukraine. Whilst there is nothing on the RDS YouTube channel to link the Appellant to the society or the videos, the Appellant could not be expected to lie about his activities for the society, which again adds to his risk profile. His social media posts and donation to the Ukraine fundraiser, which again cannot be linked to him but about which he cannot be expected to lie, would be further factors adding to risk once questioned.
40. I therefore find that there is a real risk that the Appellant on return would come to the adverse attention of the Russian authorities due to his political opinion and his political activities, including in particular his attendance at demonstrations in the UK.
41. The Respondent accepts that the treatment that the Appellant would experience as a result of adverse attention from the Russian authorities amounts to persecution. The Respondent also accepts that sufficiency of protection is not available in Russia and that internal relocation is not available. I therefore do not need to consider those aspects further.
42. The appeal is allowed on asylum grounds.
Notice of Decision
The Appellant’s appeal is allowed on asylum grounds.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 October 2026